The attainment of moshka according to Shankara and Vivekananda with special reference to the significance of scripture (sruti) and experience (anubhava) by Rambachan, Anant Anand
THE ATTAINMENT OF MOKSHA ACCORDING TO SHANKARA 
AND VIVEKANANDA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF SCRIPTURE (SRUTI) AND 
EXPERIENCE (ANUBHAVA ) 
by 
Anant Anand Rambachan 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
The University of Leeds 
Department of Theology and Religious Studies 
March 1984 
Supervisor: Dr. Ursula King 
ABSTRACT 
Advaita Vedanta, as systematized and expressed by 
Shankara (788-820), is widely represented in contemporary 
studies as positing a special experience (anubhava) to be 
the ultimately valid source of the knowledge of brahman 
(brahma jnana) . According to these studies, Shankara only 
accorded a provisional validity to the knowledge gained by 
inquiry into the words of the sruti (Vedas), and did not 
see the latter as the unique source (pramäna) of brahmajnäna. 
The affirmations of the sruti, it is argued, need to be 
verified and confirmed by the knowledge gained through direct 
experience (anubhava), and the authority of the sruti 
therefore, is only secondary. 
My own study of the original commentaries of Shankara 
suggests, however, that these common contemporary interpre- 
tations grossly misrepresent his epistemology in failing to 
apprehend the meaning and significance which he ascribes 
to the sruti as the definitive source of the knowledge of 
brahman. It is clear that in relation to the gain of 
brahmajnäna, Shankara saw all other sources of knowledge as 
being subordinate to the sruti, and supported his view by 
detailed and well-reasoned arguments. It is also clear 
that the approach to Shankara adopted by modern commentators 
is profoundly influenced by Swami Vivekananda's (1863-1902) 
formulation and presentation of Advaita Vedanta. Vivekananda 
was the first Hindu to elaborately present Advaita to the 
West, and his interpretation has dominated the understanding 
of Shankara's epistemology. Unfortunately, his views have 
received little critical attention, and are not distinguished 
from those of Shankara. 
This study therefore, is concerned primarily with 
investigating Sh ankara's understanding of the sruti as the 
source of brahmajnäna and the process through which this 
knowledge is attained. It also seeks, by analyzing the 
lectures and writings of 'Swami Vivekananda, to highlight and 
evaluate his radical contrasts with Shankara about the 
authoritative source of the knowledge of brahman. 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
In transcribing Sanskrit into Roman characters, the 
system used by M. Monier Williams in A Sanskrit-English 
Dictionary has been, with some simplifications, followed. 
The accentuation of Sanskrit words is not marked, and 
a single symbol (-) has been used for all long vowels. 
The vowels are: 
aa 
lri 1ri 
.n or m 
:h 
The consonants are: 
k 
c 
t 
t 
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i i u u 
e ai 0 au 
either true Anusvdra n 
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nasal. 
-[symbol called Visarga. 
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As far as the transliteration of names is concerned, 
a selective approach has been adopted. Diacritical marks 
have not been used for the two most common names in this 
study, Shankara and Swami Vivekananda. The names of more 
recent figures such as Rammohun Roy and Keshub Chandra Sen 
have also not been transliterated. In these cases, we have 
retained the spelling most generally used in the literature 
of that period. Diacritical marks have also not been used 
for familiar names such as Krishna, Ramanuja, etc. 
Diacritical marks, however, have been used for the more 
classical names such as Yäjnavalkya, Maitreyi, Naciketä, 
etc. Sanskrit terms are underlined throughout the study. 
NOTE ON CAPITALIZATION 
The Sanskrit alphabet does not contain any capital 
letters, and their use, in this study, has been kept to 
a minimum. Only the names of specific texts (e. g. 
Bhagavadgitä, Brahma-sutra) and systems of thought 
(e. g. Nyäya, Samkhya) are spelt with initial capitals. 
In order to differentiate and highlight a very special 
usage and meaning, certain English words are spelt with 
initial capitals. These are primarily terms such as 
Awareness, Consciousness, Witness, Knower, Subject, Self, 
Seer, etc., all of which are used to define the nature of 
brahman. Their special use will be made clear in the 
course of this study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
An awareness of the primary interests which motivate 
the undertaking of any study is important for both the 
researcher and the reader. These interests strongly 
influence, consciously or unconsciously, the focus and 
methods of the study and the concerns within that focus 
which are highlighted. On the part of the researcher, this 
awareness could assist in discovering and checking 
prejudices and preconceptions which may condition his 
perception of the material examined and the results of the 
study . 
All major schools of Indian philosophical and religious 
thought originated and developed with the aim of providing a 
viable means for the attainment of moksha. This is not to 
affirm that this end was uniformly conceived in all systems. 
The point is that Indian philosophy always had a "practical" or 
"pragmatic" end in view, if these terms can be admitted in 
respect of the quest for moksha. This subservience to the 
accomplishment of moksha is what makes it difficult to 
distinguish Indian philosophy from Indian religion. Philosophy 
aimed at the transcending or overcoming of human suffering, 
however conceived, and part of the criteria for evaluating 
any system was its adequacy as a means to moksha. Even 
Gotama, the founder of the Indian school of logical 
thought (N ä a) , begins his sutras by affirming that the aim 
of logic is the attainment of the supreme good. Jijnasä 
or the desire to know, from which is derived jijnäsu (the 
one who desires to know), was in relation to mumukshutvam 
or the intense desire for moksha, from which is derived 
mumukshu ( the one who desires moksha). In other words, 
the jijnäsu was a mumukshu. It is to explain this charac- 
teristic that T. W. Organ describes Indian philosophy as 
sädhana ("the process of the perfecting of man"). 
l 
Philosophical texts and treatises were written with the 
mumukshu in view, and often commenced by identifying the 
aspirant aimed at and the qualifications necessary for a 
successful undertaking of the inquiry. 
The centrality of the moksha-concern is one of the keys 
to understanding the motivation which prompts Indian 
philosophy, and the nature of argument both within and among 
the various schools. It is also the interest, as will 
become evident, which influences and lies at the centre of 
this study. This research is undertaken in the general 
spirit of philosophical inquiry as sädhana. In the 
specific context of the Advaita Vedanta system with which 
it is concerned, this study is an exercise in the discipline 
of manana or rational reflection upon some of its fundamental 
propositions. This discipline, which is explained more 
fully in the body of this work, aimed essentially at 
clarification, evaluation, the removal of doubts and the 
assessment of rival views. Various methods were used in 
achieving these aims, including scriptural exegesis and 
philosophical argument. It offered the scope for both 
criticism and creativity, and it is in the tradition of 
this kind of analysis that this work partly lies. In its 
treatment of Vivekananda, however, this study uses methods, 
raises issues and suggests explanations which are not 
within the usual province of manana. The use of historical 
analysis, for example, to account for some of Vivekananda's 
views and to trace some of the influences on him is not 
a traditional concern of manana. Manana has always been 
more concerned with assessing a particular view in relation 
to the gain of rnoksha, than with tracing or accounting for 
its genesis and development. These two concerns, however, 
need not be exclusive. We are perhaps in a better position 
to understand and evaluate a proposition when we have some 
knowledge of its development, and there is certainly a 
much greater scope for the application of the historical 
method to the study of Hinduism. One of the reasons for 
the lack of distinction by modern commentators between 
some of the views of Shankara and Vivekananda is precisely 
because of the non-application of this method, particularly 
to the study of Vivekananda. 
My first encounter with Advaita Vedanta and the 
literature of neo-Hinduism was through the writings of Swami 
Vivekananda (1863-1902). 1 avidly read these while I was 
still a secondary school student in Trinidad, West Indies, 
where my ancestors had migrated from northern India sometime 
around the middle of the nineteenth century. I grew up with 
a marked awareness of Hinduism, attributable in a large 
measure to the fact that both of my grandfathers were traditional 
Hindu priests (purohitas). Vivekananda's life and writings 
had a tremendous impact upon my thinking. They radiated an 
irresistible idealism, confident strength and enthusiastic 
fervour which still moves me. They afforded me a glimpse 
into the depths and profundity of Hindu religious thought. 
With reflection, it would seem that Vivekananda' s appeal 
must also be explicable in the light of some of the factors 
which account for his immense popularity in late nineteenth- 
century India. The content and tone of Vivekananda's 
lectures in North America, Europe and India clearly evince 
a powerful reaction to the cultural imperialism which 
inevitably accompanied British colonialism. In terms of 
religion, this asserted itself as the natural superiority 
of the Christian tradition. Trinidad, like India, had a 
long colonial past. Close study of the many addresses 
presented to Vivekananda during a triumphal tour of 
India after returning from his first visit to the ; Test 
clearly reveal the immense sense of pride and confidence 
which his successful reception abroad had awakened at home. 
It was felt that Hinduism, for so long despised, had at 
long last found an authentic voice capable of demonstrating 
its strength and sufficiency even in the homelands of its 
political masters. The following excerpts from addresses 
of welcome presented to Vivekananda in India reflect the 
typical sentiments aroused by his Western visit. 
-J 
We cannot adequately express our indebtedness to 
you for making the people of the West know the 
catholicity of our religion and for impressing upon the 
minds of the savants of the West the truth that there 
are more things in the Philosophy of the Hindus than 
are dreamt of in the Philosophy of the West-2 
If today we rejoice at the results of your work in 
Christian lands, it is because the eyes of men in and 
outside of India are thereby being opened to the inestimable value of the spiritual heritage of the 
pre-eminently religious Hindu nation. 3 
Like so many contemporary Hindus, my first systematic 
exposure to Hindu religious thought came through Vivekananda. 
My reading of Vivekananda convinced me that as far as 
Advaita and indeed Hinduism as a whole was concerned, the 
supreme authoritative source of knowledge was a very 
special experience (anubhava) which revealed beyond any 
doubts the fundamental truths about the universe and the 
significance of life. This experience was presented as 
the very core of Hinduism, the only meaningful end to be 
sought after and the culmination of the Hindu spiritual 
quest. It was affirmed as offering the possibility of a 
direct insight into the nature of reality and therefore, as 
the only ultimately credible source of spiritual knowledge. 
In relation to the knowledge of matters beyond the range 
of sense apprehension, Vivekananda asserted that this 
experience afforded a directness and conclusiveness which 
could only be likened to ordinary sense perception. 
Anubhava was presented by him as possessing a self-valid 
quality which obviated the need for faith or reliance on 
any source of spiritual knowledge which one could not personally 
verify. In fact, all authoritative sources were subordinate 
to anubhava and all spiritual disciplines were intended only 
b 
for its attainment. 
Along with my understanding of the paramount 
epistemological status of this experience, I also imbibed 
from Vivekananda what I considered to be the single 
established view of the scripture (sruti) in Advaita and 
in Hinduism. Sruti was just a record in words of this 
experience as attained by others. At best, it informed us 
of what they had attained and the means which they employed. 
The aspirant, however, could not simply rely with faith on 
this testimony, which was only a second-hand report. As 
the testimony of another, the knowledge which one may gain 
by a study of the sruti lacks conclusiveness and 
freedom from doubt. This knowledge is presented by 
Vivekananda as "theoretical" information which can never 
lead to moksha. To be definitive, this knowledge had to 
be verified, and this was possible only through a similar 
direct experience (anubhava). As a source of knowledge 
therefore, even the sruti was subordinate to anubhava. 
Partly as a result of Vivekananda's influence, I went to 
India very soon after completing my undergraduate studies 
at the University of the West Indies, in order to study with 
Swami Dayananda Saraswati, a contemporary teacher of Advaita. 
4 
In line with Vivekananda's thinking, I conceived of any 
scriptural studies I might undertake as primarily informing 
me of the method by which I could obtain conclusive 
knowledge through anubhava. I spent over two years as a 
student of Swami Dayananda Saraswati at Rishikesh and Bombay 
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studying with him Shankara's (788-820) commentaries on the 
major Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita and portions of the 
Brahma- sütra5 We also read many of the independent 
introductory texts attributed to Shankara such as 
Aparokshanubhüti, Atmabodha, Tattvabodha, Vivekacüdamani, 
Vakyavritti and Drigdrisyaviveka, etc. The study of these 
texts was accompanied by training in some of the practical 
spiritual disciplines associated with the Advaita tradition. 
The principal method of study consisted of the reading 
of these texts in the original Sanskrit and their exegesis 
with the aid of Shankara's commentaries. Formal classroom- 
type teaching was complemented by ample daily opportunities 
for more informal discussions (satsanga) . My study of the 
commentaries of Shankara made me aware, for the first time, 
of a radically different understanding of the nature and 
function of the sruti in relation to the gain of spiritual 
knowledge (brahmajnäna). This new understanding centred 
around Shankara's perception and treatment of sruti as 
sabda-pramäna, a source of valid knowledge (pramäna) 
constituted of words (sabda). This conception and all of 
its far-reaching implications was in thorough and remarkable 
contrast to the status and functions assigned to sruti in 
Vivekananda's representation of Advaita and of modern 
Hinduism generally. The sabda-pramäna approach offered 
a very different rationale for the necessity of the sruti. 
Unlike Vivekananda, who presented the affirmations of 
s ruti as having only a hypothetical or provisional validity 
and needing the verification which only anubhava could provide, 
8 
Shankara argued for sruti as the unique and self-valid 
source of brahmajnäna. In relation to the gain of 
brahmajnäna, all other sources of knowledge (pramänas) 
40 
were subordinate to sruti. Knowledge of matters beyond the 
apprehension of the senses was attained only through the 
sentences of the sruti. In important contrast to Vivekananda's 
argument that the declarations of sruti needed further 
verification to become conclusive was Shankara's contention 
that moksha is the immediate result of a clear understanding 
of the sruti sentences. 
knowledge was required. 
Nothing beyond sruti-derived 
It was also clear from Swami 
Dayananda's approach to teaching and Shankara's commentaries 
that this view of the sruti as a valid source of knowledge 
was connected with a methodology of unfolding and imparting 
brahmajnäna. Particular methods of teaching and instructing 
were meant to overcome the peculiar problems of 
communicating this knowledge. 
explore in this study. 
This is a matter which we 
Later on, in the course of my work at Leeds University 
for the Master of Arts degree in Religious Studies, I found 
that Vivekananda' s interpretation of the significance of 
sruti in connection with the acquisition of brahmajnäna 
was continuously identified by modern commentators as being 
the original position adopted by Shankara. Very fundamental 
differences were uncritically overlooked. The general 
conclusions of current studies on Shankara suggested that 
he also saw a special experience (anubhava) as the ultimately 
valid source of our knowledge of brahman. These studies, 
9 
which we have reviewed and summarized in Chapter 1, 
claimed that Shankara, like Vivekananda, accorded only 
a provisional validity to the affirmations of the Vedas, 
and did not perceive these texts to be, in any way, a 
unique source of knowledge. Many felt that the only 
reason for Shankara' s recourse to the sruti was the desire 
to gain the support of a traditional authority for his own 
views. It was apparent also that Shankara's Advaita 
was being classified as a form of mysticism on the basis 
that it posited this experience (anubhava) as the highest 
source of knowledge. Anubhava, in other words, possessed 
what William James refers to as a "noetic quality" . 
6 
Contemporary studies on Shankara seem to have missed the 
significance of the connection he proposes between 
sruti as a pramäna, brahmajnäna and the immediacy of moksha. 
Aims and Methods 
The central concern and focus of this study then is the 
examination of these notable differences of views between 
the foremost modern exponent of Advaita and its classical 
systematizer, concerning the authoritative source of the 
knowledge of brahman. The lack of distinction made by 
modern commentators between the respective positions of 
both men on this crucial issue further justifies this 
undertaking. The significance of the clarification and 
demonstration of these divergences which this study 
attempts has to be viewed in the light of Vivekananda's 
10 
unquestionable impact on the contemporary understanding 
of Advaita and, more broadly, of Hinduism. As Ninian 
Smart points out, "not only did he interpret Hinduism 
to the West so eloquently, but he also interpreted it to 
India itself". 7 "A shrinking world", continues Smart, 
"will surely recognize how much it owes to him, the first 
man to bring home to the consciousness of the Western 
world at large the deeper significances of the Sanatana 
Dharma". 8 A. L. Basham also assesses the legacy of 
Vivekananda in laudative terms. 
It is certainly far greater than any Western historian 
or most Indian historians would have suggested at the time 
of his death. The passing of the years and the many 
stupendous and unexpected events which have occurred 
since then suggest that in centuries to come he will 
be remembered as one of the main moulders of the 
modern world, especially as far as Asia is concerned, 
and as one of the most significant figures in the 
whole history of Indian religion, comparable in 
importance to such great teachers as Shankara and 
Ramanuja.... 9 
Agehananda Bharati was not making a completely wild exaggeration 
in asserting that "Modern Hindus derive their knowledge 
of Hinduism from Vivekananda, directly or indirectly", 
10 
In spite of the acknowledged impact and influence of 
Vivekananda, but paradoxically, perhaps, because of it, the 
Hindu tradition is yet to critically assess the nature of 
this impact. More than eighty years after his death the 
general attitude towards Vivekananda is still largely the 
understandable response of adulation with which he was 
first greeted after his return to India from the West. It 
seems as if the memory of the genuine pride and self-respect 
which Vivekananda instilled in Hindus still precludes critical 
evaluation of his contribution. It is this widespread 
impact, however, which makes a more objective appraisal 
necessary. 
Vivekananda's influence is so pervasive that it is a 
difficult and almost impossible task to separately 
identify and extricate the elements which he contributed 
to the contemporary understanding of Hinduism. Not only 
did he largely formulate this interpretation, but he 
also gave it the language in which it is articulated. 
There is very little in modern Hindu, particularly Vedanta, 
apologetic writing which does not carry the clear imprint 
of Vivekananda's influence. The fact that Vivekananda was 
a representative of the system of Advaita did not weaken 
the impression which he made on the whole of Hinduism. 
Because Advaita, through Vivekananda, was the first Hindu 
system to be so elaborately presented to the West, its 
comprehension has considerably shaped the approach to 
Hinduism in India and abroad. This was fostered by 
Vivekananda's vision and presentation of Advaita as the 
natural culmination of all Hindu religious thought. From 
his basis in Advaita, he generalized in his lectures and 
writings about the nature and features of Hinduism as a 
whole. In his own time he was represented and perceived as 
the spokesman and champion of Hinduism and not of any 
specific tradition within it. 
One of the principal aims of this study, therefore, is to 
undertake this much needed clarification and appraisal of 
Vivekananda's legacy. T, Ihile we are concerned mainly with 
12 
his estimation of sruti and anubhava, this has unavoidably 
led us to consider other very important aspects of his 
interpretation of Advaita, many of which are today seen 
as axiomatic features of Hinduism. There is, of course, 
the entire question of the nature and derivation of the 
special experience which he upheld as the only authoritative 
source of brahmajnäna. He identified the validity of 
this experience with that of sense perception and equated 
it with the methods of gaining knowledge in the 
empirical sciences. This is part of his wider attempt 
to draw parallels between Advaita and science which we 
seek to evaluate in this study. Directly connected to 
Vivekananda' s reinterpretation of the significance of 
sruti is his elaboration of the methods of karmayoga, 
bhaktiyoga, jnänayoga and räjayoga as direct and 
independent means to the attainment of moksha. This is a 
very well known argument in contemporary Hindu writing and 
we assess how far Vivekananda has successfully demonstrated 
its validity. There are also many other related issues 
concerning the nature and function of the teacher (guru) 
and the value of reason, etc. 
Our aim to consider, in respect of Shankara and Vivekananda, 
what constitutes the ultimate source or sources of 
brahmajnäna required us to first clearly establish Shankara's 
viewpoint. The reason is that Vivekananda's representation 
of Advaita has exerted an overwhelming influence on 
contemporary interpretations of Shankara's epistemology, and 
we have already noted the lack of distinction made by 
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modern commentators on the respective positions of both 
men. It is paradoxical, but nevertheless true, that in 
order to demonstrate contrasts between Shankara and 
Vivekananda, it was initially necessary to free the 
interpretation of Shankara from the extensive domination 
of Vivekananda. We undertake the analysis of Shankara 
in Part One therefore, with these prevalent interpretations 
in mind, and which will result in refuting their validity. 
In this investigation, we have not limited ourselves 
only to the task of using historical-critical methods of 
analyzing textual sources to establish the positions of 
both men. We also seek, particularly in the case of 
Vivekananda, to make certain evaluations, and it is 
important to clarify the criteria upon which these are 
based. Our assessments of Vivekananda are in relation to 
the Advaita tradition to which he professes his allegiance. 
We examine his innovations and contributions with reference 
to fundamental Advaita premises as formulated by Shankara, 
retaining the attainment of moksha as our central concern. 
While this method of looking at Vivekananda, together with 
the kinds of philosophical analysis and criticism employed, 
is profoundly influenced by the insights gained as a result 
of my personal experience of studying and living with a 
teacher of Advaita in India, it is by no means subjective 
or arbitrary. This method would be objectionable if it 
consisted of applying to Vivekananda a set of criteria and 
standards of judgement belonging to a system, Hindu or 
non-Hindu, with entirely different presuppositions. This 
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is a definite problem, for example, when the norms and 
premises of one religious tradition are employed, 
consciously or unconsciously, in considering another 
tradition. In this case, however, our criteria are 
grounded in the presuppositions of the tradition to which 
Vivekananda belongs. It is in the context of this tradition 
that our evaluations are primarily made. Vivekananda's 
epistemology is rooted in the authority of a special 
experience and together with the methods derived from the 
Advaita tradition, we also utilize forms of philosophical 
analysis developed in the recent study of religious 
experience. 
This study examines how Shankara and Vivekananda 
understood the nature of the source of brahmajnäna and 
the processes by which this knowledge is gained. It seeks 
to identify the areas of agreement or disagreement over 
this paramount epistemological question. The classical 
schools of Indian philosophy demonstrate deep concern and 
reflection about the methods of acquiring knowledge, 
secular and spiritual. It is important to see whether 
and how, through Vivekananda, this preoccupation has developed 
or been modified in contemporary Hinduism. It is not within 
the scope of this study to sketch in full the system of 
Advaita as developed either by Shankara or Vivekananda. 
At the same time, however, it is impossible to entirely 
avoid some of the wider issues of Advaita. Shankara's 
rationale, for instance, for the source of our knowledge 
of brahman is connected to his understanding of the nature 
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of brahman and the problem of avidyä. We have tried to 
introduce such discussions only where they are relevant to 
the central issue of our study. We have not attempted 
either to comprehensively account for or trace all the 
sources of Vivekananda's views. Chapter 6, however, has 
been entirely devoted to outlining certain significant 
developments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in 
India, particularly with reference to the authority of 
the Vedas, which would have influenced him. The diverse 
and complex influences on the shaping of Hindu religious 
thought in this period still await detailed study. In the 
chapters treating Vivekananda, we have sought, wherever 
possible, to identify some of the sources of particular 
views. 
One of the important methodological issues connected 
with a study of this kind is the extent to which a student 
belonging to any religious tradition can accurately 
interpret this tradition. In the field of religious 
studies, however, one gets the impression that this 
suspicion is aroused more in relation to the "committed" 
student working on so-called "non-Christian" traditions. 
Perhaps it is felt, for some reasons, that "scholarly 
objectivity" is generally less evident or possible here. 
While it is true that closeness and commitment to a tradition 
can be an impediment to dispassionate inquiry, and one 
always has to be aware of this, the advantages which 
such a closeness can confer are not always sufficiently 
recognized and valued. The study of religion is in many 
I 
16 
ways unique. The phenomena of any religion are not 
circumscribed by what can be easily observed and dissected, 
and it is in acquaintance with these other dimensions that 
closeness can be an inestimable asset. The empathy which 
the phenomenologist strives hard to assiduously cultivate is 
naturally associated with commitment. 
In the case of Advaita, for example, the concept of 
adhikära (fitness to inquire) is very significant. Sruti 
is understood as offering a solution to a particular human 
predicament, but the answers are not meaningful until the 
significance of the questions are appreciated by the student. 
As a valid source of knowledge (pramäna), sruti is meaningful 
and fruitful to the student who has found himself in that 
predicament and who enjoys a certain disposition of intellect 
and emotion. A student (adhik ri) who approaches the 
teacher and the sruti in this attitude has an understanding 
and experience totally different from the "detached" observer. 
My own study of Advaita through the conventional guru-sishya 
(teacher-student) relationship and method, which plays an 
important part in this work, has granted a vision and 
comprehension of the tradition which I am yet to find in, 
contemporary studies on Shankara. It is possible, however, 
that commitment can lead to selectivity of a certain kind 
in any study. Commitment may sensitize one to some issues 
which are highlighted more than others. My own closeness to 
Hinduism expresses itself in the concern of this study 
with moksha and matters related to 
its attainment. In 
studying Shankara and Vivekananda, there are other 
issues 
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which someone with different motives and interests may 
prefer to underline. 
Use of Sources 
Many more studies are available on Shankara than on 
Vivekananda, but these have concentrated largely on 
various aspects of his exposition of Advaita and 
have concerned themselves little with the basic question 
of his epistemology. 
ll 
On the whole, epistemology is a 
very much neglected area of study in contemporary works 
on Hinduism. In Chapter 1, we have attempted to review 
current opinions on the epistemology of Shankara, and in 
the course of our discussions we have indicated our 
departure from these. Perhaps the contemporary absence of 
interest in questions concerning Shankara's epistemology 
is not unrelated to Vivekananda's own impact and approach 
to the subject, and the view that the latter is not different 
from that of Shankara. This is a matter, however, to which 
we can return with greater clarity at the end of this study. 
Shankara selected the medium of commentaries (bhäshyas ) 
to express his views, and for this study we have relied 
primarily on those commentaries of his which are widely 
accepted as being authentic. Shankara's commentaries on 
the following works have been cited: 
1. Aitareya Upanishad 
2. Bha avadgita 
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3. Brihadäranyaka Upanishad 
4. Brahma-sutra 
5. Chändogya Upanishad 
6. Isä Upanishad 
7. Katha Upanishad 
8. Kena Upanishad 
9. Mändükya Upanishad and Mändükya Upanishad Kärikä of 
Gaudapdda 
10. Mundaka Upanishad 
11. P rasna Upanishad 
12. Taittiriya Upanishad 
Of these twelve commentaries, the authenticity of only the 
commentaries on the Mänduk a Upanishad and the Mändükya 
Upanishad Kärikä of Gaudapäda have been seriously questioned. 
The other works have all been listed by K. H. Potter among 
the authentic works of Shankara. 
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Our references to these 
two works, however, have been very few indeed and none of 
our principal arguments depend on them. Similarly, we have 
avoided using and establishing any conclusions on the 
evidence of the many independent expository treatises 
(prakarana) attributed to Shankara. The authority of all 
of these, except perhaps for the Upadesasahasri, remains 
very doubtful. We have made only a single reference to the 
Tattvabodha in Chapter 2. We have sought objectivity in the 
presentation of Shankara by citing principally and frequently 
from his bhäshyas. For this reason, we have made very 
limited use of secondary writings from the Advaita tradition. 
In the major chapters on Shankara, the writings of 
Suresvara, Vacaspati, and Sadänanda have been only alluded to 
on a few occasions to amplify certain arguments. 
19 
In the case of Vivekananda, most of the published 
secondary sources are expository in character and have 
been written mainly by members of the Ramakrishna Mission 
which he founded in 1897. These writings tend, on the 
whole, to be hagiographical in nature. We are not aware 
of any detailed critical study of Vivekananda's epistemology, 
or of any attempt to analyze his formulation of Advaita 
with reference to Shankara. In the course of this study 
we have cited the generally held view that there is little 
or no divergence between both thinkers and this may explain 
the lack of comparative studies. 
The primary sources for our study of Vivekananda 
therefore, are his published writings, lectures, letters 
and interviews. These, along with various miscellaneous 
sayings and newspaper reports, constitute the bulk of 
the diverse material comprising the eight volumes of 
The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda. Unlike Shankara, 
Vivekananda did not use the medium of bhäshyas to express 
his views and his only written commentary, significantly 
on the Yoga-sutras of Patan j al i, is included in these 
volumes. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda leave much 
to be desired in terms of chronology, 1indexing and the 
misleading titles of lectures, but they still remain the 
principal sources for any study of Vivekananda's thought 
during his short public ministry from his first major 
lecture on September 11th, 1893, to his death on July 4th, 
1902. Vivekananda wrote very little, and for the study of 
his thought we must rely mainly on his lectures as recorded 
largely by his faithful English secretary and disciple, 
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J. J. Goodwin. There is a considerable repetitiveness of 
themes and ideas in these lectures which ensure their 
reliability. It is no exaggeration, however, to add that 
because of poor chronology and indexing of the material, 
is necessary to painstakingly read the contents of every 
single volume in order to ascertain Vivekananda's views 
on any single issue. 
Outline 
This study is structured into two parts. In Part One 
(Chapters 1-5), the discussion on Shankara is presented. 
Chapter 1 is a survey of current interpretations of the 
significance of sruti and anubhava in Shankara, most of 
which are questioned in our analysis. In Chapter 2, we 
consider the nature of the six valid sources of knowledge 
accepted by the school of Advaita Vedanta, and outline 
certain central epistemological theories held by its 
proponents. This discussion provides the basis 
and background for Chapter 3, where we treat 
Shankara's justification of the sruti as a valid source 
of knowledge (pramäna) . Through words, whose references 
are finite objects known to us, sruti attempts to inform 
us of brahrian which is unknown to us and which possesses 
none of the characteristics of anything known to us. In 
Chapter 4, we study the methods of instruction and 
exegesis suggested in Shankara's commentaries for dealing 
it 
with this problem of communicating brahmajnäna. Chapter 5 
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considers Shankara's understanding of the nature of 
brahmajnäna, and its connection with moksha. We also 
seek there to provide an interpretation of the processes 
through which this knowledge is acquired, since some of the 
conclusions about Shankara' s epistemology are derived from 
different perceptions about the character and aims of 
these processes. 
In Part Two (Chapters 6-9), we present the discussion on 
Swami Vivekananda, and identify any areas and points of 
divergence from Shankara. Chapter 6 traces developments 
in attitudes towards scriptural authority and revelation 
during the period from Rammohun Roy (1774-1833) to 
Ramakrishna (1836-86), which appear to have influenced 
Vivekananda's epistemological views. We turn our attention 
in Chapter 7 to Vivekananda' s understanding of the nature, 
authority and functions of the Vedas. Following on from 
this discussion, we seek in Chapter 8 to describe, compare 
and evaluate his arguments for different methods of 
attaining moksha. In the final chapter of this section, 
we try to understand the nature and assess the significance 
of the experience (anubhava) which Vivekananda posits as the 
ultimate source of valid spiritual knowledge. 
Today, largely as a result of processes generated by 
Vivekananda himself, Hinduism no longer finds its adherents 
only among people of Indian descent. He initiated a world- 
wide interest in Hinduism and immeasurably 
influenced its 
contemporary understanding. In drawing the attention of 
the West to the richness of Hinduism, he also stimulated a 
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renewed interest among Hindus themselves. Perhaps the 
latter would not have been possible without the former. 
The legacy of his influence continues in many parts of the 
world through the activities of the Ramakrishna Mission. 
This analysis hopes to contribute to the contemporary study 
and understanding of Indian religions and the wider 
area of religious studies by examining very important 
aspects of the Vivekananda legacy. More importantly, we 
hope that it will lead to a more critical assessment of 
the character and value of this legacy. We live in times 
when religious traditions have become more aware of each 
other and of the need for dialogue as a means of mutual 
understanding and enrichment. The success of this process 
demands greater clarity and awareness on the part of each 
tradition of its fundamental perspective. This study 
would perhaps make its amplest contribution if it could, 
in some small way, stimulate the Hindu tradition into 
a renewed examination of vital aspects of its contemporary 
self-understanding which it has for long uncritically 
taken for granted. 
PART ONE 
CHAPTER 1 
A REVIEW OF CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF SRUTI AND ANUBHAVA IN SHANKARA 
In his well-known and widely used study, The Spiritual 
Heritage of India, Swami Prabhavananda writes: 
Indian philosophy is not merely metaphysical speculation, 
but has its foundation in immediate perception. God 
and the soul are regarded by the Hindu mind, not as 
concepts, speculative and problematical, as is the 
case in Western Philosophy, but as things directly 
known. They can be experienced not by a chosen few, 
but, under right conditions, by all humanity-1 
Immediate perception, according to Prabhavananda, is the 
source from which springs all Indian thought. Another writer 
who, perhaps more than anyone else, has popularized this 
view in the West is Radhakrishnan. The Hindu philosophy of 
religion, in his view, starts from and returns to an 
experimental basis. In a popular work of his, The Hindu 
View of Life, Radhakrishnan writes: 
While fixed beliefs mark off one religion from another, 
Hinduism sets itself no such limits. Intellect is 
subordinate to intuition, dogma to experience, outer 
expression to inward realization. Religion is not the 
acceptance of academic abstractions or the celebration 
of ceremonies, but a kind of life or experience.... 
Religious experience is of a self-certifying character. 
It is svatassiddha. 2 
Proponents of this interpretation of Hinduism resist the 
use of the term, philosophy, as a description of any system 
of Indian thought. They seem to find 
its connotations of 
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speculation and intellectualism quite inapt. The term 
preferred is "darsana", often rendered as "direct vision" 
or "seeing". Chandradhar Sharma sums up this predilection 
in a representative manner. 
Western Philosophy has remained more or less true 
to the etymological meaning of 'philosophy', in being 
essentially an intellectual quest for truth. Indian 
philosophy has been, however, intensely spiritual and 
has emphasized the need of practical realization of 
truth. The word 'darshana' means 'vision' and also 'the instrument of vision'. It stands for the direct, 
immediate and intuitive vision of Reality, the actual 
perception of Truth, and also includes the means which 
lead to this realization. 3 
In this review, it is useful to focus on Radhakrishnan 
because of his wide influence, and the high esteem with which 
his views are generally regarded. 
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Early in his discussion, 
Radhakrishnan seeks to present the Advaita Veddnta attitude 
to the Vedas. 5 His views at this point can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Scriptural authority is accepted by Advaita as an 
independent means of knowledge. 
2. The Vedas are eternal in terms of their significance 
and not as texts, for these are reuttered by isvara 
in each world age. The Vedas embody the ideal form 
of the universe, and since this is constant, the 
Vedas are described to be eternal. 
3. The Vedas are of superhuman origin (apaurusheya) 
and express the mind of God. They reveal His character 
and embody His ideas. 
4. Their validity is self-evident and direct, even as the 
light of the sun is the direct means for our knowledge 
of forms. 
26 
What is of significance at this point is that Radhakrishnan's 
brief discussion is the only place where he attempts to 
formulate and present the traditional Advaita attitude to 
the Vedas. Even here, however, his summary, as will be 
evident later, misrepresents the Advaita position and makes 
it appear, in some parts, contradictory. There is a 
conflict, for example, between the position that the authority 
of the Vedas is direct and self-evident, and the argument 
that their authority derives from God. In fact, his entire 
treatment of the pramänas, in relation to Advaita, is 
scant and inadequate. Although he does give some recognition 
at this point to the authoritativeness of the Vedas, as 
his argument develops, he presents a view of the Vedas which 
sharply contrasts with this earlier one. There is no 
hint of any awareness of the tension between both views, and 
it remains unresolved throughout his entire discussion. 
This unresolved tension between two different sets of 
assertions about the Vedas can be discerned in many other 
writers. 
The Vedas, as far as Radhakrishnan is concerned, are the 
records of transcendental experiences and not texts of 
theological affirmations. 
The chief sacred scriptures of the Hindus, the Vedas, 
register the intuitions of the perfected souls. They 
are not so much dogmatic dicta as transcripts from 
life. They record the spiritual experiences of souls 
strongly endowed with the sense of reality. 
They are held to be authoritative on the ground 
that 
they express the experiences of the experts 
in the field 
of religion. If the utterances of 
the Vedas were 
uninformed by spiritual 
insight, they would have no 
claim to our belief-6 
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This understanding of the nature and derivation of these 
texts is a very common one. The conclusions of the Vedas 
are quite often presented as the fruits of laborious 
spiritual experiments conducted over a long period of time 
by the ancients. There is a deliberate and intentional 
attempt to draw a scientific analogy and image. 
The Upanisads which are the end of the Veda (veddnta) 
or the crown of the sruti (sruti-siras) contain the 
discoveries made by the ancient seers in the realm of 
the spirit; they are a record of the declarations 
made by the sages and are designed to initiate the 
votary into the secrets of the intuitive or mystic 
experience. Even as in the sphere of physical 
science an investigator cannot afford to neglect the 
researches already made by others in the field, in 
the realm of the super-physical also a seeker of the 
truth must take into account the realisations of the 
sages. The appeal to the authority of sruti means no 
more and no less. 7 
In a very similar view, another writer sees the Vedas as 
the culmination of the experiences of various saints, 
"working independently in different places and times, on 
subjects of such unique type as God and soul, reality or 
unreality of Existence and so on". 
8 They record what 
occurred during moments of exalted imagination in the minds 
of these saints. 
9 
Closely linked to the idea of the Vedas as records of 
mystic experiences, and even more important, is the 
perception of their authority as being derived from the 
so-called self-certifying and intrinsically valid nature of 
these experiences. To cite Radhakrishnan again: 
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The highest evidence is perception, whether it is 
spiritual or sensuous, and is capable of being 
experienced by us on compliance with certain conditions. 
The authoritativeness of the s'ruti is derived from the 
fact that it is but the expression of experience, and 
since experience is of a self-certifying character, 
the Vedas are said to be their own proof, requiring 
no support from elsewhere. l0 
The appeal to sruti therefore, is ultimately based on the 
validity of a particular experience. Only the latter is 
seen as capable of conveying a knowledge which is immediate and 
at the same time indubitable. 11 According to some 
writers, the basis of the traditional acceptance of the 
authority of this experience is the fact that it has always 
been of a uniform nature. The "spiritual experiments", 
in other words, have yielded an unvarying result. 
In the traditional view in which Shankara was 
brought up, the Hindu scriptures have an absolute 
authority - not because a personal God wrote them 
or inspired individuals to write them; but because 
they embody the fruits of the spiritual insight of 
many sages who had searched for ultimate truth with 
single-minded devotion. They are, so to say, the 
fruits of many spiritual experiments, all of which have 
yielded the same result. 12 
This experience, when recorded in language and 
transmitted through a succession of teachers and students, 
comes to be known as sruti (that which is heard). Sruti 
therefore, is "the visible garment of the experiences 
of the awakened soul". 
13 Radhakrishnan seeks to justify 
this recording of experience (anubhava) in a linguistic 
medium, by arguing that while the former carries the 
greatest degree of certitude, it has a low degree of 
conceptual clarity. 
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This is why interpretation is necessary, and those 
interpretations are fallible and so require endless 
revision. Sruti attempts to say things which are not 
fully to be said. l5 
Besides the problem of reconciling the "highest degree of 
certitude" with "a low degree of conceptual clarity", 
this view starkly contrasts with earlier pronouncements 
about sruti as "eternal wisdom", and "the timeless rules 
of all created existence", possessing a direct and self- 
evident authority. 
From the nature of sruti as the record of mystic or 
transcendental experiences, and the derivation of its 
authority from the self-certifying nature of the same, 
comes another important proposition of current opinion. 
This is the conclusion that for one who is in search of 
Self-knowledge, the declarations of the sruti have only 
a provisional validity. Sruti is not itself a definitive 
or conclusive source of knowledge. Mahadevan again 
draws his scientific analogy. 
The students of Vedanta are required to place faith 
in sruti, even as learners of science must begin with 
a sense of confidence in the scientific theories 
formulated by the master-minds in the field. The 
final test in Vedanta, however, is experience, just 
as in science the arbiters of theory are said to be 
facts.... Sruti, to start with, is others' experience; 
and the knowledge one derives therefrom is but mediate 
(paroksa). Unless this becomes immediate (aparoksa), 
the goal of Vedanta which is self-realisation will 
not be reached. 16 
According to Menon and Allen, the recorded experiences are 
there only to guide us, but the "experiments" must be 
repeated in order that the conclusions can be tested and 
verified by us. 
17 The truths of the sruti therefore, are 
not the monopoly of any exclusive group, 
but could be 
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ascertained and verified by anyone. '8 
The Vedas therefore, contain truths which man could 
by the exercise of his own faculties discover, though 
it is to our advantage that they are revealed, seeing 
that not all men have the courage, time and equipment 
to face such an enterprise. 19 
A different view is expressed elsewhere by Radhakrishnan, 
and sruti becomes a secondary and poor substitute for 
those incapable of the first-hand experience and confirmation 
of anubhava. 
Those who have had no direct insight into reality 
are obliged to take on trust the Vedic views which 
record the highest experiences of some of the 
greatest minds who have wrestled with this problem 
of apprehending reality. For the. ordinary man the 
central truth of the ultimate consciousness is 
revealed, and not ascertained by any human evidence 
like that of perception or inference. 20 
This view of the function of the sruti is shared by Belvalkar, 
according to whom the Advaitin found it necessary to 
appeal to the authority of the sruti only because the 
experience upon which it was founded was beyond the 
reach of all. Whenever, Belvalkar claims, the scriptures are 
cited, it is merely for the purpose of supporting a 
conclusion "which has been reached independently of the 
scriptures". 
21 Shankara's reliance on the sruti is 
sometimes seen only as an attempt to show his agreement 
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with orthodox authority. Sruti then, does not incontro- 
vertibly establish anything, but awaits the confirmation of 
anubhava for the conversion of its hypothetical assertions 
into fact. 
Radhakrishnan reveals his focus on experience by 
rejecting the traditional term n"ana 
because of its 
empirical associations, preferring 
the word anubhava, 
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which he renders as "integral experience". 
23 
Anubhava 
is elevated by him to the status of an independent 
pramäna and becomes the equal of direct perception 
(pratyaksha). It is the basis on which whatever we know 
and believe of the supersensual world depends. In his 
view then, sruti occupies a decidedly secondary position 
to direct mystical insight in the religious outlook of 
Shankara. Radhakrishnan claims that it is difficult to 
find support in the writings of Shankara for the view that 
inquiry into the Vedas is the only means to knowledge of 
brahman. 24 He is unambiguous in his final conclusion about 
the relationship between sruti and anubhava in Shankara. 
For him [Shankara], integral experience or anubhava 
is the basal fact. It is the highest religious insight. 
It supplies the proof - if proof be the name for it - 
of man's awareness of a spiritual reality-25 
Radhakrishnan's final conclusions about the roles of 
sruti and anubhava in Shankara are shared by many other 
Indian writers. Prabhavananda also sees direct personal 
experience as the ultimate satisfactory proof in Shankara. 
The sruti is a mere provisional pointer along the way. 
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Sharma also upholds the view that immediate spiritual 
realization, which he terms, "supra-relational intuition", 
is the ultimate criterion of truth in Shankara. Like 
Radhakrishnan, he links up the authority of the Vedas 
in Shankara with the self-certifying nature of experience. 
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According to R. P.. Singh, Shankara's conclusion that anubhava 
is the only pramana of brahman is the result of the nature 
of the brahman-experience. In other words, ' epistemology 
is 
determined by experience. The nature of the object 
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determines the pramäna through which it can be known. 
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Whereas in some cases sensuous perception may be appropriate, 
in another case the nature of the object demands reliance 
only on spiritual perception (anubhava). 29 Singh 
emphasizes that all reasoning and reflection are only 
preparatory for what he terms the "scientia visionis", the 
final and highest court of appeal. Belvalkar argues for 
the superiority of experience over sruti, from what he sees 
to be the dominant role of the former in ordinary life. 
Reason - and by this term should be understood to 
include Analogy and the other Pramänas admitted by 
traditional Veddnta - gets its eventual sanction 
from Experience, and so likewise does the authority 
of the Scriptures. Scriptures are therefore 
subordinate to Reason where we are concerned with 
matters of actual sensuous anubhava, such as the 
heat of the fire. On the other hand, Reason has 
to yield the palm to the Scriptures where it is a 
question of matters where Scriptures can appeal to 
a distinct supra-sensuous experience of their own. 
Eventually the Vedanta acknowledges only one criterion 
of truth, viz. anubhava. Such being the case, it will 
certainly not do to style Vedanta as mere exegetics, 
or dogmatism, or theology, or whatever other 
appellation it may be fashionable to us to characterise 
the system. 30 
N. K. Devaraja is largely in agreement with the general 
view of the relationship between sruti and anubhava in 
Shankara. 
31 The interesting point about Devaraja's 
analysis, however, is that he, unlike other writers, 
broadens the concept of experience. He acknowledges the 
central role of the pramanas in Shankara, but sees 
Shankara's 
insistence that brahman is to be known only through the 
sruti, merely as an expression of his "ultra-orthodox 
mood" " 
32 His reason for not seeing this as an inveterate 
tenet of Shankara seems to be due to the latter' s emphasis 
33 
that brahman is not an object of scriptural knowledge. 33 
Sruti is by no means unique in bringing about the final 
intuition of brahman. It is merely a more direct and 
effective means. 
All the pramänas play their part in bringing about 
that final intuition, and if ýankara is at moments inclined to assign a higher place to sruti, it is 
probably because he feels that the utterances of the 
Upanisads, being vital poetic records of spiritual 
experience, can induce that intuition earlier than 
the mere negative operations of the logical under- 
standing. Or, if we are unkind critics, we may say 
that, occasionally, the orthodox in Sankara over- 
whelms the empiricist and rationalist in him. 34 
Devaraja, as mentioned, broadens the concept of experience 
with reference to Shankara. Experience is superior to 
sruti, not only in the sense of intuitive or mystical 
experience, but also in the wider sense of perceptual or 
everyday (loka) experience. This very interesting contention 
of Devaraja will be evaluated later, but here it is just 
necessary to state his evidence for this conclusion. It 
is based on two references from Shankara's commentary on 
the Brihadäranyaka Upanishad and the Brahma-sutra. In the 
first quotation, that sruti must communicate in familiar 
concepts is seen as evidence for the superior authority of 
loka. 
It is not the purpose of the scripture to distort the 
nature of things; on the contrary, its aim is to make 
the unknown known as it is... Not a hundred illustrations 
can establish that fire is cold or that the sun gives 
out no heat. For other pramanas represent the 
objects to be different in nature. Nor is one pramäna 
contradicted by another. Every pramana makes known 
only what is not an object of another pramana. Nor 
can scripture make the unknown intelligible without 
depending upon the relationship of words and their 
meaning as recognized by the loka. 35 
The second quotation is actually one of Shankara's hypothetical 
opponents (pürvapakshin) whose voice Devaraja perplexingly 
34 
thinks Shankara employs to assert the superiority of 
everyday experience. 
Yukti or reasoning which affirms the unseen on the 
analogy of the seen, is nearer to experience than 
Sruti, for the latter's authority is traditional 
merely_. 36 
Taken by themselves, both references are very tenuous 
grounds for asserting his conclusions. The first 
merely avers the authority of each prar*täna in its 
respective sphere and suggests the absence of any conflict 
among them. The implication that Shankara resorts to an 
opponent to voice his views makes the second reference very 
insubstantial evidence. 
Hiriyanna's conclusions about the respective roles of 
sruti and anubhava in Shankara are somewhat surprising, 
in the light of the fact that he is one of the few writers 
who discuss in fair detail the pramana concept. 
37 
He 
sees no essential difference between the Purva-Minansa 
concept of the Vedas and the Advaita concept, except the 
38 
role of isvara in the latter' s schere. With this background, 
it is indeed strange that he also, like the other writers 
considered, credits the intuitive experience with a separate, 
superior, and final epistemological status. 
The ultimate philosophic fact is no doubt to be known 
through the testimony of the Upanisads; but if the 
knowledge conveyed by it is to bring real freedom, 
one should verify it by one's own living experience 
in the form 'I am Brahman' or Aham Brahma Asmi. It 
is this immediate experience or direct intuition of 
the Absolute which is described as vidvadanubhava to 
distinguish it from lay experience, that accordingly 
becomes the final criterion of Truth here. 39 
Hiriyanna is also united with others in concluding that the 
Upanishads should in the last resort be regarded as recording 
35 
the intuitional knowledge of the ancient sages. While the 
Upanishads are necessary, they have only an instrumental 
value in conveying merely mediate knowledge, In resorting 
to direct experience, one has to go beyond the texts. 40 
In view of the consensus among Eastern scholars about 
the primacy of anubhava over sruti, it is perhaps not 
surprising to find their Western counterparts generally 
agreeing with their conclusions. Smart endorses the 
opinion of the essentially mystical nature of knowledge in 
Shankara. 
The full understanding of his system and its 
conclusive 'verification' comes through the non- 
dualistic realization of identity between Self and 
holy Power. Thus knowledge, at the higher level of 
metaphysical truth, is not theoretical; but it is 
essentially contemplative or mystical. 4l 
As a direct consequence of his stress on an experience, 
Smart argues for a basic similarity between Mahayana and 
Advaita. He ventures so far as to dismiss the dependence 
of the latter on the Vedas as being of no consequence, 
since revelation, in his view, culminates in non-dual 
experience. 
42 The pivotal role of the mystical experience 
considerably modifies, according to Smart, the intrinsic- 
validity concept of the scripture. This brings Shankara, 
in Smart's view, very close to the Yoga standpoint. 
In other words, the scriptures are valid at the higher 
level in so far as they point towards a certain 
supreme experience. In the last resort therefore, 
their truth is pragmatic and provisional. What 
confirms them is direct experience, and by then they 
are useless. This clearly modifies considerably the 
concept of their being self-authenticated. Here 
Sankara' s view is not far from that of Yoga, namely 
that the scriptures originate from the supreme 
perception or intuition of yogis. Hence the issue 
36 
about the validity of revelation is shifted to that 
of the trustworthiness of mystical - in particular yogic - experience. 43 
Smart reiterates this position in his later work, 
The Yogi and the Devotee, emphasizing the place of dhyäna 
and the Yoga parallel. 44 
R. de Smet is one of the few writers treating substantially 
Shankara's method, and emphasizing the primacy of sruti , 
45 
He describes Shankara as a srutivädin (one for whom the 
sruti is the primary authority), and discusses the 
superiority of sruti in relation to all other pramänas. 
As to testimony, it is of two kinds; pauruseya and 
apauruseya, i. e., it either originates from an 
individual witness (purusa) or it does not. Srmrti, 
for instance, is mere human tradition and its 
authority is therefore defective, for men are 
fallible. But Sruti (i. e., the Vedic and Brahmanic 
scriptures, especially the Upanisads) is entirely free 
from dependence upon individual authors; it is 
absolutely infallible and its authority is supreme. 46 
With such a clear comprehension of the unrivalled status 
of the Vedas in Shankara, and a detailed discussion of his 
procedure in interpreting the same, one expected de Smet 
to diverge in his conclusion from the general view. It 
comes as an anti-climax to find in him the self-same 
unacknowledged and unresolved contradiction between an 
initial emphasis on the unmitigated authority of sruti 
and their reliance for verification on an experience. This 
tension was also highlighted in the case of Radhakrishnan. 
Thus Vedic faith, which at first was a mere reliance 
on the intuition of the r is, becomes fully validated 
when it turns into that final transcendental experience. 47 
Writers who argue for anubhava as the true prariana 
. 
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of brahmajijana generally treat the process of knowledge 
in Shankara as progressing through three different phases. 
The original reference to this three-fold process comes 
from the B rihadaranyaka Upanishad where Ya j nav alkya , 
instructing his wife Maitreyi, says, 
The Self, my dear Maitreyi, should be realised - 
should be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon. 
By the realization of the Self, my dear, through 
hearing, reflection and meditation, all this is known-48 
S ravana (listening) is the initial exposure to the content 
of the Upanishads as unfolded by the qualified teacher. 
Manana (reflecting) is the employment of reason to refute 
and eliminate doubts arising within one's own mind, as well 
as objections tendered by rival schools of thought. 
These two processes are generally characterized as 
entirely intellectual and merely preliminary. They 
culminate in the final phase of nididhyäsana (contemplation 
or meditation), where the truth of the Self is directly 
apprehended, all doubts finally fall away and freedom 
(moksha) is attained. In the general presentation of this 
three-fold process, it is the final procedure that is 
considered salient and all-important. The contention is 
that it is only here that the gain of knowledge in the 
true sense occurs. 
Deep reflection (manana) leads the aspirant to the next 
stage, namely, nididhyasana. This third stage called 
nididhyäsana is constant and uninterrupted meditation 
or intense contemplation on the convinced doctrines 
of tat tvam asi and other mahdvdkyas propounding the 
Advaitic mystic doctrine. This nididhydsana is the 
immediate preparation for the Brahmajnäna or the 
transcendental experience, i. e. the supra-mental 
consciousness. After nididhyäsana, the aspirant attains 
to the experience that transcends all world-consciousness 
and ego-consciousness. In that experience 
he realizes 
the truth of the Upanisadic utterance: 
38 
'There is no diversity here' . 49 
Mere sravana, it is contended, will not take the student 
very far. 50 Only the direct and immediate knowledge 
which uninterrupted meditation (nididhyäsana) affords, 
enables the mediate instruction of the teacher to dispel 
false notions. 
51 
The experience which supposedly confers 
true knowledge is sometimes presented as one over which 
the student has no control, but upon which he simply 
waits after completing sravana and manana. 
He has listened with faith to the guru's teaching 
and explanation of the Sruti; with the help of all 
the resources of secular reasoning, he has 
successfully contradicted all the objections that could 
be raised against the doctrine he has heard; now, 
all the obstacles to advaita - Knowledge being 
destroyed, his mind is peaceful and there is nothing 
more to drive him away from the contemplation of the 
Truth; calm and happy, he concentrates all his thoughts 
on the revealed truth and awaits silently the flash- 
like illumination which is to change his high but 
still complex knowledge into the simplest and most 
immediate consciousness of the Absolute. 52 
Writers who affirm the primacy of anubhava are generally 
vague on the actual nature of the experience which gives 
us immediate knowledae of brahman. Anubhava is generally 
equated by them with intuition and presented as a form of 
"direct insight", "direct access" or "direct acquaintance". 
It is described as a form of internal perception, 
comparable to external perception, on the basis that 
perception (internal or external) alone can give us direct 
knowledge of any existent entity. 
53 Anubhava is not a 
movement around the object of knowledge, but a vision from 
the inside. 
54 In its immediacy, it is more like feeling 
than thinking, and transcends the discursive, reasoning 
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functions of the mind. Unlike our knowledge of the physical 
world, which progresses in stages, enlightenment, like 
all intuitions, descends in a sudden flash when we least 
expect it. 55 As we have noted earlier, it is supposed to 
1 eave no room for doubt. 
The intuition of the Absolute resembles perception 
rather than conception. It is as inevitable, as 
direct, as absolute as perception. It forces itself 
irresistibly on our consciousness. There can be no 
scope for doubt, hesitation, option 'this or that' 
in this act of realization. Reality as soon as it 
rises into view carries its conviction about itself; 
it lays hold upon our nature with absolute violence. 
It is objective certainty we attain and not 
subjective assurance, or rather it is absolute 
certitude, and neither subjective nor objective 
assurance which we get. 56 
Most of the writers we have considered equate anubhava 
with the Yoga experience of nirvikalpa samädhi, the state 
in which the mind transcends its usual divisions of Knower, 
knowledge and process of knowing and becomes free from 
all mental content. 
In view of the general tendency to assign epistemological 
supremacy to anubhava in relation to sruti, the common 
designation of Advaita as mysticism is not surprising, 
and any consideration of the role of these two factors in 
Shankara must take note of and evaluate this proclivity. 
One of the earliest writers to so treat Advaita was S. N. 
Dasgupta. 
57 In his work, brahman is considered as 
identical with the experience, and the latter is referred 
to as reality. Intuitive experience is the immediate 
means of Self-knowledge and is his key concept. 
Only persons who have realized this truth can point 
this out to us as an experience which is at once 
self-illuminating and blissful and which is entirely 
40 
different from all else that is known to us. Once it 
is thus exhibited, those who have the highest moral 
elevation and disinclination to worldly enjoyments 
can grasp it by an inner intuitive contact with 
the reality itself (adhyatmayoga). This truth is 
indeed the culmination of all the teaching of the 
Vedas. 58 
Dasgupta's definition of mysticism as, "the belief that God 
is realized through ecstatic communion with Hin", is 
obviously inadequate to deal with the diversity of the 
material he subsumes under the category. 
59 
But then, 
Dasgupta shows little sensitivity to variation. The method 
of Yoga is seen by him as supplying the definite technique 
lacking in the Upanishads, for the perception of the 
truths discussed there. There is little regard for 
divergent theological presuppositions, and Dasgupta's 
unhesitant recourse to Yoga is significant. 
In the most advanced state of this yoga intuition, 
all the truths regarding the nature of the true 
Self, of the mind and of the material world and its 
connection with the mind, become clear, and as a 
result of this and also as a result of the gradual 
weakening of the constitution of the mind, the latter 
ceases to live and work and is disassociated forever 
from the spirit or the Self. 60 
R. C. Zaehner, in his works on mysticism, also treats 
Shankara's Advaita primarily as an experience. 
61 
More 
recently Parrinder has done the same. 
62 
Parrinder does 
not proffer any definition of his own, but for him, the 
crucial terms are experiment and experience. Two 
definitions he does quote are, "reliance on spiritual 
intuition or exalted feeling as a means of acquiring 
knowledge of mysteries inaccessible to intellectual 
apprehension", and, "belief in the possibility of union 
with the Divine nature by means of ecstatic contemplation" . 
63 
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It is interesting that Parrinder confesses the difficulty 
of finding an Indian term to correspond to the European 
word, mysticism, in the sense of union, and more interesting 
that he selects the term yoga. 
Although Parrinder expresses no misgivings about his 
label of mysticism on Advaita, two significant passages 
in his work suggest the difficulties of this assumption. 
These, however, do not direct him to any re-evaluation. 
In the first of these, he writes about the Upanishads, 
A few other examples of word-renunciation are given 
but it is remarkable that the Upanishads, which are 
often regarded as mystical treatises, have very few 
autobiographical retails, and the experiences upon 
which they seem to be founded have to be deduced 
from their teachings. There is a search for mystical 
unity, but it is expressed in a dogmatic statement 
rather than in described experience-64 
After describing Shankara's mysticism as cool and unimpassioned, 
characterized by argument and assertion than by autobiography, 
he writes in the second passage, 
The proof of the existence of the divine being is 
in the human self and this is established by asserting 
the identity of divine and self. This dogmatic declara- 
tion results from reflection and intuition, but it is 
strongly supported by appeals to the authority of 
scripture, the Vedas and Upanishads. In this Shankara 
reveals himself as a theologian rather than a logical 
philosopher-65 
These two passages, suggesting perhaps Parrinder's own 
unconfessed doubts, reveal also the difficulty of many of the 
other writers on mysticism. Advaita Vedanta is treated as 
mystical without any satisfactory definition of the latter. 
Mysticism seems to be an alternative heading, attractive 
42 
perhaps, for the discussion of doctrinal matters. 
66 
It seems therefore, that there is a certain 
consensus in current opinion about the respective roles 
of sruti and anubhava in Shankara. The primacy of experience 
and intuition over sruti is, in fact, considered to be a 
unique characteristic of Indian philosophy in general, which 
places it 'in a distinctively superior category from Western 
philosophy. Many of the conclusions we have isolated have 
achieved an apriori status over the years and greatly 
influenced the study of and approach to Shankara and to Indian 
religious thought. It is our contention, however, that these 
views gravely misrepresent Shankara's position, and we aim to 
argue for radically different conclusions about the status 
and functions of sruti and anubhava. We can now summarize the 
chief features of the relationship between sruti and anubhava, 
as formulated in the studies we have examined: 
1. The Vedas are the records of the transcendental 
experiences of the ancient mystics, through which they 
conclusively apprehended the exact nature of reality. 
Sruti is the linguistic record of anuhhava. 
2. The Vedas derive their authority from the self-certifying 
nature of religious experience. Religious experience, 
being intrinsically valid and authoritative, lends 
this character to the texts recording them. 
3. For the aspirant, the declarations of the Vedas are 
only provisional. They are subject to the confirmation 
of direct experience, which is in the last resort the 
final criterion of truth and the ultimate satisfactory 
proof. As records of mystical experiences, the Vedas 
43 
merely indicate what can be known. They are primarily 
useful to the lesser qualified aspirant who is incapable 
of anubhava. 
4. The Vedas contain truths which man could, by the 
exercise of his faculties, rediscover and verify. 
5. The Vedas are by no means unique as a source of 
knowledge about brahman. 
6. Knowledge of brahman (brahmajnäna) is gained through 
the three-fold process of sravana, manana and 
nididhydsana. The first two are viewed as merely 
preliminary and intellectual. It is only the 
experience which deep meditation (nididhyäsana) 
affords that conclusively informs us about brahnan. 
7. Anubhava is accorded the status of an independent means 
of knowledge (prarnäna). It is the basis on which all 
knowledge of the supersensuous rests, the equivalent, 
in the spiritual context, of direct perception 
(pratyaksha) in the empirical world. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE ASCERTAINMENT AND SOURCES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE 
Orthodox and heterodox systems of Indian philosophy 
demonstrate a great concern of thought about the nature, 
validity and sources of knowledge. It was considered 
important for each school of thought to elucidate the 
authoritative basis of its postulates, and the character 
of debate was shaped by a clear comprehension of each 
other's standpoint. The code of disputation did not 
allow attempts to refute opposing arguments by reference to 
an authoritative source of knowledge which was not 
mutually acceptable. This principle is clearly evident 
throughout Shankara's commentaries, where the kind of 
argument employed and the authority specified depend on 
the epistemology of the opponent. The authority of the 
Vedas, for example, is not generally resorted to in contention 
with Buddhist schools of thought. The growth and refinement 
of sophisticated theories of knowledge were undoubtedly 
quickened by the birth of heterodox systems like Jainism and 
Buddhism, which rejected the authority of the Vedas and 
claimed to found their propositions exclusively on reason. 
Shankara, in his commentaries, does not undertake any 
independent systematic analysis of the sources of knowledge. 
45 
He treats them throughout as being well known. 
1 Nevertheless, 
it is a great error to assume that he was indifferent to 
problems of epistemology. His commentaries clearly belie 
any such conclusion. There may be a number of reasons for 
the absence of any independent systematic treatment of this 
subject in his works. Firstly, he saw his role primarily as 
a commentator on the Upanishads and the kind of discussion 
he developed was largely dictated by the content of any 
particular verse before him. Secondly, the absence could 
be accounted for by his agreement with the exponents of 
rival systems. One gets the impression that Shankara's 
concern was not with the elaboration of a theory about the 
sources of knowledge, but with the evaluation of their 
respective worth. It is a concern which arises directly 
out of his desire to uphold the authoritative source for 
our knowledge of brahman. 
Z. 1 The Nature and Criterion of Valid Knowledge 
Technically speaking, the Sanskrit word 3nana refers to 
all kinds of cognitions, without regard to the question of 
truth or error. To know, in this sense of the term, is 
simply to have a notion, doubt, desire, feeling, dream or 
incorrect idea. In this strict sense therefore, its opposite, 
a jnäna, indicates the complete absence of any cognition. 
This latter term, however, is rarely used with this 
absolute denotation. The word pramä is reserved only to 
designate a true cognition. Generally, however, 'näna is 
equated with pramä and a' nana with apramä or invalid 
cognition, which includes the total absence of knowledge, 
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doubt, error or wrong notion. 
The special source of a particular pramä or knowledge 
is termed, pramäna. It is defined as the cause (kärana) 
of valid knowledge ( ramä käranam pramänam).? A kärana 
is conceived as, "the unique or special cause through the 
action of which a particular effect is produced" .3 In the 
case of external perceptual knowledge, for instance, the 
causes are many. There is the particular sense organ as 
well as the mind. The mind, however, is common to all 
kinds of perception and so cannot be regarded as the unique 
cause. In external perception, it is the particular 
sense organ which is considered as the karana. In addition 
to being unique, a kärana should also possess an active 
function. The contact between the sense organ and the 
sense object is unique because it is a feature of perception 
alone. It is not, however, considered as the kärana of 
perception because it is itself a function of the sense 
organ. A prarnäna then, can be defined as, "an active and 
unique cause (karana) of a prama or knowledge". 
4 Its special 
feature is its capacity to produce valid knowledge. On this 
characteristic, Shankara is clear. 
A means of knowledge is or is not such according as it 
leads or does not lead to valid knowledge. Otherwise 
even a post, for instance, would be considered a means 
of knowledge in perceiving sound etc. 5 
The reverse of this proposition is also true for Shankara. 
Knowledge is only generated by a valid means of knowledge 
(pramana). 6 
The function of knowledge, according to Shankara, is to 
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reveal the nature of things and valid knowledge conforms 
to the nature of the object it seeks to reveal. Any 
object must be known as it is and thus knowledge is not 
governed by human choice but by the character of the 
object to be known. 
But a thing cannot be judged diversely to be of such 
a kind and not to be of such a kind, to be existent 
and non-existent (simultaneously). options depend on 
human notions, whereas valid knowledge of the true 
nature of a thing is not dependent on human notions. 
On what does it depend then? It is dependent on the 
thing itself. For an awareness of the form, 'This is 
a stump, or a man, or something else', with regard to 
the same stump cannot be valid knowledge. In such a 
case the awareness of the form, 'This is a man or 
something else' is erroneous, but 'This is a stump to 
be sure' is valid knowledge; for it corresponds to the 
thing itself. Thus the validity of knowledge of an 
existing thing is determined by the thing itself.? 
Dharmaräja, in Vedanta Paribhäsä, defines pramä as, 
"that knowledge which has for its object something that is 
not already known and is uncontradicted" .8 Here novelty 
(anadhigatatva) and non-contradictedness (abädhitatva) 
are considered the crucial characteristics of pramä. 
Non-contradictedness, as far as Advaita is concerned, is the 
crucial test of truth. All other tests are seen as 
conforming to this. Any invalid proposition or erroneous 
experience, such as the cognition of a rope as a snake, can 
be refuted on the ground of being contradicted. In this case, 
the object of knowledge, the snake, is contradicted by the 
knowledge of the rope. The principle of non-contradictedness 
implies that knowledge, the purpose of which is to reveal 
reality, is held to be valid until it is falsified by a 
superior pramäna. The objection may be forwarded that 
since Advaita posits brahman as the ultimate reality, it is 
impossible to speak of a valid knowledge of ordinary 
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objects. This contention is anticipated by Dharmaraja, who 
qualifies "uncontradicted" in his definition to mean, "Not 
contradicted during the transmigratory state". 
9 In the absolute 
sense, of course, brahman alone is uncontradicted and the 
notion of reality ascribed to the world of diversity is 
held to be valid until brahman is known. 
10 
There is no doubt that Shankara sees the operation 
of the pramanas, secular and sacred, as being founded on 
ignorance (avidyä). What is not often emphasized is the 
distinctive manner of the relationship between avidyä and 
the pramänas. It is not, as it is sometimes understood, 
that the pramänas are incapable of producing right knowledge, 
empirical and absolute. It is the generally implicit and 
assumed identification between the Self and non-Self in the 
operation of the pramänas that reveals their location in 
avidyä. The working of the pramänas proceeds from the natural 
superimposition (adhyasa) of the nature of the Self on the 
non-Self and vice-versa. 
Since a man without self-identification with the body, 
mind, senses, etc., cannot become a cog niter, and as 
such, the means of knowledge cannot function for him; 
since perception and other activities (of a man) are not 
possible without accepting the senses etc. (as his own); 
since the senses cannot function without (the body as) 
a basis; since nobody engages in any activity with a 
body that has not the idea of the Self superimposed on 
it; since the unrelated Self cannot become a cognizer 
unless there are all these (mutual superimposition of 
the Self and the body and their attributes on each other); 
and since the means of knowledge cannot function unless 
there is a cognizership; therefore it follows that the 
means of knowledge, such as direct perception as well 
as the scriptures, must have a man as their locus who 
is subject to nescience. ll 
The ultimate refutation of the presupposed superimposition 
upon which the function of any pramäna is generally based, 
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does not diminish its function in the production of valid 
knowledge. 12 Shankara does not propose any alternative 
avenue to knowledge, empirical and spiritual, besides the 
legitimate pramänas. He does not anywhere express doubts 
or reservations about the competence of the pramänas to 
. 
produce valid knowledge in their respective spheres. He 
claims, in fact, that practical affairs will become impossible 
if the pramänas are regarded as fundamentally perverse. 
Defending inference, for example, as a means of knowledge, 
Shankara writes, 
If you challenge the validity of an inference of the 
kind not based on a causal relation, all our activities, 
including eating and drinking, would be impossible, 
which you certainly do not desire. We see in life that 
people who have experienced that hunger and thirst, for 
instance, are appeased by eating and drinking, proceed 
to adopt these means, expecting similar results; all 
this would be impossible. As a matter of fact, however, 
people who have the experience of eating and drinking 
infer, on the ground of similarity, that their hunger 
and thirst would be appeased if they ate and drank again, 
and proceed to act accordingly. 13 
Another of Shankara's compelling arguments for the indispens- 
ability of the pramänas occurs in one of his many discussions 
with the various Buddhist schools. Here the controversy 
is with the Vijnänavdda proponent, arguing for the non-existence 
of external objects, and the validity of ideas alone which 
appear as different external objects. 
Buddhist: Since no object can possibly exist externally, 
I come to the conclusion that it appears as though it 
is outside. 
Vedantin: This conclusion is not honest, since the 
possibility or impossibility of the existence of a thing 
is determined in accordance with the applicability or 
non-applicability of the means of knowledge to it, but 
the applicability or non-applicability of the means of 
knowledge is not ascertained, in accordance with the 
possibility or impossibility (of the thing). What is 
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known through anyone of the means of knowledge, such 
as direct perception etc., is possible, and what 
cannot be known through any one of these means of 
knowledge is impossible. In the case under discussion, 
the external things are known individually by the 
respective means of knowledge; so how can they be 
declared to be impossible by raising such alternatives 
as different, non-different etc.? 14 
The second characteristic of valid knowledge, as mentioned 
above, is novelty (anadhigatatva). The question of novelty 
as a feature of pramä revolves around the acceptance of 
memory as a distinct pramäna. Vedantists, however, on the 
whole, seem uninterested in this controversy. The 
V edänta-Paribhäsa offers a definition of pramä to exclude 
. 
and include memory. Generally speaking, it is excluded from 
valid knowledge because it is not produced by any one of 
the accepted pramänas, but originates from the impressions 
of a past cognition. This does not imply that memory (smriti) 
is invalid. It is true if it arises out of the impressions 
of a valid cognition and false if it does not. In other 
words, it is the original or archetypal cognition that is 
paramount. 
2.2. The Self- validity of Knowledge 
(Svatah-Prämänya-Väda) 
The self-validity of knowledge is a very important, but 
little discussed, area of Advaita thought. It is one of 
the many epistemological theories taken from the Purva-Mimansa 
by Advaita and its understanding is vital in apprehending 
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the independent and definitive role of each pramana in 
giving rise to valid knowledge. Svatah-prämanya, may be 
translated as the self-validity or intrinsic validity of 
knowledge. The theory itself involves a dual proposition: 
1. The validity of knowledge is intrinsic (svatah-siddha). 
2. The validity of knowledge is self-evident (svatah-prakäsa), 
15 
We can now consider each proposition in turn. 
1. The validity of knowledge is intrinsic: This implies 
that the validity of knowledge arises from the totality of 
the very causes that produce a particular knowledge and not 
from factors extraneous to those causes. If all the 
conditions necessary for the successful operation of any 
one of the pramänas are fulfilled, valid knowledge will 
result. The important point is that the source of knowledge 
should be free from deficiencies. The necessary conditions 
required for the production of any knowledge will, of course, 
vary with the pramänas. In the case of the perception of 
forms, for example, the conditions will include a healthy 
organ of vision and sufficient light. When knowledge is 
discovered to be invalid, this invalidity cannot be attributed 
to the causal factors themselves, but to some adventitious 
defects (dosha) in them. Thus Purva-Mimansa and Advaita 
claim that while validity is intrinsic, invalidity is 
extrinsic. 
16 
On the question of the validity of knowledge, the Advaita 
view is best contrasted with the arguments of the Nyäya school. 
The contention between both schools on this matter has become 
one of the classic controversies in the history of Indian 
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philosophical thought. Both schools are in agreement as 
far as the invalidity of knowledge is concerned, regarding 
it as due to extraneous factors. They disagree, however, 
about the cause of validity. Nyäya proposes the theory of 
the extrinsic validity of knowledge (paratah-prämänya-vada). 
Against the Advaita argument that validity is intrinsic in 
terms of origin and apprehension, Nydya contends that it is 
extrinsic in both cases. The Nyäya argument is that if 
invalidity (aprama) is due to defects (dosha) existing 
along with the common causes of knowledge, then prama must 
be due to the presence of some favourable factor ( una ) 
along with the common causes. Hence, knowledge is not 
self-valid, but its validity and invalidity are derived 
from extraneous causes. This argument is refuted by 
Advaita on the ground that the favourable factor of Nyaya 
is not independent of the causes themselves. 
17 Valid 
knowledge can be accounted for by the absence of defect 
and contradiction, and the excellence of the causes of 
knowledge (guna) is not an extraneous factor, but an 
intrinsic condition for the rise of prarnä . 
2. The validity of knowledge is self-evident: Here the 
proposition is that the validity of knowledge is spontaneously 
apprehended along with the apprehension of knowledge itself. 
The same conditions which produce knowledge and its validity 
also give rise to belief in that validity. Knowledge arises 
when the necessary conditions which give rise to it, such as 
absence of defect and contradiction, are present, and along 
with it there is a belief in its validity. Both do not owe 
their rise to any external conditions and require no 
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verification from anything else. 
18 
The paratah-prämänya-väda of Nyaya advocates the 
extrinsic apprehension of validity. The Nyäya position is 
that the issue of validity or invalidity is relevant only 
after the origination of knowledge. Initially, knowledge 
is neither valid nor invalid. Valid knowledge corresponds 
with its object, and this correspondence can be put to the 
test in fruitful activity. One infers from the capacity 
or incapacity of knowledge to produce successful activity, its 
validity or invalidity. A mirage in a desert, for example, 
is an optical illusion because of its failure to quench the 
thirst of a traveller. 
19 
Advaitins generally respond in a twofold manner to the 
Nyäya objections. In the first case, it is argued that a 
false cognition may, and sometimes does, lead to successful 
activity. The lustre of a distant jewel may be mistaken 
for the jewel itself, but can lead the one who desires it 
to successfully obtain it. 
20 
The stronger argument urged against the Nyäya position 
is that it leads to infinite regress. If the validity of 
one cognition is to depend on another cognition, then the 
second will require a third and so on. This is the import 
of Shankara's statement that the validity of the Upanishads 
does not depend on another means of knowledge like inference. 
21 
Knowledge produced by a defect-free pramäna is apprehended 
as valid, unless contradicted by the knowledge of a 
higher 
reality. 22 
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Except Nyäya-Vaiseshika, all other orthodox Vedic 
systems (two schools of Purva-Mimansa, Sämkhya-Yoga and 
Vedanta) advocate the self-validity of knowledge. We have 
seen that whereas Advaita asserts the intrinsic validity 
of knowledge in terms of its origin and ascertainment 
against the Nyäya view of extrinsic validity, it agrees 
with the latter on extrinsic invalidity in both cases. The 
invalidity of knowledge is not apprehended along with the 
apprehension of knowledge. It is determined by inference 
from a defect in the instrument of knowledge or from a 
subsequent cognition which refutes the earlier one. If a 
post is mistaken for a man, the knowledge of the post is 
negated by the apprehension of the man. The self-validity of 
knowledge does not preclude the possibility of doubt 
about the truth of any particular cognition. Properly 
speaking, however, if one entertains doubt about the truth of 
a cognition, there is no cognition. It involves a 
vacillation between two notions and can sometimes be removed 
by repeating the same cognition after removing the cause of 
doubt. 
The importance of the self-validity argument for Advaita 
is that any defect-free pramäna can independently generate 
knowledge. The knowledge produced by any pramäna does not 
have to be authenticated by another. On the evidence of the 
sense of taste alone, for example, the sweetness of sugar is 
indubitably accepted. It follows from this that the Vedas 
also, as a means of knowledge in the form of words (sabda- 
ramäna) can generate valid knowledge independently of other 
means. The knowledge is not necessarily of a provisional 
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nature, awaiting confirmation. We can anticipate here a 
clear difference of view with those who propose the necessity 
for anubhava as a kind of certifying experience for the 
hypothetical propositions of the Vedas. 
2.3 The Self-luminosity of Knowledge 
(Svatah-Prakäsa-Vdda) 
Like the idea of self-validity discussed above, the 
concept of self-luminosity is an essential epistemological 
theory of Advaita. They are the premises for understanding 
the knowledge process in this system. The idea may be 
steed up by saying that whenever there is knowledge of 
an object, the fact of this knowledge is immediately known. 
According to Advaita, material things which are all inert 
are not revealed except by cognitions of them. A cognition, 
however, is revealed as soon as it arises, needing no other 
cognition for its revelation. Knowledge of a tree, for 
example, is dependent on its objectification by the cognition, 
"This is a tree". This cognition, however, is immediately 
apprehended. One is immediately aware of one' s knowledge 
of the tree. 
In Advaita, self-luminosity belongs to the ätman alone. 
In Its light everything is illumined and known. The Self 
is the Knower (kshetrajna) and everything else is known 
(kshetra). 23 As the unchanging Witness of all mental 
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modifications, It is referred to as säkshi. 
24 
The same 
Awareness, reflected in the mind and identified with it, 
becomes the 'iva, who functions as the perceiver (pramätä). 
The cognizer, the object cognized (prameya) and the cognition 
(pramiti) are all revealed by the Self as Witness (säkshi). 
In any act of perception, the cognitive mode objectifies 
and reveals the object because it is illumined by the Self. 
This cognition, however, does not require another cognitive 
mode for its manifestation. It is revealed directly by the 
Self as säkshi, as soon as it originates. 
On the question of the self-luminosity of knowledge, 
Advaita is at issue with the Bhätta school of 
Purva-Mimansa who advocate the theory of paratah-prakäsa-vada, 
according to which any knowledge is not self-revealed, but 
dependent for its revelation upon another knowledge. 
25 
The Mimansa argues that cognitions, being formless, cannot 
be directly apprehended, but can be inferred. When a tree, 
for example, is known, it acquires the quality of "knownness" 
which is perceptible. By perceiving this mark of "knownness", 
one infers one's prior knowledge of the tree. Thus, while 
an object may be directly apprehended, its knowledge is 
gained only indirectly by an inferential process of reasoning. 
This Mimansä argument is unmistakably refuted by Shankara. 
Those who hold that cognition (jnana) is formless and 
is not known by immediate perception must admit that, 
since an object of knowledge is apprehended through 
cognition, cognition is quite as 
immediately known as 
pleasure or the like. 
Moreover, it cannot be maintained that cognition is a 
thing which one seeks to know. If cognition were unknown, 
it would be a thing which has to be sought after just as 
an object of cognition is sought after. Just as, for 
example a man seeks to reach by cognition the cognizable 
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object such as a pot, so also would he have to seek to 
reach cognition by means of another cognition. But the 
fact is otherwise. Wherefore cognition is self-revealed, 
and therefore, also, is the cognizer self-revealed-26 
His second argument is the same as that used in refuting the 
paratah-prämänya theory. If one cognition needs another for 
its revelation, the second will need a third and the result 
will be infinite regression. 
27 
The undoubted motivation behind Advaita' s powerful 
advocacy of the theories of the self-validity and self- 
luminosity of knowledge is the necessity for incontrovertibly 
establishing the possibility of valid knowledge. This 
possibility is imperative in any outlook, like Advaita, 
where ultimate human freedom (moksha) lies in the gain of 
valid knowledge. Alternative theories are seen as leading 
to infinitive regression, making knowledge and freedom an 
impossibility. The very definition of a pramäna implies, 
as we have seen, the capacity to produce valid knowledge. 
Before embarking on an analysis of Shankara's justification 
of the Vedas as a source of valid knowledge, it is necessary 
to outline the Advaita view of the nature and operation 
of the other five pramänas. It is only in the light of our 
understanding of the mechanism of these sources, the kind of 
knowledge apprehended through each one and their limitations, 
that we can properly see the centrality and indispensability 
of the Vedas as a pramana for Shankara. Each pramäna has a 
unique way of transmitting knowledge and each one presents 
a distinct type. 
28 
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There is no unanimity among the schools of Indian 
philosophy about the nature and number of these sources 
of knowledge. The Cärväkas only admit sense perception 
as a valid means of knowledge. The schools of Buddhism and 
Vaiseshika acknowledge perception and inference. The 
S ämkhya and Yoga systems go further in recognizing perception, 
inference and sabda. To these three, the Naiyä yikas add 
comparison as a source. Nyäya has contributed immensely to 
the development of inference as a pramäna, upon which, as 
we have seen, every other source of knowledge depends for 
its validation. The Prabhäkara school of Purva-Mimansa goes 
beyond Nyäya and adds postulation as a source of knowledge. 
The process comes to an end with the Bhatta school of Mimansa 
and Advaita who include non-apprehension as the sixth 
pramana. 
2.4 The Six Pramänas 
(I). Perception (Pratyaksha) 
The term pratyaksha is a compound of praty and aksha 
(before the eye). Used as an adjective, it indicates that 
which is direct and immediate. As a noun, it signifies 
immediate knowledge. Pratyaksha principally designates 
knowledge produced from the direct contact of the external 
senses with their objects. Advaita, however, accepts the 
validity of internal perception where mental states such as 
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love, hate, anger and desire are directly known by the atman 
without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the 
mind. 
29 
In the view of Advaita, mental states are 
apprehended as soon as they arise, and the mind is not conceived 
of as the organ of internal perception (antarindriya). 
It cannot be urged that if the mind thus be not an 
organ, the perception of happiness etc., will not be 
immediate (saksat) ; because the immediacy of knowledge 
does not lie in its being due to an organ; for in that 
case inference etc., also, being due to the mind, would 
be immediate, and God's knowledge, which is not due to 
any organ, would not be immediate. 30 
The five external senses comprise the special cause 
(asadhäränam käranam) of perception. The Advaita understanding 
of the nature of the sense organs differs from that of other 
Indian systems, particularly the Buddhists and the Mimänsä. 
The former conceives the sense organs (indriyas) as the 
golokas or sense-orifices, while the latter sees them as the 
capacities (sakti) of the physiological organs. According 
to Advaita, the actual organs of perception are not the 
outer organs located in the physical body. The real sense 
organs are their subtle counterparts located in the 
subtle body (sükshma sarira) and composed of the five 
elements before they have undergone the process of 
grossification (pancikarana). 
31 
Prior to this stage, the 
elements space, air, fire, water and earth exist in a 
pure subtle form, characterized by the qualities of sattva, 
rajas and tamas. Out of the subtle sattva aspect of 
space (äkäsa) is evolved the organ of hearing, the ear. 
The organ of touch, the skin, envolves out of the sattva 
aspect of air (väyu), the organs of sight from the sattva 
aspect of fire (agni), the organ of taste, the tongue, 
from 
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the sattva aspect of water (äpah), and from the sattva 
aspect of earth is evolved the organ of smell. From the 
total sattva aspect of these five elements emerges the 
antahkarana (internal organ) constituted of the manas (mind), 
3 buddhi (intellect), ahamkära (ego) and citta (memory) .2 
It is the fivefold nature of the elements which necessitates 
the fiv efoldness of the indriyas and it is the special 
relationship which each sense organ enjoys with a particular 
element that enables it to perceive its respective object. 
The organs are but modes of the objects in order to 
perceive them, as a lamp, which is but a mode of 
colour, is an instrument for revealing all colours. 
Similarly, the organs are but modes of all particular 
objects in order to perceive them, as is the case with 
the lamp. 33 
Shankara goes to great lengths to justify the existence 
of the internal organ (antahkarana). He argues inductively 
for its reality. 
For it is a well known fact that even when there is a 
connection between the external organ, the object and 
the self, a man does not perceive that object which may 
be just in front, and when asked, 'Have you seen this 
form? ' he says, 'My mind was elsewhere -I was absent- 
minded, I did not see it'. Similarly when asked, 'Have 
you heard what I have said'? he says, 'I was absent- 
minded, I did not hear it'. Therefore it is understood 
that something else, viz., the internal organ called 
the mind, which joins itself to the objects of all the 
organs, exists, in the absence of which the eye and 
other organs fail to perceive their respective objects 
such as form and sound, although they have the capacity 
to do so, and in the presence of which they succeed in 
it. Hence it is through the mind that everybody sees 
and hears, for vision and the like are impossible when 
the mind is engaged. 34 
The existence of the antahkarana is also apparent as the 
faculty which receives, discriminates and interprets sense 
data. Because, "even if one is touched by anybody from 
behind invisibly, one knows it distinctly that this is a 
touch of the hand, or that this is a touch of the knee; 
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therefore the internal organ called mind exists. If there 
is no mind to distinguish them, how can the skin alone do 
this? That which helps us to distinguish between perceptions 
is the mind". 
35 
In addition to these two arguments, Shankara also 
proposes the possibility that the non-existence of the 
antahkarana would result in either perpetual perception 
or perpetual non-perception. The former will result whenever 
there is a conjunction of the ätman, the sense organs and their 
respective objects, since these will comprise the. sufficient 
instruments of perception. Alternatively, if in the presence 
of all three factors perception did not occur, there will be 
the possibility of constant non-perception. Since neither 
of these two alternatives obtains, one must acknowledge the 
presence of an internal organ, "through the alertness of 
which perception occurs, and through the want of alertness 
of which it does not occur" . 
36 
In any act of external perception therefore, there are 
four factors present, the absence of any one of which makes 
it impossible. These are the ätman, the antahkarana, the 
sense organ and the object. Of these four elements, the 
ätman alone is immanently luminous, being of the nature of 
Consciousness. In any act of knowing, the object is revealed 
by the atnlan, which is conjoined to the former through the 
mind conjoined with the sense organ. 
37 
Advaita contends 
that sensible knowledge results from the contact of the 
sense organs with their appropriate objects. Because it 
conceives the sense organs as composed of subtle substances, 
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Advaita finds no difficulty in claiming that these organs 
actually reach out to their objects. 
38 In reaching out to 
the objects, the organs are accompanied by the mind which 
is also composed of the same subtle substances. The mind 
assumes a modification (vritti) which corresponds to the 
object and which is illumined by the ätman as Awareness. 
The result of this entire process is perception. 
Through perception, we are able to know the object itself, 
its qualities, genus and individual differences. These are 
perceived as attributes of substances and identical with them. 
Shankara rejects the Nyäya category of inherence (samaväya) 
which is posited as an independent factor holding the 
distinct elements of substance and attribute together. Like 
the relation between the universal and the particular, the 
relation between substance and attribute is one of identity. 
They may be distinguishable in thought, but not in fact. 
The argument for inherence as an independent category leads 
to infinite regress. 
39 
Besides its classification of perceptual knowledge as 
internal and external, Advaita also recognizes the 
categories of determinate (savikalpa) and indeterminate 
(nirvikalpa) perception. 
40 Generally, perception is of the 
determinate type, which grasps the relatedness of substantive 
and qualifying attribute. The knowledge, "This is a jar", 
for example, is determinate because it apprehends the jar 
and its generic quality "jarness" as related to each other. 
Indeterminate perception, however, does not apprehend the 
relatedness of substantive and its attribute. The sentence, 
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"This is that Devadatta", is indeterminate because it points 
out Devadatta as being divested of qualifying attributes "this" 
and "that". The mahaväkya (great sentence) "tat tvam asi" 
is also a sentence of the latter type. Indeterminate 
perception is less common than determinate. 
41 
In the presence of defect-free causal conditions, 
pratyaksha produces immediate valid knowledge. Invalidity, 
as we have seen, is the result of extraneous conditions 
such as a diseased sense organ or an insufficient medium 
of light etc. Except in such instances, perception is 
unchallengeable in its own field, even by the Vedas. 
If you deny an observed fact, saying it is impossible, 
you would be contradicting experience, a thing which 
nobody will allow. Nor is there any question of 
impossibility with regard to an observed fact, because 
it has actually been observed. 42 
Shankara often rejects an opponent's position if he can 
point to its disparity with perception. 
(II). Inference (Anumäna) 
The Sanskrit term for inference is anunäna, which 
literally means "knowing after". The knowledge arrived at 
by the application of this method is referred to as anumiti 
(consequent knowledge), from anu (after) and miti (knowledge). 
It indicates therefore, knowledge that is gained from an 
anterior knowledge. Anumiti is the knowledge that is 
reasoned from the knowledge of an invariable concomitance 
between what is perceived and what is deduced. 
43 The Sanskrit 
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term for this uniform relation is ä ti (extension or 
pervasion) . This universal concurrence of the major term 
and the minor term in all the loci where the latter is 
present is held by both Advaita and Nyäya to be the core of 
44 
anumäna as a pramana. 
Advaita maintains that vydpti is discerned when it is 
established by all known cases and when no negative one 
has been observed. The actual number of observed cases is 
not important and vyäpti could be detected from one known 
instance. Repetition is necessary only when there is cause 
for doubt. 
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The Advaita basis therefore, for determination 
of vyäpti is positive invariable concomitance or agreement 
in presence (anvaya), and non-observation of any exception. 
The standard example of anumana, where there is smoke, 
there is fire, illustrates positive invariable concomitance. 
On this point there is a difference of opinion with Nyaya 
who insist also on negative invariable concomitance (vyatireka) 
or agreement in absence (where there is no fire, there is no 
smoke) as a requirement of vyäpti. 
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As a consequence of 
this view, the main fallacy of a syllogism is the contradiction 
of perception and Shankara constantly refutes arguments 
on this basis. 
When a thing is directly recognized as identical, it 
is improper to infer that it is something else, for 
when an inference contradicts perception, the ground 
of such an inference becomes fallacious. 47 
This brings us to a consideration of the syllogistic 
form which is employed by Advaita, and here a comparison 
with Ny-a is advantageous. The terms 
in Indian logic 
which correspond to the major, minor and middle 
terms of 
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the Western syllogism are sädhya, paksha and hetu. In the 
standard example, fire, the object to be inferred, is the 
sddhya. The hill, that in which the thing is inferred, is 
the paksha, and smoke, the ground of the inference, is the 
hetu (reason). The hetu is commonly referred to as the 
sädhana (means of inference) or lin a (mark, sign). The 
Nyäya form. of anumäna comprises five distinct propositions 
or stages. These are as follows: 
1. Pratijnä - (the proposition to be established) - There 
is fire on the hill. 
2. Hetu - (reason) - because there is smoke. 
3. Udäharana (universal proposition supported by example) - 
Whenever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen. 
4. Upanaya (application) - The hill has smoke such as is 
always accompanied by fire. 
5. Nigamana (conclusion) - Therefore there is fire on the 
hill. 
According to Advaita, however, the first three or the last 
three steps of the syllogism are adequate. Advaita 
distinguishes between an anumäna meant for oneself 
(svärthanumana) and one intended for convincing another 
person (pararthänumäna). It is the latter which requires 
the formal syllogistic form and this can be constituted 
of the first three or last three members of the fivefold 
Ny ya procedure. 
48 
The necessity of an observed example as an essential 
part of any anumäna points to one of its inherent features. 
Anumäna, basically speaking, is deductive reasoning since 
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its operation consists in the application of a universal 
proposition to a particular case. But the support of the 
universal proposition by at least one example taken 
from actual experience, bestows upon it an inductive feature. 
Knowledge of vydpti is acquired by observation and 
generalization. Anumäna therefore, is a combined inductive 
- deductive process of reasoning. 
Inference, dependent as it is on perception for the data 
of its propositions, is subject to the limitations of being 
able to deal only with the material that is the proper 
sphere of perception. They are both, by definition, debarred 
from authoritativeness with regards to any matter 
transcending sense apperception. This does not presume, 
however, that Shankara finds no utility for anumäna in his 
exegesis of the Vedas. The task which he apportions to this 
source of knowledge in relation to sabda-pramäna will be 
considered later. 
(III). Comparison (Upamäna) 
Upamäna, as an independent source of knowledge, is 
accepted by Mimansa, Nyäya and Advaita. It is defined as, 
"the instrument of the valid knowledge of similarity of , 
49 
The standard example of upamäna is provided by the Vedanta- 
Paribhäsä. Similarity may be known by perception, as in the 
case of one who, having seen his cow at home, goes into the 
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woods and sees a wild cow ( ava a) which resembles his own 
cow. From this experience, however, he gains the additional 
knowledge that his cow at home is like the gavaya. Upamana 
is the means by which the judgement of the cow's similarity 
to the gavaya is formed from the perception of the gavaya' s 
resemblance to his cow. This resulting knowledge is called 
upamiti. Advaita denies that upamäna is a case of 
perception, because the cow is not immediately present 
before one's eyes. Upamäna is also differentiated from 
anumäna. In Indian logic, inference is always syllogistic 
and the major premise of a comparative judgement would be 
formulated as follows: "When A is like B, B is also like A". 
Such a premise would beg the question. To the argument 
that upamäna is a combination of perception and memory, the 
Advaitin will accept that the elements of comparison may be 
so derived, the cow through memory and the gavaya through 
perception, but this leaves the question of their integration 
unanswered. The same objection, moreover, can be raised 
about inference. Dharmardja adduces the further evidence 
that in upamäna one has the apperception, "I am comparing 
[not inferring] the two things". 
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Advaita finds it 
impossible to explain comparative judgements through any 
of the other pramänas and Shankara includes upamäna in his 
detailing of the valid sources of knowledge. 
(IV). Postulation (Arthäpatti) 
The term arthäpatti is a compound of artha (fact) and 
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ä atti (obtaining). It indicates the assumption of an 
unperceived or unknown fact in order to explain two facts 
which are known but contradictory. 51 The standard example 
is that of a man who fasts during the day but manages to 
remain fat. These two incompatible facts are reconciled by 
postulating that he must be eating during the night. Another 
typical example is that of a person who is alive and not 
at home. One can assume that he must be somewhere outside, 
for the fact of being alive and not at home cannot be otherwise 
explained. It is obvious from these two illustrations that 
arthäpatti is appropriate where there is only one alternative 
possible. If the options are many, the assumption of one 
will not irrefutably resolve the paradox. Arthapatti does not, 
like a hypothesis, offer a tentative supposition that awaits 
verification. It arises out of a need for explanation and 
is intended to carry absolute certainty as the only possible 
solution. One cannot, for example, postulate the origin 
of the world in an omnipotent and omnipresent Creator, 
because of the conceivability of alternative explanations. 
The universe might have come into being from the concerted 
action of several gods. 
Arthäpatti is classified by Advaita as being of two 
types: 
1. postulation from what is seen (drishtärthdpatti); 
2. postulation from what is heard (srutärthäpatti). 
Our example of the stout man who fasts during the day 
illustrates the first type. Presumption of the second type 
occurs where, "on account of the incongruity of the direct 
meaning of a sentence that is being heard, one assumes a 
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different meaning for it". 52 For instance, as a result 
of the sruti statement, "The knower of the Self transcends 
grief", 53 one postulates that the manifold bonds signified 
by the word grief must be false, for they cannot otherwise 
be destroyed by knowledge. Srutärthapatti is further divided 
into two kinds; 
1. that due to incompleteness of verbal expression 
(abhidhanänupapatti); 
2. that due to incompleteness of meaning (abhihitänupapatti). 
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The first occurs where one hears only part of a sentence 
and assumes an additional word or words consistent with 
the context and intention of the speaker. To the words 
"open" or "close", one often supplements "the door". As 
an example of the second kind of srutärthäpatti, Dharmaräja 
gives the Vedic text, "One who desires heaven should 
perform the jyotishtoma sacrifice". 
55 This statement 
prompts a doubt about the possibility of a time bound 
ritual creating a remote future result. This doubt is 
resolved by the assumption of an unseen result (apürva) which 
endures and leads to the attainment of heaven. 
Advaitins resist any attempt to reduce arthäpatti to a 
kind of inference. It is argued that any attempt to do so 
involves begging the question, for the major premise of the 
syllogism will assume the fact which it is the aim of the 
inferential argument to prove. A formulation of the 
standard example in a syllogistic structure will read 
as follows: 
Devadatta who is stout must eat by day or by night. 
70 
Devadatta does not eat by day. 
Therefore, he eats by night. 
Advaita will argue that it is through arthäpatti that one 
arrives at the conclusion of the major premise. 
56 
Dharnaräja also adds that in arthäpatti, one has the 
apperception of "assuming" and not "inferring". 
57 
Srutärthäpatti is specifically mentioned by Shankara at 
many points in his commentaries and he uses it as a 
principle of exegesis. 
58 
Drishtärthäpatti finds less use in 
him because, as we shall see, he relies on sabda-pramäna 
as a reliable source for unperceived facts. 
(V). Non-cognition (Anupalabdhi) 
The Bhätta school of Purva-Mimansä and Advaita Vedänta 
accept non-cognition as an independent pram na. According 
to both schools, the absence of an object or its attributes 
from any locus is apprehended by its non-perception. 
59 
The 
absence of a table from its accustomed position in a room 
is not known by cognition of its non-existence, for the 
organ of vision has no contact with non-existence, but by 
the non-cognition of its presence. 
60 
Indirect knowledge of non-existence can be attained 
by other means. One can infer, for instance, the absence 
of a person at his residence from his presence at his. 
place of work. Direct knowledge, however, of the 
71 
non-existence of perceptible objects and their attributes 
is available only through anupalabdhi. It is considered 
to be independent because it does not involve any of the 
processes occurring in anumäna, upamäna, arthäpatti or 
sabda. The attempt to reduce anupalabdhi to an inference 
will result, Advaita claims, in a begging of the question. 
The major premise of such an inference, "what is not 
perceived in a place does not exist there", assumes the 
very conclusion which is intended to be proved. Moreover, 
there is still the question of how one arrives at the general 
proposition. 
It must be emphasized that only appropriate non-perception 
(yogyänupalabdhi) can serve as a pramäna of non-existence, 
for not every . non-apprehension of an object 
is evidence of 
its non-existence. If the room, for example, in which one 
does not see the desk is dark, the absence of the desk is 
not conclusively proved. Non-apprehension could be 
considered appropriate in a situation where the object 
would have been perceived if it have been present. If the 
room is well lit, anupalabdhi of the desk is appropriate 
(yogya) 
. 
61 
The Vedanta-Paribhäsä describes four kinds of non- 
existence ., all cognizable 
by appropriate anupalabdhi : 
62 
1. Previous non-existence (prägabhäva). This is the 
absence of an effect (e. g. a jar) in its cause (e. g. clay) 
n 
before the origination of the effect. Pragabhäva has 
no beginning, but comes to an end when the effect is 
72 
produced. 
2. Non-existence as destruction (pradhvansabhäva). 
When the jar, for instance, is broken, its non-existence 
in the component parts is an example of pradhvansäbhäva. 
When these parts are further broken up, then this 
destruction is also destroyed. This does not, however, 
imply the reappearance of the jar on the analogy that 
two negatives make a positive. According to Advaita, 
therefore, non-existence as destruction has both a 
beginning and an end. 
63 
3. Absolute non-existence (atyantäbhäva). That which 
does not exist in a particular locus at any time, past, 
present or future, has absolute non-existence there 
(e. g. horns of a hare). Absolute non-existence is 
beginningless, but comes to an end when its locus, being 
non-eternal, is destroyed. 
4. Mutual non-existence (anyonyäbhäva). This is 
the difference cognized in a statement such as, "The 
dog is not a man". Anyonyäbhäva has a beginning when 
its locus has a beginning, as in the difference between 
a jar and a piece of cloth. It is beginningless if its 
substratum enjoys the same characteristic, as in the 
difference of the jiva and isvara. All differences, 
however, are eventually negated in the knowledge of the 
non-dual brahman. 
73 
(VI) 
. 
*abda-pramäna 
The term sabda, includes both articulate (varna) and 
inarticulate (dhvani) sounds. 
64 
As a means of valid 
knowledge (sabda-pramäna), it refers to a meaningful, 
articulate sound, spoken or written, consisting of a 
single word or a group of words. 
65 Sabda-pramäna is accepted 
by Sämkhya, Nyäya, Purva-Milmänsä and Vedanta schools of 
Indian philosophy. There is no unanimity of interpretation 
and understanding of the concept in these different 
systems. In their attempts to explain and justify 
sabda as a pramdna, proponents of Advaita had to consider 
many questions relating to the nature of the word, the 
structure of language and its relationship with meaning, 
and different levels of meaning. We shall now examine some 
of these theories which are relevant to our understanding 
of sabda-pramana. 
66 
(A). Individual sounds and synthetic meanings 
One of the primary questions investigated was the 
possibility of deriving whole meanings from the individual 
sounds of which words were composed. 
67 The sounds which 
make up any word are presented separately to the hearer 
in the sequence in which they occur. They are not 
apprehended conjointly. In the word, "venerable", for 
example, the sound, "ve", is heard before any of the other 
sounds are apprehended. As each sound 
is apprehended, 
those which immediately precede it pass out of existence 
74 
and the subsequent ones are unuttered. There is no single 
moment therefore, so it is argued, when all the sounds 
are received together. How then is it possible to 
comprehend all three syllables of "venerable" as a unitive 
expression? If it is argued that though the sounds are 
perceived separately they are united by being remembered in 
conjunction, then it is replied that even in memory they 
will be reproduced in the sequence in which they are 
first perceived. 
68 
To obviate these difficulties, the Indian grammarians 
(vaiyakaranas) postulated the theory of sphota. 
69 
Corresponding to each word and sentence, there is a latent, 
unperceived and indivisible sphota which conveys its meaning. 
As the sounds of which a word is composed are sequentially 
uttered, the corresponding sphota is progressively revealed. 
It is fully revealed when the last syllable is uttered. 
Since the sphota is conceived by its advocates to be eternal 
(nitya) and indivisible (niravyava), there is no question 
of a time sequence and it can be grasped as a whole. The 
syllables of any word only serve to reveal the sphota and 
do not themselves present its meaning. 
70 
The theory of 
sphota (sphotaväda) is completely rejected by Shankara. 
71 
His argument is that it raises the identical difficulties 
which it is intended to circumvent. If a sound series 
which is sequentially revealed cannot manifest the 
word meaning, it - must be incapable also of manifesting the 
sphota. If the individually perceived sounds are capable 
of disclosing the sphota, there is no reason why they should 
41 
not unfold the meaning of the whole word. Shankara also 
75 
argues that the problem of the unitive perception of a 
series does not belong to a sound series alone. Other 
examples are a forest of trees, an army of soldiers and 
a line of ants. What is needed is a general solution 
applicable to all such series. His own explanation is that 
even though the letter-sounds of any word are successively 
perceived, the intellect (buddhi) possesses the capacity 
to synthesize elements which are serially cognized. He 
refers to this intellectual function as samastapratyavamarsini 
buddhi (intellect looking back on past experiences as a 
whole) . If this is acceptable, there is no need to posit a 
separate theory to explain the perception of a sound 
series. The word itself therefore, in Shankara's view, 
is capable of divulging its meaning without any mediating 
factor. 
(B). Conditions of word combination 
Words, though directly revealing their meanings, are 
generally used in conjunction with other words and are usually 
most effective and potent in such combinations. The basic 
unit of sabda-pramäna is the sentence (väýa) which has been 
defined as follows: 
That sentence is a means of valid knowledge in which 
the relation (among the meanings of words) that is 
the object of its intention is not contradicted by 
any other means of valid knowledge. 72 
It is a complete expression of human thought, generally 
consisting of two or more words, one of which 
is the verb. 
73 
The implication of the above definition of Dharmaräja is 
76 
that the significance of a sentence is the relation among 
the meanings of the individual words which comprise it. 
The meaningfulness of the sentence therefore, does not 
depend only on the understanding of the meanings of its 
component words, which are recollected from memory. This 
is an important feature of the process of sabda-pramäna 
which distinguishes it from other means of valid knowledge. 
The comprehension of these relations is referred to as 
sabda-bodha, the sentence itself is termed sabda-pramäna 
and the valid knowledge communicated by it is sabda-prama. 
The combination of word meanings to produce sabda-bodha 
occurs in the presence of specific and unique conditions, 
which identify and distinguish sabda as an independent 
means of valid knowledge. The standard classification 
enumerates four such conditions, which we shall now consider: 
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1. Expectancy (akänksha). This has been defined as, 
"the capacity of the meanings of words to become objects 
of inquiry regarding each other". 
75 The ability of 
words to enter significant combinations depends upon 
the general incompleteness of the isolated individual 
word, and the ability of other words to fulfil this 
incompleteness. The indeterminate and fragmentary 
significance of the detached word arouses the expectancy 
for other words which would consummate its meaning. 
A word signifying action awakens a desire for information 
regarding the subject of the activity, its object, time 
and place. Some words are more indeterminate in 
meaning than others and the degree of expectancy evoked 
by words differs. A preposition, adjective or verb is 
77 
comparatively less complete than a noun. The important 
point is that any meaningful sentence must satisfy the 
mutual expectancy of its constituent words. 
2. Compatibility (yogyatä). This is the counterpart 
of expectancy. It has been defined as "non-contradiction 
of the relation [between the meaning of the words] that 
is intended". 76 Each word, as we have seen, has the 
capacity to kindle the desire for other meanings to 
complete its sense. Every other word, however, cannot 
appease this expectancy. The symbol which does it 
must enjoy a compatibility of meaning with its fellow- 
word. "She is the daughter of a barren woman", is an 
example of an incompatible combination of meanings. 
The internal relationship between the meanings of the 
words determines their combination. This must not 
be mutually contradictory. Some sentences however, 
such as, "tat tvam asi", are only apparently incompatible 
in meaning. Their significance can be found in 
their implied meanings. 
3. Contiguity (äsatti). 'This has been defined as, 
"the apprehension, without an interval, of the meanings 
of words that is produced by those words" . 
77 In addition 
to the incompleteness of meaning of the solitary word, 
and the capacity of words to satisfy the mutual 
expectancy of their respective meanings, they must 
also be presented in close proximity in order that 
they may be construed together. In the case of 
written words, this proximity must be spatial, and 
78 
where the words are spoken, it should be temporal. 
Failure to meet this requirement makes it difficult to 
discover the meanings which are to be associated. In 
some cases, where particular words are omitted, they 
are to be supplied from the context in order to 
complete the meaning. The following is an example of 
a sentence lacking äsatti: "The son of the farmer 
won the prize who lives next door". 
4. Intention or purport (tätparya). This is 
defined as, "the capacity to produce cognition of a 
particular thing". 
78 
Tätparya emphasizes the fact 
that sentences are the product of a speaker or 
writer, whose intention must be an important factor 
for consideration in deciphering meaning. Intention or 
purport has to be gathered from the particular context, 
the introduction and conclusion, and the general 
emphasis. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the 
meanings of words vary with context. 
79 
(C). Relational and non-relational sentences 
A sentence generally consists of a subject (uddesya) 
and a predicate (vidheya) expressing a substantive-adjective 
relation (uddesya-vidheya sambandha) between them. "The 
lotus is blue", signifies that the flower is characterized 
by "blueness". A sentence which expresses such a relation 
is termed a samsargävagähi väkyam, and the Mimansä contends 40 
79 
that all sentences are of this nature. While accepting 
such a relation to be the general characteristic of most 
sentences, Advaita contends that there are some cases where 
the intention is not to express a relational meaning, but 
to posit identity between the subject and predicate. This 
type of väkya is not samsargavagahi but akhandärthaka i. e. 
a sentence with identity as its purport. The sentence, 
"This is that Devadatta", is an example of this atypical kind. 
Analysis of this sentence reveals an incompatibility. 
"This", as indicating present time and space, and "that", 
referring to some other space and time, are clearly 
incompatible and cannot be indentical. The intention of the 
judgement cannot be to point out that the substantive 
(Devadatta), as determined by "this" is exactly the same 
as when determined by "that". It is clear, however, 
that the expression wants to demonstrate an identity. 
The sentence points out the identity of Devadatta in spite 
of the differences expressed by "this" and "that". In 
other words, identity is arrived at by negating the 
determinants which are seen as being incapable of affecting 
the persisting identity of Devadatta. There is no question 
of a relation being the intention here. 
80 
The purpose of a sentence such as, "The most resplendent 
is the moon", is also to point out the moon to the exclusion 
of all objects appearing in the sky at night. The term 
"resplendent" negates any nonluminous body, while "most" 
distinguishes the moon from other luminous bodies in the 
sky. The noteworthy feature of this example is that it is 
not the intention of the speaker to relate the moon to any 
89 
other object. In response to the inquirer, he seeks 
only to identify it in the firmament. From the standpoint 
of only indicating the object of inquiry, this sentence 
can be said to be akhanddrthaka. 
a0 
(D). Levels of Meaning 
So far we have been discussing words in the sense of 
primary meanings alone. The theory of secondary meanings, 
however, is critically significant in the Advaita 
understanding of sabda-pramana. It obviously pre-exists 
Shankara who used it to great advantage in his exegesis of 
Vedantic texts. A systematization of the theory is attempted 
by Dharmaraja in Vedanta-Paribhäsä. 81 
Primary meaning is, "the direct reference of words to 
their meanings". 
82 
An implied meaning is, "the object 
implied by a word". 
83 The latter is described as being 
twofold: 
1. Simple or pure implication (kevalalakshanä) 
2. Double implication or implication by the implied 
(lakshitalakshanä) 84 
According to another classification, lakshanä is of three 
kinds. 85 
1. Exclusive implication (jahallakshanä). 
86 One 
resorts to exclusive implication when the primary 
meaning of a word or sentence is excluded or abandoned 
in favour of the implied meaning. The standard 
81 
example of jahallakshanä is, "The village is on the 
Ganges". It is obvious that the direct meaning of 
"Ganges" is incompatible with the purport of the other 
words. The village could not be located on the surface 
of the water. Therefore, by exclusive implication, the 
term should be understood to refer to the banks of the river. 
2. Non-exclusive implication (ajahallakshana). This 
form of implication occurs where the primary meaning of 
a word is not excluded, but included along with its 
implied meaning. An example of it is, "The red is 
winning the race". Here "red" means red horse. Thus 
the word "red", without relinquishing its primary 
meaning of red colour, indicates, by non-exclusive 
implication, the red horse. In these instances, there 
is usually a change in the syntactical function of the 
word which narrows its meaning. 
3. Exclusive-non-exclusive implication 
(jahadajahallakshanä). In this instance, only a part 
of the original meaning is retained, while the rest 
is rejected. In the example, "This is that 
Devadatta", the primary meaning of "this" is present 
time and place, and "that" points to an alternative 
time and space. These two being clearly incompatible, 
they are negated in favour of the individual free from 
spatial and temporal qualifications. The point of 
this example is not that Devadatta under the two different 
sets of conditions is absolutely identical. 
In the past he might have been stout and wearing white 
82 
clothing. He is later seen to be lean and wearing 
blue clothing. The expression, "This is that Devadatta", 
does not posit an identity between the leanness and 
blue clothing of Devadatta, and his stoutness and 
white clothing. These accidental qualities are negated 
and what is qualified by them (i. e. Devadatta) is retained. 
87 
Implication is necessitated primarily by the intention of 
a sentence rather than the logical connection of its words. 
88 
In Dharmaräja's example, "Protect the curd from the crows", 
there is no frustration of logical connection. Intention, 
however, is frustrated, for the purpose is the securing of 
the curd from all creatures. In the sentence, "The village 
is on the Ganges", there is frustration of both logical 
connection and intention. In this case, the frustration of 
intention which is common to both sentences, is the result 
of the frustration of logical connection. There is a need 
for recourse to implication only when the direct meaning 
is clearly impossible. 
89 Implied meaning is discovered 
through the application of an arthäpatti (postulation) type 
of reasoning. The data for this are the recollected primary 
meanings and the intention of the speaker. The latter can 
be inferred from the general context. Depending on the 
context, the connection between the primary and implied 
meanings may be close or remote. 
90 
(E). The validity of sabda-pramdna 
83 
Advaita argues for the acceptance of sabda as an 
independent and valid means of knowledge. It is seen as 
a unique method of access to information, and Advaita 
contends that it cannot be subsumed under any of the other 
pramanas. Sabda-pramäna, for example, cannot be reduced to 
the process of memory synthesis. The argument that the 
meaning of a sentence is apprehended by conjoining from 
memory the meanings of its individual words does not 
account for the resultant knowledge which may be entirely 
new. One can have verbal cognition of something not 
entirely known before. 
91 We have seen that the comprehension 
of the significance of a sentence depends upon grasping the 
relation among the meanings of its individual words. 
It does not depend only on the cognition of an invariable 
relation between the perceived words and their meanings. 
For this reason therefore, sabda-pramana cannot be reduced 
to inference, for the latter depends upon the knowledge 
of invariable concomitance. 
Although the Naiyäyikas concur with Advaita in accepting 
sabda as a pram na, there are important differences between 
. 
both schools with regard to the question of validity. 
92 
The Naiyäyikas accepted sabda-pramäna on the grounds that 
it provides information which is not obtained from (even 
though it may be obtainable from) other sources. The 
status of sabda as a pramäna is not demolished by the fact 
that the information which it provides can be obtained 
from perception or inference. The important point is that 
the information is novel for the hearer. On the question 
of validity, however, the Naiyäyikas, consistent with 
84 
their theory of paratah-prämänya-väda, argue that it is to 
be inferred from the trustworthiness of the source. Against 
this claim, Advaita argues that validity is produced and 
known by the very conditions that generate knowledge. The 
application of the Nydya theory, according to Advaita, 
leads to infinite regress. It is quite possible to see 
Advaita conceding the importance of the trustworthiness of 
the source in the production of validity. One imagines, 
however, that this factor will be understood as one of the 
intrinsic conditions. The Advaita argument therefore, is that 
in the absence of any grounds for contradiction or doubt, 
sabda, like any other pramäna, produces valid knowledge. 
With an understanding of this general background of the 
nature and sources of valid knowledge in Advaita, we can now 
consider how Shankara applies these views in his conception 
of sruti as sabda-pramäna. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE VEDAS AS SABDA-PRAMANA 
. 
Sabda, as we noted above, can be seen as a pramana for 
our knowledge of the empirical world, as well as ultimate 
reality. Our earlier discussion treated sabda-prarcäna 
in a more general sense. Advaita, however, is not primarily 
concerned with sabda-pramäna as a vehicle of secular 
knowledge. As such a medium, sabda cannot lay claim to any 
particular uniqueness, for the knowledge which it conveys is, 
in most cases, available through other sources. 
l As a 
pramana of the empirical world, it does not have a sphere 
which is exclusively its own, and which, by nature, it alone 
is capable of transmitting. 
2 
The special nature of sabda 
therefore, for Advaita, lies in its function as a means of 
knowledge for ultimate reality. In this capacity, sabda- 
pramäna is synonymous with the Vedas or sruti. 
3 Advaita 
seeks to justify the view that, because of the very nature 
of reality, the Vedas alone can transmit accurate knowledge. 
All of the theories about sabda-prarräna have emerged as a 
result of this central concern and the need to defend it 
against the criticisms of other Indian schools. We hope 
to show in the discussion below that Shankara posits no 
alternative to the Vedas for our knowledge of brahman. His 
acceptance of the function of the avatära as a teacher, and 
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the world, in general, as a revelation of brahman does not 
contradict the necessity for the Vedas. 
Shankara' s views on the nature of the avatära and His 
role as revealer emerge from his commentary on the 
Bhagavadgitä. In his introduction to the text, 
Shankara states that the Lord, after creating the world 
and the forefathers of man (prajäpatis), imparted to them 
the twofold paths of Works (pravritti dharma) and Renunciation 
41 
(nivritti dharma), meant respectively for worldly prosperity 
and liberation. By this twofold path, He intended to 
secure order in the universe. When, however, as a result of 
unrestrained desire, man's discrimination was overwhelmed 
and religion declined, the Lord incarnated Himself as 
Krishna, for the purpose of reintroducing and strengthening 
the Vedic religion. 
4 
Whenever there is a decay of Dharma, 0 Bharata, and an 
ascendancy of Adharma, then I manifest Myself. 
For the protection of the good, for the destruction 
of evil-doers, for the firm establishment of Dharma, 
I am born in every age. 5 
Shankara emphasizes that the Lord is by nature eternal, pure, 
intelligent and free. Through the unimpeded control of His 
creative power (mayd), He appears as though embodied. Whereas 
the individual is born under the control of mäyä, the Lord 
incarnates through the mastery of rriaya. It is a voluntary, 
self-conscious descent, in full awareness of His majesty. 
Though I am unborn, of imperishable nature, and though 
I am the Lord of all beings, yet ruling over My own 
nature, I am born by my own Mdya. 6 
In the Bhagavadgita, the avatära is not limited by embodiment. 
A rjuna is limited in knowledge, but Krishna 
is conscious of 
87 
all previous births of them both. 7 Past, present and 
future are all spanned in His awareness. 
8 The descent of 
the av atära is not for any personal need or desire born 
out of a sense of limitation. He is an already fully 
accomplished being whose actions are not characterized by 
any motive of personal achievement. 
I have nothing whatsoever to achieve in the three 
worlds, 0 son of Pritha, nor is there anything 
unattained that should be attained; yet I engage in 
action. 9 
His actions are directed to world welfare and preserv ation. 
10 
With reference to His instruction of Arjuna, Shankara writes, 
Without any interest of His own, but with the sole 
intention of helping His creatures, He taught to Arjuna, 
who was deeply plunged in the ocean of grief and delusion, 
the two-fold Vedic Religion, evidently thinking that the 
Religion would widely spread when accepted and practised 
by men of high character. ll 
The cardinal point to be noted in Shankara's discussion of 
the avatära as revealer is that He revivifies and reiterates 
the doctrines of the Vedas. The Bhagavadgitä, according to 
Shankara, "is an epitome of the essentials of the whole 
Vedic teaching", and is not at variance with it. 
12 The 
instructions of the avatära are in the form of a restatement 
and do not in any way supersede the primacy of the Vedic 
revelation. Krishna does not claim to be instituting a new 
path to freedom, but emphasizes His traditional links and 
the conventional approach. 
I taught this imperishable Yoga to Vivasvat; Vivasvat 
taught it to Manu; Manu taught it to Ikshväku. 
This, handed down thus in succession, the King-sages 
learnt. This Yoga, by long lapse of time, has been 
lost here, 0 harasser of foes. 
That same ancient Yoga has been today taught to thee 
by Me, seeing that thou art My devotee and friend; for, 
this is the Supreme Secret. 13 
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It is clear therefore, that even in relation to the role of 
the avatära, the Vedas remain the original and authoritative 
pramäna of brahman. 
There are several passages in the commentaries of 
Shankara where he suggests that brahman is directly and 
self-evidently revealed in the world and in man. In 
response to an objection that if brahman is a completely 
unknown entity It cannot become the subject of inquiry, 
Shankara replies, "that the existence of Brahman is well 
known from the fact of Its being the Self of all; for 
everyone feels that his Self exists, and he never feels, 
'I do not exist'. Had there been no general recognition 
of the existence of the Self, everyone would have felt, 
'I do not exist'. And that Self is Brahman". 
14 Earlier 
on also, in replying to a query that an unperceived Self 
cannot become the locus of superimposition, he contends that 
the Self is well known in the world as an immediately 
perceived entity. It is nothing but the content of the 
concept "It'. 
15 Elsewhere, he remarks that in all cognitions, 
brahman as absolute Existence is cognized. 
16 Each cognition 
involves a twofold consciousness of the real and unreal. In 
a cognition such as, "This is a post", the object is 
limited and finite. But the consciousness of Existence or 
"Is-ness", which is the persisting substratum of the object, 
is eternal. From the standpoint of Shankara, the entire 
universe can be seen as a name and form revealing of 
brahman with Whom it is identical. 
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The problem with these general forms of revelation, 
if they can be so termed, is that we are not, through them, 
made aware of the distinctive nature of brahman. Shankara 
develops his argument about the self-evident manifestation 
of the ätman as the content of the "I" notion, by pointing 
out that, in spite of this knowledge, the unique nature of 
the Self remains unknown. As evidence of this, he cites the 
divergent and mutually contradictory views which different 
systems hold about the nature of the Self. 
17 
The point 
therefore, is that even though we are not completely debarred 
from all awareness of reality, we do not recognize its 
existence and our understanding is incomplete. What is 
needed is a valid source of knowledge through which we can 
apprehend accurately the unique nature of the Self. The 
Vedas, Shankara contends, is just such a pramäna. 
40 
3.1 The Eternity of the Vedic Revelation 
It is an important contention of both Advaita Vedanta 
and Purva-Mimänsä that the Vedas are eternal, uncreated and 
authorless (apaurusheya). The claim for the infallibility 
of these texts follows directly from this contention. If a 
personal author is ascribed to the Vedas, they will suffer 
from the limitations of authorship, and their status as 
a defect-free source of knowledge will be under doubt. Against 
the eternity of the Vedas, it may be argued that words 
originate along with or only after the objects which they 
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signify have come into existence. They are as time-bound 
as their objects and can in no sense therefore, be eternal. 
The assumption here is that the Vedas can be eternal only 
if the words of which they are composed are established to 
be so, and words are as transient as the particular things 
which they signify. This objection, Advaita claims, will 
be valid if the Vedic words did indeed primarily signify 
the particular ephemeral objects of the world. To meet this 
objection and in order to justify the eternity of the Vedas, 
Advaita argues that the primary significance of words are 
universals and not individuals. As universals are eternal, 
the connection between the word and the object signified 
is an eternal one. 
18 
A universal, as conceived by Advaita, 
indicates the essential common characteristics existing 
in a group of particulars. It signifies both the generic 
shape (äkriti) and also the generic nature (jati). 
19 
The inquiry about whether a word primarily signifies a 
particular (vyakti) or a universal (jäti) has elicited a 
variety of views among the different schools of Indian thought 
and the Advaita position is better highlighted in relation 
to some of these views. 
20 According to the Sämkhyas, a word 
signifies a particular only, for it is with individuals alone 
that we deal in everyday usage and activity. If the primary 
meaning of a word is its essential common characteristics, 
how can it be applicable to an individual? When someone says, 
"The horse is in the field", he is invariably referring to 
a particular member of the species. Besides this, there 
are proper names which are singular and can never refer to a 
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group or class. 
The main Advaita argument against this view is that if 
the primary significance of a word is a particular, the 
word cannot be used more than once. Each individual is 
unique and the particular as known at one moment does not 
persist as the same in the next moment. The fact that 
the same word can be used repeatedly indicates that its 
primary significance is not an individual. Shankara adds 
that objects are limitless in number and if the primary 
denotation of a word is an individual, it could not indicate 
all of them. 
21 
In isolation, the word "horse" does not 
indicate any particular animal, but the essential characteristics 
of the species. It is the knowledge of the universal which 
leads to the recognition of the particular. To recognize 
a particular animal as a horse, one has to first apprehend 
the universal characteristics of the species, and these 
are the primary denotation of a word. This fact does 
not make it impossible for a word to denote a particular object, 
for the knowledge of the particular is subsumed under the 
universal. According to Dharmaräja, "the same cognition 
that comprehends a generic attribute also comprehends the 
individuals". 22 One may put the argument differently by 
saying that the individual significance is indirect or implicit, 
while its universal significance is direct or explicit. It 
is thus possible, according to Advaita, to conceive of words 
as being prior to all individuals and eternal. 
This theory, however, raises a problem for both 
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P urva-Mimansa and Advaita. The Vedas make mention of gods 
such as Vasu and Indra, and, according to this view, words 
cannot primarily indicate an individual. In this case, 
they will become non-eternal, having no referent before 
the individual's existence and after the individual's 
destruction. Shankara's view is that Vedic words such as 
Vasu signify distinctive general characteristics, for even 
gods have forms and species. These general characteristics 
can be gathered from the Vedas. On the other hand, words 
such as "Indra" indicate certain ranks like "commander". 
The conclusion therefore, that Vedic words are universal in 
significance, is not refuted. The names of gods are not 
interpreted to be proper names. 
23 
The eternal word, according to Shankara, is not of the 
nature of sphota. 
24 
Along with the teacher Upavarsha, he 
holds that "the letters themselves constitute the words" . 
25 
Is it not a fact, however, that letters are non-eternal, 
for they possess no reality before and after their 
utterance? This is not tenable in Shankara's view, for the 
letters are recognized to be the same in each new utterance. 
This recognition is not because of any similarity with a 
previous utterance, nor is it contradicted by any other 
means of knowledge. He also rejects the view that this 
recognition is produced by the fact of the letters belonging 
to the same species (jäti). 
The recognition would have been caused by the species 
if the letters were cognized as separate entities like 
individual cows at the time of each fresh utterance. 
But this is not so, for it is the letters themselves 
that are cognized to be the same at each fresh utterance, 
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the recognition taking the form, 'The word cow is 
uttered twice', but not, 'There are two words 'cow'. 26 
The letters, in other words, are not individuals which 
constitute a class as cows comprise a species. He admits 
a variation in the apprehension of syllables, but ascribes 
this to differences in pronunciation due to peculiarities 
of the vocal organs, and not to be intrinsic nature of the 
letters. Differences can also be attributed to variations 
of tone (dhvani). 27 Shankara's conclusion so far seems to 
be that since letters are recognized to be the same in 
each new utterance, they are eternal, and the words which 
they constitute share this nature. In addition to this, 
words are eternally connected to their referents, which, being 
universals, are also eternal. 
28 
As further evidence of the beginninglessness of the Vedas, 
Shankara remarks that no independent author of the Vedas 
is remembered. 
29 This is an argument which was also adduced 
by Kumärila Bhatta. He contends that if there was an author 
of the Vedas, he should have been remembered in the long 
traditional succession of teachers and students as in the 
case of, for example, the Buddha. There is no possibility 
of such an author being forgotten since religious 
performance and their effectiveness would be founded solely 
upon his authority. In reality, however, there are no clear 
ideas of any composer and some vaguely attribute 
authorship to "God", "Hiranyagarbha", or "Prajäpati30 
In replying to the argument that the Vedas must have 
human authors because some sections are named after certain 
31 Jaimini explains that this can be accounted for by men, 
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the fact that such men were foremost in the study and 
expounding of those portions. 
32 
Another important argument introduced by Shankara is 
the origin of the world from Vedic words. According to him, 
it is a matter of common experience that when one is intent 
on creating a desirable object, he first recollects the 
word signifying it and then produces it. The sequence is the 
same in the case of the creation of the world. Vedic 
words occur in the mind of Prajdpati when he is intent on 
creation, and, corresponding to them, he creates the 
universe. 
33 
He creates the earth, for example, after the 
word bhüh occurs in his mind. This view does not contradict 
. 
the Advaita doctrine of brahman as the material cause of 
creation, for it means simply that, "when there is first 
a word without a beginning and bearing a meaning with which 
it has an eternal connnection, then only is there a possibility 
of an individual cropping up which can be fit to be referred 
to by that word. In that sense, it is said to originate 
from a word" . 
34 
Skiankara states that the creation of the 
world from Vedic words is well known from sruti and smriti 
35 
and he cites several references to support his claim. 
Shankara would appear to be implying that the universe is 
cyclically created in conformity with ideas or universals 
which are eternally present in the Creator. One wonders 
therefore, whether by "word", he is really suggesting "idea" 
rather than the uttered sound or linguistic symbol. A 
distinction between the two would have been very useful here. 
The word sabda is used to denote both idea and sound syribol. 
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Shankara considers another objection to the eternity of 
the Vedas. The objector accepts that the doctrine is 
maintained if one understands names such as Indra, etc. to 
connote eternal species rather than individuals. He contends, 
however, that the doctrine cannot be argued "in the face 
of the statements in the Vedas and smrtis that the whole 
creation, consisting of the three worlds, loses its names 
and forms and gets dissolved without a trace, and it emerges 
again as a fresh entity". 
36 Shankara's reply is that the 
cyclical creation and dissolution does not refute the eternity 
of the Vedas because the names and forms of each creation are 
the same as those of the preceding world that was dissolved. 
37 
The analogy can be drawn between the creation and dissolution 
of the world and the individual states of deep sleep and 
waking. In both cases, there is a connection and continuity 
of activity with earlier states. But is this an appropriate 
analogy? The individual can easily recollect his earlier 
behaviour and activity after emerging from deep sleep, but 
is such a recall possible after all behaviour is eradicated 
in cosmic dissolution? Shankara concedes that all empirical 
activity ceases at the time of dissolution (mähapralaya), 
but argues that because of God's grace, gods like 
Hiranyagarbha can recall names and forms of earlier cycles, 
including the Vedas. 
From the fact that ordinary creatures are not seen to 
recollect their past lives, it does not follow that the 
fact must be the same in the case of divine beings as 
well. It is noticed that although as living creatures 
all are the same, counting from men to a clump of grass, 
still the obstruction to the manifestation of knowledge, 
glory, etc. increases successively all through the 
series at every stage; similarly when it is mentioned 
more than once in the Vedas and Smrtis that knowledge, 
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glory etc. become increasingly more manifest at each 
successive stage counting from men themselves up to 
Hiranyagarbha, it cannot be brushed aside as non-existent. 
From this, it logically follows, on the analogy of a 
man risen up from sleep, that the recollection of the 
behaviour in a past cycle is possible for beings like 
Hiranyagarbha, who had undertaken meditation and 
work in a superexcellent way in a past cycle, who 
have emerged at the beginning of the present cycle 
(as a result of past achievement) and who have been 
vouchsafed the grace of God. 38 
Another reason justifying the identity of names and forms 
in successive creations is tendered by Shankara. Each new 
creation is impelled by the necessity of beings to experience 
the results of virtuous and unmeritorious acts of the past. 
It is also a field for the expression of likes and dislikes. 
It is not a causeless or accidental event and must therefore, 
conform to earlier patterns. The new creation is potential 
in the past ones. It is not possible, according to Shankara, 
to conceive, for example, a different relation between senses 
and sense objects in each creation. 
It is reasonable to conclude from this discussion, that 
Shankara conceives the eternity of the Vedas in the sense 
of an identical but eternal flow (praväha nityatä). The 
eternity of brahman, on the other hand, is of an absolutely 
unchanging kind (kütastha nityata). It would appear therefore, 
that Shankara ascribes to the Vedas the same empirical 
(vyävahärika) level of reality as the world, for he admits 
that the Vedas, like the world, are negated in the knowledge 
of non-dual brahman. 
39 
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3.2 Isvara as Revealer of the Vedas 
Purva-Mimänsä uncompromisingly rejects the view that the 
Vedas were ever composed by anyone. Nyäya, on the other 
hand, ascribes authorship to isvara, whose existence they 
seek to establish inferentially. Shankara occupies a 
position between these two views. 
40 
Like the Mimänsä, 
but unlike Nyäya, Shankara admits the Vedas to be authorless 
(apaurusheya). 41 He seems, however, to understand this 
concept very differently, even though he does not offer 
us a definition anywhere. Commenting on Brahma-sutra 
1.1.3, Shankara explains why brahman alone can be the 
source of the Vedas. 
42 It is a well known fact, he asserts, 
that the author of a text on any subject is more informed 
than the text itself. The grammar of Panini, for instance, 
represents only a part of the subject known to him. It 
is obvious therefore, that the source of texts like the 
Vedas, divided into many branches and illuminating lamp-like 
a variety of subjects, must be omniscient and omnipotent. 
This is even more apparent from the effortlessness with 
which they emerge from Him. The Vedas compare their own 
emergence with the ease of breathing. 
43 
Shankara states 
very clearly, however, that it is the eternally composed and 
already existent Vedas that are manifest like a man's 
breath. 44 Elsewhere, he explains that the projection of 
the Vedas should only be understood in the sense of the 
initiation of a cycle of transmission through a line of 
teachers and students, for no other kind of projection is 
possible for a text without beginning and end. 
45 
Isvara 
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then, does not produce the Vedas but reveals or manifests 
them as they were in the previous creation. He offers 
various suggestions to this effect. 
46 The general idea is 
that the Vedas are revealed in the same linguistic form at 
the beginning of each creation to qualified seers. 
Further clarification of Shankara's understanding of the 
concept of apaurusheya is provided by Dharmaräja and Vdcaspati. 
According to Dharmaräja, the Vedas are not eternal because they 
are produced by brahman. They are not, however, paurusheya 
because they depend on utterance of the same kind. A 
sentence can be described as paurusheya only if it is original 
and not the reproduction of an earlier utterance. 
For instance, in the beginning of the cosmic projection, 
the Lord produced the Vedas having a sequence of words 
similar to that which had already existed in the Vedas 
in the previous cosmic projection, and not Vedas of 
a different type. Hence the Vedas, not being the object 
of utterance that is independent of any utterance of the 
same kind, are not connected with a person. The utterance 
of the Mahäbhärata etc., however, is not at all 
dependent on any utterance of the same kind. Thus two 
kinds of verbal testimony have been determined, viz., 
that which is connected with a person and that which is 
not. 47 
Väcaspati argues along similar lines. 
48 Pürva-Mimänsäkas, he 
says, who do not believe in a creation or destruction 
advocate. a beginningless and unbroken sequence of Vedic 
study. Advaita, however, although differing from them in 
accepting the Supreme Self to be the creator of the eternal 
Vedas, does not understand Him to be entirely free in 
respect of them, since He creates their sequence in 
conformity to the previous ones. 
Not in any creation is brähminicide the cause of good 
nor the horse-sacrifice the cause of evil, any more 
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than fire can wet or water can burn. Just as, in this 
creation, the study of the Vedas in the settled 
sequence is the cause of prosperity and beatitude, and 
(studied) otherwise is the cause of evil even as a 
verbal thunderbolt, even so does it happen in another 
creation; hence, the creator, who, though omnipotent 
and omniscient, creates the Vedas in accordance with 
what they were in earlier creations, has not a free 
hand. 49 
3.3 The Necessity and Justification of the 
Vedas as a Pramäna 
The general justification of Shankara for a special means 
of knowledge like the Vedas is that it provides the knowledge 
of those things which cannot be known through any of the other 
available sources of knowledge. More specifically, it informs 
us of the means of attaining good and avoiding evil, in so 
far as these cannot be known through perception and inference, 
and are the two ends naturally pursued by us. The Vedas 
are not concerned to provide information about these dual 
objectives to the extent that they are within the range of 
human experience. Such knowledge is easily available from 
perception and inference. 
50 One imagines, for example, that 
a scripture is not necessary for instruction about road safety. 
The two categories of knowledge, according to Shankara, 
inaccessible to all other pramanas and attainable exclusively 
through the Vedas are dharma and brahman. 
51 We are afforded 
a clear statement of Shankara's view on 
the knowledge of 
dharma in his commentary on Brahma-sutra 
3.1.25.52 Here he 
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is responding to the objector's (pürvapakshin) claim that 
the slaying of animals in sacrifices might be responsible 
for the soul's birth as a plant. He answers that the 
knowledge of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) is derived 
solely from the scriptures. From the Vedas alone we can know 
which acts are virtuous and which are not. The reason is 
that these are supersensuous realities, beyond the capacity 
of the senses. In addition to this, dharma and adharma vary 
with time and place. An act that may be sanctioned at a 
certain time and place and under some circumstances may not 
be approved with a change of these factors. It is 
impossible therefore, to learn of dharma from any other 
53 
source. 
It is necessary, however, for the individual to be made 
aware of the persisting existence of the Self in a future 
life if he is to be motivated to attain what is good in that 
life. The materialists (Cärväkas) , for example, who deny 
all future existence do not show any such concern. S ruti 
therefore, informs us of this future existence and of the 
particular means of attaining good and avoiding evil in 
that life. 
54 
In a typical discussion which illustrates very 
well his procedure for legitimizing the Vedas as a pramäna, 
Shankara shows why this knowledge of a future existence is 
not otherwise attainable. After a series of Upanishad 
quotations to show support for the doctrine, a question is 
tendered. 
Objection: Is it not a matter of perception? 
Reply: No, for we see the divergence of opinion 
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among different schools. Were the existence of the self in a future body a matter of perception, the materialists 
and Buddhists would not stand opposed to us, saying that there is not self. For nobody disputes regarding an 
object of perception such as a jar, saying it does not exist. 
Objection: You are wrong, since a stump, for instance is looked upon as a man and so on. 
Reply: No, for it vanishes when the truth is known. 
There are no more contradictory views when the stump, for instance, has been definitely known as such through 
perception. The Buddhists, however, in spite of the 
fact that there is the ego-consciousness, persistently 
deny the existence of the self other than the subtle body. 
Therefore, being different from objects of perception, the 
existence of the self cannot be proved by this means. 
Similarly, inference too is powerless. 
Objection: No, since the Sruti points out certain 
grounds of inference for the existence of the self, and 
these depend on perception, (these two are also efficient 
means of the knowledge of the self) . 
Reply: Not so, for the self cannot be perceived as 
having any relation to ar3other life. But when its existence 
has been known from the Sruti and from certain empirical 
grounds of inference cited by it, the Mimamsakas and 
logicians, who follow in its footsteps, fancy that those 
Vedic grounds of inference such as the ego-consciousness 
are the products of their own mind, and declare that the 
self is knowable through perception and inference. 55 
This knowledge of dharma and adharma is derived from the 
ceremonial portion (karmakända) of the Vedas. 
56 This does 
not, however, exhaust the authoritative subject matter of the 
Vedas. The karmakända, authoritative as it is, is not 
a* 
accepted by Shankara as providing a solution to man's 
fundamental problem. It accepts man's desires for the 
enjoyment of the results of various actions, but does not 
question the origin or legitimacy of these desires. This 
propensity, as maintained by Shankara, is born out of a 
basic Self-ignorance, the perception of oneself as a 
limited being. As long as this false notion is not removed 
by the knowledge of one's already accomplished identity with 
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b rahman, one continues to search for fullness through the 
results of limited actions. Actions, however, produce 
inescapable results and the individual is trapped in a 
futile quest through successive births and deaths 
(samsara). His ever accomplished freedom and unlimitedness, 
the real end of all his actions, perpetually eludes him. 
The removal of this ignorance (avidyd) is the authoritative 
aim and concern of the jnänakända (knowledge section) of 
the Vedas. 57 Sruti eliminates this ignorance by teaching 
about the true nature of the Self. It is the intention of 
all the Upanishads Shankara says, to establish the identity 
between ätman and brahman. 
58 
We hold that it is the definite conclusion of all the 
Upanisads that we are nothing but the Atman, the 
Brahman that is always the same, homogeneous, one 
without a second, unchanging, birthless, undecaying, 
immortal, deathless and free from fear-59 
Sh ankara is equally emphatic on the absolute 
inapplicability of all pramanas except sruti, to the 
knowledge of brahman. 
60 
He is tireless in explaining the 
incompetence of sense perception in apprehending brahman. 
Shankara refuses to accept that because brahman is an 
existent entity, like all such realities, It must be the 
object of other sources of valid knowledge. The senses 
are naturally capable of grasping and revealing their 
appropriate objects. Brahman, however, remains unapproachable 
through any of them because of Its uniqueness. 
61 
The organs 
can only grasp a differentiated object within their range. 
62 
We have already considered the nature and evolution of the 
five sense organs. 
63 Each organ evolves out of a particular 
element which enables it to apprehend a quality proper to 
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that element. The eyes, for example, evolve out of the 
subtle sattva aspect of fire, and are the organs for 
perceiving the quality of form, which is unique to fire. 
64 
It is the special relationship therefore, between sense 
organ and element which empowers each one to cognize an 
appropriate quality. Sound, sensation, form, taste and 
scent are their respective spheres of functioning. 
Brahman, however, has neither sound, touch, form, taste 
or smell. It is without qualities (nirguna) and outside 
the domain of the sense organs. 
65 
Brahman is limitless, and 
to become an object of sense knowledge is to be finite and 
delimited, to be one object among many objects. A brahman 
that is sense apprehended is therefore, a contradiction. 
However perfect or magnified the capacity of a sense 
organs is imagined to be, it will function only in 
a limited sphere of activity. Shankara refutes the 
allegation that there is any contradiction in the 
Bhagavadgitä's denial of brahman as both sat and asat, by 
interpreting these terms with reference to the non-availability 
of brahman as an object of sense knowledge. 
Objection: Every state of consciousness involves either 
the consciousness of existence or that of non-existence. 
Such being the case, the Knowable should be comprehended 
either by a state of consciousness accompanied with the 
consciousness of existence, or by a state of consciousness 
accompanied with the consciousness of non-existence. 
Answer: No; for being beyond the reach of the senses, 
it is not an object of consciousness accompanied with 
the idea of either (existence or non-existence). That 
thing, indeed, which can be perceived by the senses, 
such as a pot, can be an object of consciousness 
accompanied with the idea of existence, or an object of 
consciousness accompanied by the idea of non-existence. 
Since, on the other hand, the Knowable is beyond the 
reach of the senses and as such can be known solely 
through that instrument of knowledge which is called 
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Sabda, It cannot be, like a pot, etc., an object of 
consciousness accompanied with the idea of either (existence or non-existence) and is therefore 
not said to be 'sat' or 'asat'. 66 
In addition to the inherent limitations of the sense 
organs and the absence in brahman of any quality that can 
be apprehended by any one of them, there is the impossibility 
of objectifying brahman. The process of empirical knowledge 
involves a distinction between the Subject and object, the 
Knower and known. We know things by making them the objects 
of our Awareness and in this way they are available for 
our scrutiny and analysis. Knowledge of an object 
presupposes the Subject, the Knower. Brahman, however, is 
the eternal Subject. As Awareness, It illumines everything, 
and the entire universe, including mind, body and sense 
organs, is Its object. 
67 
It is impossible for the unchanging 
Knower to be made an object of knowledge, like a pot or a 
thought. It is absurd to conceive of the Subject as an 
object, for in Its absence there is no Subject to know the 
Subject as an object. It is the Light even of lights. 
68 
Even in the state of ignorance, when one sees 
something, through what instrument should one know 
that owing to which all this is known? For that 
instrument of knowledge itself falls under the 
category of objects. The Knower may desire to know, 
not about itself, but about objects. As fire does 
not burn itself, so the self does not know itself, and 
the knower can have no knowledge of a thing that is not 
its object. Therefore through what instrument should 
one know the Knower owing to which this universe is known 
and who else should know it? 69 
It is not possible to circumvent this difficulty by positing 
that the Self can be both Subject and object. This might 
have been tenable if the Subject and object were complementary 
and not opposed. By nature, however, the Subject and 
-4 
object are absolutely opposed and such contradictory 
105 
qualities cannot be posited of the same entity. 
70 No 
division of any kind can be made in the case of the ätman. 
71 
If perception is unfitted for furnishing us with the 
knowledge of brahman, are any of the other four pramanas 
(inference, comparison, postulation, and non-cognition) 
more competent? The general view of Shankara is that these 
sources are more or less dependent on perception for their 
data, and can have no access to areas from which it is 
debarred. We have already, for instance, considered the 
nature of inference as a pramäna. 
72 
Inferential knowledge 
is derived from a knowledge of the invariable relation 
(vydpti) between a thing inferred (sädhya) and the ground 
from which the inference is made (hetu). Brahman, however, 
has no apprehensible or differentiating qualities with which 
it has an invariable relation and which can form the ground 
of an inference. 
73 It is impossible, therefore, to infer 
the existence of brahman. 
There is no hint, however, of the sceptic in Shankara. 
He is unwavering in his position that Brahman is knowable 
and the sabda-pramäna is the only valid means. In a discussion 
where he is concerned to establish that brahman is changeless 
and indivisible in spite of being the material cause of the 
creation, his views are unequivocal. 
There is no violation of the texts about partlessness, 
since partlessness is accepted on account of its very 
'mention in the Upanisads', and the Upanisads are the 
only authority about it, but not so are the senses etc. 
Hence it has to be accepted just as it is presented by 
the Upanisads. The Upanisads prove both the facts for 
Brahman - the non-transformation of Brahman as a whole 
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and partlessness. Even the things of this world like 
gems, incantations, herbs, and so on, are seen to possess 
many powers capable of producing incompatible effects 
under a variety of space (environment), time, and 
cause. And even these powers can be known not from mere 
reasoning but from such instructions as, 'Such a thing 
has such kinds of potency with the aid of such things, 
on such things, and for such purposes'. So what need 
has one to argue that the nature of Brahman, whose power 
is beyond all thought, cannot be ascertained unless it be 
through the Vedas? So also it has been said by an 
author of the Puräna, 'Do not bring those things within 
the range of argumentation which are beyond thought. The 
nature of a thing beyond thought consists in its being 
other than the things within Nature'. Hence a 
supersensuous thing is truly known from the Vedic source 
alone. 74 
It is not possible, according to Shankara, to even guess 
about brahman without the assistance of the Vedas. 
75 
He 
leaves no room for any doubt about this conclusion. 
Brahma- sutra 1.1.2, for instance, reads "That (is Brahman) 
from which (are derived) the birth etc. of this (universe)". 
The following sutra (1.1.3) reads, "Because of being the 
source of the scriptures". Shankara sees another possibility 
in the Sanskrit compound of the latter and reads it also as, 
"Since the scriptures are its valid means". 
76 
He justifies 
this reading on the ground that since sutra 1.1.2 made no 
explicit mention of the scriptures, one might construe 
that an inferential argument is being presented for 
establishing brahman as the source of the world. Any such 
doubt ought to be removed and it must be made clear that 
brahman is known as the source of the universe from the 
scriptures alone. They are the only valid means of this 
nowledg e. 
77 We can briefly note that Shankara also dismisses knowledge. 
77 
independent reasoning as a suitable means of arriving at 
accurate knoledge of brahman. 
78 
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One has to be extremely cautious in examining Shankara's 
exegesis of Upanishad verses treating the unknowability of 
the Self. He never accepts any of these passages literally 
and there is no basis for concluding, as some have done, 
that in Shankara's view, none of the pramänas can give us 
knowledge of brahman. 
79 
There are basically two ways in 
which Shankara interprets these statements. First of all, 
the Self is unknowable in the sense and manner of an object. 
The knowing process generally involves the knowledge of an 
object different from oneself. As the eternal Knower, the 
Witness of every cognition, brahman can never be "known" 
in this manner. 
(Teacher) : If you think, 'I have known Brahman well 
enough', then you have known only the very little 
expression that It has in the human body and the 
little expression It has among the gods. Therefore 
Brahman is still to be deliberated on by you. 
(Disciple): 'I think (Brahman) is known'. 
"I do not think, 'I know (brahman) well enough'; 
(i. e. I consider) 'Not that I do not know: I know 
and I do not know as well. He among us who understands 
that utterance, 'Not that I do not know: I know and 
I do not know as well', knows that (Brahman)'. 
It is known to him to whom It is unknown; he does not 
know to whom It is known. It is unknown to those who 
know well, and known to those who do not know. 80 
Secondly, brahman is unknown in the sense of being undisclosed 
through any other pramäna but sabda-pramäna. Brihadäranyaka 
Upanishad 3.6.1, for example, consists of a discussion 
between Gargi and Yäjnavalkya. Beginning with earth and 
ending with the world of Hiranyagarbha, Gärgi questions 
him about the successive pervasiveness of each factor. 
According to Shankara, the inference suggested here is that, 
"whatever is an effect, limited and gross, is respectively 
pervaded by that which is the cause, unlimited and subtle, 
108 
as earth is pervaded b water". 
gl by When Gargi, however, 
asks, "By what is the world of Hiranygarbha pervaded? ", 
Y äjnav alkya refuses to proceed with the discussion. 
'Do not, 0 Gargi, push your inquiry too far, lest your 
head should fall off. You are questioning about a 
deity that should not be reasoned about. Do not, 0 Gargi, 
push your inquiry too far'. Thereupon Gärgi, the 
daughter of Vacaknu, kept silent. 
Shankara does not construe Yäjnavalkya's silence as an 
indication of the impossibility of any further knowledge. On 
the contrary, he charges Gärgi with disregarding the proper 
method of inquiry. Yäjnavalkya terminates the discussion, 
according to Shankara, because of Gärgi's attempt to 
establish brahman inferentially, whereas It is to be known 
only from the Vedas. The idea is that brahman is not 
unascertainable, but must be approached through the 
apposite pramana. 
82 Kena Upanishad 1.3, is a classic 
declaration of the predicament of conceptualization and 
instruction about brahman. 
The eye does not go there, nor speech, nor mind. We do 
not know (Brahman to be such and such); hence we are 
not aware of any process of instructing about It. 
Shankara does not reiterate this sense of perplexity and 
impotence. Concluding his remarks on this verse and 
introducing the following one, he writes, 
The contingency of the total denial of any process 
of instruction having arisen from the text, 'We do not 
know Brahman, and hence we are not aware of any process 
of instructing about It', an exception to this is being 
stated in the next verse. True it is that one cannot 
impart knowledge of the highest with the help of such 
means of valid knowledge as the evidence of the senses; 
but the knowledge can be produced with the help of 
traditional authority. Therefore traditional authority 
[a] is being quoted for the sake of imparting 
instruction about It-83 
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It is palpable therefore, that Shankara presents an 
argued and developed rationale for sabda-pramana as the 
only source of brahmajnäna. Radhakrishnan' s view that it 
is difficult to find support in Shankara for the claim that 
inquiry into the Vedas is the only avenue to the knowledge 
of brahman is absolutely without basis. 
84 
Unsubstantial 
also is Devaraja's argument that Shankara's reliance on 
sruti is an expression of his "ultra-orthodox mood". 
85 
it 
is not at all possible to dismiss Shankara's affirmation of 
the sruti as simply an attempt to clothe his views with 
a sanction of a traditional authority. One may perhaps 
dispute his exegesis of particular scriptural passages, but 
not his endorsement of sruti as the only credible pramana 
of brahma j näna . 
3.4 The Authority and Infallibility 
of the Vedic Revelation 
The authority of the sruti within the sphere of its own 
subject matter is, according to Shankara, independent and 
self-evident. Its function in relation to the revelation 
of brahman is comparable to the perception of an object 
through the eye. 
86 This independent authoritativeness is 
underscored by his analogy with the sun. The Vedas, 
he says, 
are as trustworthy in respect of their own subject matter, 
as the sun is with regards to the objects which 
it illumines. 87 
The suggestion here seems to be that while objects 
depend 
for their revelation on the light of the sun, the sun itself 
110 
is self-illuminating. Similarly, the authoritativeness of the 
sruti is independent and self-evident. The validity of the 
Upanishad does not await inferential verification. 
88 There 
are no misgivings about sruti's infallibility in respect of 
its subject matter. "Knowledge of Reality springs from the 
Upanisad texts alone". 
89 "Truth is the fact of being in 
accordance with the scriptures". 
90 Vedic statements, he 
affirms, unlike those of men, are not delusive, equivocal or 
deceptive about their theme. 
91 
They admit of no doubt and are 
productive of accurate knowledge. 
92 
In this respect, there 
is no difference between ritualistic texts and those 
informing us of the nature of brahman. 
That rites like the new and full moon sacrifices produce 
such and such results, and have to be performed in a certain 
definite way, with their parts following each other in a 
particular order, is a supersensuous matter beyond the 
range of our perception and inference, which we nevertheless 
understand as true solely from the words of the Vedas. 
Similarly it stands to reason that entities like the 
Supreme Self, God, the deities, etc. of which we learn, 
also from the words of the Vedas, as being characterized 
by the absence of grossness etc., being beyond hunger 
and thirst and the like, and so on, must be true, for 
they are equally supersensuous matters. There is no 
difference between texts relating to knowledge and those 
relating to rites as regards producing an impression. 
Nor is the impression conveyed by the Vedas regarding 
the Supreme Self and other such entities indefinite or 
contrary to fact. 93 
In the main, however, Shankara's principal justification of 
the reliability and authoritativeness of the Vedas is an 
epistemological one. The sruti fulfils the criteria of 
being a pramäna. It has the capacity to generate certain 
and fruitful knowledge. 
Is or is not certain and fruitful knowledge generated 
by passages setting forth the nature of the Self, and 
if so, how can they lose their authority? Do you not 
see the result of knowledge in the removal of the evils 
which are the root of transmigration, such as 
ignorance, 
grief, delusion and fear? Or do you not hear those 
111 
hundreds of Upanisad texts such as, 'Then what delusion 
and what grief can there be for one who sees unity'? (Is. U. 7). 94 
In addition to its fruitfulness, this knowledge can 
neither be produced nor nullified by any other pramäna, for 
there is none superior to the Vedic texts. 
95 
Suresv ara 
suggests four reasons when a pramäna may be disregarded: 
96 
(i) if it reveals something already revealed by another 
authoritative source of knowledge. (ii) if its revelations 
are contradicted by another source of knowledge. (iii) if 
it reveals ambiguous or doubtful knowledge. (iv) if it 
reveals nothing. The Vedas, however, according to him, 
reveal brahman which is beyond the scope of all other 
pramanas. Their revelations are neither ambiguous nor 
contradicted by any other pramdnas. In addition, they 
are productive of fruitful knowledge. 
97 
A similar view 
has been tendered by Väcaspati. He argues that the 
authoritativeness of a pramäna consists in generating 
knowledge which is unsublated, not already understood, and 
indubitable. This capacity is an intrinsic one and not 
dependent on any other pramäna. 
98 
At this stage, we can underline a conclusion which 
was only hinted at earlier. Advaita does not attempt to 
establish the authority or infallibility of the Vedas from 
the fact of isvara's omniscience. The reason is that 
Advaita finds it impossible to demonstrate the existence 
of God by any kind of independent reasoning. In the absence 
of such a proof, all arguments become helplessly circular, 
"omniscience being proved from the authority of the 
scriptures and the 
(authority of the) scriptures being proved 
112 
from the knowledge of the omniscience of the author"* 
99 
In Indian philosophy, Nyaya champions the rational theology 
and seeks to establish God's existence by a syllogistic 
inference. This argument as we have seen, is based on a 
knowledge of the invariable relation (vyäpti) between the 
object perceived (hetu) and the object inferred (sädhya). 
The Nyäya argument takes the following form: All created 
or produced objects, for example, pots, have sentient 
beings as their makers who are aware of the material cause 
and purpose of creation. The universe is a created object 
because it is a compound of insentient parts which could 
not have assembled themselves. From this fact, it is 
inferred that the world has a creator. In brief, the 
Vedas are authoritative because they are derived from God 
who is reliable and trustworthy. 
100 Shankara accepts that 
the world is an effect, but argues that it cannot be 
certified by inference that brahman is the cause. While the 
universe is an object of perception, brahman is not and an 
invariable relation (vyäpti) cannot be established between 
them. 101 Shankara also advances other strong arguments 
against the conclusions of a purely rational theology. 
102 
It is difficult, he contends, to explain the inequalities of 
creation unless we ascribe to God the possession of likes and 
dislikes. If in order to avert this charge, one argues 
that He is impelled by the merits and demerits of beings, 
the defect of a circular argument arises. God acts in 
accordance with karma and karma produces results when 
impelled by Him. To suggest that this mutual dependence is 
beginningless does not avert this difficulty. Moreover, 
Nyäya themselves admit that the impulse to act is an 
113 
indication of the defect of likes and dislikes. The 
Yoga concept of God as a special indifferent purusha 
does not help. Nydya maintains that God is distinct from 
matter and individual souls. How then does He control 
them? God, matter and souls being omnipresent and partless, 
can neither be related by conjunction nor inherence. Those 
who resort to inference argue that God moulds matter 
(pradhäna) even as a potter with clay. But this is not possible 
because pradhäna is conceived of as being formless and 
beyond the range of perception. How is it possible to work 
upon such a material? We are thrown into enormous difficulties 
if perceptual experience is used as the basis for inferences 
about God. We will be forced to conclude that God 
possesses a body like us and is consequently subject to all 
of our limitations. Finally, Nyäya argues that God, matter 
and soul are eternal and infinite. In this case, Shankara 
says, God will be unable to measure the limits of all three and 
He ceases to be omniscient. On the other hand, if God knows 
the limits of all three, they cannot be infinite and will 
come to an end, depriving God of rulership. 
Unlike the rationalists, however, the Advaitin is not 
constrained into dependence upon observed facts for the 
knowledge of God. 
Sruti is his source for ascertaining the 
nature of the cause. For this reason, he has no 
difficulties 
in accepting brahman to be both efficient and material cause, 
although we find no such analogy in experience. Conscious 
agents are not generally material causes. 
103 To the argument 
that in conformity with experience, it is not admissible 
for 
114 
b rahman to create without organs, Shankara rejoins, 
This supreme and sublime Brahman, is to be known from 
the Vedas alone, but not from reasoning. Moreover, 
there cannot be any such rule that since somebody is 
seen to have some power in some way, another should also 
have it in the same way. Moreover, this also has been 
stated that even though all distinctions are denied in 
Brahman, still It can have accession of all powers owing 
to the presence of a variety of aspects conjured up 
by ignorance. In support of this is the scripture, 'He 
moves and grasps even though he is without feet and 
hands, he sees without eyes and hears without ears' 
(Sv. U. 3.19), which shows the possession of all kinds 104 
of power by Brahman, even though It is devoid of organs. 
One should not conclude from the above argument that Shankara 
finds no use for inferential arguments about God's existence. 
The problem with these kinds of arguments is that they merely 
suggest possibilities; they are not conclusive. Once, however, 
the reality and nature of God are ascertained from the sruti, 
he attempts as far as possible to show that the conclusions of 
sruti conform to reason. In this attempt, he unhesitatingly 
uses inferential arguments and analogies. 
105 
Before concluding this section of our discussion, it is 
necessary on the basis of our ascertained conclusions, to 
refute some of the widely accepted interpretations of 
Shankara's orientation to the authority of the Vedas. 
106 
Having seen that he does not try to establish 
authoritativeness on the basis of an inference from God's 
omniscience, there is no basis whatsoever for the view that 
sruti is acceptable to him because it embodies the records 
of the religious experiences of ancient mystics. The 
uniqueness of sruti is that its authority 
is not personal or 
derived. It is, as we have seen, apaurusheya. We cannot 
emphasize strongly enough the purely conjectural character 
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of the view that the Vedas are merely meant for inferior 
aspirants who are incapable of directly discovering 
revealed assertions, or that these assertions are discoverable 
through some other source. Shankara has not left this matter 
open to speculation and such conclusions are entirely 
indefensible. The overwhelming evidence of his major 
commentaries affirms that he saw sabda-pramäna as the only 
definitive source of brahmajnana. His unambiguous 
justification of this pramäna is the impossibility of knowing 
brahman otherwise. The view that the Vedas "contain truths 
which man could, by the exercise of his own faculties 
discover" is entirely irreconcilable with Shankara's vindication 
of their authority. 
107 
The nature and detail of his 
justification of the Vedas as the only pramäna of brahman 
do not lend any support to the view that his aim was 
merely to seek the approval of their authority for his 
conclusions. 
3.5 The Qualifications of Sruti and Its Relation 
to Smriti 
The word smriti is derived from the root smr (to remember). 
It is generally used to indicate authoritative texts other 
than the Vedas. 
108 Smritis are also a form ofsabda-pramäna, 
but unlike the sruti, they are of human origin (paurusheya) 
and therefore, less authoritative. Shankara uses the 
analogy of perception and inference to describe the 
relationship between sruti and smriti. Smriti is dependent 
116 
on sruti even as inference is reliant on perception for its 
data. S mritis are not therefore, independently authoritative-109 
Compared to the direct and independent validity of the Vedas, 
the authority of smriti is remote because it "depends on 
some other source of knowledge and since the memory of the 
speaker intervenes", 110 
Smritis are authoritative only when they conform to . 11 
Vedic texts. They are to be discarded in those cases 
where they directly contradict the sense of the Vedas. This 
is the method, according to Shankara, of reconciling and 
lll deciding between mutually opposed smriti texts. 
One need not reject an entire smriti text because some 
parts are opposed to Vedic doctrines. Advaita, for example, 
shares some doctrines in common with Säm] hya and Yoga. 
Although they are both dualists, Sämkhya subscribes to the 
41 
quality-less nature of the Self and Yoga emphasizes the value 
of detachment. Both are compatible with and acceptable to 
Advaita. 112 Shankara also acknowledges the authority of 
Kapila and his followers with respect to the nature, 
functions and products of the gunas. 
113 
How should we view smriti texts which do not contradict 
Vedic ones, but for which we can find no corroboration in 
the Vedas? In such cases, according to Shankara, we are to 
infer the existence of a sruti text upon which the smriti 
is based. 
114 
The sruti shares with all other pramänas, the characteristic 
of having a circumscribed concern and sphere of authority. As 
117 
we noted earlier, it is intended for the revelation of 
dharma and brahman, both of which are incapable of being 
known through any other pramäna. Its purpose is not to 
disclose matters within the range of human experience, 
ascertainable through any of our ordinary means of knowledge. 
If a sruti statement contradicts a well-established fact of 
our everyday experience, it cannot be considered authoritative 
because such a matter would be outside its authority. 
Sruti is an authority only in matters not perceived by 
means of ordinary instruments of knowledge such as 
pratyaksha or immediate perception; - i. e., it is an 
authority as to the mutual relation of things as means 
to ends, but not in matters lying within the range of 
pratyaksha; indeed, sruti is intended as an authority 
only for knowing what lies beyond the range of human 
knowledge. . .A hundred srutis may declare that fire 
is cold or that it is dark; still they possess no 
authority in the matter. 115 
If, however, sruti did describe fire as being cold or dark, 
we should construe its meaning figuratively. 
116 Vedic texts 
are not meant for creating things anew or reversing the 
nature of anything. They are revelatory and are concerned 
with simply expressing things as they are. They do not 
misrepresent facts. 
117 In order to accomplish its purpose, 
the sruti uses conventional words and meanings and cites 
examples from our everyday world. By these examples, "the 
scriptures seek to tell us about some other thing which does 
not contradict them. They would not cite an example from 
life if they wanted to convey an idea of something 
contradictory to it. Even if they did, it would be to no 
purpose, for the example would be different from the thing to 
be explained II , 
118 
As conceived by Shankara, one pramana does not contradict 
118 
another. Each pramana only reveals knowledge that cannot 
be obtained by another. 
119 Clarification has been provided 
on this point by Suresvara. 120 According to him, two 
pramänas, whose spheres are entirely different, cannot be 
contradictory. The eyes which perceive forms and the ears 
which apprehend sounds are not opposed. It is only when 
two pramänas deal with the same object and are contradictory 
that they are opposed. 
If a thing is perceived by the senses it cannot be 
revealed by the Veda; if a thing is genuinely revealed 
by the Veda it cannot be an object of sense-perception. 
A perception (purporting to bear on a revealed subject 
is only) a semblance of a perception; and a revealed text 
(bearing on what is subject to perception is only) a mere 
semblance of a revelation. 121 
S uresvara goes on to add that pramänas do not have to 
co-operate with each other to produce knowledge as the 
various members of a syllogism do. Each is authoritative 
within its own sphere and independently capable of giving 
rise to valid knowledge. 
In Shankara's view then, the knowledge of the Vedas 
is not opposed to fact. He denies, for example, that there 
is any conflict between sruti and perception with regard to 
the nature of the Self. The claim of the sruti that the 
Self is free from all limitations is not opposed to our 
perceptual experience. The latter has for its object the 
Self as identified with various limiting adjuncts (upddhis). 
Sruti, however, points to a Self free from all erroneous 
identification. 122 Similarly, Shankara denies that there 
is any contradiction between perception and the unity of 
brahman. 
123 We should remind ourselves, however, of 
119 
Shankara' s 'position that not everything revealed by sruti 
is explicable on the analogy of our everyday experience. 
The nature of brahman as both efficient and material cause 
cannot be inferred from any of our experiences of creation. 
124 
If, after the meaning of a sruti text is well ascertained, 
a conflict arises with any other pramäna, sruti must be 
accorded primacy. 
125 
Skiankara mentions some very specific topics which it is 
not the function of the sruti to reveal. It is not the 
purpose of the sruti to inform us of the details and 
order of the creation of the world. We neither observe, 
nor are we told by the texts, that the welfare of man 
depends upon this kind of knowledge. In fact, when the 
texts are properly analysed, we find that such passages 
are intended for instruction about brahman. ri'hey are 
not independent passages, but are subservient and linked 
to those discussing brahman. Accounts of creation, 
which involve analogies of clay, iron, sparks etc., are 
only meant for showing the non-difference of effects from 
cause and upholding the unity of brahman. 
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Similarly, sruti is not concerned to provide 
information about the individual self (jivätman). 
The individual soul, present in everybody as the 
agent and experiencer in association with such 
limiting adjuncts as the intellect, is known 
from common experience itself, and so 
it is not 
mentioned in the Upanisads 
for its own sake. 
But as God is not thus familarly 
known from 
common experience, 
He is intended to be declared 
in the Upanisad for His own sake. Hence 
it is 
not proper to say 
that any mention of Him is 
uncalled for. 127 
120 
Finally, not only is sruti limited with reference to 
its content, but its injunctions have a limited applicability. 
The one who has gained brahmajnäna stands outside the pale 
of injunctions. Directives to act or to refrain from action 
are relevant to one who is in search of appropriate means for 
gaining some desirable object or avoiding an undesirable 
one. Injunctions somehow appear superfluous to the 
brahmajnäni who has no unfulfilled personal wants. 
That man, verily, who rejoices only in the Self, who 
is satisfied with the Self, who is content in the 
Self alone, - for him there is nothing to do. 
For him, there is here no interest whatever in what 
is done or what is not done. Nor is there in all 
beings any one he should resort to for any object. 128 
The point seems to be that the brahmajnäni, having shed 
self-centred wants, spontaneously becomes a source and 
example of right action. The directives which aim at 
bringing about this effortless ideal are redundant once 
it is discovered. It is sruti' s own tribute to her ideal. 
As Shankara remarks, 
If a man who has realised the identity of the Self 
and Brahman has still to bow down to injunctions, even 
though he is beyond all mandates, then there will 
remain none who is outside the pale of scriptural 
direction; and so all actions will become fit to be 
undertaken by all and sundry at all times. But that 
is undesirable. Nor can he be directed by anybody, 
for even the scriptures emanate from him. Not that 
anyone can be impelled by any sentence issuing out of 
his own wisdom. Nor is a well-informed master 
commanded by an ignorant servant. 129 
The conclusions we have reached in this discussion about 
Shankara's understanding of the nature of the authority of 
the sruti differ radically from some of the opinions we 
have summarized, in Chapter 1. We terminate our discussion 
here by briefly reflecting on these. 
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It is indisputable that there is a profound epistemological 
basis for Shankara's dependence on sruti as the only authoritative 
source of brahmajnäna. There is no dearth of evidence to 
support the view that he saw the sruti as the only valid 
source of this knowledge. His way of justifying the 
necessity for a pramäna in the form of words completely 
belies the argument that his recourse to sruti was motivated 
merely by the wish to gain the support of an authoritative 
tradition for his personal views. S abda-pramäna, 
contrary to the view of current opinion, is perceived by him 
as a unique source of knowledge about brahman, justified 
by the fact that, as human beings, we cannot otherwise know 
brahman. S ruti would not satisfy the criterion of novelty 
if the knowledge which it provides could be obtained from 
any other source. We have also highlighted his argument that 
the sruti, like all other valid sources of knowledge, does 
not need the confirmation or verification of any other 
pramana. It is a self-valid source of fruitful knowledge. 
We have not found any evidence in the commentaries of 
Shankara to support the conclusion that he accepted the 
sruti as authoritative and infallible because it embodied 
the self-certifying experiences of ancient mystics. The 
grounds of his argument for sruti's infallibility are very 
different. When Shankara does not even seek to establish 
the authority of the sruti on the basis of isvara's 
omniscience, it is difficult to conceive that he would derive 
it from human authority. In this matter, his views are 
closely allied with those of P-urva-Mimänsä. We have noted 
the connection between his arguments for the uncreated, eternal 
122 
and impersonal (apaurusheya) nature of the sruti, and its 
infallibility. 
While Shankara advances various arguments for the 
validity of the sruti, it appears to us that he ultimately 
falls back upon the claim that the sruti fulfils the 
criteria of being a pramäna. It provides a knowledge which 
is not available through any other source, and which is not 
contradicted by another valid pramäna. In addition, this 
knowledge is seen to be fruitful in the elimination of 
samsära, and its attendant evils such as grief, fear and 
delusion. It would seem that the onus is rather thrust upon 
the one who does not accept sruti as a pramäna to disprove 
its validity. 
Having thus examined Shankara's understanding of the 
status and justification of sruti as a pramäna of brahman, 
we can now consider how he sees brahmainäna as unfolded 
through this medium. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE METHOD OF SABDA-PRAMANA AS MEDIUM 
OF BRAHMAJNANA 
In the last chapter, we discussed Shankara's conception 
of the Vedas and sought to establish his evident conclusion 
that the Vedas are our only authoritative means for the 
knowledge of brahman. We also attempted to unfold the 
rationale underlying this view. In brief, his argument is 
that because brahman possesses no characteristics or 
distinguishing marks which can be apprehended by any of our 
ordinary means of knowledge, It can be known only through 
sabda-pramäna 
The case for sabda-pramdna in Shankara, however, cannot 
end there. If brahman, by definition, excludes the 
applicability of all other sources of knowledge, It also 
poses special difficulties for sabda-pramäna. There is clear 
evidence in Shankara's commentaries of his acute awareness of 
these problems. Sabda-pramäna is a means of knowledge in 
the form of words and the words of the Vedas are the 
conventional words of everyday usage. 
1If 
the words 
employed by the Vedas are unfamiliar, the texts become useless 
as a pramana. 
2 The problem, however, is that conventional 
words and meanings are employed in designating known and 
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familiar objects. When employed in the sruti, they must 
serve as the medium of informing us about an unknown entity 
(brahman) which possesses none of the distinguishing marks 
of ordinary objects. A language which is conditioned by 
the world of objects which it describes, must somehow define 
a unique and entirely dissimilar entity. Words, according 
to Shankara, can define their objects in four ways. They do 
this through categories denoting genus, action, quality or 
relation. Words such as "horse" and "cow" imply genus, 
"cook" and "teacher" suggest action, "white" and "black" 
indicate qualities, and "wealthy" or "cattleowner" point 
to a relation or possession. Brahman, however, belongs to 
no genus. It is devoid of qualities (nirguna), actionless 
and not related to anything. 
3 
It seems obvious therefore, that if conventional words 
are to be employed in informing us accurately of brahman, 
they will have to be employed in a very special manner, as 
part of a unique method of instruction. The feasibility 
of sabda-pramana as a vehicle of brahmajnäna becomes 
credible only when some method can be demonstrated for 
overcoming the natural limitations of language. This is 
a difficulty which also partly explains the attempt to 
suggest an alternative to sabda-pramäna in Shankara, and 
it is important therefore, that we examine his treatment 
of this problem. We can do this more effectively, however, 
by first examining the precise problem which sabda-pramana 
aims to resolve. Its adequacy or inadequacy can only be 
assessed in relation to this problem. 
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4.1 The Fundamental Problem of Avidyä 
and its Resolution 
The Vedas, according to Shankara, do not reveal the ätman 
in the sense of illumining Its existence. Being of the 
nature of Consciousness (cit), ätman is self-revealing. It 
is absolute Awareness in whose light everything stands 
revealed. 
There the sun does not shine, neither do the moon and 
the stars; nor do these flashes of lightning shine. How 
can this fire? He shining, all these shine; through 
His lustre all these are variously illumined. 4 
There are several important and interesting discussions in 
Shankara's commentaries which are relevant to this issue. 
In his introduction to the Brahma-sutra, an objection is 
5 
raised against the superimposition (adhyäsa) argument. 
The objector's view is that superimposition is possible 
only on something that is available for sense perception. 
In the mistaken apprehension of the rope for a snake, for 
example, the form of the snake is seen. How can anything, 
however, be superimposed on the ätman which is not an 
object of the senses? Shankara's reply is to suggest that 
even though the Self is not an object of perception, It is 
not entirely unknown and adhyäsa is possible. 
The Self is not absolutely beyond apprehension, 
because It is apprehended as the content of the 
concept "I"; and because the Self, opposed to the 
non-Self, is well known in the world as an 
immediately perceived (i. e. self-revealing) entity. 
Nor is there any rule that something has to be 
superimposed on something else that is directly 
perceived through the senses; for boys superimpose 
the ideas of surface (i. e. concavity) and dirt on the 
space (i. e. sky) that is not an object of sense 
perception. Hence there is nothing impossible 
in superimposing the non-Self on the Self that is 
opposed to it. 6 
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Elsewhere, the objector asks whether brahman is known 
or unknown. 
7 
The point of the query here is that if 
brahman is known, there is no need for a means of knowledge 
or an inquiry to ascertain Its nature. If, on the other 
hand, brahman is entirely unknown (i. e. not even the 
object of a desire to know), It cannot become the subject 
of any kind of inquiry (jijnäsä). Shankara, however, 
denies that brahman is entirely unknown. 
Besides, the existence of Brahman is well known from 
the fact of Its being the Self of all; for everyone 
feels that his Self exists, and he never feels, 
'I do not exist'. Had there been no general recog- 
nition of the existence of the Self, everyone would 
have felt, 'I do not exist'. And that Self is Brahman-8 
If the ätman is known, is not inquiry into the sruti 
redundant? 
No, for there is a conflict about Its distinctive 
nature. Ordinary people as well as the materialists 
of the Lokäyata school recognise the body alone to be 
the Self possessed of sentience. Others hold that 
the mind is the Self. Some say that it is merely 
momentary consciousness. Others say that it is a 
void. Still others believe that there is a soul, 
separate from the body, which transmigrates and is 
the agent (of work) and the experiencer (of results). 
Some say that the soul is a mere experiencer and not 
an agent. Some say that there is a God who is 
different from this soul and is all-knowing and all- 
powerful; others say that He is the Self of the 
experiencing individual. Thus there are many who 
follow opposite views by depending on logic, texts 
and their semblances. If one accepts any of these 
views without examination, one is liable to be 
deflected from emancipation and come to grief. 
Therefore, starting with the presentation of a 
deliberation on Brahman, here is commenced an 
ascertainment of the meaning of the texts of the 
Upanisads with the help of reasoning not opposed 
to the Upanisads themselves, for the purpose of 
leading to emancipation (through knowledge). 9 
Shankara's reference to the absence of distinctive or 
particular knowledge (visesha-jnäna) suggests that the kind 
of knowledge of the ätrnan which we possess is of a general 
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nature only (sämänya-jnäna). In fact, superimposition occurs 
where knowledge is of a general nature and lacks specificity. 
In the rope-snake analogy, an object is perceived as existing, 
but its particular (visesha) nature is incorrectly ascertained. 
The qualities of a snake are then attributed to the rope. In 
the case of the ätman, that "I exist" and "I know" are self- 
revelatory. This knowledge, however, is of a general (sämänya) 
nature only. Upon this Existence (sat) and Awareness (cit), 
mortality and finitude are superimposed. That one exists in all 
three periods of time is unknown. Bliss (änanda) is manifest 
in various experiences, but its identity with the Self is 
not known. It is generally understood to be a quality of 
sense objects. Where the ätman is concerned therefore, the 
problem is a lack of visesha-jnäna, and this makes 
superimposition possible. The result is the ascription of 
the qualities of the non-Self upon the Self. If the ätman 
is fully known or entirely unknown, It cannot become the 
locus of any kind of superimposition. It is clear therefore, 
that from Shankara's standpoint, the problem does not 
involve the knowledge of an entirely unknown, unrevealed or 
remote Self. It is one of incomplete or erroneous knowledge 
of an ever-available and self-manifesting atman. 
Shankara introduces his commentary on the Brahma-sutra 
by arguing that the Self (Subject) and the non-Self (object) 
are so radically different from each other that identity 
between them is impossible. Nevertheless, he says, owing to 
the absence of discrimination, their natures and attributes 
are mutually confused and superimposed. 
10 
He concludes his 
introduction by illustrating the forms which this 
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transposition takes. 
One superimposes the characteristics of the body when one 
has such ideas as 'I am fat', 'I am thin', 'I am fair', 
'I stay', 'I go', or 'I scale'. So also one 
superimposes the attributes of the senses and organs when 
one thinks, 'I am dumb', 'I am deaf', or 'I am blind'... 
Similarly one superimposes the attributes of the internal 
organ, such as desire, will, doubt, perseverance, etc. 
In the same way, one first superimposes the internal 
organ, possessed of the idea of ego, on the Self, the 
witness of all the manifestations of that organ; then 
by an opposite process, one superimposes on the internal 
organ etc. that Self which is opposed to the non-Self 
and which is the witness of everything. 11 
The function of the sruti in this context lies primarily in 
the negation of attributes imposed through avidya on the 
Self. The sruti does not reveal an unknown entity. 
12 
One 
of the most important reasons for emphasizing the immediate 
availability of the Self and clarifying the nature of 
avidyä pertaining to It is that it establishes the 
possibility of sabda-pramäna giving rise to immediate and 
direct knowledge. It is very simple when words like 
"search", "quest", "achieving", "accomplishing" and 
"attaining" are used, to think of the object of inquiry as 
being remote and immediately unavailable. In fact, from 
the perspective of Advaita, the seeker's difficulty 
arises from not having appreciated himself to be the object 
of all quests. He is himself the ever-available sought. 
The challenge is not one of creating anything new, but of 
erroneous understanding of himself. In fact, if the Self 
to be known is not always available and manifest, the 
implication would be that It is somehow limited. 
It is extremely significant that Shankara opens his 
commentary on the Brahma-sutra with an introduction on 
superimposition. It is necessary to posit superimposition 
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(adhyäsa) before non-duality and liberation (moksha) 
can be established. Since adhyäsa is a product of 
avidyd, it can be negated by 'näna. It is as absurd to 
employ any other means, as it is to use a stick for 
protecting oneself against the snake perceived in place 
of the rope. Shankara's emphasis on ' nana as the only 
direct means to moksha has to be understood in the light 
of his definition. of bondage. His standpoint is that if 
bondage is real (i. e. existing in all three periods of 
time without change), it cannot be eliminated by 'näna or 
indeed by any other means. If it is entirely non-existent, 
for example, like the son of a barren woman, there is no 
need for any means to bring about freedom. An apparent 
bondage, however, with its basis in incomplete and 
erroneous knowledge, can be overcome by 'näna born out of 
sabda-pramäna. 
This is the true context also, in which his refutation 
of action (karma) as a direct means to moksha has to be 
placed. 
13 Karma becomes a direct means where the attainment 
involved is one of accomplishing something not yet 
accomplished. If one admits, Shankara contends, that 
moksha is to be effected through karma, then the action 
necessary, whether physical, mental or vocal, should be 
any one of four kinds. 
14 These are creation, modification, 
attainment, and purification. If, however, moksha is 
regarded as the product of an act of creation 
(e. g. like the 
creation of a pot from clay) or modification 
(e. g. milk into 
curds), it becomes finite and non-eternal. The result of 
any action is conditioned by the nature of the act, and 
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action is always finite and limited. In any event, 
brahman is an already existing entity, and beyond all 
change. Is brahman an already existing entity, but separate 
from the individual ( diva) ? Can we consider moksha to be 
the result of an act of attainment or reaching? Brahman, 
being the very nature of one's Self, there is no question 
of Its accomplishment through an act of reaching or any 
movement. 
Even if Brahman be different from oneself, there can 
be no acquisition, for Brahman being all-pervasive 
like space, It remains ever attained by everybody. 15 
Is it possible to view moksha as the result of an act of 
purification? The latter, Shankara points out, can be 
effected either by the addition of some excellence to 
what is to be purified or by the removal of some blemish. 
Moksha, however, is of the nature of brahman to which no 
excellence can be added. 
16 Brahman is, by definition, 
eternally pure and there is no question of the removal of 
any blemish from It. A final possibility is envisaged and 
refuted by Shankara. 
Objection: May it not be, that though liberation is 
inherent in oneself, it remains covered and it becomes 
manifest when the Self is purified by action, as the 
brilliance of a mirror does when cleaned by the act 
of rubbing? 
Vedäntin: No, since the Self cannot reasonably be the 
sphere of any action, for no action can take place 
without bringing about some change in its locus. But 
if the Self changes through action, It will be subject 
to impermanence and that will militate against such 
texts as, 'It is said to be immutable' (B. G. 2: 25)... 
Hence the Self can have no action occurring on Itself. 
And action, taking place on something else, cannot 
purify the Self which is not an object thereof. 
17 
If action is the appropriate mode for realising the 
accomplishment of the unaccomplished, 
'näna is adequate for 
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the accomplishment of the already accomplished. The 
accomplishment of. the accomplished is a paradoxical 
description, but it is quite clear from Shankara's metaphysics 
that he conceives rnoksha to be an attainment of this kind. Such 
an attainment is involved where the loss is entirely notional 
or apparent and the gain is in the form of knowledge. 
Shankara uses a number of illustrations to describe a 
problem of this kind and its solution. The story of the 
tenth man has become a classic parable of Advaita and its 
implications have been contemplated in detail. 
18 
Ten 
disciples were on their way to a pilgrimage site, when they 
encountered a river in flood. In the absence of the boat-man, 
they decided to swim across. On reaching the opposite shore, 
the leader took a count to ensure that everyone was 
safe. To his dismay, one seemed to be missing. Every 
other member of the group did likewise, but ended up with 
the same result. They were all deeply grieved after 
concluding that the tenth man had drowned. A passer-by, 
who was attracted by their loud lamentations, inquired about 
the problem. After patiently listening and observing, 
he assured them that the tenth man was indeed available 
and requested the leader to count again. When the 
disciple stopped at nine and looked bewildered, the stranger 
smilingly said, "You are the tenth man". The error was 
immediately appreciated by everyone. Each had omitted 
himself from his count! The already accomplished and 
immediately available tenth man is denied in avidyä and 
again accomplished inýäna. Similarly, the limitless, 
which is the object of the seeker's quest, is not different 
132 
from his own ever accomplished, always shining, Self. 
Being unaware of this, he assumes the guise of finitude and 
like the tenth man is subject to all its attendant 
sorrows. S ruti frees him by pointing out the identity of 
the seeker and sought. Sruti is like a mirror in which he 
sees his true image. 19 
The attainment of the Self cannot be, as in the 
case of things other than It, the obtaining of 
something not obtained before, for here there is 
no difference between the person attaining and 
the object attained. Where the Self has to 
obtain something other than Itself, the Self is the 
attainer and the non-Self is the object attained. 
This, not being already attained, is separated by 
acts such as producing, and is to be attained by 
the initiation of a particular action with the 
help of auxiliaries. And the attainment of 
something new is transitory, being due to desire 
and action that are themselves the product of a 
false notion, like the birth of a son etc. in 
a dream. But this Self is the very opposite of that. 
By the very fact of Its being the Self, It is not 
separated by acts such as producing. But although 
It is always attained, It is separated by ignorance 
only. 20 
4.2 The Independent Authoritativeness 
of the Vedanta Sentences 
The aim of the previous section was to establish Shankara's 
conception of the nature of avidyä as it relates to the 
atrnan, and its appropriate resolution. The function of the 
sruti does not lie in establishing or revealing the existence 
of the ätman, but in removing ignorance and in negating 
the attributes and qualities which are erroneously ascribed 
to an ever-manifest, but imperfectly known Self. One may 
say that the problem is not a lack of experience of ätman, 
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but one of incorrect knowledge. Someone, for example, 
searching for a certain Mr. Smith, encounters a stranger 
and has a lengthy conversation with him. At the end of the 
exchange, he inquires about Mr. Smith, and the stranger 
declares, "I am Smith". One may say that prior to this 
revelation, the seeker had the experience of Smith, but 
lacked knowledge. Similarly, ätman as sat (Existence), 
cit (Awareness) and änanda (Bliss) is not completely 
unknown, but erroneously understood. We also sought to 
understand the notional nature of bondage, and the 
rationale of Shankara's conclusion that 'näna is the only 
direct means to freedom. 
We must now consider some relevant aspects of his exegesis 
of the Vedic texts. His exegetical position was developed, 
In a large measure, in response to the interpretations of 
Pürva-Mimänsä. Although some of the issues and arguments 
appear archaic, we can examine those still important arguments 
which shed further light on his conception of the nature 
of ' näna and the role of sruti as a pramäna. 
In brief, the Mimansä exegesis, in so far as it is 
relevant to Shankara, contends that the Vedas have their 
purport only in the inculcation of dharma. 
21 
The latter 
is defined by Jaimini as, "that which, being desirable, 
is indicated by Vedic injunction". 22 On the basis of this 
view, Purva-Mimansa argues that only injunctions (vidhi) 
inculcating the performance of acceptable acts, and 
prohibitions (nishedha) instituting restraint from acts opposed 
to dharma, are direct and independent in authority. 23 The 
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authority of all other texts is indirect and dependent for 
their meaningfulness on a connection with the injunctions. 
They are not viewed as having any independent end in 
themselves. Many Vedic texts, for example, including 
Vedanta sentences (Vedanta-, Vakyas), are seen as having 
their purposefulness only in praising what has been enjoined 
in the injunctions. 24 Purva-Mimänsa argues that if such 
sentences are taken by themselves, they are absolutely 
meaningless because they neither impel us to activity or 
restrain us from a prohibited action. 
25 
Their view is that 
the Vedanta-väkyas are merely an appendage to the main body 
of injunctive statements. Their utility lies only in 
praising the prescribed action or in providing some useful 
information such as knowledge of the deity or agent for the 
performance of a particular rite. If they are statements 
about already accomplished entities, then they are without 
fruit, for they neither prompt the performance of dharma 
nor the avoidance of adharma. Against the independent 
authority of the Vedanta-väkyas, Purva-Mimansa contends that 
knowledge about already accomplished things is obtainable 
from other pramänas. The knowledge of dharma and adharma, 
however, is not otherwise obtainable. 
26 
This Mimänsä exegesis is obviously incompatible with 
Shankara's justification of the role of the Vedas. It is 
irreconcilable with his view that the Upanishads are an 
independent pramana for brahman. He seeks therefore, to 
refute, from various standpoints, the Mimansä thesis, and 
to establish that the Vedanta-vakyas are not subservient 
to any other texts, but have an independent meaningfulness 
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and authority in the revelation of brahman. 
Skiankara does not accept that sentences cannot have a 
factual referent or significance. 
27 
He points out that 
even though a sentence might have its ultimate purport in 
initiating some activity, it does not necessarily cease 
to communicate valid factual information. Even as a man 
travelling to some destination perceives the existence of 
leaves and grass at the side of the road, a statement might 
have its aim in activity, but its factual content is not 
thereby invalidated. 28 In response to the Mimansa 
exaltation of injunctions, Shankara reminds them that 
injunctions are valid not simply because they are injunctions, 
but because they are revealed in an authoritative pramäna, 
the Vedas. 
When a thing has been known to be true from the 
Vedas, a person will perform it, should it admit 
of being performed, but will not do it if it is 
not a thing to be done. 29 
Another proposition of Mimänsä is that if Vedic statements 
are understood to independently signify already existent 
things, they become redundant. Existent things are knowable 
through ordinary sources of knowledge. While agreeing that 
most existent things can be so known, Shankara contends that 
brahman is unique. Possessing no characteristics apprehensible 
through any other pramäna, it can be cognized through 
sabda-pramäna alone. Its existence cannot be denied just 
because Its nature precludes all other sources of knowledge. 
30 
In reply to the claim that mere factual statements which 
neither persuade us into activity nor dissuade us 
from it are 
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fruitless, Shankara asserts that, "the test of the 
authority or otherwise of a passage is not whether it 
states a fact or an action, but its capacity to generate 
certain and fruitful knowledge. A passage that has this is 
authoritative and one that lacks it is not" .1 He never 
3 
tires of continuously affirming the independent fruitfulness 
of the Vedanta-vakyas. Even as a simple statement of fact, 
"This is a rope, not a snake", is fruitful in removing the 
fear occasioned by the error of taking a rope for a snake, 
V edänta-väkyas, by helping to discriminate the Self from 
the non-Self, release us from the sorrow of taking ourselves 
to be incomplete and finite beings. 
32 
It contravenes 
experience to maintain that brahmajnäna is unproductive 
because knowledge brings about no change in the life of 
someone who knows brahman. 
For one. who has realised the state of the unity of the 
Self and Brahman, it cannot be proved that his mundane 
life continues just as before; for this contradicts 
the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the Self 
arising from the Vedas which are a valid means of 
knowledge. From noticing the fact that a man can have 
sorrow, fear, etc. as a result of identifying himself 
with the body etc., it does not follow that this 
very man will have sorrow etc. contingent on false 
ignorance, even when his self-identification with the 
body etc. ceases after the realization of the unity 
of Brahman and the Self, arising from the Vedas which 
are a valid source of knowledge. Just because a 
householder, who had been rich and prided himself on that 
account, had been seen to be sorrowing for the theft of 
his wealth, it does not follow that this very man will be 
miserable for any loss of that wealth even after 
he has become a monk and given up the idea of being 
wealthy. 33 
Besides, Shankara states, if one contends that only statements 
prompting activity are meaningful, Vedic prohibition (nishedha) 
will be deprived of all authority. A sentence such as, 
"A Brähmana should not be killed", is neither directly nor 
0 
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indirectly connected with any action. It is the aim of 
a nishedha to influence us to desist from a particular 
action. 
34 
Finally, our attention is drawn to the contradiction 
involved in asserting that the Vedanta-vakyas are subsidiary to 
the injunctive texts. Vedanta texts, which proclaim the 
reality of the non-dual brahman, deny the absolute truth 
of the duality of agent, instrument and result implied in 
activity. In the light of such a clear repudiation of 
duality, it is impossible to maintain that they can in any 
way subserve injunctions. 
35 
From a hermeneutical point of view, the most important 
basis for Shankara's affirmation that Vedanta-vakyas are 
independently authoritative and fruitful is his contention 
that by right correlation (samanvaya), it can be shown that 
these sentences have their purport (tätparya) only in the 
revelation of brahman. 
Besides, when the words in the Upanisadic sentences 
become fully ascertained as but revealing the 
nature of Brahman, it is not proper to fancy some 
other meaning; for that will result in rejecting 
something established by the Vedas and accepting 
some other thing not intended by them. 36 
In order to discover the purport of any scriptural passage, 
Advaita makes use of the sixfold criteria (shadlinga) 
37 formulated by Purva-Mimansa exegetists. These very important 
exegetical canons are as follows: 
1. Upakramopasamhärau (the beginning and the end). 
This means the presentation at the beginning as well as 
the end, of the subject matter treated in a particular section. 
A unity of the initial and concluding passages is 
considered to be a good indication of the intention of 
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the sruti. For example, CH. U. 6.2.1, begins with the 
text, "In the beginning, my dear, this was being only, 
One without a second". The section ends (6.16.3), 
"All this is identical with That; That is the Self; 
That Thou Art, 0 Shvetaketu". 
2. Abhyäsa (repetition). The purport of the sruti 
is also suggested by the frequent repetition of a theme 
in the course of a discussion. In CH. U. 6, the sentence, 
"That Thou Art", is uttered nine times. 
3. Apürva (novelty). The idea here is that if the 
subject under discussion is knowable through other 
pramänas, it cannot be the purport of sruti. As a 
pramäna, the main function of sruti is to inform us of 
things which are inaccessible through any other means of 
knowledge. Brahman is considered to be a subject 
unknowable through any means but the Vedas . 
4. Phala (fruit). The purport of a passage is also 
indicated by the clear mention of an independent result. 
The fruitfulness of the Vedanta-vakyas is an argument 
which Shankara returns to again and again. CH. U. 6.14.2, 
mentions moksha as the 2hala of brahmajnäna. In other 
words, if in a particular passage there is an unambiguous 
mention of its own independent fruit, such a passage 
cannot be seen as being merely subservient to some other 
parts of the text. A distinct result gives a good 
indication of a different purport. By arguing that there 
is a clear mention of a different end in the jnänakända 
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(i. e. moksha), Shankara distinguishes its purport from 
the karmakanda section of the Vedas. 
5. Arthaväda (commendation). This is the praise 
of the subject matter in the course of the discussion. 
"Have you ever asked for that instruction by which one 
hears what has not been heard, one thinks what has not 
been thought, one knows what has not been known"? 
(CH. u. 6.1.3), is seen as a praise of brahmajnäna. 
6. Upapatti (demonstration). This indicates the 
use of arguments to suggest the reasonableness of the 
subject presented. CH. U. 6.1.4-6 uses a variety of 
illustrations to demonstrate the non-difference of 
cause and effect and to explain brahman as the material 
cause of the universe. 
38 
Advaita contends that by the application of the shadlinga 
it can be proved that the Vedanta-vakyas are not ancillary to 
any other texts, but have an independent purport (tätparya) 
in revealing the non-dual brahman. 
Shankara' s refutation of the Mimänsä exegesis of the 
significance of the Vedanta-väkyas highlights and reinforces 
salient features of his own outlook. It underlines the 
nature of brahman as an ever-available entity and emphasizes 
the role of V edänta-väkyas in producing fruitful knowledge 
of an existent thing. That brahman is existent does not at 
all imply Its attainability through other pramanas. 
Brahmajnäna is fully revelatory in character, for it does 
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not accomplish its end by instigating engagement in any 
activity. Like the case of the tenth man, sabda-pramana 
can produce fruitful results where the problem involved is 
a mistaken notion of an existent reality. 
Having highlighted Shankara's arguments for the autonomy 
of the Vedanta-vakyas, we can conclude by summing up his 
conception of the subject matter and purport of the Vedas 
as a whole. The first section (karmakända) informs us of 
.0 
approved means for attaining desirable but yet unaccomplished 
ends. 
39 
The second section (jndnakända) constitutes the 
Upanishads and informs us of the nature of brahman. 
40 
The 
two sections are clearly distinguishable from each other 
in four ways: 
41 
1. Vishaya (subject matter). Karmakanda is concerned with 
.. 
the revelation of dharma, while the jnänakända has 
brahman as its subject. 
2. Adhikari (aspirant). The aspirant after the ends of the 
karmakända is one who has not yet grown to understand 
the limitations of any result achievable by karma. The 
adhikari of the jnänakanda has appreciated the non-eternity 
of karma-accomplished ends, and seeks an unaccomplished 
limitless end. 
42 
3. Phala (result). The karmakända has prosperity as its result. 
The result of the jnanakanda is moksha. 
43 
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4. Sambandha (connection). The knowledge which is revealed 
in the karmakdnda informs us of an end which is not yet 
existent. Its actualization depends upon being effected 
by an appropriate action. Knowledge here is not an end 
in itself. The jnänakdnda, on the other hand, reveals 
an already existent brahman. B rahmajnäna is an end in 
itself. The connection here is between a revealed 
object and a means of revelation. Jnanakanda fulfils 
itself in its informative role, while the karmakanda 
impels us into activity. 
Shankara makes frequent reference in his bhäshya to the 
criticism that the non-dual brahman of the jnänakända 
renders invalid the entire karnakända with its dualistic 
presuppositions. His general response is that the sruti 
is realistic and practical in its awareness of the human 
condition and provides solutions which are appropriate to 
man's needs and demands. S ruti does not, he points out, 
instruct us at birth about the duality or unity of existence, 
and then about rites or the knowledge of brahman. In fact, 
he says, the notion of duality does not have to be 
instructed. It is initially accepted as naturally true by 
all of us. The scripture, he argues, in full awareness of 
this fact and in recognition of the multifarious desires in 
men, prescribes, in the karmakända, appropriate rites for 
securing these ends. 
44 In doing this, the sruti does not 
comment on the reality or otherwise of these actions. 
Moreover, actions, their factors and their results 
are things we naturally believe in: they are the 
creation of ignorance. When, through their help, a 
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man who desires to gain something good or to avoid 
something evil, proceeds to adopt a means of , which he has only a vague, not definite idea, the Sruti 
simply tells him about that; it says nothing either for or against the truth of the diversity of actions, 
their factors and their results - which people have 
already taken for granted. For the gruti only 
prescribes means for the attainment of desired ends 
and the avoidance of untoward results. 45 
S ruti stands helplessly in her confrontation with insatiable 
human desires. To exercise forceful restraint is utterly 
futile. She simply instructs in accordance with capacity. 
Shankara explains the stance of the sruti in one of his 
clearest statements on this issue. 
People have innumerable desires and various defects, 
such as attachment. Therefore they are lured by the 
attachment etc. to external objects, and the scriptures 
are powerless to hold them back; nor can they persuade 
those who are naturally averse to external objects to 
go after them. But the scriptures do this much that 
they point out what leads to good and what to evil, 
thereby indicating the particular relations that 
subsist between ends and means; just as a lamp, for 
instance, helps to reveal forms in the dark. But 
the scriptures neither hinder nor direct a person by 
force, as if he were a slave. We see how people 
disobey even the scriptures because of an excess of 
attachment etc. Therefore, according to the varying 
tendencies of people, the scriptures variously teach 
the particular relations that subsist between ends 
and means. In this matter people themselves adopt 
particular means according to their tastes, and the 
scriptures simply remain neutral, like the sun, for 
instance, or a lamp. Similarly, somebody may think 
the highest goal to be not worth striving after. One 
chooses one's goal according to one's knowledge, and 
wants to adopt corresponding means. 46 
When, however, an individual appreciates the limited nature 
of all the results that he can possibly achieve through 
karma and seeks the enduring factor of existence, sruti 
imparts brahmajnäna. It is only for this person that the 
validity of duality, presupposed in the karmakända, is 
negated. 
47 Therefore, Shankara concludes, the texts that 
teach the unity of brahman are not antagonistic to those 
143 
enjoining rituals. Nor do the ritualistic texts deprive 
the Upanishads of authority. Each is authoritative in its 
own sphere. 
48 
4.3. The Distinctive Method of Word Manipulation 
as Mode of Instruction 
We have already emphasized the need for cautious 
approach to Shankara's explanation of sruti statements 
treating the unknowability of brahman and discussed the chief 
ways in which he reads such passages. 
49 
That brahman is 
knowable and that sabda-pramäna is the only vehicle of 
this knowledge are the unmistakable conclusions of his 
bhashya. In his altercation with Purva-Mimansä, we have 
seen his labour to argue the independent significance and 
efficacy of the Vedanta-väkyas. The task of such 
statements is not to demonstrate brahman's existence but 
to correct and complete our muddled and partial understanding. 
As an entity which has to be defined by a pramäna in the 
form of words, brahman presents unique difficulties. It 
possesses none of the characteristics of genus, quality, 
relation and activity, through which words are normally 
able to describe a subject. Therefore, along with his 
emphasis on the possibility of brahmajnana, Shankara also 
draws attention to a traditional method of instruction. 
With all of their limitations, there is no means of evading 
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the use of words, since they constitute the very nature of 
the indispensable pramdna. If limited words are to discard 
their finite references and reveal the infinite, they must 
be skilfully and deliberately wielded. It is this necessity 
for skilful instruction which explains the Advaita 
conception of the role and qualifications of the traditional 
teacher. There is no lack of emphasis in Shankara on the 
imperative of the guru. "Brahman", he says, "can only be 
known through such a traditional instruction of perceptors 
and not through argumentation, nor by study (or exposition), 
intelligence, great learning, austerity, sacrifices, etc. , 
50 
Shankara describes such a teacher as a rare one among many. 
51 
In the Chändogya Upanishad, the certain acquisition of 
knowledge by the person fortunate to have a teacher is 
described in an illustration, which is often cited by 
Shankara. 
Just as, my dear, some one, having brought a man from 
the Gandhära regions with his eyes bound up, might leave 
him in a desolate place, - and that man would shout 
towards the East, or towards the North, or towards the 
South, or towards the West - 'I have been brought here 
with my eyes bound up and left here with my eyes bound 
up'. 
And as someone might remove his bandages and tell him - 
the Gandhära regions lie towards this direction, go in 
this direction, - whereupon, asking his way from village 
to village, and becoming informed and capable of judging 
for himself, he would reach the Gandhära regions; - in 
the same manner, in this world, that person knows who 
has a teacher; and for him the delay is only so long as 
I am not liberated and become merged. 52 
The qualified teacher is one who has thoroughly mastered the 
sruti (srotriyam) and who abides in brahmaj äna (brahmanishtham). 
53 
Such a teacher should be reverentially approached and is 
under an obligation to instruct the well-qualified student 
(sishya). 
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To him who approaches duly, whose heart is calm and 
whose outer organs are under control, that man of 
enlightenment should adequately impart that knowledge 
of Brahman by which one realises the true and immutable 
Purusa. 54 
The skilful teacher instructs in accordance with the 
receptivity of the student and his capacity for assimilation. 
The method of teaching is referred to in Advaita as, 
arundhati-darsana-nyäya (the method of indicating arundhati). 
Arundhati, a very small star, is difficult to perceive. In 
order to point it out, a proximate, larger star is indicated 
as arundhati. This large star is dismissed when it is seen 
and arundhati is then shown. 
55 The aim of imparting 
brahmajnana is accomplished by a combination of several 
approaches. Only for the sake of convenience can we try to 
distinguish between them. In sruti and in the actual 
teaching process, they are employed together and 
presuppose each other. 
(I). The Method of Adhyäropa (Superimposition) 
and Apaväda (De-Superimposition) 
One of the finest examples of this method of instruction 
is to be found in the Bhagavadgita, Chapter 13: 12-14.56 We 
can understand Shankara's conception of the nature of this 
process of instruction, by following his bhäshya on these 
verses. 
That which has to be known I shall describe; knowing which 
one attains the Immortal. Beginningless 
is the Supreme 
Brahman. It is not said to be 'sat' or 'asat'. 57 
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Shankara advances two reasons for not accepting that the 
Bhagavadgitä's description of brahman as neither sat 
(existent) nor asat (non-existent) is contradictory. 
58 
His argument here is that only something which can be perceived 
by the senses can be an object of consciousness accompanied 
by the idea of existence or non-existence. 
59 
Brahman is 
beyond all sense apprehension and is knowable through 
sabda-pramäna alone. In addition to this, no word can define 
brahman which lacks all characteristics (viz. genus, quality, 
action, relation) denoted by words. This assertion, however, 
Shankara says, that brahman is not definable by the word, 
sat, may lead one to the unacceptable conclusion that 
brahman has no reality. The next verse averts this by 
attributing to It the organs of a living being. 
With hands and feet everywhere, with eyes and heads 
and mouths everywhere, with hearing everywhere, That 
exists enveloping all. 60 
The superimposition (adhyäropa) of sense organs and organs 
of action on brahman is a purely pedagogic device for 
indicating Its existence. In reality all such attributions 
(upädhis) are false. Once Its existence is indicated, the 
apaväda immediately follows in the next verse. 
Shining by the functions of all the sense organs, 
yet without the senses; unattached, yet supporting all; 
devoid of qualities, yet enjoying qualities. 61 
This paradoxical method of adhyäropa and apaväda is one 
way by which the finite limitations of language can to some 
extent be overcome to indicate brahman. The sruti abounds 
with examples of this kind of verbal juxtaposition. 
62 
The 
adhyäropa-apaväda procedure is a unique method of indicating 
the immanent and transcendent aspects of brahman. Adhyaropa 
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definitions are possible because the entire universe is 
dependent on brahman and nothing is apart from It. In the 
actual process of instruction, initial attention must 
necessarily be drawn to brahman through Its association with 
the world and the individual. 63 
That from which all these beings take birth, that by 
which they live after being born, that towards which 
they move and into which they merge. That is 
Brahman. 64 
That which man does not comprehend with the mind, that 
by which, they say, the mind is encompassed, know 
that to be Brahman and not what people worship as an 
object. 65 
Definitions of the first kind reveal the world's dependence on 
and identity with brahman, by presenting the latter as both 
its material and efficient cause. 
66 Definitions of the 
second type reveal brahman as the ätman. Brahman is 
indicated as the Self through Its nature as illumining 
Awareness (caitanya) in relation to the body, sense organs 
and mind. They serve as the indicators through which brahman 
can be pointed out, even as one points out the star 
arundhati. When these aspects of brahman are fully 
grasped by the student, then all false attributions (upädhis) 
must be negated because of their finite implications and 
because of the nonessential nature of the characteristics 
associated with brahman. Having accomplished their purposes, 
these definitions are withdrawn and apaväda negates from 
brahman all anthropomorphic semblances. Both procedures are 
complementary and indispensable. Language is employed by 
revealing its limitations. 
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(I I) . The Method of Negation, (Neti, Neti) 
The method of pure negation is another means by which 
words can be detached from their primary limited denotations. 
Purely negative definitions of brahman are intended to 
distinguish It from the known and limited referents of all 
words. Such negative descriptions are exceedingly common 
in the Upanishads. 
The wise realise everywhere that which is invisible 
(adris a), ungraspable (agrähya), without family 
(a otra), without caste (avarna), without sight or 
hearing (acakshusrotra), wit ut hand or foot (apänipäda), 
immortal (nitya), multiformed, and all pervasive, 
extremely subtle, and undiminishing (avyaya) ; and 
which is the source of all. 67 
One becomes freed from the jaws of death by knowing 
that which is soundless (asabdam), touchless (asparsam), 
colourless (arü am), undiminishing, and also 
tasteless (arasam), eternal, odourless, without beginning 
and end (anadi, anantam), distinct from Mahat and ever 
constant. 68 
Very often the negation employed by the sruti is twofold. 
Contrary attributes are side by side denied in order that 
the negation of one attribute does not lead to the supposition 
that brahman is characterized by its opposite. 
Tell (me) of that thing which you see as different 
from virtue, different from vice, different from 
this cause and effect, and different from the past 
and future. 69 
It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, 
neither red colour nor oiliness, neither shadow nor 
darkness, neither air nor ether, neither savour nor 
odour, without eyes or ears, without the vocal organ 
or mind, non-luminous, without the vital force or 
mouth, not a measure, and without exterior or interior. 
It does not eat anything, nor is It eaten by anybody. 70 
Words are so saturated with the content of finitude, that 
no single word can directly signify brahman. One is initially 
surprised to encounter Shankara's statement that even terms 
like "ätman" and "brahman" are incompetent to directly 
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denote It. Commenting on BR. U. 1.4.7, Shankara points out 
that the use of the particle "iti" (thus) along with the 
word atman signifies that the truth of the dtman is beyond 
the scope of the term and concept "ätman". If it were 
otherwise, the sruti would have said, "One should meditate 
upon the Ätman". This would have wrongly implied, however, 
that the term and concept ' tman" were acceptable with 
reference to the Self. 
71 The essential aim of the negative 
method is to deny all specifications which are the result 
of superimposition. Neti, neti (not this, not this) 
can also be seen as a rejection of brahman as a known 
objectified entity, and a positive hinting of Its nature 
as the Knower. The negative method, according to Shankara 
is our only option when we wish to describe brahman free 
from all known and finite specifications. 
By elimination of all differences due to limiting 
adjuncts, the words [neti, neti] refer to something 
that has no distinguishing mark such as name, or form, 
or action, or heterogeneity, or species, or qualities. 
Words denote things through one or the other of these. 
But Brahman has none of these distinguishing marks. 
Hence It cannot be described as, 'It is such and such', 
as we describe a cow by saying, 'There moves a white 
cow with horns'. Brahman is described by mean of 
name and form and action superimposed on It, in such 
terms as, 'Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman [vijnänam, änandam, 
brahman]' (BR. U. 3.9.28), and 'Pure Intelligence 
vijnänaghana]' (BR. U. 2.4.12), 'Brahman', and 'lAtman'. 
When, however, we wish to describe Its true nature, free 
from all differences due to limiting adjuncts, then it 
is an utter impossibility. Then there is only one 
way left, viz. to describe It as 'Not this, Not this' , 
by eliminating all possible specifications of It that 
have been known. 72 
It is obvious therefore, that the method of negation, as 
understood by Shankara, is more a unique positive way of 
defining brahman rather than the suggestion of an inability 
to formulate a concept of brahman. In association with 
the other methods of teaching, 
it is remarkably suitable 
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for indicating the non-objectivity of brahman and Its 
freedom from all limiting characteristics. 
(III). The Method of Lakshana (Implication) 
The two methods of teaching about brahman which we have so 
far considered are essentially negative in character. They 
highlight the problems of language in relation to brahman 
and point to the latter as being beyond the ordinary 
signification of any words. These methods are successful 
if they alert us to the difficulties involved in speaking 
about brahman. They prepare us for, and are made complete 
by the positive method of definition through lakshana. 
73 
Although references to this method can be found in 
various places, throughout the writings of Shankara, his 
most detailed discussion occurs in his bhäshya on 
Taittiriya Upanishad, 2.1.1.1 In this verse, we have what 
is perhaps the most important definition of brahman in 
Advaita Vedanta. 
Satyam, j nanam, anantam brahma (brahman is Re ality, 
Knowledge and Infinite). 74 
In the light of Shankara's view that the Upanishads impart 
positive knowledge of brahman and his clear contention that 
ordinary words cannot directly signify It, it is important 
to understand how such an apparently positive definition 
can inform us decidedly about brahman's essential nature. 
75 
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According to Shankara, the sentence, "satyam, 'nänam, 
anantam, brahma", is meant as a definition of brahman. 
All three words, which have the same case endings and 
are in apposition, serve as distinguishing adjectives of 
brahman. When qualified by these three terms, brahman 
becomes distinguished from all other substantives. The 
method is the same as when a lotus is differentiated from 
all other lotuses by being described as, "big, blue and 
fragrant". 
Shankara formulates a likely objection to this view 
of "satyam, jnänam, anantam brahma". It is argued that a 
substantive can be differentiated when there is a possibility 
of negating alternative attributes. The adjective, "white", 
for instance, negates "red" or "blue" from the particular 
lotus. Adjectives are useful when there are many 
substantives belonging to the same genus, and there is a 
possibility of qualification by several adjectives. They are 
not similarly purposeful where there is a single, unique 
entity and no possibility of any other substantives with 
alternative attributes. Like the sun, there is one 
brahman. Unlike the blue lotus, which can be distinguished 
from the red or white one, there are no other brahmans from 
which It can be distinguished. 
In this case, Shankara responds, the adjectives 
are meant for defining and not for qualifying brahman. 
He explains that while an adjective might distinguish a 
noun from others of the same genus, a definition distinguishes 
it from all other things. As an example, Shankara gives the 
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definition of äkasa as that which gives space. The 
sentence, "satyam, 'nänam, anantam brahma", is meant as a 
definition of brahman. The three terms are not mutually 
related since they are meant for subserving the substantive. 
Each term is independently related to brahman, and the 
sentence ought to be read in this way: satyam brahman, 
'nanam brahman, anantam brahman. 
The term, "satyam" (Real i-ty) , indicates the non-deviation 
of an object from its established nature. The opposite is 
anritam (unreali. ty) . Changeability is thus equivalent to 
untruth or unreality. "Satyam" therefore, distinguishes 
brahman from all changing and therefore, unreal things. On 
the basis of the word "satyam" alone and its implications, 
one might conclude that brahman is an insentient material 
like earth. To avert this conclusion, Shankara says, the 
term "jnanam" is introduced. "J nänam" means Knowledge or 
Consciousness. It conveys the abstract notion of the verb 
'nä (to know). It does not refer to the agent of knowing 
(jnänakartä) because of its use in conjunction with "satyam" 
and "anantam". Reality and Infinity cannot be attributed to 
the agent of knowledge, since agency implies change. 
Knowership also implies the division of Knower and known and 
cannot be described as infinite in accordance with Vedic 
texts such as, "Wherein one sees nothing else, hears nothing 
else and understands nothing else, - that is the Infinite; 
wherein one sees something else, hears something else, and 
understands something else, - that is Finite. That which is 
Infinite is immortal; that which is Finite is mortal" 
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(CH. U. 7.24.1). 76 " Jnänam" therefore, along with "satyam" 
and "anantam" denies agency and insentiency in brahman. The 
term "anantam" (infinite), following "'nänam", also serves 
to negate the idea that because all human knowledge is 
finite, brahman is similarly limited. 
Shankara explains that the word "jnänam" in its ordinary 
sense cannot define brahman. The word 'nana normally 
indicates a modification of the intellect and is subject to 
change. When the word is applied to brahman, however, it is 
used as identical with brahman and eternal. 
But the Consciousness of Brahman is inherent in Brahman 
and is inalienable from It, just as the light of the sun 
is from the sun or the heat of fire is from fire. 
Consciousness is not dependent on any other cause for 
its (revelation), for. it is by nature eternal (light). 
And since all that exists is inalienable from Brahman 
in time or space, Brahman being the cause of time, space, 
etc., and since Brahman is surpassingly subtle, there 
is nothing else whether subtle or screened or remote or 
past, present or future which can be unknowable to it. 
Therefore Brahman is ommiscient... Just because Brahman's 
nature of being the knower is inseparable and because 
there is no dependence on other accessories like the 
sense-organs, Brahman though intrinsically identical with 
knowledge, is well known to be eternal. Thus, since this 
knowledge is not a form of action, it does not also bear 
the root meaning of the verb. Hence, too, Brahman is not 
the agent of cognition. And because of this, again, It 
cannot even be denoted by the word jnäna. 77 
Shankara explains, however, that brahman can be implied by 
the word "j hanam" even though the latter cannot directly 
signify It. 
78 
Similarly, Shankara point out, the word 
satya which refers to external reality in general, can 
only by implication refer to brahman. 
Thus the words truth etc. occurring in mutual proximity, 
and restricting and being restricted in turns by each other, 
distinguish Brahman from other object denoted by the words 
truth etc., and thus become fit for defining It as well. 79 
The clear contention of Shankara then is that any single term 
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drawn from general usage can be misleading if applied 
directly to brahman. When, however, carefully chosen 
expressions are skilfully juxtaposed, they mutually 
qualify and eliminate from each other their finite associations. 
Such terms are then capable of defining brahman by implication. 
Other striking examples of this kind of exegesis are adduced 
by Shankara. The word ätman ordinarily refers to the empirical 
self (jivatman), identified with the body and subject to 
the notions of differentiation. When, however, by the 
process of elimination, the body, etc. are rejected as the 
Self, the word ätman can then indirectly signify the Self. 
For instance, when an army with the king is seen marching 
along, with umbrellas, flags, standards, - even though 
the king is actually hidden by all this paraphernalia 
and hence, not visible, yet the expression is used 'the king 
is seen'; and when it is asked which is the king? and 
people come to look for the particular person who is the 
king, - everyone of the other persons that are actually 
visible being rejected (as not being the king), there 
follows (as a result of elimination) that the person 
who is not visible is the king, - and thus the idea of 
the 'king' is secured; - exactly similar is the case in 
question. 80 
Similarly, änanda (Bliss), when used as a definition of 
brahman cannot be understood as pleasure born out of contact 
between a sense organ and object. Such a joy is transient; 
when associated with brahman it is eternal. 
81 When used 
along with brahman, änanda has to be understood as signifying 
brahman's very nature. It does not suggest that the 
Bliss of the Self is cognised. 
82 
The kind of implication involved in the exegesis of 
positive defining words such as "satyam, 'nänam, anantam" is 
of the exclusive - non-exclusive type (jahadajahallakshanä). 
83 
It is not non-exclusive (ajahallakshanä) because the word 
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meaning is not entirely retained. It is not exclusive 
implication (jahallakshanä) because the word meaning is 
not entirely rejected. By the rejection of the ordinary 
meaning and the retention of the implied meaning, the word 
denotation is freed of its finite associations. It is then 
acceptable for defining brahman. Recourse to implication 
in the case of sentences such as, "satyam, jnänam, anantam 
brahman", is necessitated by a frustration of both the 
logical connection of the words and the purport (tätparya). 
The direct meanings of the words are incompatible with 
each other and incapable of defining brahman. The purport 
in any context is discovered by the application of the 
sixfold criteria (shadlinga). By arguing that brahman 
can only be defined at the implied level of meaning, 
Shankara is able to accept sruti statements such as, 
"Failing to reach which (Brahman), words, along with the 
mind turn back" (TA. U. 2.4.1), and still maintain the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the sruti as the aramana 
of brahmajnäna. The essentially negative methods of 
adhyaropa - apaväda and neti, neti do not culminate in 
nihilism and are not understood in an absolutely literal 
sense by Shankara. 
As for the statement that Brahman is beyond speech and 
mind, that is not meant to imply that Brahman is 
non-existent. For it is not logical to deny that very 
Brahman after establishing It with a great show of 
girding up one's loins, in such sentences of the 
Upanishads as, "The knower of Brahman attains the 
highest", "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinity" 
(TA. U. 2.1.1. ); for as the popular saying has it, 
"Rather than wash away the mud, it is much better to 
avoid its touch from a distance". As a matter of fact. 
the text "Failing to reach which, words turn back with 
the mind" (TA. U. 2.9.1) presents only a process of 
propounding Brahman. The idea expressed is this: Brahman 
156 
is beyond speech and mind; It cannot be classed with 
objects of knowledge; It is one's inmost Self; and It is by nature eternal, pure, intelligent and free. 84 
One cannot overestimate the importance of lakshanä as a 
method of defining brahman. It is integral to Shankara's 
rationale for the Vedas as a pramäna of brahman. After his 
justification of the Vedas as a source of knowledge by showing 
the limitations of all other pramänas with regard to brahman, the 
problem of the latter' s inexpressibility through words, which 
are unavoidably finite in their reference, still remains. 
In response to this dilemma, Shankara proposes lakshanä as the 
method of surmounting brahman's inexpressibility. It 
complements his case for the necessity ofsruti by demonstrating 
its competence and capability to effect brahmajnäna. 
4.4 The Lakshanä Exegesis of "That Thou Art 
(Tat Tvam Asi) " 
The lakshanä method can be demonstrated further by a 
consideration of the Advaita exegesis of the rnahäväkya 
(great sentence), That Thou Art (tat tvan asi)". 
85 
The 
text first occurs in CH. U. 6.8.7, during a conversation 
between the teacher Uddälaka and his son Svetaketu. 
86 
The term "tat", according to Shankara, indicates Being, 
the ground of the entire universe. It is that which is 
real, eternal and immortal. 
87 
The word "tvam" indicates 
Svetaketu, the son of Uddä? _aka, the one who was exposed 
to the teaching, pondered over it and requested to be 
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taught again. 
This represents the person who, being entitled to be 
the hearer, the ponderer and the knower, - did not, 
before he was taught by his father, had not reached the 
true nature of his own self, as Being, the self of all 
as distinct from all aggregates of causes and effects, 
- which - as the Supreme Deity, - had entered into the 
aggregate of causes and effects made up of Fire, Water 
and Food, for the differentiating of Names and Forms, 
- just as a man enters the mirror, as his own reflection, 
or the sun enters into the water and other reflecting 
surfaces, as its own reflection; - now, however, having 
been enlightened by his father by the teaching 'That 
Thou Art', through a number of illustrations and reasons, 
- he understood from his father that 'I am Being itself'. 88 
The result of this instruction, according to Shankara, is 
the elimination of the notion of doership and enjoyership in 
respect of the Self. The knowledge imparted by the mahäväkya 
is incompatible with Svetaketu' s previous notions of himself 
and displaces the latter. 
89 Although Shankara does not 
specifically mention a lakshana interpretation here, the 
latter is obvious from the context of his discussion and 
from his assertion that no word can directly indicate 
brahman. It is "team" stripped of all finite attributes which 
is identical with brahman. 
90 
This best known of Advaita mahdväkyas therefore, is to 
be understood just like the sentence, "This is that 
Cevadatta". 91 Here the identity is not posited between 
the primary meanings of "this" and "that". These indicate 
present and past spatial and temporal conditions, and are 
clearly incompatible. The accidental qualities of space and 
time are negated and the identity of Devadatta is asserted 
by the implied meanings of both terms. The rejection of 
ordinary for -implied meanings 
is, of course, an instance of 
jahadajahallakshanä. 
15d 
The primary meaning of "tat" is Consciousness in association 
with the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, creatorship, etc. 
In other words isvara or saguna brahman (brahman with qualities). 
Consciousness unassociated with these upädhis (nirguna 
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brahman) is the implied meaning of "tat". Similarly, 
Consciousness associated with individual ignorance and the 
qualities of limited knowledge and powers of action is the 
primary meaning of "tvam". In other words, the individual 
(jiva). The implied meaning is again pure Consciousness. 
92 
Like in the sentence, "This is that Devadatta", the primary 
meanings of "tat" and "tvam" are incompatible. Omniscience 
and omnipotence are opposed to limited knowledge and powers 
of creation. This conflict of primary meanings leads to 
the positing of identity at the level of pure Consciousness, 
free from the superimpositions of jivahood and isv arahood. 
The exegesis involved here is not jahallakshanä as in the 
sentence, "The village is on the Ganges", where the express 
meaning of the sentence is entirely abandoned. In the case 
of "tat team asi", the contradiction is in part of the 
meaning only. Nor is it a case of ajahallakshanä, because 
there is an incompatibility involved and part of the 
meaning has to be dropped. The identity between ätman and 
brahman is affirmed through jahadajahallaksh anä. 
6 
Shankara categorically denies any interpretation of 
"tat tvam asi" other than the absolute identity of ätman 
and brahman. 93 The sentence is not comparable in meaning to 
the attribution of the idea of Vishnu on a mürti and the 
contemplation of the latter as if it were Vishnu. The 
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mahäväkya does not ask us to look upon ätman as if it were 
brahman, but asserts a definite identity. Nor is it to be 
conceived figuratively (gauna) as in the sentence, "You are 
a lion". If identity was a mere figure of speech, jndna 
alone could not lead to the discovery of oneness with 
brahman and the gain of moksha. "Tat tvam asi" is also not 
a mere eulogy (stuti). Svetaketu is not an object of 
worship in the discussion, and it is no praise to brahman 
to be identified with Svetaketu. A king is not complimented 
by being identified with his servant. Apart from these 
interpretations, Shankara concludes, there is no other way 
of understanding the mahäväkya. 
In Chapter 3, our aim was to highlight the deliberate 
case which Shankara makes out for sruti as the only pramäna 
of brahman. In the light of the current opinions we 
presented in Chapter 1, it was necessary to clearly demonstrate, 
by citing crucial arguments from Shankara's commentaries, 
that his recourse to sruti is not adventitious or dispensable. 
His rationale is firmly grounded in the argument that because 
of the very nature of brahman, knowledge through any other 
pramäna is inconceivable. 
Our discussion in the present chapter supplements these 
arguments and affords further insights into the way he regarded 
the sruti and its capacity to produce brahmajnäna. It was 
necessary to treat his understanding of the nature of avidyä 
because the capacity of the sruti to resolve this problem 
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becomes credible in the light of this approach. Words can 
liberate where the problem is only a notional one of 
incorrect understanding. In this sense, the words of the 
sruti are not unlike those of the passer-by who "produced" 
the tenth man. We cannot overemphasize the connection 
between Shankara's arguments for the effectiveness of sruti 
as a pramana, and his view of the ätman as always available 
and accomplished. This all-important connection seems to 
have been entirely missed in current studies of the 
role of sruti in Shankara. Shankara clearly accepts that 
the knowledge derived through words is not an end in itself, 
if the object about which we are informed is as yet 
unaccomplished or not immediately available. If the object 
is available but simply misapprehended, correct knowledge 
through the words of a valid pramäna is all that is needed. 
The significance of this distinction is further highlighted 
by one of the key grounds for his distinction between the 
karmakända and the jnänakända. The former does not fulfil 
itself in the knowledge or information which it provides. 
It tells us of the means for the achievement of ends not 
yet actualized. The jndnakdnda, on the other hand, fulfils 
itself in its informative or revelatory role, for its object 
(the ätman) is already available. Its fruit ( hp ala) 
is immediate. It was useful and necessary to focus on 
Shankara's differences with the Purva-Mimansä over the 
status of the Vedanta-väkyas, for the points of divergence 
illuminated his understanding of sruti as a pramäna. The 
dispute clearly showed that he differentiates the 
Vedanta-väkyas from sentences which prompt engagement in action 
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for the accomplishment of their end. The V edänta-väkyas 
are not redundant because they inform us of an immediately 
available entity. They have a sufficient and fruitful 
purport in eliminating our misunderstandings about the 
ätman. This end is accomplished through the grasping of 
the purport (tätparya) of the words which constitute the 
pramäna. There is no suggestion here that Shankara 
conceives the knowledge gained from inquiry (jijnäsä) into 
the words of the sruti as provisional or hypothetical. There 
is no indication that it can or needs to be confirmed by any 
other source of knowledge. Shankara' s case for the competence 
of the sruti as a pramana includes a view about the 
particular methods employed by sruti for overcoming the 
limitations of the words it is constrained to use. Sruti 
is unfolded by specific traditional methods of teaching, and 
we sought to highlight some of these in the concluding 
sections of our discussion. Words must be wielded in a 
manner which frees them from their limited denotations. 
The significance of some of these arguments will be 
further developed in the next chapter, where we examine the 
nature of brahmajnäna, and the process and context of its 
acquisition. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE NATURE OF B RAHMAJNANA - THE PROCESS AND 
CONTEXT OF ITS ACQUISITION 
We have already considered, from different standpoints, 
Shankara's vindication of the sruti as a pramäna of brahman. 
We have seen his responses to a total denial of its authority. 
We have also examined his arguments against those who accept 
the overall authority of the Vedas but forbid any independent 
purport to the V edänta-väkyas, assigning them a subsidiary 
role to the ritualistic texts. 
One of our primary concerns in the previous chapter was to 
explore, in the context of the inherent limitations of 
language, the problems confronting sabda-pramana in its aim 
to inform us accurately of brahman. The methods of negation 
deny brahman to be a limited object of our knowledge, and 
caution us about the difficulties of defining brahman. The 
result, however, is not a mere negativism. When we have seen 
that no word in its direct significance can define brahman, 
we are shown that definition is possible by the method of 
implication (lakshanä). By a deft handling of rightly 
chosen and placed words, the latter can to some extent shed 
their finite apparel and become pointers to the infinite. 
This is one of the important reasons for Shankara's emphasis 
on the role of the teacher and the traditional methods of 
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instruction. The argument in Shankara for the lakshanä 
. 
method of definition is a crucial one, for sabda-pramanä 
" 
is of no avail unless we can properly apprehend the object 
of our investigation through it. 
By considering Shankara's conception of the nature of 
knowledge along with the mode and conditions of its 
attainment, we aim, in the present discussion, to clarify 
further the relationship between sabda-pramäna, brahmajnäna 
and moksha. Our discussion also seeks directly to examine 
and evaluate the role, if any, of anubhava in the entire 
scheme of brahmajnäna. 
5.1 The Character of Jnäna and its 
Differentiation from Activity (Karma) 
Shankara's distinction between the nature and aim of the 
karmakända and jnanakända is central to his entire Vedic 
exegesis. Another differentiation with wide implications is 
the one he makes between knowledge and activity. 
1 An action 
(karma), as Shankara understands it, secular or religious, 
is dependent on the individual (purushatantram) in the 
sense of involving options. It may or may not be done, or 
could be done in alternative ways. In moving from one place 
to another, for example, one may walk, use a vehicle or 
perhaps not go at all. Options are sometimes even provided 
by the Vedas in respect of ritualistic activity. In the 
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atirätra sacrifice, for instance, the sixteenth cup may or 
may not be used. Oblations can be offered before or after 
sunrise. It is only with reference to an action that is yet 
to be accomplished, that injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions 
(nishedha) as options, general rules or exceptions are 
possible. Injunctions and prohibitions, possible in the 
case of activity, imply the existence of alternatives. They 
are redundant where an alternative is not possible. The 
distinctive features of any action then, for Shankara, are 
the presence of options, the possibility of injunctions and 
prohibitions, and its dependence on the individual person 
(purushatantram). 
Knowledge, on the other hand, according to Shankara, 
which involves an already accomplished object, does not 
involve options dependent on the human intellect. It must 
entirely conform to the nature of the object and is therefore 
solely dependent on the thing itself (vastutantram). 
Knowledge is centred on the object and is as true as the 
object. It does not involve any choice as far as the 
nature of its object is concerned. Fire, for instance, cannot 
be known as either hot or cold. The valid knowledge of a 
post, for example, cannot be of the form, "This is a post, 
a man or some unknown object". "This is a post" 
is valid 
knowledge because it is dependent on the object and conforms 
to its nature. Brahman is no exception to this 
fact. Being 
an already accomplished object, b rahmajnäna 
is also dependent 
on brahman. 
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An exception can be made with regard to some part of 
an action, where the general rule would otherwise apply. 
For example, in the dictum, 'Killing no animals except 
in sacrifices', (CH. U. 8.15.1), the killing of animals 
prohibited by the general rule is allowed in a special 
case, viz. a sacrifice such as the Jyotistoma. But that 
will not apply to Brahman, the Reality. You cannot 
establish Brahman, the one without a second, by a general 
rule, and then make an exception in one part of It; 
for It cannot have any part, simply because It is one 
without a second. Similarly, an option also is 
inadmissible. For example, in the injunctions 'One 
should not use the vessel Sodasi in the Atirdtra 
sacrifice', and 'One should use the vessel Sodasi in 
the Atirätra sacrifice', an option is possible, as 
using or not using the vessel depends on a person's 
choice. But with regard to Brahman, the Reality, there 
cannot be any option about Its being either dual or monistic, 
for the Self is not a matter depending on a person's 
choice. 2 
Following from this general distinction between 
knowledge and activity is Shankara's very important distinction 
between knowledge and mental activity. In this context, 
his definition of an action is significant. 
An action is. in evidence where the injunction about it 
occurs independently of the nature of the thing 
concerned, and where it is subject to the activities 
of the human mind. 3 
As an illustration of a mental action, Shankara gives 
examples such as, "When the priest is about to utter vausat, 
he shall meditate mentally on the deity for whom the libation 
is taken up", or "One should mentally meditate on (the deity 
vening" .4 Even though these forms of identified with) evening". 
4 
meditation (dhydna) are mental, Shankara contends, they 
are still dependent on the human person (purushatantram) for 
they involve the options of being done, not done, or done 
in a different way. Knowledge, on the other hand, is 
generated entirely by a pramäna which has for its object 
the thing as it exists. It cannot be effected in a way 
different from the object of its inquiry. Shankara does not 
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deny that ' nana is mental, but argues for its difference from 
dhyäna (meditation). Another example which he offers 
helps to clarify his distinction. 
5 The injunction, "0 
Gautama, a man is surely a fire" (CH. U. 5.7.1), "0 Gautama, 
a woman is surely a fire" (CH. U. 5.8.1), is a mental action 
where a choice is involved. There is not concern here for the 
real nature of fire. If, however, fire is to be known as 
fire, this is a case of jnäna which can only be the result 
of a valid pramdna and does not involve any human option. 
The real nature of the object cannot be disregarded. 
B rahmajnäna must conform to the nature of brahman and the 
pramäna involved is sabda-pramana. 
6 
It is clear from Shankara's discussion that when he 
speaks of a mental action, he is identifying it with what 
is termed as upäsanä or dhyäna (meditation) and he clearly 
denies brahman as an object of this kind of activity. 
7 It 
is important to pursue this distinction in some detail, for 
it is germane to our consideration of the role of 
anubhava. The latter is generally presented as the 
culmination of an act of meditation or contemplation and 
seen as the true pramäna of brahman. 
There are several points in his commentaries where 
Shankara defines upäsanä. 
8 This B rihadäran aka Upanishad 
badshya definition is typical. 
Meditation is mentally approaching the form of the 
deity or the like as it is presented by the eulogistic 
portions of the Vedas relating to objects of meditation, 
and concentrating on it, excluding conventional notions, 
till one is completely identified with 
it as with one's 
body, conventionally regarded as one's self. 
9 
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Shankara mentions four kinds of meditations, 10 
1. Sampad u äsana: This is an imaginary identification 
between two dissimilar objects with some similar attributes. 
For example, the mind has endless modifications and the 
visvedevas (gods) are innumerable. On the basis of this 
resemblance, the mind is contemplated upon as the 
visvedevas. The result of this particular meditation is 
11 that the upasaka (meditator) attains infinite worlds. 
In another example, the bricks (yäjushmati) used for 
building the altar for the agnihotra are three hundred and 
sixty in number. This is equal to the number of oblations 
which are daily offered throughout the year. By meditating 
upon the resemblance between the bricks, the oblations and the 
days of the year, one attains identity with Fire, the 
Prajäpati called the year. 
12 In sampad upasanä, the 
inferior factor (e. g. the mind) is contemplated as the 
superior one (e. g. visvedevas) and primacy is accorded to 
the latter. In the case of the opponent's argument that 
brahmajnana involves sampad upäsanä, the parallel is that 
because of a similarity of Consciousness (caitanya), brahman 
is merely imagined in the ' jiva. 
2. Adhyasa upäsana: In this form of meditation, there 
is no necessary similarity between the two factors. "One 
should meditate thus: 'The mind is Brahman'" (CH. U. 3.18.1), 
and "The instruction is: 'The sun is Brahman' " (CH. U. 3.19.1), 
are examples of adhyäsa upäsanä. The difference between 
sampad and adhyäsa upäsanä is that in the latter, primacy 
is accorded to the locus (älambana) and not to the superimposed 
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object. 
13 In the case of brahmajnäna, the opponent's 
contention is that brahman is only superimposed on the jiva 
and the latter is contemplated as brahman. 
3. Kriyäyoga upäsanä: This meditation is based upon 
some mode of activity. Here the two factors are distinct, 
but are contemplated as one owing to a similarity of action. 
Chändogya Upanishad 4.3.1 - 4, for example, describes Vdyu 
as the great absorber at the time of cosmic dissolution. 
Similarly, at the time of sleep, all organs of the individual 
are said to merge in the vital air (präna). Because of 
this resemblance in activity, präna is contemplated as 
Vdyu. Similarly, the jiva is contemplated as brahman 
because of its association with the act of causing to grow 
(i. e. because of a common root-meaning of causing to grow). 
4. Samskara upäsanä: In the upansu sacrifice, there 
is the injunction that the sacrificer' s wife should look at 
the ghee for its purification. The purification of the ghee 
is a subsidiary action to the performance of the sacrifice. 
Similarly, the pUrvapaksha here is that as a subsidiary 
purificatory rite, the jiva ought to contemplate himself 
as brahman before the commencement of any ritual. Such a 
meditation purifies the agent of the specific ritual. 
Shankara emphatically argues against the idea that the 
Vedänta-vak as are meant for meditation of any of the four 
above kinds. 
14 To suggest this, he adds, would do violence 
to the purport of the mahäväkyas whose clear intention 
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is to declare the real identity obtaining between the jiva 
and brahrnan. A sentence such as, "One who knows Brahman 
becomes Brahman" (MU. U. 3.2.9), declaring the simultaneity of 
'nana and identity cannot be reconciled with the view that 
V edänta-väkyas are meant for meditation. This view also, 
Shankara adds, contradicts the clearly mentioned result of 
the knowledge of the already obtaining identity between 
jiva and brahman, 
l5 
The significance of Shankara's careful distinction 
between knowledge and meditation can never be overestimated 
in the context of the function of the sruti in giving rise 
to brahmajndna. It is perhaps a conveniently overlooked 
distinction, which repudiates the view that the 
Vedanta-väkyas merely afford an indirect knowledge to be 
then contemplated upon in order to produce an experience 
(anubhava) giving direct insight into the nature of brahman. 
Along with all the other evidence we have considered, it 
lends support to the direct relationship which Shankara sees 
in respect of the sruti, brahma j? na, and moksha. The 
substance of Shankara's distinction between jnana and upäsanä 
is that the action of upäsanä is possible where the real 
nature of the contemplated object is irrelevant and where 
the action is directed towards the production of a 
hither-to non-existent result. 
16 Where there is a question 
of knowing the nature of an object as it is, for which all 
that is required is the appropriate pramäna, then it is a 
" 
question of 'ný ana" Meditation is nowhere elevated by Shankara 
to the status of a prarnäna. New knowledge is not produced by 
contemplating, as if they were identical, two known and 
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distinct entities. Upäsana does not produce the identity 
of the contemplated objects and if, as in the case of 'iva 
and brahman, the identity is an already obtaining but unknown 
one, a pramana is required for its revelation. If the 
identity is not an already existing fact, it cannot be 
produced by knowledge alone. It is exceedingly clear that 
in Shankara's view, the relationship between sruti and 
brahman is that obtaining between a means of revelation and its 
revealed object. 
17 Upäsanä, however, is not entirely futile 
in the process of acquiring brahmajnäna. Rightly practised, 
it purifies the mind and develops its powers of concentration. 
These are important prerequisites for the acquisition of 
brahmajnäna. 18 
5.2 The Simultaneity of Knowledge and Freedom 
The general understanding that sabda-pramana has only 
mediate or provisional validity as a means to the accomplishment 
of moksha is also clearly refuted when assessed alongside 
very important, but generally ignored, passages from Shankara's 
commentaries concerning the coincidence of brahmajnäna 
and mok sha . 
It is his often repeated contention, supported by numerous 
scriptural references, that release is simultaneous with the 
gain of knowledge. He is emphatic in his denial for 
the necessity of any intervening action between the two. In 
iii 
fact, from the standpoint of Shankara, it is not even accurate 
to say that moksha is the fruit or effect of 'nana. Moksha, 
being identical with brahman, is ever accomplished and 
eternal. The function of jnäna lies in the removal of 
obstacles to the appreciation of the ever liberated Self. 
19 
The relationship is comparable, Shankara says, to that 
obtaining between standing and singing where no other action 
intervenes. 20 
In connection with the subject-matter of injunctions 
are to be found certain acts which are like the 
Agnihotra to be performed subsequent to the understanding 
of the text, through a combination of numerous 
accessories, to wit, the agent etc. Unlike this, 
nothing remains to be performed here within the domain 
of the higher knowledge; but all actions cease 
simultaneously with the comprehension of the meaning 
of the sentences, inasmuch as nothing remains to be 
done apart from continuance in mere knowledge revealed 
by the words-21 
In fact, adds Shankara, the absence of any intervening action 
constitutes the very beauty and glory of brahmajnäna. The 
gain of knowledge alone leads to the fulfilment of all human 
desires. 22 Even the gods cannot frustrate the fruit of 
brahmajnäna (i. e. the attainment of brahman) since the 
latter consists merely in the cessation of avidyä. Even as 
in our everyday world a form is revealed to the eyes as soon as 
it is properly illumined in light, similarly avidyd and its 
effects are negated once brahmajnäna is gained. 
They [the gods] succeed in their efforts to put obstacles 
only in the case of one who seeks a result which is other 
than the Self and is separated by space, time and causation, 
but not with regard to this sage, who becomes their self 
simultaneously with the awakening of knowledge, and is 
not separated by space, time and causation, for there is 
no room for opposition here. 23 
We have already considered the significance of Shankara's 
distinction between knowledge and meditation. In denying the 
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necessity for any intervening action between jnana and 
moksha, he is very explicit about the redundancy of 
upäsanä. His bhäshya on B rihadäranyaka Upanishad 1.4-7, 
includes a fascinating discussion where he considers several 
related objections from the proponents of meditation. 
24 
Here the opposing view (pürvapaksha) is that knowledge and 
meditation are synonymous. The argument is that in response 
to its injunctions concerning sacrifices, the Vedas 
supply the relevant information about the nature of the 
rituals, the materials and the methods to be used. Similarly, 
in response to the injunction to meditate, we are told that 
the ätman is to be the object of meditation through the 
mind, by means of the practice of renunciation, continence, 
etc. All the Upanishad texts dealing with the ätman, it is 
contended, should be seen as part of this meditative 
injunction. This meditation, it is argued, generates a 
special kind of knowledge about the ätman which eliminates 
avidyä. Ignorance is not eliminated merely by the V eddnta- 
väkyas revealing the nature of the Self. The resemblance, 
if not identity, between this pürvapaksha and the more modern 
interpretations that the mediate knowledge of the Vedanta- 
väkyas must be converted into anubhava is remarkable. 
25 
Shankara's unhesitating reply is forceful and unequivocal. 
Except the knowledge that arises from the dictum setting 
forth the nature of the Self and refuting the non-Self, 
there is nothing to be done, either mentally or outwardly. 
An injunction is appropriate only where, over and above 
the knowledge that arises immediately from hearing a 
sentence of the nature of an injunction, an activity on 
the part of a man is easily understood, as in sentences 
like, 'One who desires heaven must perform the new and 
full moon sacrifices'. The knowledge arising from a 
sentence enjoining these sacrifices is certainly not 
the performance of them. This depends on considerations 
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such as whether a person is entitled to perform them. 
But apart from the knowledge arising from such passages 
delineating the Self as 'Not this, not this', there is 
no scope for human activity as in the case of the new 
and full moon sacrifices etc., because that knowledge 
puts a stop to all activity-26 
Sentences such as, "tat tvam asi", Shankara adds, do not 
suggest the necessity for any action over and above the 
knowledge of brahman which they impart. The ritual analogy 
is inappropriate here. Unlike the ritual, whereafter it is 
enjoined, one wishes its nature, materials and method, once 
the meaning of the texts defining brahman is understood, 
there is no further curiosity. 
27 
Brahmajnäna, because it is identical with the nature of 
brahman which is eternal and unchanging, is independent of 
time, place and circumstances. 
28 Its function is neither to 
create anything anew, nor to alter the nature of an existent 
entity. Like other valid pramänas, its role is entirely 
informative and revelatory. Because bondage is only a 
notional problem resulting from a mental confusion of mutually 
superimposing the Self and non-Self, the Vedanta-vakyas are 
self-sufficiently adequate to the task of removing ignorance. 
This is itself the long desired freedom, for bondage and 
limitation were always only imagined on the ever-free, full 
and joyful ätman. 
5.3 The Fourfold Means (Sädhana-catushtaya) 
There is no lack of definitive statements in the writings of 
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Shankara on the relationship between brahmaj1Iäna and moksha. 
The V edänta-väk as themselves, without any physical or 
mental accessories liberate; knowledge is itself freedom. 
Brahmajnäna, however, although mental like other kinds of 
knowledge, is nonpareil. Generally, our knowledge is 
involved with the apprehension of objects other than the 
Knower. 29 It is the knowledge of things which can be 
objectified. In the case of brahmajnana, the Knower 
(drik or säkshin) is the subject of inquiry and 
investigation. Brahman, the entity to be known, is unique. 
It is full, complete, without lack or want, eternally 
peaceful and of the nature of joy. Brahmajnana is not the 
vague awareness of a remote brahman to be of this nature. 
If it were, the inquiry ('i 'näsä) would have little relevance 
to the inquirer's problem. Närada's angst in the Chdndogya 
Upanishad is quite typical of the sort of predicament and 
unaccountable anguish which motivates the inquirer towards 
brahmajnäna. After listing his accomplishments and mastery 
of various subjects, he declares his helplessness before the 
teacher, Sanatkumära. 
It has been heard by me from persons like your reverence that 
one who knows the Self passes beyond sorrow; I am in sorrow; - 
please Sir, make me pass beyond that sorrow. 30 
Brahmajnäna is the appreciation of oneself to be of the 
unique nature of brahman, and the receptacle of this knowledge 
is the mind (antahkarana). 
31 If brahmajnäna is to be 
meaningfully and successfully attained, it is imperative that 
the mind enjoys a certain disposition. If the ätman to be 
known is all peace and fullness, such a knowledge cannot occur 
in a mind which is in perpetual agitation and which 
entertains countless desires. The beauty and joy of a Self 
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which shines in everything cannot be discovered in a mind 
lacking in compassion and love. The significance of 
brahmajnana will be lost to one who has not risen above 
the yearning and pursuit after limited ends. It is vital 
here therefore, that the receptacle of knowledge relatively 
conforms to the nature of the object which it seeks to 
know. Such an identification is not generally required where 
other kinds of knowledge are concerned. Another reason for 
emphasizing the indispensability of the right mental 
disposition is that brahmajäna, once successfully 
accomplished, must be continuously retained. Outside of 
certain contexts and times, there is no need for a constant 
remembrance of knowledge centred on objects other than the 
Self. There is no necessity, for example, to be continuously 
aware and attentive of one's knowledge of geology. 
B rahmajnäna, however, is not rewarding unless it is fully 
integrated and assimilated. Even as one naturally and 
effortlessly assumes oneself to be limited and identified 
with the body and its manifold dispositions, so one should 
spontaneously know oneself to be limitless and complete. For 
this, the vision of oneself must be held uninterruptedly 
in one's awareness and this demands certain mental qualities. 
It is the lack of these qualities which renders brahrnajnana 
difficult of attainment. 
32 Knowledge itself, once it has 
emerged, requires no accessories for giving rise to moksha. 
Its emergence, however, is dependent on various factors. 
33 
Shankara emphasizes that even inquiry with the aid of the 
right ramäna does not produce knowledge in one who lacks 
self-control and austerity and who is arrogant. 
34 
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Though the intellect in all beings is intrinsically 
able to make the Self known, still, being polluted by 
such blemishes as attachment to external objects etc., it becomes agitated and impure, and does not, like a 
stained mirror or ruffled water, make the reality of 
the Self known, though It is ever at hand. The 
favourableness of the intellect comes about when it 
continues to be transparent and tranquil on having been 
made clean like a mirror, water etc., by the removal of 
pollution caused by the dirt of attachment, springing 
from the contact of the senses and sense object. 35 
It is important to clarify and emphasize this neglected 
aspect of brahmajnäna because the role generally assigned to 
anubhava is partly influenced by the wish to demonstrate that 
'näna is not only a process at the cognitive level but involves 
a transformation of will and emotion. It is perhaps felt 
that a cognitive change alone is inadequate for the 
commitment to a new understanding of oneself. It is the 
search for a level of verification beyond the authority of 
the Vedanta-vakyas. It is not necessary, however, to 
misrepresent Shankara's understanding of the sruti in order 
to make this point. The meaningful emergence of brahmajnäna, 
as we are seeking to demonstrate, is dependent on a 
transformation and involvement of intellect, will and emotion. 
There are references to these virtues and their roles as 
prerequisites throughout the writings of Shankara. Commenting 
on Brahma-sutra 1.1.1, "Hence (is to be undertaken) thereafter 
a deliberation on Brahman", Shankara argues that the word 
"atha" (thereafter) should be understood in the sense of 
"immediate succession" only. 
36 
The problem then, he says, 
is to determine what is that which immediately precedes 
the inquiry into brahman as a prerequisite of its success. 
He denies that the inquiry into brahman (brahmajijnäsä) 
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must be preceded by a knowledge of rituals acquired by an 
inquiry into the first part of the Vedic texts (karmajijnäsa). 
Between brahmajijnäsa and karmajijnäsä there are differences 
of subject matter, result, aspirant and connection between 
texts and results. 
37 The predispositions for brahmajijnasä 
have been classified by Shankara under four headings: 
1. Viveka 
2. Vairägya 
3. Samadisadhanasampat 
4. Mumukshutvam 
Before considering each factor separately, it is important to 
note the close interrelationship which exists among these 
dispositions. The acquisition of one often presupposes and 
implies the other. As far as the aspirant is concerned, 
it is not the perfection of these qualities which is demanded. 
In fact, such a perfection is not possible without brahmajnäna, 
when these qualities are spontaneously manifest. What is 
required is a disposition towards and a relative mastery of 
the fourfold means. As the inquiry proceeds and understanding 
grows, the qualities emerge in new depth and profundity. 
1. Viveka: This is defined by Shankara as the discrimination 
between the real (nit a) and unreal (anitya). 
38 
As a 
prerequisite of the inquiry into brahman, Shankara's 
definition cannot be taken as an example of an accomplished 
understanding of reality. In that case, there is no further 
need for inquiry. It is perhaps better understood as the 
capacity to undertake the investigation which leads to the 
distinguishing of the real from the unreal. Various forms 
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of reasoning are employed by both teacher and sruti, and 
the qualified student (adhikari) should be able to quickly 
assess and assimilate the impact of these. The 
quality of viveka underlines the necessity for focusing our 
capacity for rational thought and analysis upon our quest 
for brahmajnäna. The deliberation upon brahman is in the 
form of an inquiry (jijnäsä), during which doubts about the 
validity of the means of knowledge and about the object 
investigated are aroused. Such doubts are to be resolved 
by proper application of the prescribed forms of investigation 
(e. g. shadlinga) . The adhikari has also to contend with the 
views of rival Vedic and non-Vedic systems. The structure of 
Shankara's commentaries in the form of rival view (pürvapaksha) 
and refutation (siddhänta) is an excellent example of the subtlety, 
detail and fervour of traditional debates. 
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The 
necessity for an alert and discriminating intellect is 
emphasized both in the Upanishads and by Shankara. 
40 While 
the inquirer will not have a full grasp of the nature of the 
real at the initiation of the inquiry, he must have 
understood, to some extent, the limitations of the non-eternal. 
This partly explains his motivation to seek out a teacher 
and is a sufficient incentive for continuation of the inquiry. 
2. Vairägya: This is defined by Shankara as non-attachment 
to the enjoyment of the results of one's actions here or 
hereafter. The dispassion, which is a necessary prerequisite 
of brahmajijnäsa, is aroused by the appreciation of the 
limitations of non-eternal pursuits. It bears a direct 
relationship therefore, to viveka. The student will not 
yet know that the fullness which he seeks through 
innumerable 
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desires and activities is not different from himself. He will 
have discovered, however, that he continues to want, and to feel 
insufficient inspite of his struggles to fulfil successive 
desires. He has found that his natural and unconditioned 
urge to be happy, which gives rise to numerous conditioned 
and cultivated desires, is forever unsatisfied. He has a 
deep intimation that there is some lasting and reconciling 
purpose in existence. Nachiketä, the exemplar of vairägya 
in the Upanishads, approaches the teacher Yama for 
brahmajnäna. 41 As an appraisal of his competence and 
resolve, Yama tries to dissuade him from yearning for 
knowledge by luring him with the offer of unmitigated 
sensual pleasures. Nachiketä, as Shankara says, was as 
unperturbed as a vast lake. 
O Yama, ephemeral are these, and they waste away the 
vigour of all the senses that a man has. All life, 
without exception, is short indeed. Let the vehicles be 
yours alone; let the dances and songs be yours. 
Man is not satisfied with wealth. Now that we have 
met you, we shall get wealth. We shall live as long 
as you will rule it. But the boon that is worth 
praying for by me is that alone (i. e. brahmajnäna]. 42 
Shankara sums up very well the dispassionate state of mind 
which is a precondition for approaching the teacher. 
In the universe there is nothing that is akrta, a 
non-product, for all the worlds are effectso of karma; 
and being products of action, they are impermanent. 
The idea is that there is nothing that is eternal. 
All actions are productive of transitory things, since 
all effects of actions are only of four kinds - they 
can be produced, acquired, purified, or modified; over 
and above these, action has no other distinctive result. 
But I am desirous of the eternal, immortal, fearless, 
unchanging, unmoving, absolute Entity and not of its 
opposite. 43 
JijnOv- äsä therefore, presupposes a certain degree of reflection 
and analysis upon one's experiences. Brahmajnäna is of the 
nature of a solution which becomes relevant only when the problem 
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that informs it is intensely experienced. 
It is important to note that the dispassion mentioned 
by Shankara extends also to results that may be enjoyed in 
heavenly worlds. The transitoriness of the results of 
actions is absolute. Even the fruits of meritorious actions, 
which lead to the attainment of heavenly worlds, are limited. 
Upon their exhaustion, one is plunged back into the world of 
mortality. 
They, having enjoyed that spacious world of Svarga, their 
merit exhausted, enter the world of mortals; thus 
following the dharma of the Triad, desiring (objects of) 
desires, they attain the state of going and returning-44 
Vairägya, as a prerequisite of brahmajnäna, is not an 
attitude of escapism born out of a fear of life. It is 
associated with a serious reflection upon the nature of one's 
fundamental pursuit in life and the inherent limitations of 
finite activites to lead directly to that result. 
Katha Upanishad describes the human choice as one between 
10 
the good (sreyah) and the pleasurable (preyah). Good befalls 
(sädhu bhavati) the discriminating one who opts for sreyah. 
The short-sighted who aspire for preyah fall short of the 
supreme human purpose. 
45 
3. Samadisadhanasampat: These six accomplishments 
are: ' ama, dama, uparati, titikshä. samädhäna and sraddha. 
Sama is generally defined as mental control. 
46 It is a 
disposition closely allied to the acquisition of viveka 
and vairägya. A mind which has shed a multiplicity of 
personal desires, having come to appreciate their limitations, 
is more disposed to quietness and restraint. Desires for 
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various objects of enjoyment are, according to Shankara, the 
principal causes of mental agitation. Vairägya therefore, 
is conducive to sama. 
By convincing oneself of the illusoriness of sense-objects 
through an investigation into their real nature, and 
by cultivating indifference to worldly objects, the 
mind can be restrained from sense-objects and brought 
back to the Self wherein to abide firmly. 47 
Sama is a discovery which accompanies the unfolding of 
brahmajnäna rather than a forceful restraint. It is vital 
for the deep attentiveness necessary in a sustained inquiry. 
In the person of firm knowledge ('nani or sthita-prajna), it 
is a natural quietness and mental restfulness consequent 
upon the fulfilment of all desires in the knowledge of 
oneself. 
48 
Dama is the control or restraint of the sense organs 
and the organs of action. It reflects and presupposes the 
acquisition of sama. It is the natural tendency of the 
sense organs to be attracted to their respective sense 
objects, but it is possible by discrimination to turn the 
attention inward for the knowledge of the Self. 
49 The 
relationship between sama and dama or between intellect, mind 
and sense organs is beautifully described in the chariot 
analogy of the Katha Upanishad. 
50 
Uparati (withdrawal) seems to differ little from sama 
and dama, but would seem to indicate the actual state of 
accomplishment achieved by the practice of both. Sadänanda 
offers an alternative definition of uparati as indicating 
the formal renunciation of obligatory duties in accordance 
with the injunctions of 
sruti. 51 
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Titiksha (fortitude) is the patient endurance of 
suffering. It is the cheerful accommodation of the many 
unpleasant experiences in our relations with our environment 
and the refusal to unnecessarily linger or lament over them. 
In the Bhagavadgitä, it is presented as the tolerance of 
opposites, and the one who achieves success in it is said 
to be fit for immortality. 52 In terms of human relationships, 
it expresses itself in an unwillingness to seek redress or 
revenge. Titiksha is a quality born out of an awareness of 
the profundity of one's inquiry and a refusal to be 
diverted. A mind that is easily troubled in the face of the 
unpleasant, or aroused to heights of excitement in 
encountering the pleasant, lacks the poise and composure 
necessary for brahmajijnäsa. 
Samädhäna is single-pointedness of mind. It is the 
ability to focus one's attention upon the object of inquiry 
until the end is attained. It is an expression of commitment 
and determination in pursuit of the ideal. 
Sraddhä is faith in the authority of the pramana and the 
teacher who unfolds it. Its importance as a prerequisite is 
constantly emphasized by Shankara. 
Though when a certain fact has been established by 
reasoning and scriptural authority, it is always 
understood to be so (and true), - yet, in the case of 
extremely subtle things, a manwhohashis mind taken 
up by external things, and follows the natural bent 
of his activities, could find it difficult to 
understand if he were not imbued with a large degree 
of faith-53 
4. Mumukshutvam is a burning desire for moksha. It is 
the flame which is fed by all the afore-mentioned qualities. 
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Unless there is a deep earnestness and sincerity of purpose, 
efforts will be mediocre. 
54 
Equipped with these qualities, the student is ready to 
undertake brahmajijnasa and fit to be instructed. 55 It is 
the qualification of the aspirant by virtue of possessing 
these prerequisites which ensures that brahmajnäna is 
immediate in its results and is not a mere theoretical 
possibility unable to effect a total transformation of 
vision. In their absence, the declarations of sruti 
seem indirect and there is perhaps the suspicion that 
something over and beyond the pramäna itself is required 
for effecting ' nana. As we have noted in Chapter 1, 
anubhava is presented as that additional pramäna which is 
required for converting the "theory" of the sruti into 
realized fact. But this denies the direct connection which 
Shankara affirms between the Vedanta-vakyas, and the 
results they aim at, and undermines their status as a 
self-sufficient pramäna. Shankara clearly distinguishes 
Vedanta-väkyas, whose results are immediate, from statements 
which impel the individual into action for the production of 
a result. To claim that he advocates a further verification 
for the Vedanta-vakyas is to deny the clear evidence of his 
commentaries and to miss the significance and subtlety of 
his conception of sruti as a pramäna. It is also inconsistent 
with his metaphysics about the nature of brahman and the 
problem of avid ä. Shankara does not conceive brahmajnäna 
as unfolded by the sruti and the teacher as a hypothesis 
needing the aid of another pramäna for its certification. It 
is a means of knowledge, which, in the absence of obstacles, 
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is immediate in its results. Sädhana-catushtaya is meant 
for eliminating some of these obstacles and preparing the 
way for ' näna . 
5.4 Karmayoga as Preparation for B rahmajnana. 
The collective aim of sädhana-catushtaya is the attainment 
of what is termed in Advaita as citta-suddhi (mental 
purity). Karmayoga, in Shankara's view, is intended for 
the accomplishment of the same end. 
The successful attainment of Jnana requires that the 
antahkarana should relatively assume the nature of brahman. 
To know brahman which is absolute peace, the mind should 
enjoy an alert poise and equanimity. One obstacle to the 
discovery of this serenity is the helpless subjection to 
likes and dislikes. These opposites are termed in the 
Bhagavadgita as raga and dvesha and their mastery is always 
mentioned as a precondition of brahmajnäna. 
Love and hate lie towards the object of each sense; let 
none become subject to these two; for, they are his enemies. 56 
He should be known as a perpetual renouncer who neither 
hates nor desires; for, free from the pairs of opposites, 
0 mighty-armed, he is easily set free from bondage. 57 
Conversely, the description of the 'näni in the Bhagavadgita 
always includes reference to his triumph over raga and dvesha. 
He who, without attachment anywhere, on meeting with 
anything good or bad, neither exults nor hates, his 
knowledge is steady. 58 
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He attains peace, who, self-controlled, approaches 
objects with the senses devoid of love and hatred and 
brought under his own control-59 
The individual subjection to raga and dvesha is most 
apparent in his response to the results of various activities. 
Hoping to find a joy that is ever evasive the human being 
entertains desires of every description and engages in action 
for their accomplishment. If the result of the action is 
favourable, one is elated. If it is not, one is dejected 
and disappointed. He is therefore, constantly tossed 
between these pairs of opposites. 
The very desire and aversion which are opposed to 
each other like heat and cold, which, arising in connection 
with pleasure and pain and their causes, occur to every 
being in its turn, are known as pairs (dvandva). Now, 
when desire, and aversion arise on the occurrence of 
pleasure and pain or of the causes thereof they cause 
delusion in all beings and create obstruction to the 
rise of a knowledge of the Supreme Reality, the Self, 
by subjugation to themselves the intelligence of those 
beings. To one whose mind is subject to the passions of 
desire and aversion, there cannot indeed arise a 
knowledge of things as they are, even of the external 
world; and it needs no saying that to a man whose 
intellect is overpowered by passion there cannot arise 
a knowledge of the Innermost Self, inasmuch as there 
are obstacles in its way-60 
The solution does not lie in the abandonment of actions, as 
this is clearly impossible. Withdrawal from pursuits, as 
Krishna points out (B. G. 3: 5-6), without genuine mental 
detachment is self-deceptive. 
None, verily, even for an instant, ever remains doing 
no action; for everyone is driven helpless to action 
by the energies of Nature. 
He who, restraining the organs of action, sits thinking 
in his mind of the objects of the senses, self-deluded, 
he is said to be one of false conduct. 
It is not possible also to perform actions without expecting 
a result, even though karmayoga is often loosely spoken of as 
motiveless action. It is obvious that action, even of the 
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simplest kind, presupposes a motive and the expectation of 
a result. 
Karmayoga, as envisaged by Shankara , is a method of 
neutralizing raga and dvesha while remaining in the field 
of activity. It involves the recognition that while we 
have to perform actions, the results are beyond our control. 
61 
These results are determined by isvara in His role as 
distributor of the fruits of actions (karrnädhyaksha or 
karma-phala-data). Therefore, whether the results are 
favourable or unfavourable, they are acceptable as coming 
from Him. Karmayoga is best described as prasäda-buddhi. 
Even as the sacramental food (prasada), distributed after 
the performance of a ritual, is gladly accepted with no 
regard to its actual nature because it is visualized as 
coming from Him, so also are the results of ordinary actions 
seen. This reverential acceptance of results implies the 
dedication of the action to isvara. In this sense therefore, 
karmayoga presupposes, and is, in fact, indistinguishable 
from bhaktiyoga. Without an attitude of surrender and devotion, 
it is not possible to gladly accept all results as 
determined by Him, and Shankara does not particularly attempt 
to distinguish karmayoga and bhaktiyoga. The worshipful 
attitude becomes the all-pervasive factor in everything. 
He offers all actions to Isvara, in the faith that, 
'I act for His sake' , as a servant acts 
for the sake of 
the master.. . The result of actions so 
done is only 
purity of mind, and nothing else. 62 
By this outlook, actions which can normally be an obstacle 
to the pursuit of freedom become, as a means of mental 
purification (citta-suddhi), an indirect aid to its 
accomplishment. 
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When a man who is qualified for (Karma-Yoga) performs 
obligatory works without attachment and without a longing for results, his inner sense (antahkarana) unsoiled by desire for results and regenerated by (the performance of) 
obligatory works, becomes pure. When pure and tranquil, 
the inner sense is fit for contemplation of the Self. 63 
Though the Religion of Works, - which, as a means 
of attaining worldly prosperity, is enjoined on the 
several castes and religious orders, - leads the devotee to the region of the Devas and the like, still, 
when practised in a spirit of complete devotion to the 
Lord and without regard to the (immediate) results, it 
conduces to the purity of mind (sattva-suddhi) . The man whose mind is pure is competent to tread the path 
of knowledge, and to him comes knowledge; and thus 
(indirectly) the Religion of Works forms also a means 
to the Supreme Bliss. 64 
The psychological end-result of karmayoga is the absence 
of egotistic elation at the successful accomplishment of 
an action and dejection in failure. Raga and dvesha are 
thus effectively neutralized and the mind abides in a quiet 
joyfulness even as it does in the culmination of every act 
of worship. It becomes receptive and competent for jnäna. 
It is obvious therefore, that karmayoga is not envisaged by 
Shankara as a method for its own sake. It is intended 
primarily as a preparation relevant to one who has the 
acquisition of 'nana in view, but is not yet fit to embark 
directly upon brahmajijnasa. Karmayoga, according to Shankara, 
was recommended to Arjuna because of his incompetence for 
'n5na. 65 As a preparatory attitude, it is redundant after 
knowledge is gained. This does not imply that the Jnäni 
66 
is debarred from engagement in action. Being free from personal 
desires, he can act, like isvara, for the welfare of others 
(lokasamgrahartham) and in order to set an example of right 
action. In the case of the active 3näni, however, there 
is no delusion about his essential nature and actions are 
not accompanied by any sense of doership. 67 The karmayogi 
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is still acting in the hope of attaining freedom; the 
'näni acts out of his already accomplished freedom. 
Karmayoga does not, in Shankara, describe a specific type 
of action. It is essentially an attitude with reference 
to the performance of all actions. It is, in itself, not a 
direct means to moksha for, like meditation, it is not 
a pramdna. Any aid to Nana can only serve it indirectly . 
by facilitating its emergence. 
5.5 The Triple Process -S ravana (Listening), 
Manana (Reflection), and Nididhydsana (Contemplation) 
The triple process in relation to the acquisition of 
brahmajnäna is described in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 
in the course of Yajnavalkya's instruction to his wife, 
Maitreyi. 68 In Chapter 1, we have noted the view that the 
task of sravana is to acquaint us with the declarations of 
sruti. Knowledge gained during sravana, however, is not 
self-certifying and therefore incapable of conferring 
freedom. It is indirect (paroksha) and lacks conviction. 
In manana, it is argued, we remove all doubts which might 
have arisen about the validity of what we have apprehended 
during sravana. The assumption, however, seems to be that 
even at this stage of the process knowledge is still 
inadequate. The removal of all doubts is somehow not 
doubtless, immediate (aparoksha) knowledge. It is only 
after manana that we can undertake the practice of 
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nididhydsana, which eventually provides us with a direct 
experience of what we have gathered as a possibility in 
sravana and reasoned over in manana. This experience 
(anubhava), it is claimed, offers us a direct insight, and it 
is held up as the true pramdna of brahman. The theory of 
the sruti is realised even as we realise our knowledge of a 
foreign place when we reach there. 
On the accumulative evidence of our analysis so far, 
however, it is not possible to reconcile Shankara's views 
with this seemingly well-ordered division. There are 
many areas of obvious contradiction which cannot be 
easily dismissed. Besides important questions which 
arise about the very nature of the experience which 
nididhydsana is supposed to produce, its elevation to the 
status of the ultimate pramäna of brahman runs counter to all 
of the laborious arguments of Shankara to legitimatize and 
advocate the sruti as the singular and exclusive means of 
knowledge about brahman. The logic and detail of this 
justification does not lend support to the view that 
Shankara's only motive was to secure the prestige of 
traditional authority in support of his views. Shankara 
has left no doubts about his view of the pramäna for our 
knowledge of brahman. The argument that sruti needs the 
confirmation of anubhava which nididhyasana affords is 
not reconcilable with the cardinal epistemological theory of 
svatah-prämänya (the self-validity of knowledge). The view 
that the dependence of one pramäna upon another for its 
validity leads to infinite regress is relevant in this 
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context. Within the framework of Shankara's views, the 
sruti is no longer a valid pramäna if it cannot independently 
give rise to valid knowledge. That sabda-pramäna is only 
capable of giving rise to an indirect form of knowledge is 
also contrary to the main trends of Shankara's arguments. 
In any assessment of the triple process in brahmajnana, 
Shankara's dismissal of the argument that Vedänta-väkyas 
are meant for meditation is centrally significant. The 
incompatibility and tensions between both viewpoints are 
even further evidenced when we look at some of the direct 
references in Shankara on sravana, manana and nididhyäsana. 
In his Brahma-sutra bhäshya, Shankara considers a 
pürvapaksha that 'näna is a mental action, the fruit of 
which is moksha. 
69 This mental action, it is argued, is 
enjoined in sruti declarations such as, "The Self, my 
dear Maitreyi, should be realised - should be heard of, 
reflected on and meditated upon" (BR. U. 2.4.5. ). We have 
already examined part of Shankara's response in our 
analysis of the significance of his distinction between 
knowledge and meditation. 
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Briefly, he has argued there 
that an action is something with reference to which an 
injunction is possible, even without regard to the nature 
of the object, and is dependent on the activity of a person 
(purushatantram). It may be done, not done, or done in a 
different manner. Knowledge, on the other hand, is generated 
by a pramäna which has for its object the nature of the 
thing as it exists. It is not subject to man's choice, for 
the knowledge of an object, once gained, cannot be dismissed 
or known in a different way. It is entirely dependent on the 
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object (vastutantram). An injunction instigating an 
action is possible where there exists the chance of acceptance 
or rejection. As the Self, however, brahman can neither 
be accepted nor rejected and cannot be the object of any 
injunction. 
Though verbs in the imperative mood etc. are seen 
(in the Upanisad) to be used with regard to this 
knowledge, they become infructuous like the sharpness 
of a razor etc. striking against stone etc., for they 
are aimed at something beyond the range of human 
effort inasmuch as that knowledge has for its object 
something (i. e., Brahman) that is neither acceptable 
nor rejectable. 71 
If such texts do not enjoin an action in respect of 
the acquisition of brahmajnäna, what function do they 
serve? Shankara sees the purpose of such statements in 
challenging man's attention from its preoccupations with 
the natural pursuits of sense objects and turning it 
towards brahmajnäna. 
As for expressions like "(The Self) is to be seen" 
(BR. U. 2.4.5), which are met with in the context of 
the supreme knowledge, they are meant mainly for 
attracting one's mind towards Reality, but do not 
aim mainly at enjoining any injunction about the 
knowledge of Reality. In ordinary parlance also, 
when such directive sentences as, 'Look at this', 
'Lend ear to that', etc. are uttered, all that is 
meant is, 'Be attentive to these', but not, 'Acquire 
this knowledge directly'. And a man, who is in the 
presence of an object to be known, may sometimes 
know it, and sometimes not. Hence a man who wants 
to impart the knowledge of the thing has to draw 
his attention to the object of knowledge itself. 
When that is done, the knowledge arises naturally in 
conformity with the object and the means of knowledge. 
It is not ä fact that any knowledge (of a given thing), 
contrary to what is well known through other means of 
valid knowledge, can arise in a man even when acting 
under some direction. And should the man, under 
the belief, 'I am directed to know this in such a way', 
know it otherwise, this cannot be true knowledge. 72 
The clear implication of Shankara's argument here . is that the 
text - does not enjoin a mental action over and above 
' näna. 
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Nididhydsana, as a mental action, does not produce i na. 
73 
Shankara terminates his discussion on the fourth sutra 
by returning again to a consideration of the roles of 
sravana, manana and nididhyäsana. 
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Here the objector appears 
to accept that there is no injunction (vidhi) insravana. 
His argument, however, is that since manana and nididhyäsana 
are mentioned subsequent to sravana, these must be understood 
as actions enjoined for a result different from the knowledge 
of brahman gained in sravana. Brahman therefore, still 
becomes subsidiary to the injunction of reasoning and 
contemplation. Shankara unequivocally denies that , 
manana and nididhyäsana are meant for accomplishing anything 
different from the knowledge of brahman gained during 
sravana. All three processes, he argues, have the same 
aim of brahmajnäna in view. It is only, he points out, if 
brahman, known from the sruti, was meant for some other 
purpose (i. e. beyond the goal of Its knowledge) that it 
could become the object of an injunction. The argument 
here again is clear. Brahmajnäna, revealed by the sruti, 
is the end in itself. Manana and nididhyasana do not 
seek to produce a result which is in any way different from 
the knowledge of brahman gained during sravana. 
If these three processes are not different in aim, but 
are meant for bringing about the knowledge of brahman which 
is revealed in the Upanishads, we can now turn our attention 
to the specific function and contribution of each to this 
end. It is important that these functions be consistent with 
the general trends of Shankara's arguments so far outlined. 
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(I) 
.S ravana (Listening) 
Sravana indicates the acquisition of knowledge by listening. 
It suggests, of course, the indispensable role of the teacher 
in transmitting this knowledge and the oral nature of 
traditional Vedic learning. It is defined as, "the 
ascertainment through the six characteristic signs 
[i. e. shadlirnga] that the entire Vedänta philosophy 
establishes the one Brahman without a second". 
75 Sravana 
is essentially an exegetical investigation of the purport 
(tätparya) of the Vedanta texts conducted on the student's 
behalf by the teacher. As the first of the three processes, 
it emphasizes the primacy of sruti as the source of 
brahmajnana. It is during sravana that the teacher seeks 
to establish that the Upanishads have brahman as an 
independent subject matter and are not subservient to the 
texts enjoining rituals. It is an attempt to show that 
brahmajnäna is not baseless, but grounded in the authority 
of the sruti. It is during sravana also that the teacher 
seeks to unfold the nature of brahman by applying the 
exclusive-inclusive method of implication to words and 
sentences defining brahman. Mahäväkyas like "tat tvam asi" 
are carefully analysed to show that the identity imparted is 
at the level of Awareness alone. Sravana therefore, incorporates 
the entire process of Vedantic instruction and encompasses 
all the traditional methods (e. g. adhy-aropa-apaväda, neti, 
neti) employed by the teacher in gradually unfolding 
brahman. 
Brahman is an already accomplished and ever available entity, 
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identical with the ätman, and only wrongly apprehended by us. 
B rahmajnäna is its own end and does not require us to do 
anything. We are called upon to simply know. It is entirely 
reasonable and consistent with Shankara's arguments to 
suggest that the act during which we eliminate our 
misapprehensions and correctly comprehend the nature of 
brahman must be the principal one in the process of 
brahmajnäna. As the direct inquiry into the only pramana 
of brahman, sravana must be granted primary significance. 
This accords with both Shankara's epistemology, and his 
metaphysics as it relates to the fully notional problem of 
avidyd. The view that sravana is capable only of affording 
a speculatory or hypothetical knowledge of the ätman raises 
two kinds of questions. Firstly, it implies, contrary to 
the main thrust of Shankara's reasoning, that something 
over and above the knowledge of ätman gained from the 
Vedanta-väkyas is required. It also, of course, undermines 
Shankara's concept of the sruti as a pramäna. Secondly, 
and very interestingly, it raises doubts about the method of 
teaching which such an understanding suggests. How does 
the teacher unfold brahman, the self-manifest Awareness 
of the student, in an entirely conjectural manner? The 
subject matter is not a remote entity to be reached or 
created and the aim of the Advaita teacher is to produce 
immediate liberating knowledge. The problem that confronts 
him is akin to the tenth man analogy. The limitless ätman 
mistakenly attributes on itself the qualities of finitude, 
even as the alive tenth man erroneously denies himself. If 
the teacher's exegesis follows the texts of the Upanishads, 
there is a little scope for indirect instruction, for the 
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hearer must be made to appreciate brahman as his very 
Self. It is impossible to putatively exegesize texts like 
the following from the Kena Upanishad. 
That which is not uttered by speech, that by which 
speech is revealed, know that to be Brahman, and not 
what people worship as an object. 
That which man does not comprehend with the mind, that 
by which they say, the mind is encompassed, know that 
to be Brahman and not what people worship as an object. 
That which man does not see with the eye, that by which 
man perceives the activities of the eye, know that alone 
to be Brahman and not what people worship as an object-76 
The exegesis of passages like these can only proceed 
by helping the student to appreciate the non-objectivity of 
himself as the Knower. In other words, passages like these 
are direct in their instruction of the Self as brahman 
and they aim at complete knowledge. There is no evidence 
that Shankara understands their function in any other way. 
To the skilful teacher and the qualified student, sravana 
can never mean the hypothetical instruction which it is 
made out to suggest in current opinions. 
If sravana therefore, does no produce brahmajnäna, 
the explanation does not lie in its conjectural nature or 
in the fact that brahmajnäna is not its aim. There might 
be several possible obstacles. For example, in spite of 
being exposed to the instruction of the teacher, the 
listener might be unconvinced. He could be troubled by 
doubts about various aspects of the teaching. His doubts 
could concern the validity of the pramäna or the nature 
of brahman. According to Shankara, the knowledge that 
leads to moksha must be free from all doubts. 
77 It is to 
deal with this impediment to 'näna that the second of the 
17V 
threefold process is suggested. 
(II). Manana (Reflection) 
Manana is defined as, "the constant thinking of Brahman, 
the one without a second, already heard about from the 
teacher, by arguments agreeable to the purport of the 
78 Vedanta". There are numerous references in Shankara to 
the possibilities and limitations of reason in relation to 
brahmajnäna, and it is important that they be properly 
correlated so that we can accurately evaluate the contribution 
of manana to the acquisition of knowledge. 
Shankara is certain that independent reasoning cannot 
lead to brahmajnäna. This conclusion emerges very clearly 
from several discussions in his commentaries. In his 
bhäshya on Brahma-sutra 2.1.11, he says that reasoning which 
is not rooted in the Vedas and springs from mere conjecture 
lacks conclusiveness. 
79 
Human conjecture has no limits. 
The thoughts of one group of clever men, he points out, are 
falsified by others, and these are also in turn eventually 
contradicted. Intellectual opinions differ and arguments 
are indecisive. We cannot hold fast to the views of 
eminent thinkers like Kapila and Kanada, for even they are 
seen to contradict each other. 
80 
To this view, the rationalist responds by arguing that 
not all reasoning is inconclusive, for this conclusion is 
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arrived at by reasoning alone. Besides, if we were to 
adopt the view that all reasoning is inconclusive, ordinary 
life becomes impossible. Future plans for securing happiness 
and avoiding pain, the rationalist remonstrates, are made on 
the supposition that nature is uniform in the past, 
present and future. Even with regard to divergent 
interpretations of Vedic passages, reasoning is applied in 
order to arrive at the correct meaning. The tentative 
nature of reasoning, he contends, is its advantage. 
Faulty reasonings can be discarded in favour of sound ones. 
Even as a man should not be considered a fool because his 
ancestors were foolish, so also, all reasoning should not 
be discarded because some forms are defective. Shankara's 
reply, which sums up very well his views on the limits 
of reason in relation to brahmajnäna, is worth quoting in 
full. 
Although reasoning may be noticed to have finality in 
some contexts, still in the present context it 
cannot possibly get immunity from the charge of being 
inconclusive; for this extremely sublime subject-matter, 
concerned with the reality of the cause of the Universe 
and leading to the goal of liberation, cannot even be 
guessed without the help of the Vedas. And we said 
that It cannot be known either through perception, being 
devoid of form etc., or through inference etc., being 
devoid of grounds of inference etc. 
Besides, it is the accepted view of all who stand by 
liberation that freedom from bondage comes from true 
illumination. And that true enlightenment has no 
diversity, since its content is the thing-in-itself. 
That content of knowledge is said to be the most real 
since it ever remains the same; and in the world, the 
knowledge of that kind is said to be right knowledge, as 
for instance, the knowledge about fire that it is hot. 
This being the case, people should have no divergence 
when they have true knowledge, whereas the difference 
among people whose knowledge is based on reasoning is 
well known from their mutual opposition. For it is a 
patent fact of experience, that when a logician asserts, 
'This indeed is true knowledge', it is upset by 
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somebody else. And what is established by the latter 
is disproved by still another. How can any knowledge, 
arising from reasoning, be correct, when its content has 
no fixity of form?... It is not also possible to assemble 
all the logicians of past, present, and future at the same 
place and time, whereby to arrive at a single idea, 
having the same form and content, so as to be the right 
source of knowledge. But since the Vedas are eternal 
and a source of knowledge, they can reasonably reveal 
as their subject-matter something which is (well 
established and) unchanging; and the knowledge arising 
from them can be true, so that no logician, past, 
present, or future can deny it. 81 
Shankara's conclusions in passages like these do not 
imply the complete rejection of every form of reasoning. 
Indian philosophy generally employs two kinds of reasoning. 
82 
The first type is the syllogistic inference or anumäna 
as illustrated by the establishment of fire from the 
perceived smoke. We have seen, however, that because 
brahman possesses no perceptible characteristics, this kind 
of reasoning is inapplicable. The second type is termed 
sämänyato-drishtänumana and is equivalent in modern logic 
to analogical reasoning. It is also designated as yukti 
or tarka. This type of reasoning is not itself a pramäna, 
but operates as an ancillary to a pramäna. Its function is 
to produce a belief in the possibility of a thing. In 
relation to brahmajnäna, the aim of all such tarkas is to 
strengthen the teaching of the Upanishads. The Nyäya 
argument that the world as an effect must have as its source 
a sentient being is viewed by Advaita as an example of this 
kind of reasoning. This argument cannot conclusively 
establish isvara's existence, but it demonstrates the 
reasonability of His revelation in the sruti. 
Reasoning in harmony or conformity with the ; rut' is what 
Shankara repeatedly emphasizes. 
177 
It was also argued that by enjoining 'reflection' 
over and above 'hearing', the (Brhadaränyaka) Upanisad 
shows that logic is also to be honoured! But through 
such a subterfuge, empty logic cannot find any scope 
here; for logic, conforming to the Upanisads, is alone 
resorted to here as a subsidiary means helping 
realization. 83 
S ruti has to be supplemented by such kinds of tarka because 
of the variety of contradictory views which are held 
about the distinctive nature of brahman. 
84 
These arguments 
fortify the Vedanta-vakyas. 
The realization of Brahman results from the firm conviction 
arising from the deliberation on the (Vedic) texts and 
their meanings, but not from other means of knowledge like 
inference etc. When, however, there are Upanisadic texts 
speaking of the origin etc. of the world, then even 
inference, not running counter to the Upanisadic texts, 
is not ruled out in so far as it is adopted as a valid 
means of knowledge reinforcing these texts; for the 
Upanisads themselves accept reasoning as a help. 85 
The meaning of sruti should be tested in the light of 
arguments, for it is only when they are both combined that 
they can show the unity of the ä. tman, "as clearly as a bael 
fruit on the palms of one's hand" . 
86 
Ewen when Shankara seems to suggest that Advaita can be 
established by tarka alone, close examination reveals that 
the reasoning employed is only of the analogical type in 
conformity with sruti (srutyanugrihita tarka). In his 
introduction to Brihadäranyaka Upanishad 4.5.1, he says 
that the Yäjnavalkya section of the text illustrates the 
establishment of brahmajnäna by tarka. Yet, the arguments 
which Shankara uses in this section are not of an 
independent kind. At one point, he argues that the sun and the 
moon, which are like two lamps giving light to all beings, are 
held in place even as a kingdom under the unbroken and 
orderly rule of a king. He says that even as we infer the 
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existence of the lamp-maker from a lamp, the sun and moon 
"must have been created for the purpose of giving light 
by a Universal Ruler who knows of what use they will be to 
all, for they serve the common good of all beings by giving 
1i ht" . 
87 
g We cannot construe this as an independent 
argument for the establishment of the Self, for it is the 
very kind of argument which Shankara criticizes Nyaya 
for independently using to verify isvara's existence. 
88 
Similarly, in his Mändükya Upanishad Kärikä bhäshya, 
Shankara says that non-duality can be demonstrated on logical 
grounds. 
89 
That these are not independent logical grounds 
becomes obvious when he concludes his commentary on the 
Karika by pointing out that non-duality is to be known only 
from the Upanishads and that this doctrine was not the same 
as that unfolded by the Buddha, in spite of certain similarities. 
That the nature of the supreme Reality is free from the 
differences of knowledge, the known, and the knower 
and is without a second, this thing was not expressed by 
Buddha; though a near approach to non-dualism was implied 
in his negation of outer objects and his imagination 
of everything as consciousness. But this non-duality, 
the essence of the ultimate Reality, is to be known from 
the Upanisads only. This is the purport. 90 
It will be useful to further clarify the nature of 
reasoning employed in Advaita by looking at some examples. 
The Upanishad, for example, declares the Self to be änanda 
(Joy). 91 This conclusion may seem doubtful to the aspirant 
because of the general tendency to pursue joy by striving 
after acquisitions other than the ätman and the common 
experience of sorrow 
(duhkha). In order to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the 
sruti revelation, arguments of the 
following kind are employed. If the joy which is assumed to 
be the content of the pursued object was an objective 
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quality of it, the object should universally make any 
person happy. It is impossible, however, to find a single 
object which can satisfy this criterion. An object which 
appears to be a source of delight to one is very often a 
cause of pain to another. This is not only valid in 
relation to different individuals. A single object at 
different periods of time could be a source of joy and 
sorrow to the same individual. Reasoning therefore 
suggests that our belief in the presence of joy in objects 
other than the Self is not unquestionable. Ananda appears 
to be related to desirability. In deep sleep, there is an 
experience of joy without any object or sense of possession. 
Advaita suggests that this joy is identical with the Self. 
It explains that in the fulfilment of a desire, we only 
temporarily eliminate the sense of want and inadequacy, 
entertain a thought of fullness, and identify with a joy 
that is not different from the Self. We mistakenly, 
however, attribute the source of this joy to the object 
outside. Yuktis of this kind therefore, strengthen and 
make reasonable the sruti declaration that ätman is änanda. 
Another example of acceptable reasoning, suggested by 
Shankara himself, concerns the analysis of our three states 
of experiences. 
92 Sruti informs us that the ätman is 
changeless, and this is found to be consistent with our 
own experiences. In the waking state (jagarita avastha), 
all our experiences are illumined by Awareness (cit). As 
the Knower (drik), ätman is the Witness of the entire waking 
world. In the dream state 
(svapna avasthä), the waking world 
is temporarily negated and a world of subtle experiences 
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projected. The Self as Awareness, however, also illumines 
and makes these experiences known. The entire dream 
experience is enveloped in the light that is Awareness. The 
state of deep sleep (sushupti avastha) negates both the waking 
and dream worlds, but even here, Advaita contends, the 
experience is known. Statements like, "I had an undisturbed, 
pleasant sleep", indicate the presence of Awareness. Thus, 
the three states and their experiential content vary and 
mutually negate each other, but the common unchanging factor 
is the Self. 93 The Bhagavadgita uses the argument of 
unchanging Away eness in the states of childhood, youth and 
old age to illustrate the immortality of the Self. 
94 
States and experiences differ, but "I know" is common to 
all states and life experiences. Arguments such as the 
difference of the Knower from the known are used to 
reinforce the sruti' s revelation of the distinction of the 
Self from the body, sense organs and mind. Each one is 
progressively distinguished by showing that it is subject 
to objectification and therefore, different from the Knower. 
The same function of creating certainty in the sruti 
is served by a profuse use of analogies in the texts themselves 
and by Shankara. The rope-snake analogy, so frequently 
resorted to by Shankara, illustrates a creation of ignorance 
as a result of incomplete knowledge and its immediate negation 
by right knowledge. The story of the tenthman aptly 
illustrates the notional loss and gain of something that 
is already available. It also reveals very well the sense 
of sorrow which can accompany a fictitious loss, and the 
joy and freedom which knowledge brings. The crystal ball 
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example shows how the ätman, while remaining pure and 
unaffected, seems to assume the characteristics and qualities 
of adjuncts (upädhis) with which It becomes associated. 
Just as before the perception of distinction, the 
transparent whiteness, constituting the real nature of 
a crystal, remains indistinguishable, as it were, from 
red, blue and other conditioning factors; but after 
the perception of distinction through the valid means of 
knowledge, the crystal in its latter state is said to 
attain its true nature of whiteness and transparence, 
though it was exactly so even earlier; similarly in the 
case of the individual soul, remaining indistinguishably 
mixed up with such limiting adjuncts as the body etc. 
there springs up a discriminating knowledge from the 
Upanisads constituting his rising from the body 
(consciousness); and the result of the discriminating 
knowledge is the attainment of the real nature, its 
realization of its nature as the absolute Self. 95 
Brahman as both instrumental (nimitta kärana) and 
material cause (upädäna kärana) of the creation is made 
comprehensible when compared with the spider's projection 
of its web. 
96 The non-difference of cause and effect is 
illustrated by the analogy of clay or gold and their many 
products. Differences are the creation of name alone. 
97 
The example of space is often cited. It illustrates the 
purity of the Self in spite of Its association with the 
body, as well as the accommodation of all change by the 
changeless Self. 
98 Brahman appears divided even as the space 
within pots is only seemingly broken up. 
99 
Analogies, however, 
are useful only as a method of teaching. 
Since the Self is by nature Consciousness Itself, 
distinctless, beyond speech and mind, and can be taught 
by way of negating other things, hence in scriptures 
dealing with liberation an illustration is cited by 
saying that it is "like the sun reflected in water". 100 
An interesting objection is raised against the above analogy. 
Both the sun and water are limited entities remotely placed 
from each other. It is possible therefore, for the sun to 
LU4 
be reflected on the latter. The Self, however, is 
unlimited and all-pervasive. There is nothing remote or 
separate from It. The comparison therefore, is inappropriate. 101 
In responding to this, Shankara explains that between the 
illustration and the thing illustrated, there is similarity 
only in some respects. It is this that is the focus of 
attention. If both objects were identical in all respects, 
the analogy would not be possible. He points out the 
particular aim of this analogy. 
'A participation in increase and decrease', inasmuch 
as the reflection of the sun in water increases with 
the increase of water, and decreases with its reduction, 
it moves when the water moves, and it differs as the 
water differs. Thus the sun conforms to the 
characteristics of the water; but in reality the sun 
never has these. Thus also from the highest point of 
view, Brahman, while remaining unchanged and retaining 
Its sameness, seems to conform to such characteristics 
as increase and decrease of the limiting adjunct (body) 
owing to Its entry into such an adjunct as the body. 
Thus since the illustration and the thing illustrated 
are both compatible, there is no contradiction. 102 
The primary function of manana therefore, is to demonstrate 
the tenability of sruti's declaration. It is neither an 
independent means to brahmajnäna, nor an alternative to the 
sruti. Contrary to the sharp distinctions we have examined 
in Chapter 1, manana is not necessarily exercised only 
after sravana. It is an integral part of sravana itself. 
The application of the sixfold canons of interpretation 
in determining the purport of the Vedanta-vakyas is an 
exercise of reasoning and critical evaluation. It is 
important to remind ourselves that upapatti or intelligibility 
in the light of reasoning is one of those canons. Reasoning 
is also necessary for determining whether a word or passage 
should be understood in its primary 
(mukhya) or secondary 
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(lakshya) sense and in distinguishing between the different 
forms of the latter. Manana is a process provoked by the 
teacher himself, as he uses various kinds of yuktis, to 
create certainty in his student. Doubts are often resolved 
in dialogue with the teacher during sravana. Manana is also 
useful for refuting the views of systems opposed to 
Advaita. Shankara explains that although the entire Brahma- 
sutra is meant only for showing that the Upanishads have 
brahman as their purport, and not for proving or disproving 
any conclusion by pure logic, it is necessary to repudiate 
the views which run counter to right knowledge. This need 
arises because of the reputation which some of these 
alternative views enjoy and the difficulty of properly 
evaluating their worth. 
103 
Shankara in a twofold way. 
This function is approached by 
If the views of these schools 
are based on their interpretations of sruti, the validity 
of these interpretations are questioned by exegesis. If they 
are based on mainly rational grounds, their inconsistencies 
and contradictions are exposed. 
104 In this way an attempt 
is made to show that they are untenable. 
Because brahmajnäna is born out of the sruti as 
sabda-pramana, the role of manana must therefore, be a 
largely negative one. It releases and relieves knowledge 
from doubt. If brahmajnäna is not produced by the investigation 
of the pramäna, it is difficult, in the context of Shankara, 
to conceive how it can be produced only by manana. The 
problem is like the relationship between any means of knowledge 
and its respective object. If a form is not perceived by 
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the eye, for instance, because of the intervention of some 
obstacles, these must be eliminated, and the eye again 
employed. It is the only appropriate organ. Similarly, if 
the sruti does not give rise to knowledge because of doubts, 
it is the function of manana to remove such doubts in order 
that knowledge is unobstructed. Because of its radical 
challenge to our habitual conception of ourselves, it is 
difficult to imagine sravana not provoking doubts of 
different kinds. It is consistent with Shankara's views 
to suggest, however, that if doubtless knowledge is gained 
during sravana, there is no need for manana. The suggestion 
here is that if sravana fails to engender direct knowledge, 
it is not because of the absence of intention to do so or 
the presence of any natural limitations. The reasons are to 
be found in the various obstacles to the emergence of 
knowledge, related to the preparedness of the student. 
(III). Nididhyäsana (Contemplation) 
The view, presented in Chapter 1, that nididhyäsana 
is necessary for an experience in which alone brahmajnäna is 
conclusively gained, raises several problems in relation to 
Shankara's central views. Besides the misunderstanding and 
underestimation of the role of sravana, the argument seems 
self-contradictory. It accepts that the aim and achievement of 
manana is the creation of doubtless knowledge. It then 
immediately suggests that this well ascertained and doubtless 
knowledge is inadequate. This contradiction is never resolved 
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and we are not made aware of what then is the exact status 
of brahmajnäna after manana. That brahmajnäna is the 
product of an act of meditation is at variance with 
Shankara's recurrent distinction between knowledge and 
meditation and his view that the sentences of the Upanishads 
are not meant for the latter. His view, as we have seen, 
is that the Vedanta-vdkyas directly give rise to knowledge, 
the results of which are immediate. Knowledge does not 
need to be followed by any physical or mental act. 
105 In 
fact, meditation cannot follow knowledge, for it presupposes 
a duality which is already negated in brahmajnana. 
106 
The 
entire weight of Shankara's arguments is opposed to the 
view that an act of meditation is necessary over and above 
the knowledge gained from the sruti for brahmajnäna. The 
view that only through anubhava afforded by nididhyäsana 
is brahman really ascertained displaces sruti as the 
definitive pramäna. 
Avidyä is not an absolute ignorance of the ätman, but an 
erroneous knowledge of It, which leads to the the superimpositior 
(adhyäsa) of attributes properly belonging to the body, 
senses and mind. It is a confusion arising from the inability 
to discriminate and distinguish between the Self and non-Self. 
It is obvious therefore, that avidyä at the individual level 
is a mental modification (antahkarana vritti) but of an 
erroneous nature. A vritti is a mode or modification of the 
internal organ (antahkarana) and it is clear that Shankara 
conceives all mental processes, cognitive, conative and 
emotive, as modifications of the internal organ. 
107 This 
incorrect mental modification can only be negated and 
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corrected by another antahkarana vritti which coincides 
with the object to be known and which is produced by an 
adequate and appropriate pramäna. It is exceedingly 
important to note that Shankara all along sees 
brahmajnäna as a mental process occurring in the mind and 
not transcending it. B rahmajnäna is of the nature of an 
antahkarana vritti coinciding with the nature of brahman 
and produced by Its authoritative pramäna, the sruti. 
There is no basis in Shankara for conceiving of its nature 
in any other way. The references in his commentaries are 
explicit. 
(Objection): In this connection some conceited 
pedants say: To no man can arise the conviction 'I am the 
immutable Self, the One, the non-agent, devoid of the 
six changes, such as birth, to which all things in the 
world are subject; which conviction arising, 
renunciation of all works is enjoined. 
(Answer) : This objection does not apply here. For, 
in vain then would be the Scriptural teaching, such as, 
'the Self is not born', etc (B. G. 2: 20). They 
(the objectors) may be asked why knowledge of the 
immutability, non-agency, unity, etc., of the Self 
cannot be produced by the Scripture in the same way as 
knowledge of the existence of dharma and adharma and 
of the doer passing through other births is produced by 
the teaching of the Scripture? 
(Opponent): Because the Self is inaccessible to any 
of the senses. 
(Answer): Not so. For the scripture says, "It can be 
seen by the mind alone" (BR. U. 4.4.19). The mind, refined 
by Sama and Dama -i. e., by the subjugation of the body, 
the mind and the senses - and equipped with the teaching 
of the Scripture and the teacher, constitutes the sense 
by which the Self may be seen. Thus, while the Scripture 
and inference teach the immutability of the Self, 
it is 
mere temerity to hold that no such knowledge can arise. 
108 
Meditation or any experience that might arise from it is 
nowhere envisaged by Shankara as 
independently capable of 
producing the appropriate antahkarana vritti which can 
eliminate Self-ignorance 
(atma-avidyä). 109 Shankara accepts 
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that this vritti, produced in the mind by the Vedanta- 
väkyas, does not enjoy the status of absolute reality 
(päramärthika sattä). Its reality would be the same as that 
of the world, the Vedas and the antahkarana. He sees no 
difficulty, however, in its capacity to negate ignorance 
(avidydnivritti) and effect the knowledge of the absolutely 
real. 
110 
He willingly concedes that once brahmajnäna is 
effected, the absolute reality of the Vedas is also negated. 
111 
The Vedanta-väkyas, having negated from brahman all upädhis, 
eventually negate themselves. 
Suresvara develops a line of argument which is fully 
consistent with what we have so far seen in Shankara about 
the nature of brahmajndna and the function of meditation. 
In the Naishkarmya Siddhi, he deals with the argument that 
the knowledge derived from sabda-pramäna is mediate and 
indirect (paroksha) and becomes a direct conviction only 
through meditation (prasamkhyana). 
112 According to Suresvara, 
if the properly understood and interpreted V eddnta-väkyas 
do not produce immediate knowledge, continuous contemplation 
on their purport in the form of hearing and reasoning will 
not do so. 
113 Meditation can only produce the ability to 
habitually concentrate the mind, but it is not through 
meditation that the pramänas yield knowledge, 
114 They do so 
directly. Besides, according to Suresvara, if someone gains 
knowledge through the sruti and then denies the same, knowledge 
through any other source is likely to be rejected. 
115 If 
one does not accept that the 
sruti is capable of producing 
direct knowledge, then the texts cease to be authoritative. 
Moksha becomes non-eternal if it is conceived of as the 
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product of an act of meditation. 
116 By emphasizing the 
need for prasamkhyäna over and above the Vedanta-väkyas, one 
elevates prasamkhyäna to the status of a pramana. This is 
as absurd as trying to take food with one's eyes. 
117 
Suresvara all along emphasizes that direct knowledge is 
the result of inquiry into the Vedic texts. 118 Suresvara, 
however, accepts that prasamkhyäna, as repeated hearing and 
pondering of the Vedänta-vakyas, is acceptable. He grants 
that a clear comprehension of the texts may not result from 
a single hearing, but may do so after repeated listening. 
119 
In this sense prasamkhyäna becomes an integral part of 
sravana or the process of ascertaining the meaning of the 
texts. Like Shankara, he emphasizes the importance of 
mental purity (citta-suddhi) as a precondition of brahmajnäna, 
120 
Sadänanda defines nididhyäsana as, "a stream of ideas of 
the same kind as those of Brahman, the One without a second, 
to the exclusion of such foreign ideas as those of the body 
etc". 
121 This definition is reconcilable with a function 
that Shankara assigns to contemplation, after brahman has been 
apprehended from the sruti. In addition to doubts, which 
it is the function of manana to eliminate, brahmajnäna may 
be subject to a further impediment. Even after the gain of 
brahmajnana the deep impressions (väsands) formed as a result of 
habitual identification with the body, sense-organs, and mind, 
may reassert themselves, and there is a possibility of lapse 
from Self-knowledge. This possibility is increased by the 
fact that the effects of actions which have given rise to 
this particular embodiment and life-experience continue to 
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bear fruit. 
Since the resultant of past actions that led to the 
formation of the present body must produce definite 
results, speech, mind and body are bound to work even 
after the highest realization, for actions that have 
begun to bear fruit are stronger than knowledge; as for 
instance an arrow that has been let fly continues its 
course for some time. Hence the operation of knowledge, 
being weaker than they, (is liable to be interrupted by 
them and) becomes only a possible alternative. Therefore 
there is need to regulate the train of remembrance of 
the knowledge by having recourse to means such as 
renunciation and dispassion. 122 
For brahmajnäna to be meaningful and fruitful to the 
aspirant, it should continuously and steadily abide in his 
mind, and not be displaced by age-old tendencies and 
inclinations. 123 Shankara argues therefore, that Upanishad 
sentences such as, "The Self alone is to be meditated 
upon" (BR. U. 1.4.7), and, "The intelligent aspirant after 
Brahman, knowing about this alone, should attain intuitive 
knowledge" (BR. U. 4.4.21), are meant for impressing upon us 
the need for sustaining a continuous trend of thought 
centred on the nature of the Self, so that knowledge is not 
overwhelmed by erroneous past tendencies. 
124 Sentences 
such as these, he explains, are not intended for indicating 
any act for the production of a new result over and above 
the knowledge of brahman gained from the sruti. This 
contemplation of the ätman is not different from the 
knowledge that is gained during sravana. 
125 They do not 
constitute original injunctions, enjoining something 
entirely unknown. 
The very knowledge of the nature of the Self removes the 
ignorance about It, consisting in identification with the 
non-Self, and the superimposing of action, 
its factors, 
principal and subsidiary, and its results 
(on the Self). 
When that is removed, evils such as desires cannot exist, 
and consequently thinking of the non-Self is also gone. 
L1L 
Hence on the principle of residium, thinking follows as 
a matter of course. Therefore meditation on it, from 
this point of view, has not to be enjoined, for it is 
already known from other sources-126 
On the evidence of Shankara's commentaries, it is quite 
clear that the idea of contemplation after sravana and 
manana is understood to mean continuous fixing of attention 
on knowledge already gained. It is not seen as an avenue 
to any new knowledge. 127 In the context of this view, 
even as manana is an integral part of sravana, nididhyäsana 
is not distinct in intention and purpose from both, except 
that it presupposes the gain of brahmajnäna. Nididhyäsana 
ensures that brahmajnäna becomes a natural and spontaneous 
part of one's thinking, even as the former limited notions 
of oneself. Nididhydsana therefore, must be carefully 
distinguished from what is understood as meditation 
(upasanä) proper by Shankara. The latter, according to 
Shankara, is a mental action which does not necessarily 
depend upon or conform to the exact nature of the meditated 
object. The object may be thought of as something else. 
128 
Nididhyäsana, on the other hand, is the contemplation of an 
object, already conclusively known from a valid pramana, as 
it really is. This contemplation is not meant for gaining 
anything beyond the knowledge already gained from the 
authoritative pramäna. Nididhyäsana is therefore, strictly 
speaking, a process of and identical with 'näna or prramä 
rather than upasana (meditation). To contemplate a thing 
as it is can only be knowledge, for such a contemplation would 
be dependent on the nature of the object (vastutantram) and 
not on the will of the contemplator (purushatantram), 
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There is no absolute rule about the effort required in 
sravana, manana or nididhydsana for the gain of knowledge. 
It is dependent, in Shankara's view, on the aptitude and 
qualification of the student. This is clear in Shankara's 
reply to a pürvapaksha that if brahmajRana is not gained 
during the first hearing of the teaching, it "cannot be 
gained by a repetition of the same. In addition to the 
light which it sheds on his understanding of the threefold 
process, this particular reply is very significant for its 
revelation of Shankara's understanding of the Advaita 
method of instruction as it relates particularly to the 
exegesis and unfolding of the mahäväkya, "tat tvam asi". 
It is a very clear statement on the direct relation between 
the sruti and brahmajnana. 
Repetition will be unnecessary for one who can realize 
the Self as Brahman after hearing 'That thou art' once 
only. But for one who cannot do so, repetition is a 
necessity. Thus it is noticed in the Chändogya 
Upanisad that Udddlaka teaches his son, 'That thou 
art, O Svetaketu' (CH. 6.8.7), and then being requested 
by his son again and again, '0 revered sir, explain to 
me again' (ibid. ), he removes the respective causes of 
his (ývetaketu's) misconceptions, and teaches that 
very fact, 'That thou art' repeatedly. That very 
process is referred to by citing the text, 'It is to 
be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon' 
(BR. U. 4.6.6).... It is a matter of experience that 
though the meaning may be vaguely apprehended from a 
sentence uttered only once, people understand it fully 
after removing progressively the false ideas standing in 
the way, through a process of sustained consideration. 
Again, the text 'That thou art' speaks of the identity 
of the entity denoted by 'thou' with the entity denoted 
by 'That. By the word 'That' is denoted the Brahman 
under discussion that is Existence, the Witness, and the 
cause of the birth etc. of the universe as is well 
in 
evidence in such texts as, 'Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, 
and Infinite' (TA. U. 2.1.1. ), 'Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman' 
(BR. U. 3 . 9.28) , 
'This Immutable is never seen, but is the 
Witness, It is never known, but is the Knower' (BR. U. 3.8.11), 
'Without birth, decrepitude, death', 'Neither gross nor 
minute, neither short nor long' (BR. U. 3.8.8), and so on. 
In these texts, changes like birth etc. that befall all 
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things are denied by the words 'without birth' etc. 
and the properties of matter like grossness etc. are 
denied by the words 'neither gross' etc. By the words 
'knowledge' etc. it is stated that Brahman is by nature 
Consciousness and Effulgence. This object called Brahman, 
which is denoted by the word 'That', which is free from 
all mundane attributes, and which is by nature 
Consciousness, is well known to the people who are 
adepts in the Upanisads. Equally well it has been known 
by them that the inmost Self of the taught (i. e. disciple) 
is the meaning of the word 'thou', which is the seer and 
the hearer, and which is thought of as the inmost entity 
inhabiting the sheaths starting from the gross body, and 
which is then ascertained as Consciousness Itself. That 
being the case, the sentence 'That thou art' cannot 
produce a direct realisation of its meaning in those 
people to whom these two entities remain obstructed by 
ignorance, doubt, and confusion; for the meaning of a 
sentence is dependent on the meaning of the words 
(constituting it). Thus it is that for such people it 
becomes desirable to resort repeatedly to the scriptures 
and reasoning that lead to a clarification of the concepts. 
Although the Self to be realized is partless, still many 
constituents are superimposed on It, such as the body, 
sense-organs, mind, intellect, perception of objects, etc. 
That being so, one false constituent may be discarded at 
one attempt at comprehension, and another at another. 
In this sense the dawn of a conception in a progressive 
manner becomes justifiable. But even this is only the 
penultimate stage of the realization of the Self. 
Those of sharp intellect on the other hand who have no 
obstruction like ignorance, doubt, and confusion, with 
regard to the object to be known can realize the meaning 
of 'That thou art' even from the first utterance, so that 
a repetition in their case is certainly useless. For 
the knowledge of the Self emerging once for all is able 
to remove ignorance and no progressive development is 
admitted here. 130 
The idea of the repetition of the threefold process is not 
meant for its own sake. There is no obligation to persist 
with it after brahmajndna is conclusively gained. Such a 
feeling might distract from the imperative of understanding 
the Vedanta-väkyas_. 
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That nididhyasana is identical with brahmajnäna and distinct 
from the concept of meditation as a probable means of 
knowledge is supported by Shankara's clear refutation of Yoga 
and its disciplines as a direct means to brahmajnäna. 
132 
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Commenting on Brahma-sutra 2.1.3, Shankara justifies the 
need for a special rebuttal of S amkhya and Yoga. This is 
necessary, he explains, because of the claim of Yoga to be 
a means to the knowledge of reality, and the references to 
this method in the Vedas. 133 The fact that these schools 
share some views and practices in common with Advaita does 
not justify their claim as independent paths to the knowledge 
of brahman. 
Though there is agreement in respect of a portion of the 
subject matter, still since disagreement is in evidence in 
respect of others, as shown above, an effort is being made 
against the Sämkhya and Yoga Smrtis alone, though many 
Smrtis dealing with spiritual matters are extant. For the 
Säinkhya and Yoga are well recognized in the world as 
means for the achievement of the highest human goal 
(liberation), and they are accepted by the good people and 
are supported by the Vedic indicatory marks, as in, 'One 
becomes freed from all the bondages after realizing the 
Deity that is the source of these desires and attained 
through Säinkhya and Yoga' (SV. U. 6.13). -Their refutation 
centres only round this false claim that liberation can 
be attained through Safnkhya knowledge or the path of 
Yoga independently of the Vedas. For the Upanisads 
reject the claim that there can be anything apart from 
the Vedic knowledge of the unity of the Self that can 
bring about liberation, as is denied in, 'By knowing Him 
alone, one goes beyond death. There is no other path to 
proceed by' (SV. U. 3.8). But the followers of Sämkhya and 
Yoga are dualists, and they do not perceive the unity of 
the Self. 134 
The Sämkhya view of the quality-less nature of the purusha 
and the Yoga emphasis on detachment are only acceptable 
because they are harmonious with sruti' s own revelations. 
Although these schools might be indirectly conducive to the 
gain of Self-knowledge, that knowledge itself, however, 
contends Shankara, can be had only from the texts of the 
Upanishads. 135 Although Shankara admits that extraordinary 
powers are attainable through Yoga practices, 
136 he denies 
that the discipline of mind control or concentration is a 
means to freedom. The Upanishads, he says, 
do not prescribe 
216 
these as leading to moksha. 
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This is a denial therefore, 
of meditation as normally understood, as a means to brahmajnäna. 
In fact, Shankara sees mental control as being impossible 
without brahma jhana and the continuous abiding of the mind 
in that knowledge. 138 
Elsewhere, Shankara argues that any perfection possible 
is attainable only through the practice of dharma and the 
latter is revealed exclusively in the injunctions of the 
Vedas. 139 Hence, the validity of a scriptural text cannot 
be overriden on the personal authority of someone who has 
attained perfection through the practice of it. 
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Besides, 
if one has to rely on the personal authority of adepts, 
there is a difficulty of contradictory assertions. These 
conflicts, according to Shankara, can only be resolved by 
a consideration of their agreement with the Vedas. 
141 
Like all other mental and physical disciplines outside of 
the Vedanta-väkyas, Yoga can assist the gain of knowledge by 
helping to bring about concentration and mental purity 
(citta-suddhi), 142 
In current studies, the most often cited statement from 
Shankara in support of anubhava as a pramäna of brahman 
occurs in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra. Here Shankara 
says that anubhava, etc., can be used as a means of inquiry 
about brahman. 
143 In view of the significance attached to 
this statement, it is important that we examine the context 
in which it occurs. 
The discussion in which Shankara expresses this view is 
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prompted by an objection that the second sutra, That 
(is Brahman) from which (are derived) the birth etc. of this 
universe", seeks to establish brahman by an inferential 
argument. 
144 Shankara emphatically denies this view. 
The sutras, he says, are meant for, "stringing together the 
flowers of the sentences of the Upanisads". They only cite 
and analyze the Vedänta-väkyas because, 
the realization of Brahman results from the firm 
conviction arising from the deliberation on the 
(Vedic) texts and their meanings, but not from 
other means of knowledge like inference etc. 145 
Having said this, Shankara adds that after brahman is 
revealed as the world-cause by the sruti, inferential 
arguments not opposed to the Upanisadic texts can be 
employed as a means of reinforcing these texts. The 
sruti itself, Shankara points out, in texts such as, 
'(The Self is) to be heard of, to be reflected on' 
(BR. U. 2.4.5), and, 'A man well informed and intelligent 
can reach the country of the Gändhäras; similarly in this 
world, a man who has a teacher attains knowledge', 
prescribes and accepts the aid of human intelligence and 
146 
reasoning. 
It is in the immediate context of suggesting a 
supplementary role for all other pramänas, that Shankara 
mentions anubhava as a means of knowledge. It is also 
significant that he adds "etc. " after anubhava 
(anubhavädayasca). This would suggest that no special 
significance is being attached to anubhava. The inevitable 
conclusion here is that anubhava is grouped along with all 
other pramänas whose roles are conceived by Shankara as 
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only subordinate and supplementary to sruti. There seems 
no justification from this discussion for the deliberate 
singling out of anubhava and the claim that it is the 
ultimate pramäna of brahman. The context and the 
development of the argument here does not vindicate such an 
interpretation. 
Shankara clearly explains why it is possible to have 
supplementary pramänas in inquiring about brahman. In the 
case of the inquiry into dharma, for example, sruti alone 
can be employed, for the result is yet to be produced and 
is dependent on human effort. The result cannot be 
experienced prior to its production. 
147 The inquiry into 
brahman, however, Shankara says, relates to an already 
existing entity and admits therefore, of the use of other 
pramänas. 
148 The clear idea of the contrast which Shankara 
introduces here is to suggest that because brahman is not 
outside the range of one's knowledge and experience, 
149 
other pramänas are employable alongside sruti. Besides, 
anubhava here seems to be used in a very wide sense. It 
can include any experience which can be analyzed to support 
and reinforce the revelations of sruti. The analysis of the 
three states of experience and the demonstration of a 
persisting and unchanging Awareness are good examples of the 
supportive use of everyday experience. 
The important point is that there are no grounds here or 
elsewhere for seeing any of these other sources of knowledge 
as independent or alternative means to brahmajnäna 
in 
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Shankara. This is reinforced in the course of the same 
discussion where an objection is raised that if brahman 
is an existing reality, it should be the object of other 
means of inquiry and Upanishad inquiry is futile. Shankara's 
reply leaves no room for doubt. 
Not so; for Brahman's relation with anything cannot 
be grasped, It being outside the range of sense 
perception. The senses naturally comprehend objects and 
not Brahman. Had Brahman been an object of sense- 
perception, knowledge would have been of the form, 'This 
product is related to (i. e., produced by) Brahman'. 
Again, even when the mere effect (i. e. universe) is 
cognized, one cannot ascertain whether it is related to 
Brahman (as its cause) or to something else. Therefore 
the aphorism, 'That from which' etc., is not meant to 
present an inference. 150 
The issue is put even further beyond doubt when Shankara says 
that the next sutra (1.1.3), 'Since the scriptures are its 
valid means', is meant for establishing sruti as the only 
pramäna of brahman. 
151 We are left with no choice, therefore, 
but to see this reference to anubhava in the same light as 
Shankara's mention of any other pramäna in relation to 
sruti and brahmajnana. It is difficult to accept that if 
Shankara wished to establish anubhava as the definitive 
pramäna of brahman he would have chosen to do so through 
this single reference. The direct revelation of brahman 
is the concern of sruti alone, but other methods of inquiry 
and reasoning can assist us in removing doubt and in 
understanding this revelation. 
With this discussion, we bring to an end that part of our 
thesis dealing exclusively with Shankara's understanding of the 
sruti as a source of brahmajnäna. Our aim here was to 
reinforce the conclusions arrived at in Chapters 3 and 4, 
by studying Shankara's conception of the nature of 
brahmajnäna 
and the manner of its acquisiton. 
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We consider Shankara's distinction between 'nana 
(knowledge) and karma (activity), which is totally overlooked 
in contemporary discussions, to be fundamental in a correct 
understanding of his conception of sruti, and its direct 
role in producing brahmajnäna. This distinction is the basis 
of his differentiation between upäsanä or dhyäna (meditation) 
and 'näna. In dhyana or upäsana one is not concerned with 
gaining correct knowledge of an object. In the examples 
Shankara has given, the object meditated upon may be imagined 
or conceived in a manner different from its real nature. 
When, on the other hand, a decision is made to obtain knowledge 
('näna), there is no choice or question of conceiving the 
object differently from what it is. Jnäna, of any kind, is 
produced only by an appropriate pramdna, and in the case of 
brahman, the V edänta-väkyas constitute the only valid 
p ramäna. 
We wish to strongly reiterate Shankara's clear conviction 
that the sentences of the Upanishads are concerned with 
imparting 3nana of an already available brahman and are 
not at all meant for dhyäna or upäsanä of the kinds 
mentioned by him. The simple point, perhaps missed because 
of this very simplicity, is that these sentences fulfil their 
purpose in being correctly understood. Whereas meditation is 
a mental activity concerned with the production of a hither-to 
non-existent result, jnäna informs us of already existing 
things. The Vedanta-väkyas tell us something about brahman, 
and that information, correctly understood, constitutes their 
aim. This conclusion is a challenge to the view that 
Shankara understands knowledge gathered from the 
sruti as 
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merely hypothetical. Sruti is not a pramäna if it fails to 
engender ramä (valid knowledge). We find it impossible 
therefore, to support the conclusion of de Smet and others, 
that even after grasping the purport of the sruti and 
eliminating all doubts, 'näna, in Shankara, still awaits 
further verification. 152 This is a very central and crucial 
issue on. which we differ radically. De Smet, after a 
detailed and lucid discussion of Shankara's methods of 
exegesis, has missed the cardinal implication of his 
acceptance of sruti as the pramäna of brahmajnäna. 
We find further support for our conclusions in the 
numerous passages where Shankara affirms the simultaneity 
of jnäna and moksha. His position is that between 'näna, 
conceived as a clear comprehension of the purport of the 
Upanishads, and moksha, there is no necessity for any kind 
of intervening activity. We wish here to emphasize his 
refutation of the contention that it is meditation, over and 
above the understanding of the meaning of the Vedanta-vakyas, 
which gives rise to knowledge capable of destroying avidyä. 
We have pointed to the identity of this pürvapaksha with 
current views. Nothing more than the understanding of the 
nature of the Self and non-Self is required. 
We suspect that one reason for the positing of anubhava as 
the pramäna of brahman is the wish to show that 'näna is not 
only a cognitive transformation but also carries the conviction 
of will and emotion. It is not necessary, however, to 
overturn Shankara's epistemology to make this point. The 
discussion on sädhana-catushtaya was introduced to demonstrate 
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that the successful attainment of 'näna implied a transform- 
ation of intellect, will and emotion. These qualities are 
the prerequisites for inquiry into the sruti, and for the 
successful gain of jnäna. It is in the absence of these 
prerequisites that sruti-derived knowledge lacks conviction 
and immediacy. Sraddhä (faith) in the pramana and in the 
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teacher is a very significant attitude. One can be faithful to 
Shankara's epistemology and also demonstrate that jnäna 
implies a profound transformation of one's entire vision. 
Fitness to inquire into the sruti demands and presupposes 
a high level of moral attainment in the aspirant. Bhagavadgitä 
13: 6-11, enumerates a selection of such qualities, and summing 
up his bhashya on these virtues, Shankara writes, 
Knowledge of truth results from the mature development of 
such attributes as (humility 13: 7), which are the means of 
attaining knowledge. The end of this knowledge is moksha, 
the cessation of mortal existence, of samsara. The end 
should be kept in view; for, it is only when one perceives 
the end of knowledge of truth that one will endeavour to 
cultivate the attributes which are the means of attaining 
that knowledge. These attributes - from 'humility' to 
' perception of the end of the knowledge of truth' - are 
declared to be knowledge because they are conducive to 
knowledge. What is opposed to this - viz., pride, hypocricy, 
cruelty, impatience, insincerity and the like - is ignorance, 
which should be known and avoided as tending to the 
perpetuation of samsara. 153 
In our discussion on sravana, manana and nididhyasana, we 
sought to refute the sharp distinctions made between them, 
and the claim that they are intended for different ends. All 
three processes, according to Shankara, have the same end in 
view. We have also argued that they do not necessarily follow 
each other in sequence. In the properly qualified aspirant, 
brahmajnäna can be gained in the initial sravana. If this does 
not occur, it is not because this is not the aim of 
sravana, 
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or that it is incapable of bringing about knowledge. The 
aspirant may lack any one of the qualities described in 
sädhana-catushtaya. If there are any doubts about the pramana 
or the prameya (object revealed), then manana is required for 
the elimination of these. Manana, however, does not seek 
to establish the truth of brahman by logic independent of the 
sruti. It only releases 'nana from doubts. 
In our discussion of nididhyäsana, we sought to refute 
the view that it is conceived by Shankara as a special act 
of meditation which truly produces brahmajnana. The habitual 
tendency of identifying the ätman with the mind, senses or 
body may reassert itself even after the gain of brahmajnäna. 
Nididhyäsana, as conceived by Shankara, is that process of 
continuous contemplation by which one seeks to uninterruptedly 
focus one's mind on the true nature of the Self, gleaned from 
the sruti . At this stage, valid knowledge 
is already gained, 
and the purpose of nididhyäsana is not to produce new knowledge. 
It is contemplation of the ätman as It is, having already 
ascertained Its nature from Its valid source. Its aim is to 
bring about firmness or steadiness (nishthä) injnäna. 
Contrary to current views, it appears to us that sravana, the 
process during which we correctly comprehend the nature of 
brahman, should be accorded primacy in Shankara. 
In Part 2 of our study, we consider Vivekananda's understanding 
of the sruti and its role in the gain of brahmajnäna. We 
begin, however, with a discussion of certain general features of 
his times, and the legacy of attitudes toward the sruti 
which he inherited from his immediate predecessors. 
PART TWO 
CHAPTER 6 
ATTITUDES TOWARD SCRIPTURAL AUTHORITY AND 
REVELATION FROM RAMMOHUN ROY TO RAMAKRISHNA 
6.1 The British Impact 
In its long history, Hinduism has undergone innumerable 
changes and has responded and adapted itself to diverse 
influences. The most important challenge and stimulus 
it has encountered is the presence and impact of the West. 
The response to this impact effected changes of the most 
radical kind, and the present form of Hinduism can only be 
properly understood in the light of this historic meeting. 
It is not, however, within the scope of our study to consider 
all the dimensions of this encounter but to focus only on 
its effects in relation to the authority and status of the 
Vedas. 
The uniqueness of the impact of the West on Hinduism is 
easily appreciated when one considers the marginal effects of 
Islam, in spite of a coexistence extending over seven 
hundred years. The reason lies, of course, in the nature of 
Islamic rule. Islamic dominance in many parts of India was 
primarily political and military. Their efforts at 
conversion were sporadic and there was no attempt to challenge 
the religion, philosophy or social life of the Hindus. The 
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Islamic state did not set up an educational system. This 
is not to argue that both civilizations did not influence 
each other. The point is that the beliefs and institutions 
of Hinduism were not interfered with nor were their assumptions 
challenged by Islam. In fact, as K. M. Panikkar points out, 
the general effect of the Islamic impact was a greater 
withdrawal into religious and social rigidity and orthodoxy. 
So far as Hindu Society was considered, the impact of 
Islam seems on the whole to have made it more rigid. A 
study of the extensive smriti literature of the Muslim 
period including the encylopaedic Todarananda, composed 
under the orders of Akbar's famous Revenue Minister, 
Raja Toder Mal would clearly demonstrate that Hinduism, 
far from liberalising itself under the impact of Islam, 
became stricter in its observations of rituals and caste 
rules, placing more emphasis on the prayaschitta, or the 
religious penances for social offences. Briefly, 
therefore, it may be said that the encounter between Islam 
and Hinduism became, after a short time, a problem of 
co-existence, with mutual toleration rather than the 
domination of one by another. l 
The challenges to Hinduism have not only originated outside 
its borders. The bhakti movement of medieval times vented 
ideas of religious and social reform, later echoed in the 
reformist movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. They asserted that God was not embodied in a 
material object and that man had direct access to salvation 
without the mediation of priests. Most of the bhakti 
adherents were fervent monotheists and the doctrine of 
direct access to salvation through bhakti offered dignity 
and equality to all who had been denied full participation 
in religious life under orthodox Brahmanism. They were 
inevitably anti-caste and women were considered spiritually 
equal by many of them and admitted to the inner ranks of 
disciples. 
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The bhakti movement, however, failed to effect widespread 
changes in the beliefs and institutions of orthodox Hinduism. 
Many reasons explain this failure. 
2 Equality was an ideal 
of the religious and not the secular sphere. While 
criticizing certain social practices, the movements offered 
no alternative programme of social and economic reorganization. 
In fact, they never built up organizations which could carry 
out positive social programmes. The saints of bhakti were 
of a pacific turn of mind, tolerant in outlook and eschewed 
controversy or conflict. Social reform was peripheral to the 
reconstitution of religious beliefs. Most of the sects 
fostered an other-wordly attitude to life. Heimsath sees this 
as a result of their emphasis on mysticism. 
But it was not the primacy of spiritual concerns alone 
that caused the bhakti movements to fail in the 
transformation of social life; religious movements have 
been known to overturn social structures. Most bhakti 
sects, like other Hindu religious movements, leaned 
towards mysticism, as a method of spiritual revelation, 
and this often encouraged a drawing away from wordly 
concerns. Individual salvation, not the salvation of 
society or the group, was the reason for and the result 
of the religious quest through mysticism. 3 
The British challenge, in contrast to Hinduism's earlier 
encounters with other civilizations and cultures, was total. 
The main challenge of the West was in respect of the religion 
of the Hindus. The missionaries questioned the validity 
of Hinduism and denounced it as a mass of superstitions. It 
was condemned as idolatrous and polytheistic. Social 
customs for which religious legitimation was claimed invoked 
the severest disapproval. These included such practices as 
the burning of widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands, 
infant marriages, compulsory widowhood and the institution of 
caste with the acceptance of untouchability. The structure of 
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Hinduism was challenged by the concept of equality which 
became part of the legal system. Economically, India's 
handicraft industry was subjected to the pressures of 
industrialization, and politically the divisions and 
fragmentations of Indian society were challenged by the 
British sense of community and nationalistic pride. The 
British, in other words, offered an observable, functioning 
and successful alternative to her own system. There were 
economic, social, religious and intellectual alternatives 
presented by the West. 
The Western impact on India, which resulted in what is 
now quite commonly referred to as the Indian Renaissance, 
transmitted itself to the Indians through English education, 
the preaching of Christian missionaries and the research 
work of Orientalists. The first great impetus to English 
education was the establishment in Calcutta of the Hindu 
College in 1817. A large number of schools and colleges 
were founded during the next forty years in Bengal and in 
other parts of India, creating a small but influential 
English-educated class. The spread of English as an all- 
India language, along with improved transport, facilitated 
communication and the spread of ideas from one part of the 
country to another. Among the writers most influential in 
shaping Indian thinking around this time were Mill, Comte, 
and Spencer. Mill's political writings, in which he argued 
that social tyranny might be more oppressive than political 
subjugation, and his arguments in favour of female equality 
were well known. With Comte, it was his effort to discover, 
"laws of progress". He argued that the key to progress was 
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moral development leading to altruism; moral development depended 
on religion. Comte also insisted on the necessity for female 
equality. Indians were also inspired by Spencer's ideas of 
evolution as applied to human society, showing that social 
change was a natural process which could be guided by men, 
that violent breaks with the past were unnecessary, and that 
ultimate progress was certain . Spencer's writings were 
translated into the major Indian languages, reaching a wide 
audience. 
4 The significance of these philosophies was the 
emphasis on reason rather than tradition and authority as 
the factor in determining the norms and values of society. 
The objective assessment of tradition was encouraged. The 
Christian missionaries were among the leading vehicles 
of Western ideas and concepts. Their scathing criticisms of 
Hindu doctrine and practice were a major impetus to religious 
reform and revaluation. Some of their more specific influences 
will be discussed subsequently. They were influential also 
in a positive manner through their example in education, 
welfare work, uplift of the backward classes and female 
emancipation. 
The contribution of the Orientalists is well documented 
and accepted. 
5 In the history of Indology, the names of 
Jones, Wilson and Colebrooke are legendary. Jones related 
Hindu civilization to that of Europe by linking Sanskrit to 
the European language family, and reanimated the idea of a 
golden age in the past. The golden age concept was given 
further shape by the work of Colebrooke. He argued that the 
West owed a debt of gratitude to the East for their contributions 
in the arts and sciences. Civilisation, which had its origin 
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in Asia, was now in a state of decline there whereas the 
West was steadily progressing. He concentrated his research 
upon the Vedic Age of India characterizing it as an age of 
gold and comparing it with present decline. He demonstrated 
trom textual sources that the practice of sati was a 
departure from the authentic tradition and discovered 
many other discrepancies between ancient texts and actual 
practices. Colebrooke romanticized the virtues of the Aryan 
inhabitants of North India, describing their worship as a 
non-idolatrous monotheistic faith, free from the fertility 
goddesses, rites and rituals of contemporary Hinduism. 
Wilson, unlike Jones and Colebrooke, concentrated his efforts 
on translating, describing and analyzing the Puränas. In 
contrast to Colebrooke, who was harsh in his judgement and 
evaluation of all post-Vedic developments in Hinduism, 
Wilson argued, "that it was neither necessary nor desirable, 
and was perhaps even absurd, to eliminate traits that 
through the ages had become deeply ingrained in Hindu 
culture". 
6 His work, as Kopf suggests, linked contemporary 
traditions with their "historically authenticated pristine 
forms". The Orientalist conception of the golden age directly 
influenced the reformist arguments of men like Rammohun Roy 
and was perhaps their greatest contribution. 
Knowledge of this golden age would become the cohesive 
ideology underlying a new sense of community. It is 
doubtful that the rise of nationalism would have been 
possible without the sense of community, the sense of 
community without a collective feeling of self-respect, 
and self-respect without the stimulus of a rediscovered 
golden age. 7 
The Indian Renaissance had effects of the most 
far-reaching kind, touching almost every aspect of Indian life. 
Li 
It set up a high standard of rational thinking, leading to 
religious and social reform and developed the political 
ideas and institutions which led eventually to the freedom 
of India. Its chief effect, relevant to the authority and 
status of the Vedas, was the growth of the spirit of 
criticism. Majumdar argues that this spirit of inquiry and 
criticism is the most important result of the impact of 
Western culture on India. 
8 
The claim of the Vedas to be an 
infallible 'revelation was questioned and its authoritativeness 
and role eventually redefined. This change, as will be 
shown later, had serious consequences for the understanding 
of the specific role of these texts and of Hinduism in 
general. 
9 
It will be argued that the reinterpretation of 
their meaning which the texts underwent in this period 
eventually came to be accepted, for various reasons, as 
the true and original role they had always been assigned. 
One of the important consequences of this acceptance was 
a remarkable change in the understanding and interpretation 
of Shankara's Advaita Vedanta. 
A study centred on any aspect of this fervent period in 
the history of Hinduism must inevitably concern itself in a 
large measure with the Brahmo Samaj. This study is no 
exception. ^rom the days of Rammohun Roy until the death of 
Keshub Chandra Sen in 18R4, the Brahrno Sanaj, although 
nunerically small, was the centre of all progressive religious, 
social and political, movements and exerted considerable 
influence. The movement produced a series of charismatic 
leaders who determined its doctrine and direction. 
10 
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6.2 Rammohun Roy 
Rarmohun Roy (1774-1833) is the acknowledged pioneer of 
the Indian Renaissance. He was born in an orthodox Hindu 
Brahmin family and his early education in Persian and 
Arabic was intended to prepare him for a career in the Muslim 
administration. He also learnt Sanskrit and had a working 
knowledge of Greek and Hebrew. During the years 1806 to 
1814, when he worked with the East India Company, he acquired 
a considerable command over the English language. He 
settled in Calcutta in 1815 and involved himself in the 
campaign for religious and social reform, establishing the 
Brahmo Sabha in 1828.11 Roy died on September 27th, 1833, 
at Bristol, while on a visit to England. 
The question of the significance of scriptural revelation 
is important in respect of Rammohun Roy, for the reason that 
his work on religion consists largely of attempting to interpret 
the scriptures to people who considered the texts to be 
of divine origin and infallible. Opinions are divided among 
modern scholars on Roy's real attitude to scriptural authority. 
S. K. Das is doubtful whether Roy really believed in the 
inspiration of the Vedas. 
12 On the other hand, B. G. Ray 
sees Roy as a champion of Vedic infallibility. 
13 Ray's 
opinion is shared by S. Mitra. He sees the Vedas as the 
authoritative basis of Hindu theism for Rammohun Roy-14 
According to Mitra, the Vedas were for Roy, 
extremely luminous works, affirmed to 
be co-eval with the 
creation and containing the whole body of 
Hindu Theology, 
Law and literature. 15 
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The difficulty of ascertaining his true position on the 
scripture arises from his tendency to use texts which he 
himself did not necessarily uphold but which his opponents 
did. He preferred to avoid questioning the authoritativeness 
of the scripture in his controversies with Hindu opponents. 16 
Rammohun, like all other Brahmo Samaj leaders, was not a 
theologian, and his purpose was not to provide a completely 
rounded, consistent theology. He had an abiding interest 
in social reform. It is difficult, however, to agree with 
ilitra and Ray that Roy upheld without reservations the 
traditional authority of the Vedas and their absolute 
infallibility. There is a strong case for modifying this 
view. 
17 
Rarunohun Roy saw the Vedas as directing man's attention 
to the regular and orderly operation of the natural world, 
enabling him thereby to form a concept of the Creator. 
The Vedas (or properly speaking the spiritual parts of 
them)... recommend mankind to direct all researches 
towards the surrounding objects, viewed either 
collectively or individually, bearing in mind their 
regular, wise and wonderful combinations and arrangements, 
since such researches cannot fail, they affirm, to 
lead an unbiased mind to the notion of a Supreme Existence, 
who so sublimely designs and disposes of them, as is 
everywhere traced through the universe. l8 
It is very significant that in this view the Vedas do not 
themselves give certain knowledge of God, but point to the 
means by which such knowledge may be gained. There is a 
shift here in the nature of traditional scriptural authority. 
It is interesting to note that Roy expresses an idea which 
becomes very important in later Brahmo doctrine. This is the 
notion that nature provides the basis for a particular type 
of revelation. This idea features prominently in the thought 
L-5 4 
of Keshub Chandra Sen and will be explored more fully when 
he is treated. 
For Rammohun Roy, the criterion by which the 
authoritativeness of any text may be evaluated is whether 
or not it teaches the "true" religion. This view enabled 
him to accept as authoritative, texts of the Hindu 
tradition other than the Vedas. In this sense it is 
difficult to argue that the Vedas were for him a unique and 
incomparable source of knowledge. 
If the spiritual part of the Vedas can enable men to 
acquire salvation by teaching them the true and eternal 
existence of God, and the false and perishable being of 
the universe, and inducing them to hear and constantly 
reflect on these doctrines it is consistent with reason 
to admit, that the Smriti, and Agam, and other works 
inculcating the same doctrines, afford means of 
attaining final beautitude. 19 
One may add that it is also consistent with reason and the 
logic of his thought, that the texts of other traditions 
inculcating the "true" religion, would also be accepted as 
authoritative. There is no reason to suppose that this 
view would have been disagreeable to him. His wide sympathies 
with Christian and Islamic thought are well known. This, 
of course, further erodes the uniqueness of the Vedas. The 
view that a text is authoritative only if it teaches the 
"true" religion implies that Roy has an extra-scriptural 
concept of right doctrine which he brings to bear in his 
evaluation of any text. In his earliest known work, a Persian 
tract entitled, Tuhfat al-Muwahhidin (A Gift to Monotheists) 
1803-4, Rammohun outlines a minimal theology common to all 
religions. 
20 These include the existence of God, derivable 
from the design of the universe and man's innate capacity 
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to infer God from it, and a morally accountable soul 
existing after death, a belief necessary for the maintenence 
of social order. The minimal moral principle was a concern 
for the welfare of mankind. These basic beliefs were 
contrasted with the doctrinal diversity of historical 
religions and they were seen as the converging points of all 
traditions. Here is the germ of the idea of the unity of 
all religions, which in various forms became a prominent 
feature of Hindu thought in the modern period. 
A very important clue to Roy's attitude to the Vedas 
emerges in his contrast with Shankara on the question of 
adhikdra (entitlement). Roy differs from Shankara in 
upholding the view that householders and not only samnyäsins 
are entitled to the knowledge of brahman. The question of 
whether südras are able to know brahman is related to the 
question of the indispensability of the Vedas for a knowledge 
of brahman. Shankara, who argues for the indispensability 
of the Vedas as a source of knowledge of brahman, sees 
thesüdras, who are debarred from Vedic study, as not being 
entitled to this knowledge. Rammohun Roy, however, in 
a dispute with one Subrahmanya Sastri, argues that the 
knowledge of the Vedas is not necessary for a knowledge 
of God, wrongly citing Shankara's support for this view. 
21 
As far as Roy was concerned, the entitlement of people to true 
or inferior forms of religion was not determined by 
formal qualifications of birth or ritual status, but by 
inclination and ability. 
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It is clear then, that although Rammohun Roy did not 
unambiguously reject Vedic authority and infallibility, he 
had a considerably modified attitude to it. He never worked 
out a cohesive theology, but if he had, it is difficult to 
see how he could have consistently maintained the traditional 
exclusiveness of the Vedas. His view of nature as revelation, 
his extra-scriptural concept of a type of minimal 
theology, his idea that religious truth is not confined to 
the texts of the Vedas, and his argument that knowledge of 
the latter is not necessary for a knowledge of God, all 
mollify the age-old attitudes towards the Vedas. It is also 
relevant to note that Roy adopted an extremely critical view 
of Biblical texts, expunging matters he felt to be irrational. 
He sometimes argued, in fact, that the Vedic texts 
themselves and not only the interpretations of them must 
be subjected to rational analysis. 
22 Rammohun Roy did not 
lay down a detailed set of doctrines for the Brahmo Samaj, 
but his general approach certainly influenced the theological 
evolution of the movement and its formulation of a definite 
stance towards the Vedas. 
In this context, it is interesting to examine the 
conclusions of two subsequent leaders of the Brahmo Samaj on 
Roy's approach to the Vedas. Sivanath Sastri, who joined the 
movement in the early eighteen sixties, partnered Keshub 
Chandra Sen in the break with Debendranath Tagore in 
1866, and became the spiritual leader of the revolt against 
Keshub in 1878, is critical of Roy' s use of the Vedas. He 
sees Roy's reliance on the texts as vitiating his protest 
against idolatry. Over seventy-five years after Rarnrnohun' s 
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death in England, Sastri writes, 
Proceeding on the strict lines of the Shastras, he could 
not but concede to his adversaries that the old scriptures 
tolerated idolatrous practices as an inferior kind of 
culture necessary for the ignorant and innocuous in the 
case of the wise. The admission of this principle 
largely neutralized the effects of his earnest protest 
against the idolatry of his countrymen; and as a consequence 
the Brahmo Samaj long remained only as a meeting place 
of a number of educated and influential persons who 
intellectually sympathised with the doctrine of 
monotheism, but practically adhered to all the 
idolatrous rites in private life. 23 
Keshub Chandra Sen is very critical of the exclusion of all 
but brahmins from hearing the recitation of the Vedas, 
during the services of the Samaj in Roy's time. It was an 
inconsistent anomaly in his eyes and militated against the 
universalistic ideals of the church. 
24 In spite of Keshub's 
suspicions about Rammohun's reverence for the Vedas and his 
censuring of the Hindu image which the Samaj projected under 
Roy's guidance, he warns against concluding that Roy maintained 
an orthodox view of the texts. 
We must not however rush to the extreme of supposing that 
Ram Mohun Roy was a thorough Vedantist, and that he 
offered implicit obedience to the authority of the Vedas 
as the infallible scriptures of God. All that we could 
gather from his published writings tends to prove that 
his idea of revelation was catholic, that he measured the 
inspiration of the so-called scriptures by the truths 
which they inculcated. Hence he attached great value 
and importance to the Christian scriptures, and he 
published a compilation entitled, "The precepts of Jesus, 
the guide to Happiness", for the welfare of his countrymen. 
We are therefore led to the inference that Ram Mohun Roy 
availed himself of the authority of the Vedas for 
emancipating his countrymen from the yoke of Puranic 
idolatry, not from an absolute belief of those ancient 
books having come from God himself, but on account of the 
sublime truths they set forth with all the weight of 
acknowledged authority on the unity of the Godhead and 
the spirituality of true worship. 25 
238 
6.3 Debendranath Tagore 
The watershed in the attitude of the Brahmo Samaj to the 
Vedas came under the leadership of Debendranath Tagore 
(1817-1905). A definite stand was taken and the infallibility 
of the Vedas formally rejected. This was perhaps the 
turning-point also in the general status of these texts in the 
ensuing history of modern Hinduism. 
26 Debendranath was born 
in Calcutta in 1817. He received his early education in a 
school founded by Rammohun Roy. In 1834 he obtained admission 
to the Hindu College where he spent about four years, before 
joining his father, Dwarkanath Tagore, a close associate of 
Rammohun Roy, in the family business. 
27 Debendranath was of 
a contemplative turn of mind and the death of his grandmother, 
to whom he was deeply attached, aroused in him deep sorrow and 
an aversion to wealth and enjoyment. A chance encounter with 
the Isä Upanishad brought relief to his inner turmoil, and with 
great zeal he took up the study of the Upanishads. In 1839 
Debendranath founded the Tattvabodhini Sabha for propagating the 
ideas of the Upanishads. To carry out the objectives of 
the Sabha, the Tattvabodhini Pathsala, a school for the 
training of the young, was established in 1840, and a monthly 
journal, the Tattvabodhini Patrika, started in 1843. 
Akshaykumar Datta, who proved to be an important influence on 
Debendranath and indeed on the whole movement, was a teacher 
at this school and editor of the journal. The relations 
between the vigorous Sabha and the Samaj, which was in a 
state of decline after Roy's departure for England, were 
extremely close. The Tattvabodhini Sabha served as the 
organizational wing of the Brahmo Samaj, finally merging 
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with the latter in 1859.28 The assumption of leadership by 
Debendranath initiated a new phase in the growth of the 
Samaj. There was a rapid increase in the power and influence 
of the Brahmo movement. New rituals and ceremonies were 
added, the most important being a special form of initiation 
for membership. 
Debendranath followed Rammohun Roy in his belief that 
original Hinduism was a spiritual theism and that the 
Upanishads were its source. The spark that led to a change 
of this view was ignited, strangely enough, as a result of 
controversy over missionary proselytization. In 1845, the 
Hindus of Calcutta were aroused and incensed by the 
conversion to Christianity of Umesh Chandra Sarkar and his 
young wife, and a movement in opposition to Dr. Alexander 
Duff's school, where Umesh was a student, was launched. 
Duff's work on India and Indian Missions, which appeared 
at that time, was assailed in the pages of the Tattvabodhini 
Patrika. Duff responded by denouncing the doctrines of the 
Samaj in the Calcutta Review, fixing his fury on the idea 
of the infallibility of the Vedas. 
29 The initial response 
of the Samaj was to defend the concept. 
We will not deny that the reviewer is correct in remarking 
that we consider the Vedas and the Vedas alone, as the 
authorized rule of Hindu theology. They are the sole 
foundation of all our beliefs and the truths of all other 
Shastras must be judged of according to their agreement 
with them. What we consider as revelation is contained 
in the Vedas alone; and the last part of our holy 
Scriptures treating of the final dispensation of 
Hinduism forms what is called Vedanta. 30 
This categorical public declaration of adherence to Vedic 
infallibility soon provoked dissent and unease within the 
Samaj and also found expression in its columns. Akshaykumar 
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Datta, the editor of the Tattvabodhini Patrika was the leading 
dissident, and it is generally accepted that it was under his 
influence that Debendranath and the Samaj discarded the 
notion of infallibility. 
It is important to briefly consider Datta's religious 
views, because his linking of religion and science became a 
constantly reiterated theme throughout the period, and salient 
in Vivekananda' s thought. His notion of natural religion 
was also prominent. 
31 Datta (1820-1886) posited a deistic 
concept of God as the supreme watchmaker, who created a 
purposeful universe. God's plan for the universe is 
apprehended through the discovery of natural laws which 
reveal the unity and interrelatedness of all phenomena. 
The approach to God was not through worship or monism but 
through the study of the natural sciences. A complete 
understanding of these natural laws or "God's scripture" 
reveals the harmony of all things. The logic of this thinking 
led him to reject Vedanta as the revealed source of the 
Brahmo Samaj. Because of his belief in natural laws, he 
felt that the emphasis in the Brahmo Samaj should be less 
on national character and more on the religious impulses 
common to all men. In this way it could offer itself to the 
world as a scientifically constructed natural religion. 
his own way, Datta was developing the embryonic theme of 
Rammohun which was further enlarged by Keshub. Sastri is 
of the opinion that Datta's arguments against Vedic 
infallibility had wide support in the Samaj. 
32 
In 
As part of his effort to ascertain the truth of the issue, 
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Debendranath sent four Brahmin youths to Benares to study the 
Vedas. His own visit to that city in 1847 was partly in 
pursuit of the same inquiry. 
33 
In 1850 the doctrine of 
infallibility was finally abolished. 
34 
In order, however, 
to keep the movement along the lines of Upanishadic 
monotheism, Debendranath published in 1850 a compilation of 
carefully selected passages from the Upanishads entitled, 
Brahmo Dharma. Perhaps the main cause which led Debendranath 
to the final rejection of the authority of the Upanishads 
was his refusal to accept those passages proclaiming the 
identity of ätman and brahman. Earlier, Ramrnohun Roy had 
also refused to accept this identification. He preferred 
to treat brahman as the Lord and Regulator of the cosmos, 
related to the soul as Its superintendent. Both the 
soul and the universe depend on God for existence. 
35 In 
a revealing passage of his autobiography, worthy of being 
quoted in full, Debendranth writes, 
How strange. Formerly I did not know of the existence of 
this thorny tangle of Upanisads: only eleven Upanisads 
were known to me, with the help of which I started the 
propagation of Brahma Dharma, making its foundation. But 
now I saw that even this foundation was shaky and built 
upon sand; even here I did not touch firm ground. First 
I went back to the Vedas, but could not lay the foundation 
of the Brahma Dharma there then I came back to the 
eleven authentic Upanisads? 6 but how unfortunate, even 
there I could not lay the foundation. Our relation with 
God is that of worshipper and worshipped-this is the 
very essence of Brahmoism. When we found the opposite 
conclusion to this arrived at in Shankaracharya's Sarirak 
mimamsa of the Vedanta Darsana we could no longer place 
any confidence in it; nor could we accept it as a support 
of our religion. I had thought that if I renounced the 
Vedanta Darsana and accepted the eleven Upanisads only, 
I would find support for Brahmanism, hence I had relied 
entirely upon these, leaving aside all else. But when in 
the Upanisads I came across, 'I am He' and 'Thou art 
That', then I became disappointed in them also. 37 
Here, one feels, is perhaps the real clue to his rejection of 
scriptural infallibility. 
14L 
Henceforth, the non-authoritative status of any text 
became enshrined in the creed of the Brahmo Samaj. This 
was a tenet adamantly and inflexibly upheld through all the 
fragmentations of the movement in later years. 
38 In the 
absence of any authoritative standard of doctrine, nature and 
intuition became the twin sources of knowledge. 
39 
The basis 
of Brahmoism became, "the pure heart filled with the light 
of intuitive knowledge". 
40 Debendranath became increasingly 
reliant on personal intuition as his authority and the 
concept of divine command (ädesa) played an important part 
in his life. It was also to become an unquestionable source 
of authority with Keshub Chandra Sen. The idea of intuitive 
experience as an immediate source of spiritual knowledge, 
which rose to prominence at this time, became a leading idea 
of the period, and has become a dominant motif in the 
rhetoric of modern Hinduism. In Vivekananda, it became 
associated with the idea of a scientific method of arriving 
at religious verification. 
The rejection of the Vedas as revealed texts paved the 
way for an even more rigorous questioning of accepted 
articles of religious belief and intensified the clamour for 
social reform. Debendranath's more conservative approach 
to the latter led to the first splinter in the Samaj. The 
decision to reject scriptural authority was not entirely 
accepted without protest. Rajnarian Bose, for example, an 
early associate of Tagore, was not pleased with the decision 
and left the employ of Debendranath. 
41 The strongest voice 
of protest, however, came from Sitanath Tattvabhusan, who 
joined the movement under Keshub Chandra Sen in 1871, and 
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later broke with him to become a member of the Sadharan 
Brahmo Samaj. Sitanath saw the weakness of the movement in 
its lack of any systematic theology. It is extremely 
interesting also that all efforts of the Brahmo Samaj to 
establish and maintain a regular theological school ended in 
failure. 42 Sitanath, with remarkable insight, saw the 
tenuous and feeble basis of the appeals to natural religion 
and intuition and the impossibility of arriving at any 
philosophical consensus through these. 
43 The rejection of 
the Vedas by Debendranath, he felt, had led to a neglect of 
the scriptures and positively discouraged scholarship. He 
wanted a movement back to the Upanishadic-based Vedänta. 
Unfortunately, voices like Sitanath's, appealing for 
systematization, refinement and clarity of doctrine were 
solitary ones. Within the movement itself Sitanath was 
decried as an advocate of barren intellectualism and scholas- 
ticism. He was branded as a reactionary who wanted to abolish 
the spontaneity of the religious life and suspend the right 
to private judgement. 
44 The opposition to any systematic 
and methodical approach to doctrine went hand in hand with 
the accentuation of the importance of the intuitive experience. 
It is another legacy to modern Hinduism, where the emphasis 
is very often upon the lack of a necessity for any belief 
in doctrine or dogma. This was an outstanding argument in 
Vivekananda's presentation of Hinduisr to the West. 
nebendranath, as mentioned before, adopted a very 
conservative attitude on questions of social reform. In 
fact, he saw the mission of the l3rahmo Samaj as a narrowly 
defined religious one, and felt that in natters of social 
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reform, individual tastes and inclinations should prevail. 
This approach conflicted with the demands of the younger and 
radically-minded members of the Samaj and led to the first 
split in 1866. This group wanted the movement to actively 
promote inter-caste marriage and widow re-marriage. They 
were opposed to the wearing of the sacred thread. There was 
also a division of opinion over the quality and extent of 
female education, many of the younger members advocating 
the ideal of complete social equality. In the vanguard of 
this progressive party was Keshub Chandra Sen (1838-1884). 
6.4 Keshub Chandra Sen 
Sen was born in a Vaishnava family of Calcutta and 
educated at the Hindu College. Keshub's western education 
had eroded his childhood religious beliefs and created a 
void which left him restless and searching. He sought 
solace in Unitarian philosophy and the writings of Theodore 
Parker and established the Goodwill Fraternity in 1857. It 
was at a gathering of this society in the same year that 
he first met Debendranath. There was a mutual attraction and 
Keshub was soon active in the Brahmo Samaj. He was an 
enthusiastic worker and largely responsible for the 
reinvigoration of the movement and its attraction to the 
young. His tour in 1864 to the Presidencies of Madras and 
Bombay facilitated the expansion of the Samaj as an all- 
India movement. After the schism in 1866 he became the 
leader of the Brahmo Samaj of India. The section under 
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Debendranath called itself the Adi (original) Brahmo Samaj. 
In Keshub's eyes, the rejection of the Vedas as inspired 
texts was a grand step in the evolution of the Samaj. Before 
this, it was simply revivalist in intention. In a sermon 
delivered during his English visit at the Mill-Hill Chapel 
in Leeds on August 28th, 1870, Keshub contrasted the two stages 
of the Brahmo Samaj. 
For twenty years the movement was carried on in that 
spirit, based all the time upon the national Scriptures 
of the Hindoos. The same God that lifted this noble 
band of Hindoos out of the darkness of superstition and 
idolatry, the same God, led them further onward and 
heavenward, until they gave up completely and thoroughly 
the doctrine of the inspiration of the Vedas. They took 
a broader and more unexceptionable basis; they went into 
their own hearts in order to hear the voice of God, and 
they went forth throughout the amplitudes of nature in 
order to study in silence the direct revelation of God's 
spirit. Thus the Hindoo Pantheists became Hindoo 
Theists. They embraced pure monotheism, such as was 
not confined to Hindoo books, to the Scriptures of their 
own countrymen, but was to be found in human nature in 
all the races and tribes and nations in the world. 45 
Keshub wanted to sever all links between the Brahmo Samaj 
of India and Hinduism. The Hindu image of the movement under 
Debendranath was a point of contention. When the Brahmo 
Samaj of India proposed in 1872 a Marriage Reform Bill, the 
Adi Samaj argued that the bill would lead to the separation 
of the Brahmos from the general body of Hindus. Keshub 
interestingly countered this by rejoining that Brahmos were 
already not Hindus, using non-belief in the Vedas as the 
dividing line. 46 
Of all the leaders of the Brahmo Samaj, Keshub has left 
the largest legacy of speeches and writings, some of which 
contain very clear pronouncements on the nature of revelation 
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and sources of religious knowledge. The problem with 
Keshub, as with other Brahmo leaders, is the unsystematic and 
often contradictory quality of his thought, a reflection 
perhaps of the paradoxical times in which they lived. 
47 
In a lecture delivered at the Town Hall in Calcutta on 
September 28th, 1866, Keshub propounds what amounts to be a 
general theory of revelation. 
48 According to Keshub, the 
primary and ordinary revelation of God, accessible and 
intelligible to all, is His self-evident manifestation in 
nature. 
The universe exhibits on 
of design and beauty, of 
cannot explain except by 
First Cause, the Creator 
object in nature reminds 
heart in spontaneous rev 
majesty. 49 
all sides innumerable marks 
adaptation and method, which we 
referring them to an Intelligent 
of this vast universe. Each 
us of its Maker, and draws the 
erence to His infinite 
Nature, however, does not only reveal God as her Creator, 
comparable to a watchmaker who has invested his object with 
independent powers of functioning. It also reveals His 
immanent function of sustaining and preserving and His 
goodness in supplying daily needs. 
Behold the Supreme Creator and Ruler of the universe - 
infinite in wisdom, power and goodness - immanent in 
matter, upholding it, and quickening all its movements, 
and mercifully dispensing joy and blessings to all His 
children. Such is the revelation of nature. 50 
In two lectures delivered the following year at the 
Calcutta Brahmo School, Keshub repeats this argument. Here 
however, he distinguishes between the importance of external 
nature and internal nature as sources of theological knowledge, 
and as an example of the inconsistency of his thinking, external 
nature is here undervalued as a type of revelation. 
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There is nothing in matter itself, not even all the power 
and wisdom it manifests, which can lead us to the True 
God, whose spiritual nature, intelligence, personality, 
and holiness can only be deduced from the facts of our 
consciousness. 51 
Here, as the quotation suggests, the mind is eulogised as the 
instrument of revelation. Theology, Keshub claims here, is 
essentially dependent on psychology, and the doctrines and 
arguments of religion are derived primarily from the 
constitution of the human mind. 
The value and importance of the mind as an object of 
speculation through which we obtain a knowledge of the 
fundamental principles and main arguments of religion 
cannot be over-estimated. To what source are we to 
refer but to the human mind for our ideas of God, 
immortality and duty, and where do we seek for their 
proof but in the mind? 52 
It is obvious that Keshub was not consistent in the 
significance which he attributed to the different forms of 
revelation. After the revelation of God in nature, the 
next in Keshub's typology is what he calls, God in history. 
History, he contends, is not the mere chronicle of past 
events, but if read properly is full of religious significance 
displaying the workings of Providence. The manner in which 
53 God reveals Himself in history is through "Great Men" . 
For what is history but the record of the achievements 
of those extraordinary personages who appear from time 
to time and lead mankind? and what is it that we read 
therein but the biography of such men?. . It is through 
these great men, these leaders of mankind, that God 
reveals Himself to us in history: in short, they 
constitute what we mean by "God in history". 54 
He sees "Great Men" as the apostles and missionaries of God, 
owing their talents and success not to personal exertions, 
but to an inherently superior constitution endowed by God. 
Keshub is scrupulous, however, in distinguishing his 
"Great Men" theory from the Hindu notion of the 
avatära and the Christian concept of incarnation. 
55 With 
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him, it is not a case of the perfection of divinity embodied 
in a mortal frame, the God of the universe in a human body. 
It is God manifest in man, "not God made man but God in man". 
These extraordinary men, who are representative of their 
country and age and also of specific ideas, are born as a 
result of a moral necessity in times of crisis and turmoil. 
They are characterized by originality of wisdom, sincerity, 
invincible power and selflessness. 
56 
Christ commands 
a special regard from Keshub, but he pleads for reverence and 
honour to all dispensations. 
And though Jesus Christ, the Prince of Prophets, effected 
greater wonders, and did infinitely more good to the world 
than the others, and deserves therefore our profoundest 
reverence, we must not neglect that chain, or any single 
link in that chain, of prophets that preceded him, and 
prepared the world for him; nor must we refuse honour 
to those who, coming after him, have carried on the 
blessed work of human regeneration for which he lived 
and died. 57 
In comparison with the final and highest category of 
revelation, the first two types, according to Keshub, are 
merely external. Inspiration, is the loftiest. It is 
direct communion with the spirit of God, vouchsafed only 
through His mercy, and its effect on the human person are 
total. It is in Keshub's own words, 
the direct breathing-in of God's spirit - which infuses 
an altogether new life into the soul, and exalts it above 
all that is earthly and impure. It is more powerful, 
being God's direct and immediate action on the human soul, 
while the revelation made through physical nature and 
biography is indirect and mediate. 58 
It is very significant that in this lecture, where we are 
provided with Keshub's most detailed statements pertaining to 
revelation, no mention is made of any text and scripture as 
revelation, as these have no place in his scheme. 
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There are three tendencies in Keshub's writings and 
lectures which have very important implications for our 
study of the changing status of scriptural authority and 
for our understanding of salient orientations in modern 
Hinduism. The first of these is his powerful invective 
against the importance of dogma and doctrine. These were 
seen to relate to intellectual cognition, reasoning and 
logical thought, all of which were cold and lifeless, in 
contrast to the "fire of inspiration" and "direct communion 
with God". The former processes had nothing to do with the 
attainment of salvation. The following quotation will suffice, 
as it is typical of his outbursts on this point. 
Do not preach to me dogmas and traditions; talk not of 
saving my soul by mere theological arguments and 
inferences. These I do not want; I want the living 
God, that I may dwell in Him, away from the battle of 
the world. 59 
It is interesting to compare Keshub's aversion for doctrine 
with his criticism of Rammohun Roy, only three years earlier. 
In this article Keshub is reviewing the growth of the Samaj 
and its structure under Roy's leadership. Compare the 
following quotation with the one above. 
The creed was of no consequence, unity in faith was not 
demanded except only in the idea of the Godhead; community 
of worship was all in all; such a baseless and incomplete 
system cannot last long: worship must be sustained by 
knowledge and faith and love, congregational worship must 
find its life in community of dogmatic faith. This is an 
inevitable moral necessity-60 
The second tendency, a direct consequence of the first, is 
his repudiation of all forms of authority, a type of spiritual 
anarchism. The claim was made that the Samaj was free from 
61 
teachers, priests, books, ceremonies and rites. The third, 
and most important tendency in his thought, is his stress on 
direct perception as the means for gaining spiritual knowledge, 
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foreshadowing an argument that rose to prestigious 
significance in Vivekananda. Keshub sees the direct 
perception approach as a most familiar topic of the 
Upanishads. 
No expression is more frequently used in the Upanishads 
than the "perception" of God (darshan). It appears that 
Hindu sages, not content with intellectual conceptions 
of the Almighty or abstract contemplation of certain 
Divine attributes, sought earnestly and indeed successfully, 
to behold the Supreme Spirit directly and to apprehend 
Him as a distinct and vivid Reality in their inner 
consciousness. 62 
This certainty, Keshub contends, which arises from the 
direct perception or realization of reality, is comparable to 
the assuredness arising from the sensual apprehension of 
objects around us. It is a self-evident truth, the only 
satisfactory kind of proof. 
The Real God is seen as plainly as we see ourselves 
and the world. We must place our belief in God upon 
direct evidence or eyesight. I will apply the same 
demonstration in reference to God as we do to material 
objects. All arguments a priori or a posteriori are 
feeble. 63 
In 1878, the Brahmo Samaj underwent its second schism. 
This time the rebellion was against Keshub and the causes 
were many. 
64 It is interesting that many of the issues 
which provoked the first rift were still very much alive, 
and on this occasion Keshub was the accused. Sen's ideas on 
female education and emancipation were seen as being 
retrograde. He was opposed to university education for 
women and their exposure to subjects like mathematics, 
philosophy and science. He feared that they would lose 
their sexual identity. He refused the demand of some members 
that their wives should be at their sides during Samaj services. 
There was opposition also to Keshub's authoritarian management 
of affairs and a demand for constitutional government and 
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public control of the Samaj property. There was a deep 
suspicion about Keshub's own perception of his role in the 
movement and the attitude of hero worship which was growing 
around him. Keshuh was giving increasing prominence to the 
idea of having received a special dispensation from God and 
the fact that his decisions with regard to the movement were 
above question, being motivated by ädesa (divine command). 
6 7' 
From 1875 onwards, Keshub began to emphasize the importance 
of asceticism in the religious life, giving prominence to 
meditation and withdrawal from the world. The social reform 
and welfare-oriented activities of the movement fell into 
neglect. The issue, however, which inallv precipitated 
the split, was Keshub's consent to the marriage between his 
eldest daughter and the young Maharaja of Cooch Behar, in 
violation of the principles of the Marriage Act of lß'72, 
and in spite of considerable protest within the Sarºaj. Both 
had not attained the varriageahle aqe stipulated by the Act, 
and the rites were non-Brahmo. The schism led to the 
formation on "say 15th, 1878, of the gadharan ßrahrlo Samaj. 
One year later Keshub inaugurated the Nava Vicdhan or "Tew 
Dispensation. 
The launching of the New nispensation was motivated by 
Keshub's conviction that he was inspired by a new revelation 
from (od, the special feature of which was to harmonize and 
unify all conflicting creeds. It was not, he claimed, his 
intention to form a new sect. 
It is the harmony of all scriptures, and prophets and 
dispensations. It is not an isolated creed, but the 
science which binds and explains and harmonizes all 
relicjions. It gives to history a meaning, to the action 
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of Providence a consistency, to quarrelling churches a 
commond bond and to successive dispensations a 
continuity... It is the wonderful solvent, which fuses 
all dispensations into a new chemical compound. It is 
the mighty absorbent, which absorbs all that is good and 
true and beautiful in the objective world-66 
The Nava-Vidhan did not alter Sen' s attitude to the 
scriptures even though his views on the necessity of 
authority in religious matters were dramatically reversed. 
He strongly, for example, refuted deism because of its 
disavowal of authority in religion. 
67 
In one of the most 
revealing pieces of writing belonging to this period, 
Keshub expounds what the New Dispensation understands by the 
concept of revelation. 
68 
His illustrations here, as in 
most of his speeches and writings, are drawn from the 
Christian tradition, but it is fair to assume that his views 
are applicable to the scriptures of other traditions as well. 
He draws a distinction between the New Dispensation and 
Deism, claiming that the former, unlike the latter, does 
not deny revelation, but reserves the right to interpret it 
in its own way. This interpretation is based on a contrast 
between the inspiration of words and the inspiration of 
events. The former is categorically denied. 
That a book has come down to us from heaven, cut and dry, 
containing lessons for our guidance and salvation, we do 
not believe. As a meteor falls from heavens, even so 
dropped a dazzling gospel-light! This story is too 
fantastic for our credence. Inspiration is not an ethereal 
rainbow delusion like that. It is real; it is solid. 
It is neither a written nor a printed book. Nor is it a 
voice behind the clouds speaking like thunder unto entire 
nations through their accredited prophet-leaders. We 
wholly disbelieve in the inspiration of words written or 
words spoken. Neither in the pen nor in the lips can there 
be inspiration. 69 
Events alone, according to Keshub, are inspired and revealed. 
In this sense, both the Old and New Testaments and the leading 
figures of its drama are inspired. By revelation, he means, 
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the living history not the dead narrative; the fresh 
events as they occured, not the lifeless traditions 
recorded on paper. The letter killeth. Convert a 
saint into a beautiful picture on canvas, convert living 
apostles into antiquated doctrines', transform living 
events into lifeless ceremonies, and burning enthusiasm 
into the cold dogmatism of books and creeds, and you 
kill inspiration. What you read in the Bible was 
inspired. It would be incorrect to say that the Bible 
is inspired. Inspiration dwells in the fact-Bible 
not in the book-Bible, in the living Gospel, not in the 
letter of the book. 70 
The effect of this kind of view was to further reduce 
the significance of the scriptural text. The unique claim 
of any scripture was dissolved in the unbounded eclecticism 
of Keshub's thought. In fact, the scriptures of Nava- 
Vidhan included, "the whole of science, physical, meta- 
physical and moral and also the science of religion". 
71 
Keshub continued the trend noted earlier, especially with 
A. K. Datta in the time of Debendranath Tagore, of attempting 
to justify his religious experiments in the name of science. 
The special mission of the New-Dispensation to unite all 
creeds was proclaimed as scientific, for "science and salvation" 
were identical, and its enemies were not atheists but 
"unscientific men". Its truths, Keshub argued, were 
demonstrable for they were based upon observation and 
experiment and the movement was ready to expunge any tenet 
falsified by scientific discoveries. 
72 
Strange also, but 
perhaps not surprising, was his attempt to justify the 
Nava-Vidhan on the authority of Shankara. The latter was 
seen as fore-shadowing the Nava-Vidhan which Keshub described 
as a "New Shankaracharya, loftier and grander far than the 
Old Shankara". 
73 
Of all the leaders so far considered, Keshub is significant 
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as being the most influential of his times. He is important 
in any consideration of Vivekananda's thought, for the latter 
had also imbibed the legacy of Brahmoism. Early in his 
career, Vivekananda was active in the circles of the Brahmo 
Samaj. He was a member of Keshub's Band of Hope, and acted 
on stage at the side of Keshub. 
74 Along with Ramakrishna, 
Keshub was probably the strongest moulding force in shaping 
Vivekananda's thought. 75 It is perhaps by no means 
inexplicable that Vivekananda first approached Ramakrishna 
with a strong scepticism of texts and doctrines, searching 
for someone who had personal experience of reality and who 
could lead him to such direct experience himself. This was 
the only kind of proof, which as we have seen, Keshub 
thought imperative and accepted as valid. 
6.5 Ramakrishna 
At the time of Keshub's death in January 1884, the centre 
of religious attention in Calcutta had already shifted to 
Ramakrishna, who had taken up abode in the Kali temple at 
Dakshineshwar. It was Keshub, in fact, who brought Ramakrishna 
to public attention. Since their first meeting in 1875, a 
close relationship had developed between both men, and it 
is often claimed that Ramakrishna exercised considerable 
influence on Keshub's thinking, many of the ideas of the 
New Dispensation being attributed to him. Primarily through 
Vivekananda and the Ramakrishna Mission founded in 1897, 
Ramakrishna, like the Brahmo Samaj, has exercised a considerable 
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influence on the character of modern Hinduism. Our 
primary concern being his attitude to scriptural authority, 
only the briefest biographical details are necessary here. 
76 
Ramakrishna was born in a poor Brahmin family of 
Kamarpukur, a village about seventy miles from Calcutta, on 
February 18th, 1836. He seemed endowed with an extremely 
sensitive temperament and frequently experienced trance-like 
states of unconsciousness, once when struck by the 
spectacular contrast between a flock of white swans flying 
against the background of a dark band of clouds, and again 
while enacting the role of Siva during a Siva-rätri 
festival. Rarnakrishna, then known by his childhood name of 
Gadadhar, was averse to formal education, and his eldest 
brother Ramkumar, who ran a Sanskrit school in Calcutta, took 
him to the city hoping to reform his attitudes. Ramkumar 
failed in this task, but Gadadhar became his assistant in 
performing the rituals of worship in several Calcutta homes 
where he served as family priest. When in 1855 Rani Rasmani, 
a wealthy Calcutta widow who built a temple dedicated to 
the Goddess Kali, had difficulties in securing the services 
of a brahmin priest because of her low caste status, Ramkumar 
accepted the offer and Gadadhar, after an initial reluctance, 
also took up residence there. Here also, he became his 
brother's acolyte, and when the latter died suddenly in 
1856, Gadadhar became the temple priest. He entered into 
the worship of Kali with characteristic intensity and passion, 
yearning for a vision of the Goddess. The agony and 
culminating ecstasy of his experience is best described in 
his own words. 
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There was then an intolerable anguish in my heart 
because I could not have Her vision. Just as a man 
wrings a towel forcibly to squeeze out all the water 
from it, I felt as if somebody caught hold of my heart 
and mind and was wringing them likewise. Greatly 
afflicted with the thought that I might never have 
Mother's vision, I was in great agony. I thought that 
there was no use in living such a life. My eyes 
suddenly fell upon the sword that was there in the 
Mother's temple. I made up my mind to put an end to 
my life with it that very moment. Like one mad, I 
ran and caught hold of. it, when suddenly I had the 
wonderful vision of Mother and fell down unconscious. 
I did not know what happened then in the external world 
- how that day and the next slipped away. But, in my 
heart of hearts, there was flowing a current of intense 
bliss, never experienced before, and I had the immediate 
knowledge of the Light that is Mother. 77 
Ramakrishna's intense spiritual life aroused fears 
concerning his sanity and his mother implored him to return 
to his village, hoping that marriage might lead to a more 
settled and normal course of life. Accordingly, in May 
1859, he was married to Saradamani, who eventually became 
known as the Holy Mother, and assumed an important role in 
the Mission's activities after his death. In 1860 
Ramakrishna returned to Dakshineshwar temple, practising 
over the next few years various forms of sädhana. Under 
the guidance of Bhairavi Brahmani, a female ascetic, he 
went through the disciplines of Tantra. Incidentally, it 
was Bhairavi who proclaimed him an avatära and made efforts 
to have him accepted as such. Ramakrishna was also initiated 
into the study and practice of Advaita Vedänta by a wandering 
monk, Tota Puri, a phase claimed to be the climax of his 
sädhana. He is also said to have been exposed to the 
Christian and Islamic paths. 
78 Ramakrishna soon settled into 
the role of spiritual mentor to a large body of disciples who 
gathered around him, venturing only occasionally from his 
abode in the Dakshineshwar temple. He died of throat cancer 
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on August 16th, 1886. 
Ramakrishna's instructions as a spiritual teacher covers 
a wide variety of subjects, and we have selected for 
analysis only those which are relevant to our understanding 
of his attitude to the scriptures. 
79 
His antipathy to formal 
education has already been noted. He felt that it was useful 
only for prosperity in the world and this was an often 
repeated theme of his talks. Two of his favourite parables 
centred on this idea. Learned men were compared by him to 
kites and vultures which soared to great heights in the sky 
but whose eyes were forever focused on the decaying 
carcasses below. They were also likened to foolish men in 
a mango orchard who counted the leaves and fruits and 
argued to estimate their value, instead of plucking and 
relishing the juicy fruits. Along with this strong censure 
of the pedantic mind, he attributed little importance to 
reason and intellect in the religious life. 
80 He often, 
however, qualified this denunciation by praising knowledge 
which led to mental purification. 
In terms of the actual role of the scriptures, he drew the 
parallel with a geographical map. Sacred books, he contended, 
only point the way to God. 
81 The maximum that one can derive 
from a study of the scriptures is a feeling that God exists. 
82 
At times he was even more pessimistic about what could be 
accomplished by textual studies. The scriptures are diluted, 
containing as he puts it, a "mixture of sand and sugar", 
difficult to distinguish and separate. Their essence is 
much better learnt from a spiritual teacher. 
83 They were 
of no use in conveying the feeling of God. 
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This feeling is something very different from book- 
learning. Books, scriptures and science appear as mere 
dirt and straw after the realization of God. 84 
There is also the implication in Ramakrishna that the Vedas 
are by no means unique, for there are many other such texts. 
85 
Direct vision of God was the central idea of his entire 
instruction. It was the only form of verification. 
But seeing is far better than hearing. Then all 
doubts disappear. It is true that many things are 
recorded in the scriptures; but all these are useless 
without the direct realization of God, without devotion 
to His Lotus Feet, without purity of heart. The almanac 
forecasts the rainfall of the year. But not a drop of 
water will you get by squeezing the almanac. No, not 
even one drop. 86 
The awakening of the kundalini in the state of sämadhi, 
alone led to n-ana (knowledge), and the realization of 
brahman. 87 
It is interesting to look at the references to Shankara 
in the conversations of Ramakrishna. One expects to find 
significant mention of Shankara, in the light of his 
tuition under Tota Puri, a member of one of the ten 
monastic orders founded by Shankara. 
88 
There are however, 
only six references to Shankara in Gupta's recordings. Five 
of these relate, with minor variations, an unflattering 
incident in Shankara's life. One day, after emerging from 
a bath in the Ganges, Shankara was accidentally brushed by 
an untouchable. Shankara reproached the man, who then 
suprisingly questioned him on the nature of his identification 
with the body. The pure Self, argued the untouchable, neither 
touches nor is touched. In the sixth reference, Ramakrishna 
uses Shankara to illustrate the example of a 'nani who 
retains his sense of ego for the purposes of instructing 
others. 
2 t) 
The very few references to Shankara in Ramakrishna's 
conversations raises the important question concerning the 
sources of Ramakrishna's ideas. It is a matter well worth 
examination in view of Ramakrishna's cardinal place in the 
modern revival of Hinduism. Unfortunately, critical 
studies of Ramakrishna's thought are few and the work of 
W. G. Neevel Jr. is perhaps the only attempt to explore 
this question. 
89 Neevel does not specifically investigate 
Ramakrishna's attitude to the Vedas, but raises questions 
and suggests answers which shed light on this problem. He 
goes into great details of examination of textual sources, 
but the principal lines of his argument are well worth 
outlining here. Neevel reiterates the point already noted 
about Ramakrishna's disregard for philosophical and 
theological deliberations and his devaluation of the role 
of reason. He contrasts this with the systematic presentation 
of his ideas by Vivekananda as a reinterpretation of Shankara. 
Neevel suggests that this methodic arrangement was a response 
to the foreign audience which Vivekananda sought to reach. 
Swami Vivekananda and the succeeding Rämakrishna 
missionaries were concerned to present the Hindu tradition 
and Sri Rämakrishna's message in a manner most 
comprehensible and appealing to Americans and Europeans. 
The Upanisads and the Veddnta school of religious thought 
(darsana) based upon them had already found ready 
acceptance and praise, especially within certain 
non-traditional and non-Christian circles. Moreover, the 
currency of transcendental idealism and vitalistic 
monism within Western philosophy provided a ready basis 
for an acceptance of the profundity of Shankaräcärya's 
idealistic non-dualism (advaita). Since Sri Rämakrishna 
held such a widely inclusive Hindu position, it was not at 
all difficult to emphasize or highlight the more appealing 
and acceptable Vedäntic and advaitic aspects of his 
teachings . 90 
By contrasting the standard biographies of Ramakrishna with 
earlier historical evidence, Neevel calls into question the 
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systematic arrangement of Ramakrishna's sädhana. This is 
usually presented in an orderly sequence from certain 
preliminary forms of discipline to the pivot of his non-dual 
experience. Neevel's view is that this is a reconstruction, 
derived more from the views of Swami Vivekänanda and the 
later Rämakrishna Mission than from the teachings of Sri Rämakrishna himself. I propose that Saradänanda 
and other official biographers were moved to establish 
this particular order by their conviction that Advaita 
Veddnta is the ultimate expression of religious truth 
and therefore the ultimate and finally satisfying phase 
of Ramakrishna's sadhana. 91 
Neevel's thesis is that the primary influence on 
Ramakrishna' s thought, forming the basic framework through 
which all his later experiences were interpreted, was his 
Tantra sädhana, and that his views are more adequately 
understood in the concepts of T antra than in Shankara's Advaita. 
He proceeds to emphasize several significant differences in 
method and content between Shankara and Ramakrishna, 
illustrating the derivation of the latter from Tantra 
sources. 
92 To the many points of difference argued by 
Neevel, we would also add the important area of attitudes to 
the authority and role of the Vedas. Ramakrishna, 
as we have seen, did not reject outright the authority of 
the scriptures as much as redefine it, and this accords with 
Tantra perceptions of the texts. 
93 The sources of 
Ramakrishna's attitude to the scriptures provide, of course, 
another important clue to the comprehension of Vivekananda's 
position. 
LII 
6.6 The Influence of the Unitarians 
Throughout this period, Unitarian influences were most 
significant in prompting the questioning of scriptural 
authority and also in the formulation of the new attitudes 
which eventually emerged. The Unitarian association with 
the Brahmo Samaj existed from its early beginnings in 
the time of Rammohun Roy, continued through all the 
vissicitudes, and was strong in the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj 
at the close of the nineteenth century. Incidentally, 
Roy died at the Bristol estate of Reverend Lant Carpenter, 
the well known English Unitarian. Fie also corresponded 
with famous American Unitarians like William Ellery Channing 
and Joseph Tuckerman, and had planned to visit America in 
the hope of meeting Channing. 
94 He often referred to 
himself as a Hindu Unitarian. 
95 In the time of Keshub 
Chandra Sen, the American missionary C. H. A. Dall was 
active in the circles of the Samaj, even though both men 
later parted ways as Keshub became less interested in 
soical reform. 
96 As late as 1896, the Sadharan Brahmo 
Samaj was visited by R. J. T. Sunderland, a representative of 
the British and Foreign Unitarian Association. The Brahmo 
Samaj Committee was organized by Sunderland for the annual 
selection of a suitable candidate interested in the 
propagation of Brahmoism, for theological training at the 
Manchester New College of Oxford. Funds for the scholarship 
were provided by an English Unitarian gentleman, and many 
were trained under the scheme. 
97 There were further visits 
by representatives of the same organization 
in 1897 and 1899. 
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The attraction of Unitarianism for Ranmohun Roy was 
perhaps the critique of Trinitarian Christianity it 
provided, which he used in his disputation with the 
missionaries. The entire critique was adopted by the 
Brahmo Sarnaj. Following the Unitarians, the Sanaj objected 
to the doctrine of the Trinity arguing that it subverted 
the unity of God. They felt that Christ ought to be 
regarded. as distinct from and inferior to God and discussed 
the problems of representing him as both human and 9ivine. 
Te was an emissary of God to effect a spiritual regeneration 
of mankind, and his agony and suffering were real. Unitarians 
rejected the idea that Christ's death made God more 
placable and merciful. They also opposed t'e doctrines on 
the natural depravity of man and the predestination of a 
select few for salvation. 
9p 
't'he Unitarian thinkers who exercised the qreatest 
influence on the formation of ßrahno theology were Channing 
and -heodore Parker. The works of both men were wii? e1y 
circulated among Brahmos and the latter's writings . i-re 
translated into Bengali. The strength and extent of the 
influence become very clear when the writings of both men 
are compared particularly with those of the prolific T'eshub 
Chandra Sen. Channing, for exarnnle, does not appear to 
question the existence of a valid scriptural revelation, 
but argues for a wider concept of revelation. 
But we shall err greatly, if we imagine that his Gospel 
is the only licht, that every ray cores to us from a single 
gook, that no splendours issue from God's TIorks and 
Providence, that we have no teacher in religion rut t'-ie 
few pages hound up in our Bibles. Jesus Christ care, 
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not only to give us his peculiar teaching, but to 
introduce us to the imperishable lessons which God for ever furnishes in our own and all Human Experience, 
and in the laws and movements of the Universe-99 
He does not appear to question the significance and status 
of the Bible as revelation, but argues for the thorough 
exercise of reason in its interpretation, for it is a book, 
"written for men, in the language of men, and its meaning is 
to be sought in the same manner as that of other books". 
100 
His concern is with enunciating the principles of its 
right interpretation. Rammohun Roy appears more akin to 
Channing in his attitude to the scriptures, whereas 
Keshub seems to have imbibed his views mainly from Parker, 
who radically rejected any idea of scriptural infallibility 
and argued for the human origin and character of all 
scriptures. 
Laying aside all prejudices, if we look into the 
Bible in a general way, as into any other books, we find 
facts which force the conclusion upon us, that the Bible 
is a human work, as much as the Principia of Newton or 
Descartes, or the Vedas and Koran. Some things are 
beautiful and true, but others no man, in his reason, can 
accept. Here are the works of various writers, from the 
eleventh century before, to the second century after 
Christ, thrown capriciously together, and united by no 
common tie but the lids of the bookbinder. 101 
The alternative forms of revelation suggested by Keshub 
are culled from the writings of Channing and Parker. 
Keshub's views on internal and external nature as revelation 
were earlier affirmed by Channing and his ideas on inspiration 
are a close restatement of Parker's own. The "Infinite", 
according to Channing, is revealed in all things, and 
until we have learnt to see the infinite in nature, we have 
missed a lesson that is continuously taught to us. He 
describes the universe as a symbol of "Infinite Power, 
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Intelligence, Purity, Bliss and Love". 
Nature everywhere testifies to the Infinity of its 
Author. It bears throughout the impress of the 
Infinite. It proclaims a Perfection illimitable, 
unsearchable, transcending all thought and utterance. 
It is modelled and moulded, as a whole and in its 
least molecule, with grandeur, unfathomable intelligence, 
and inexhaustible bounty. This is the glory of the 
universe. And to behold this is to understand the 
universe. 102 
Channing understood internal human nature to be a revelation 
in the sense that man's primary emotions urge a relationship 
with a perfect being. In human nature is wrapped up the idea 
of God, and His image is carried in man's moral and 
intellectual powers. 
Thus we see that human nature is impelled by affections 
of gratitude, esteem, veneration, joy, not to mention 
various others, which prepare us to be touched and 
penetrated by the infinite goodness of God, and which 
when directed to Him, constitute piety. That these 
emotions are designed to be devoted particularly to the 
Creator, we learn from the fact that they are boundless 
in their range and demand an Unbounded Object. They 
cannot satisfy themselves with the degrees of love, 
intelligence, and power which are found in human beings... 
They delight in the infinite, and never can find repose 
but in an Infinite Being, who combines all good. l03 
Parker argues here that inspiration is superior to the 
revelation of God in nature, and is a regular mode of God' s 
operation on the human spirit. It is universal, varying in 
degree not in kind, and its revelation is modified by the 
peculiar circumstances of the individual who receives it. 
It is the direct and intuitive perception of some truth, 
either of thought or of sentiment. There can be but 
one mode of Inspiration: it is the action of the Highest 
within the soul, the divine presence imparting light. 104 
Inspiration, according to Parker, is the only means by which 
we gain knowledge of what is not seen and felt, and it is 
not confined to any single religious tradition, nation or 
age. The variation in the degree of inspiration, however, 
is dependent on the natural intellectual, moral and religious 
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endowment of the individual, as well as upon the use each 
individual makes of this inheritance. It results from the 
faithful use of our faculties; the purer the moral 
character, the loftier and more complete is the inspiration. 
Inspiration, says Parker, can assume a variety of forms, 
modified by the country, character and education of the one 
who receives it. It can motivate action as well as words. 
Parker laments the fact that in modern times men have 
ceased to believe in the possibility of inspiration. It 
is accepted as an experience of the past and guidance is 
sought instead in tradition, "the poor and flickering light 
which we get of the priest". 
The study of Parker's writings throws great light on 
many of Keshub's arguments, and particularly on what he means 
by the intuitive knowledge of God. 
105 It is Parker's 
contention that the institution of religion is founded in 
the very constitution of man's being. The principle in 
man which gives rise to religion is his inborn sense of 
dependence. He argues further that this religious element 
presupposes the existence of its object of satisfaction. 
A natural want in Man's constitution implies satisfaction 
in some quarter, just as the faculty of seeing implies 
something to correspond to this faculty, namely, objects 
to be seen, and a medium of light to see by. As the 
tendency to love implies something lovely for its object, 
so the religious consciousness implies its object. If it 
is regarded as a sense of absolute dependence, it implies 
the absolute on which this dependence rests, independent 
of ourselves . 106 
The knowledge of God then, in Parker's view, is a "spontaneous 
intuition of reason". He argues, as Keshub later does, that 
belief does not depend on any a posteriori or a priori 
argument, but preceded proof and is gained through this, 
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"natural revelation". It is the result of the interaction 
of the intellectual and religious faculties of man. The 
identical argument has been suggested by Keshub. 
107 After 
alluding to the sense of dependence, Keshub concludes, 
When a man feels this dependence then he has proclaimed 
himself a theist. Atheism is impossible. The very 
consciousness of self repudiates atheism. 108 
It is obvious then, that the rejection of Vedic infallibility 
created a gap which the alternative forms or revelation 
suggested by Unitarianism quickly filled. 
Throughout the period under survey, Dayananda Saraswati 
(1824-1883), founder of the Arya Samaj, was the solitary 
champion of Vedic authority and infallibility. Born at 
Kathiawar in the state of Gujarat, Dayananda left home at 
an early age after a dispute with his father over the worship 
of idols and wandered across India for many years before 
finally becoming the disciple of Virajananda, a blind 
samnyasin of Mathura. 
109 He founded the Arya Samaj in 1875 
at Bombay. Belief in the infallibility of the Vedas was the 
cornerstone of all the doctrines of the movement. The four 
Vedas were held by him to be the eternal utterances of God, 
containing all religious truth. This was his major difference 
with the leaders of the Brahmo Samaj, a view which they were 
unsuccessful in getting him to reject. 
110 All Post-Vedic 
developments in Hinduism, contradicted in the Vedas or not 
expressly approved by them, were denounced by Dayananda. 
This view was also extended to other texts of the Hindu 
tradition, and the Puränas, for example, were repudiated by 
him as being false. Dayananda, however did not accord equal 
authoritativeness to all portions of the Vedas. He accorded 
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primacy to the samhitas (hymns) alone. He was positively 
anti-brahminical, attacked the doctrine of caste and like 
the Brahmo Samaj, dismissed the idea of the avatara. 
The Arya-Samaj, however, had a limited impact. At the 
time of Dayananda's death in 1883, the total membership was 
around twenty-thousand, and the movement never really had 
an appeal outside of the Punjab. 
ill Panikkar suggests 
several reasons for this. 
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Dayananda's call for a return 
back to the Vedas involved a denial of all the developments 
of medieval Hinduism which were bitterly opposed by him. 
The Vedic religion was no longer related to the religious 
experiences of the masses and Panikkar feels that Dayananda's 
intolerant attitude towards other religions, especially 
Islam and Christiantiy, even though explicable in the context 
of his times, was inconsistent with Hindu traditions. 
We have traversed a period of over one hundred years in 
our survey of attitudes to scriptural authority from 
Rammohun Roy to Ramakrishna. We have argued that in order 
to be consistent, Rammohun's position compelled him to adopt 
a considerably modified view of Vedic authority, even though 
he did not unambiguously reject the doctrine of Vedic 
infallibility. We sought to demonstrate how many of the 
ideas which influenced his view of the scriptures were made 
more explicit and their implications drawn out in greater 
detail by subsequent leaders of the movement. Of all the 
thinkers we have studied, however, Rammohun Roy strove most 
assiduously to justify his views by resort to scriptural 
authority through interpretation and commentary. With the 
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formal rejection of the authoritativeness of the Vedas 
in the time of Debendranath Tagore, appeals to Vedic 
authority were no longer indispensable, for then intuition 
emerged as the alternative source of religious knowledge. 
The hermeneutical approach was almost totally disregraded, 
a legacy most manifest in the history of modern Hinduism in 
its lack of development in this method. This turning 
point came about in Tagore's time when, in controversy with 
Christian missionaries, the doctrine of infallibility became 
a positive embarassment and dissidents under A. K. Datta 
clamoured for its expurgation. We have seen how Keshub 
Chandra Sen welcomed the decision as the most important 
stride in the doctrinal growth of the Samaj. This direction 
of development continued under Keshub, and the triumph of 
individual intuitive experience over all forms of religious 
authority, may be said to have attained its climax in 
his time. With Keshub, the Brahmo Samaj completed a full 
paradoxical circle. Founded in the name of rationalism, 
it ended with a denial of the role of reason and the intellect 
in the religious quest, upholding personal experience as 
unquestionable and sacrosant. We have noted also the anti- 
dogma argument of Keshub. This most probably had its origin 
in Rammohun's time when, under the barrage of missionary 
criticism, he attempted to prune the unwieldy mass of Hindu 
beliefs, seeking to introduce a definiteness of shape and 
a facility of comprehension, rivalling what he saw as 
positive features of Christianity. With the rejection of 
Vedic infallibility and the introduction of the authority 
of intuitive experience, the anti-doctrinal argument took 
on new meanings. Doctrines became antithetical to 
direct 
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intuitive realization and the importance of the latter was 
argued in contradistinction to the former. 
Ramakrishna's background was different from that of the 
Brahmo Samaj leaders in that he was virtually unexposed to 
Westernizing influences. He was rooted, as we have seen, 
in the traditions of Hinduism, but in the strands which 
emphasized the authority of mystical experience. His claim 
to have had direct personal experience of the truths of 
religion was undoubtedly the most important factor in 
explaining Keshub's attraction to him. In one of those 
strange and consequential coincidences of history, two 
different, but very important and influential figures of 
modern Hinduism, concurred on the supremacy of personal 
spiritual experience and relative scorn of scripture. 
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CHAPTER 7 
VIVEKANANDA'S CONCEPT OF THE NATURE, ROLE 
AND AUTHORITY OF THE VEDAS 
In Chapter 6, our aim was to trace the development of 
attitudes towards scriptural authority and revelation 
during the period from Rammohun Roy to Ramakrishna. We 
discovered, in this interval, an increasing rejection of 
conventional interpretations of the authority of the 
scriptures. We saw Debendranath Tagore formally renouncing 
the authoritative supremacy of the Vedas, and Keshub 
Chandra Sen seeking to establish the sacrosanctity of 
individual intuitive experience over all forms of 
religious authority. Ramakrishna was derogatory and 
cynical about the value of scriptural study, and negative 
in his views about their overall importance. He maintained 
the primacy of direct personal experience. Vivekananda, 
of course, as a direct disciple of Ramakrishna was the 
heir of this legacy. Many of the attitudes of the time 
were given renewed emphasis by him, and some of its mere 
suggestions and outlines were elaborately detailed and 
expanded. 
In the present chapter, we seek to examine the direction 
and development given to this legacy by Vivekananda, and to 
highlight any contrasts with the conclusions we have drawn 
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out from our study of Shankara. In general, our concern 
is to unfold his understanding of the origin of the Vedas, 
the nature and scope of their authority, his principles 
of interpretation, and significant differences of emphasis 
between the views he expressed abroad and those in his 
homeland. 
7.1 The Genesis of the Vedas and the Personal 
Foundations of their Authority 
Perhaps the clearest statements in all of the writings 
and lectures of Vivekananda on the origin of the Vedas and 
the personal basis of their authority occur in his commentary 
on the Yoga-sutras of Patanjali. 
1 Vivekananda comments on 
the sutra, "Pratyakshänumänägamäh pramänäni", which 
enumerates the valid sources of knowledge acceptable to the 
Yoga school of Indian philosophy. Vivekananda renders 
"pramanäni" as "proofs" and translates the sutra, "Direct 
perception, inference, and competent evidence are proofs". 
Pratyaksha, for him, is knowledge directly derived from 
the senses, and this is valid as long as the sense instruments 
are accurate and free from error. Anumäna is the inference 
of a signified object through an appropriate sign. Very 
significantly, the term, "agama", which he first translated 
as "competent evidence", is now given as "Aptavakya". 
2 
The latter, he defines as, "the direct evidence of the Yogis, 
3 
of those who have seen the truth". The difference 
between 
such a person and the ordinary individual 
in the matter of 
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acquiring knowledge is the freedom of the former from the 
effort of intellectualizing. 
Before his mind, the past. the present, and the future 
are alike, one book for him to read; he does not require 
to go through the tedious processes for knowledge we 
have to; his words are proof, because he sees knowledge 
in himself. 4 
Vivekananda distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge or 
truths. Science, according to him, is knowledge derived 
from the application of reason to data acquired through the 
senses. The Vedas, on the other hand, is knowledge acquired 
by the "subtle, supersensuous power of Yoga". 
5 
He considers 
the latter to be valid because it is derived from direct 
perception. 
In his commentary on this sutra, Vivekananda shows a 
certain awareness of the immediate problem of determining 
whether a particular äptaväkya is valid knowledge. He 
proposes therefore, a set of criteria for evaluating the 
authenticity of the äpta and his perceptions. Firstly, 
Vivekananda emphasizes the character of the äpta. Unlike 
other fields of endeavour, where the discovery of truth is 
independent of and not conditional on the moral character of the 
inquirer, here the reverse is true. "No impure man will 
ever have the power to reach the truths of religion" .6 We 
must first ascertain therefore, that the äpta is perfectly 
unselfish and holy. In imparting knowledge, Vivekananda 
advances, we must be clear that the dpta has no motive for 
material gain or acclaim. Secondly, we must be certain that 
he has reached beyond the senses. The content of his 
knowledge should be information unobtainable through the 
application of our senses.? Thirdly, his perceptions should 
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not contradict truths derived from other valid sources of 
knowledge. It should, for example, be immediately 
rejected if it contradicts scientific knowledge. 
Because whatever I see is proof, and whatever you see 
is proof, if it does not contradict any past knowledge. 
There is knowledge beyond the senses, and whenever it 
does not contradict reason and past human experience, 
that knowledge is proof. 8 
Finally, according to Vivekananda, the assertions of the 
pta must have a possibility of verification. The ýipta 
should never claim any singular or unique faculty of 
perception. He must only represent in himself the possibilities 
of all persons and his perceptions must be directly accessible 
to everyone. 
It is these äptas, adds Vivekananda, who are the authors 
of the sacred scriptures and the latter are proof only because 
of this fact. The authority of the scripture is therefore, 
one derived from the personal authority of the äpta. 
Who is a true witness? He is a true witness to whom 
the thing said is a direct perception. Therefore the 
Vedas are true, because they consist of the evidence 
of competent persons. 9 
Vivekananda uses the word, rishi, synonymously with dpta 
and often describes the Vedas as the documentation of their 
perceptions. 
The Vedas are said to be written by the Rishis. The 
Rishis were sages who realised certain facts. The 
exact definition of the Sanskrit word Rishi is a Seer 
of Mantras - of the thoughts conveyed in the Vedic 
hymns. 
These men declared that they had realised - sensed, 
if that word can be used with regard to the superconscious 
- certain facts, and these they proceeded to put on 
record. 10 
This, of course, accords with his view of revelation as, 
"later reports of spiritual discoveries". 
11 It is important 
to note, however, that Vivekananda does not see 
the rishis 
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as creators of the truths advocated by them. Like 
scientists in relation to the natural world, they are only 
discoverers. He characterizes the Vedas as a collection 
of spiritual laws discovered at different times by different 
persons. 
Just as the law of gravitation existed before its 
discovery, and would exist if all humanity forgot it, 
so is it with the laws that govern the spiritual world. 
The moral, ethical, and spiritual relations between 
soul and soul and between spirits and the Father of all 
spirits, were there before discovery, and would remain 
even if we forgot them. 12 
We may briefly note here that these spiritual laws are not 
conceived to be existing anywhere outside, but are described 
by him as, "the eternal laws living in every soul". 
13 
It is to substantiate this claim that he describes the Vedas 
as being "expired" rather than "inspired". 
7.2 The Provisional and Limited Character 
of the Authority of the Vedas 
The nature of the authoritative claim of the Vedas, 
as perceived by Vivekananda, is best illustrated by beginning 
with two analogies which he repeatedly employs. The adequacy 
of the scriptures is compared to the value and utility of 
a map to a traveller, before he visits a country he longs 
to see. 
14 The map, according to Vivekananda, can only create 
curiosity for first-hand knowledge of the place, and can 
communicate a vague conception of its reality. Maps are 
in no way equivalent to the direct knowledge of the country, 
gathered by actually being there. The second analogy to 
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which Vivekananda resorts is the almanac or calendar 
comparison. 
15 
The difference between the knowledge derived 
from a study of the scriptures and true spiritual knowledge 
is compared by him to predictions of rainfall in an almanac 
and actual rainfall. The rain is not to be found in the 
calendar. The significant point of both analogies is the 
same. The knowledge which we may gain from the scripture 
is not a self-sufficient one. Something over and beyond 
this is required. Like maps, scriptures can only arouse 
our curiosities and stimulate us to make the discoveries 
for ourselves. 
The Vedanta, in the view of Vivekananda, does not accept 
the authority of any text, denies the validity of any one 
text over another, and refuses to concede that any one text 
can exhaust all truths about ultimate reality. 
16 It is 
clear that, for him, the Vedas do not possess any intrinsic 
validity. Consistent with his views on their origin and 
the personal foundations of their authority, he envisages 
them as simply recording the spiritual discoveries of others, 
and the methods by which such discoveries have been made. 
These findings, however, must be personally rediscovered 
by every individual before they are valid for him or her. 
There are certain religious facts which, as in external 
science, have to be perceived, and upon them religion 
Will be built. Of course, the extreme claim that you 
must believe every dogma of a religion is degrading 
to the human mind. The man who asks you to believe 
everything, degrades himself, and, if you believe, 
degrades you too. The sages of the world have only 
the right to tell us that they have analysed their minds 
and have found these facts, and if we do the same we 
shall also believe, and not before. That is all there 
is in religion. 17 
The text therefore, is only an indication of the way to 
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the discovery of certain facts. 18 The proof of truth is 
the direct knowledge of the individual, and not the fact 
of its embodiment in any text. The individual verifies 
and must verify the text. 19 This verification is likened 
to ordinary direct perception, and constitutes the ultimately 
valid knowledge. 
The proof, therefore, of the Vedas is just the same 
as the proof of this table before me, Pratyaksha, direct 
perception. This I see with the senses, and the truths 
of spirituality we also see in a superconscious state 
of the human soul. 20 
Books are not an end-all. Verification is the only 
proof of religious truth. Each must verify for himself; 
and no teacher who says, "I have seen but you cannot", 
is to be trusted, only that one who says, "You can see 
tool l. All scriptures, all truths are Vedas in all times, 
in all countries; because these truths are to be seen, 
and any one may discover them. 21 
For Vivekananda, the fact of one individual gaining knowledge 
is proof of the ability and necessity of every other individual 
to do the same. 
22 
A scriptural text is represented by him 
as a second-hand religion. As a record of the experiences 
of others, it may stimulate our own desires, but even as 
one person's eating is of little value to another, so also 
is the record of another person's experiences until we attain 
to the same end. 
23 
The imperative therefore, for Vivekananda, is that every 
one should become a rishi. Until that time, the religious 
life remains empty and has not even commenced. The chief 
characteristic of the rishi status is the possibility of 
a direct apprehension of religious truth. 
He is a man who sees religion, to whom religion is not 
merely book-learning, not argumentation, nor speculation, 
nor much talking, but actual realisation, a coming 
face to face with truths that transcend the senses. 24 
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This possibility and requirement of every individual to 
become a rishi is one of the important points of contrast 
which Vivekananda emphasized between Hinduism and other 
religious traditions. In the latter, he claims, insight 
is limited to a few select individuals, through whom truth 
is made available to the many. 
Truth came to Jesus of Nazareth, and we must all obey 
him. But the truth came to the Rishis of India - the 
Mantra-drashtas, the seers of thought - and will come 
to all Rishis in the future, not to talkers, not to 
book-swallowers, not to scholars, not to philologists, 
but to seers of thought. 25 
Vivekananda did not only advocate the necessity of each 
one becoming a rishi and verifying for himself the experiences 
of others recorded in the Vedas, he often asserted that 
it is only in becoming a rishi that the scriptures are 
properly understood. 
26 
His justification for this view 
seems to be that as products and records of direct perception, 
they were not written for the intellect or for understanding 
through a process of rational inquiry and analysis. The 
texts become meaningful only when one has lifted oneself 
to the same heights of perception. At that point, however, 
they are only useful to the extent that they confirm what 
one has known directly. 
27 One peculiarity of the Vedas, 
Vivekananda says, in contrast to the scriptures of other 
religious traditions is that they are the only ones asserting 
the need for going beyond them. They are only written, 
according to him, for the adult who is in the childhood 
state of religious growth. One has therefore, to outgrow 
the necessity for them. He likens the texts to tubs or 
hedges around a tiny plant, the confines of which it must 
eventually transcend. 
28 
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7.3 The Distinction between Scriptural 
Revelation and Realization 
It is possible to make a clear and significant distinction, 
in Vivekananda, between the knowledge that is gathered from 
inquiry into a scriptural revelation and what he understands 
as realization. 
29 
The former is not perceived as a self- 
sufficient end, capable of taking one directly to realization. 
This is, of course, consistent with his call for verification 
of scriptural declarations. 
We can read all the Vedas, and yet will not realise anything, 
but when we practise their teachings, then we attain 
to that state which realises what the scriptures say, 
which penetrates where neither reason nor perception 
nor inference can go, and where the testimony of others 
cannot avail. 30 
The real study, according to Vivekananda, is that by which 
the unchangeable is realised, and he distinguishes this 
from reading, reasoning and believing. He identifies it 
with superconscious perception. 
31 In fact, distinguishing 
Vedänta from scriptural texts, Vivekananda says that the 
former is necessary because neither books nor reasoning 
can lead us to God. He identifies Vedanta here as a method 
for attaining superconscious perception. 
32 
He accepts the 
legitimacy of one of his disciples' complaint that he had 
read of everything in the scriptures, but had not realized 
anything. 
33 He saw the ultimate end of the religious quest, 
the realization of God within oneself, as being beyond all 
books. 
Talking, arguing, and reading books, the highest flights 
of the intellect, the Vedas themselves, all these cannot 
give knowledge of the Self. 34 
Vivekananda sometimes adopted an extreme position of asserting 
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that no scriptural text can make us religious, and that 
the latter can be attained only by dispensing with such 
texts. 35 
The process of inquiring into scriptural texts is 
identified by him with activity at the intellectual level, 
and is seen only as benefiting that level of our personalities. - 
He points out, however, that there is no equation between 
a high order of intellectual development and spiritual growth. 
Scriptural analysis can easily delude us that we are growing 
spiritually. He describes it as intellectual opium-eating. 
36 
Scriptures are specified by him as theoretical religion 
which is ultimately unsatisfactory. 
37 
Knowledge of the Absolute depends upon no book, nor 
upon anything; it is absolute in itself. No amount 
of study will give this knowledge; it is not theory, 
it is realisation. 38 
Vivekananda distinguishes between the essentials and non- 
essentials of every religion, between what he terms as the 
essential truth and the non-essential receptacle in which 
this truth is held. Scriptures and belief in their validity 
are classified by him along with the non-essentials of religion. 
39 
Among other non-essentials, he lists doctrines, dogmas, 
rituals, temples, images and forms. He describes these 
as only preparations for removing internal impurities. 
40 
With his clear definition of scriptures as theoretical 
religion, and his association of inquiry into them with 
limited intellectual activity and achievement, it is not 
surprising to find Vivekananda distinguishing the aims of 
sravana, manana and nididhysana. These distinctions are, 
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of course, closely related to the view that the claims of 
any scripture are to be verified, and that the knowledge 
one can derive from investigating the words and sentences 
of the same is not definitive. We must remark, however, 
that there is little discussion, elaboration or definition 
of these processes in his lectures and writings. He rarely 
refers to the original Sanskrit terms. There is still enough 
evidence, however, to show that he differentiates their 
natures and aims. 
In one of his revealing analogies about the usefulness 
of scriptures, he refers to the relation between surgical 
texts and the making of a surgeon. 
41 
His purport is that 
textual knowledge is not adequate, but must, in some way 
or other, be further applied to produce the desirable end. 
This seems to be the leading idea in his distinction of 
sravana, manana and nididhydsana. From the brief references 
that are available to us, sravana is identified by him with 
hearing or listening. This hearing is from the teacher, 
and its essential content is the reality of the atman and 
the maya nature of everything else. 
42 
Manana seems generally 
to be the process of understanding. It is thinking or 
reasoning from different standpoints on what has been heard. 
Its purpose is to establish knowledge in oneself by reason, 
so that belief is not founded on ignorance. This is only 
preliminary. 
You may reason it out and understand it intellectually, 
but there is a long way between intellectual understanding 
and the practical realisation of it. Between the plan 
of the building and the building itself there is quite 
a long distance-43 
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The processes of hearing and reasoning are followed by 
nididhyäsana, described by Vivekananda as meditation. 
is the stage when all arguments are put behind, and one 
is concerned with developing the truth within oneself. 
It 
He 
continuously affirms that the aim of meditation is realization, 
ensuring that knowledge is not merely intellectual assent 
or theory. While many may grasp the truth intellectually, 
only very few will attain realization. In his few and brief 
discussions of the threefold processes, the nature of this 
meditation is not outlined. At one point, he describes 
it as the constant assertion of the truth of one's identity 
with brahman. 
44 
It must be heard, apprehended intellectually, and lastly 
realised. Cogitating is applying reason and establishing 
this knowledge in ourselves by reason. Realising is 
making it a part of our lives by constant thinking of 
it... realization will come as a result of this continuous 
cogitation. 45 
One of the important results of Vivekananda's characteriz- 
ation of scriptural texts as the records of other people's 
experiences, as mere theoretical religion incapable of giving 
rise to liberating knowledge, was a strong denunciation 
of the value of learning and scholarship in the quest for 
satisfactory spiritual knowledge. He affirmed that learning 
was not necessary for salvation, and that its only value 
lay in the strengthening and disciplining of the mind. 
46 
We attend lectures and read books, argue and reason 
about God and soul, religion and salvation. These are 
not spirituality, because spirituality 
does not exist 
in books or in theories or in philosophies. It 
is 
not in learning or in reasoning, 
but in actual inner 
growth. Even parrots can learn things 
by heart and 
repeat them. If you become 
learned what of it? Asses 
can carry whole libraries. So when real 
light will 
come, there will be no more of this learning 
from books 
- no book-learning. The man who cannot write even his 
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own name can be perfectly religious, and the man with 
all the libraries of the world in his head may fail 
to be. Learning is not a condition of spiritual growth; 
scholarship is not a condition. 47 
The great teachers of the world, according to Vivekananda, 
were not the ones who went into detailed analysis and 
explanations of texts. The ideal spiritual teacher, in 
his view, is not one who commands a mastery of the texts, 
but one who knows their spirit. 
48 
His own teacher, Ramakrishna, 
was presented by him as an example of one who spurned 
intellectual scholarship, and who apprehended religious 
truths directly. Perhaps the strength of Vivekananda's 
views on this matter is best demonstrated by the fact that 
he understood the central purpose of Ramakrishna's life 
as an illustration of this principle. 
In order to show how Vedic truths - eternally 
existent as the instrument with the Creator in His work 
of creation, preservation, and dissolution - reveal 
themselves spontaneously in the minds of the Rishis 
purified from all impressions of worldly attachment, 
and because such verification and confirmation of the 
scriptural truths will help the revival, reinstatement, 
and spread of religion - the Lord, though the very 
embodiment of the Vedas, in this new incarnation has 
discarded all external forms of learning. 49 
The obvious conclusion of our study, at this point, 
is that the value and functions of scriptural texts, as 
far as Vivekananda was concerned, were minimal in the search 
for genuine religious understanding. Vivekananda never 
seemed to miss an opportunity for deprecating their importance, 
and calling into question their usefulness. Almost everyone 
of his addresses contains such denunciations. These were 
directed both to scriptures in general and the Vedas. 
He confesses a general scepticism of the accuracy of 
scriptural testimony. 
50 He sees the view that all of God's 
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knowledge could be confined to any particular text as being 
horribly blasphemous. 51 Scriptural infallibility was 
understood by him to be a denial of the freedom to question 
and inquire, and book-worship as the worst form of idolatry. 
52 
He reviled the view that even incarnations must conform 
to the text. 
There are sects in my country who believe that God incarnates 
and becomes man, but even God incarnate as man must 
conform to the Vedas, and if His teachings do not so 
conform, they will not take Him. Buddha is worshipped 
by the Hindus, but if you say to them, "If you worship 
Buddha, why don't you take His teachings"? they will 
say, because they, the Buddhists, deny the Vedas. Such 
is the meaning of book-worship. Any number of lies 
in the name of a religious book are all right. In India 
if I want to teach anything new, and simply state it 
on my own authority, as what I think, nobody will come 
to listen to me; but if I take some passage from the 
Vedas, and juggle with it, and give it the most impossible 
meaning, murder everything that is reasonable in it, 
and bring out my own ideas as the ideas that were meant 
by the Vedas, all the fools would follow me in a crowd. 53 
Vivekananda criticizes and rejects the view that the Vedas 
are the only authentic revelation of God, or that they alone 
contain all the truths of religion. 
54 
He seems to see religious 
revelation as an eternal process. 
The Bible, the Vedas, the Koran, and all other sacred 
books are but so many pages, and an infinite number 
of pages remain yet to be unfolded. 55 
Revelation is also continuing in the sense that any individual 
who is suitably prepared may discover the fundamental truths. 
56 
He alleged that parts of the Vedas are apparently contradictory, 
that they contain many crude ideas, and that the Upanishads 
offered varying advice on the methods of gaining knowledge of 
the ätman. 57 He felt that only those parts of the Vedas in 
harmony with reason should be accepted as being authoritative. 
58 
In this connection, he expressed the view that many of the 
rituals and sacrifices of the Vedas are held in reverence 
284 
only because of their antiquity and because their perpetuation 
became the business of the priestly class. 
59 
Vivekananda 
ridiculed the Mimänsä view that the existence of anything is 
dependent on its mention in the Vedas. 
The Hindus believe that creation has come out of the 
Vedas. How do you know that there is a cow? Because 
the word cow is in the Vedas. How do you know there 
is a man outside? Because the word man is there. 
If it had not been, there would have been no man 
outside. That is what they say. Authority with a 
vengeance! 60 
7.4 The Connection between Sddhana-catushtaya 
(the Fourfold Means) and the Acquisition of 
Liberating Knowledge 
An important area of study, which accentuates the 
contrast between Vivekananda and Shankara in their respective 
presentations of the significance of the Vedas, emerges 
from Vivekananda' s treatment of sädhana-catushtaya. 
61 
In Chapter 5.3, we have already discussed the scope of 
these means in Shankara' s system. We have shown there 
that he regards these as the indispensable qualities of 
intellect, volition and emotion for inquiry into and assimilation 
of knowledge from the Upanishads. The cultivation of these 
qualities is only a preparation for 'sabda-pramäna study 
and not an alternative to it. They do not replace the 
pramäna, but ensure the fruitfulness of its operation. 
Knowledge is never gained other than by a valid and appropriate 
means. We now turn our attention to Vivekananda's handling 
Of these prerequisites. 
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Viveka, he defines as the discrimination of the true 
or real from that which is untrue or unreal, the eternal 
from the transitory. It is the recognition of the reality 
of God and changefulness and illusory character of everything 
else. 
62 Vairägya is a renunciation of the desire for gain 
in this life or in the life to come. Vivekananda emphasizes 
the abnegation of the desire for heaven. The gain of heaven 
is not the attainment of truth or freedom from original 
false notions about oneself. 
What is heaven? Only the continuation of this earth. 
We would be better and the little foolish dreams we 
are dreaming would break sooner if there were no heaven, 
no continuation of this silly life on earth. By going 
to heaven we only prolong the miserable illusions-63 
He defines sama and dama as, "the keeping of the organs 
in their own centres without allowing them to stray out ", 
64 
In this connection, he distinguishes between the "organs" 
and "instruments". The "organs" are the nerve centres 
in the brain and are the true instruments of perception, 
while the "instruments" are the external perceptible sense 
vehicles. Any act of external perception, according to 
Vivekananda, requires the conjunction of the mind, the 
organs and instruments. The mind and the organs can be 
internally active even when there is no external perception. 
By lama and dama therefore, he means the checking of the 
internal and external activities of the mind, the restraint 
of the organs in their centres, and the control of the 
external instruments. Uparati, he defines as "not thinking 
of things of the senses". This includes not recalling 
pleasurable experiences of the past, and not anticipating 
- uture ones. 
65 
lä6 
Titiksha is forbearance. In amplifying this quality, 
Vivekananda focuses on the internal dimensions of restraint. 
Titiksha is not merely desisting from an external response, 
but not reacting with feelings of anger or hatred. It 
is the ability, he says, to tolerate the inevitable miseries 
of life, and sees Christ as the exemplar of this capacity. 
He presents sraddhä as faith in religion and God, and a 
fervent eagerness to reach Him. He also points to the 
necessity of faith in the teacher. 
66 S amädhäna is the 
constant practice of fixing the mind on God, while 
mumukshutvam is the intense desire to be free, born out 
of an appreciation of the vanity and limitations of sense 
enjoyments. 
67 
Whereas Shankara argues for sädhana-catushtaya as a 
preparation for sabda-pramäna inquiry with the aid of the 
teacher, Vivekananda adopts the reverse position of using 
these to argue against scriptural necessity, to denounce 
the need for study and learning, and to emphasize the 
secondary role of the intellect in the quest for spiritual 
knowledge. Nothing more than the cultivation of these 
disciplines is required, he adds, because the knowledge 
sought is all within. 
68 
He sees sadhana-catushtaya as 
a preparation for the purification of the heart rather 
than as a training of the intellect or reason. This 
purification is all that is necessary. 
The pure heart is the best mirror for the reflection 
of truth, so all these disciplines are for the 
purification of the heart. And as soon as it is pure, 
all truths flash upon it in a minute; all the truth 
in the universe will manifest in your heart, if you 
are sufficiently pure. 
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The great truths about atoms, and the finer elements, 
and the fine perceptions of men were discovered ages 
ago by men who never saw a telescope, or a microscope, 
or a laboratory. How did they know all these things? 
It was through the heart; they purified the heart. 69 
This training, he contends, takes us beyond the senses, 
and he seems to suggest that all bondages will naturally 
fall off when one has cultivated these qualities. 
70 As 
far as other general qualifications are concerned, Vivekananda 
adopted a much more liberal attitude, in some respects, 
than Shankara. Shankara did not challenge the orthodox 
position of the right of only the three upper castes to 
study the Vedas. The südras were debarred. 
71 Vivekananda 
adopted the position that there was no bar of sex, race 
or caste to realization. He severely chastises Shankara 
for his lack of liberality in this respect, and accuses 
him of fanatical brahmin pride. 
72 He seems, on the other 
hand, to support Shankara's position that only the sarnnyasin 
73 
can attain to the fullness of brahmajäna. 
Nobody attains freedom without shaking off the 
coils of worldly worries. The very fact that somebody 
lives the worldly life proves that he is tied down 
to it as the bond-slave of some craving or other. 
Why otherwise would he cling to that life at all? 
He is the slave either of lust or gold, of position 
or of fame, of learning or of scholarship. It is only 
after freeing oneself from all this thraldom that one 
can get along on the way of freedom. Let people argue 
as loud as they please; I have got this conviction 
that unless the monastic life is embraced, none is 
going to be saved, no attainment of Brahmajnana is 
possible. 74 
His attacks on householders were often quite scathing. 
He suggested that the gulf between the householder and 
the samnyäsin was wide and unbridgeable, and that the 
former are incapable of sincerity, but of necessity must 
possess some selfish motive. He would not 
believe God 
to be sincere if he incarnated as a 
householder. He even 
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spoke of the repulsive odour of householders. In this 
context, one must admit that Vivekananda appears as partisan 
as Shankara was with respect to caste. Views like these 
seem to contradict his declared aim of making V edänta a 
practical religion, accessible to all. 
7.5 The Claim to a New Formula for 
Vedic Exegesis 
In our study of Shankara, we have seen his view that 
the single purport of the Upanishads is to reveal the identity 
between ätman and brahman. 
75 
And it is not proper to explain these texts otherwise 
than literally, for they are meant to show that the 
individual Self is no other than the Supreme Brahman. 76 
Moreover, the ultimate aim of all the Upanisads is 
to teach Self-knowledge. 77 
This conviction about the cardinal intention of all sentences 
of the Upanishads is the governing principle of Shankara's 
exegetical method. We have seen that in his commentaries, 
he sets himself the task of resolving apparent contradictions, 
and establishing that all the sentences of the Upanishads 
could be reconciled in the light of this central aim. 
Vivekananda, on the other hand, claims this assumption 
to be an unsatisfactory criterion for Vedic exegesis. 
He suggests that both Advaita and Dvaita commentators are 
constrained to resort to text-torturing in their attempt 
to prove that either view is the exclusive theme of the 
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Upanishads . The Advaita commentator retains Advaita texts 
and juggles with the Dvaita ones, while his rival adopts 
the reverse procedure. Vivekananda feels that this is 
facilitated by the intricacy and complexity of the Sanskrit 
language. 78 Vivekananda seems to clearly accept that there 
are texts in the Vedas which are entirely dualistic and 
others which are truly monistic. He suggests that it is 
absurd to set out to demonstrate that all texts are either 
monistic or dualistic, and accuses Shankara of occasionally 
resorting to sophistry to sustain his conclusions. 
79 
Vivekananda felt that the time had come for a better and 
more faithful interpretation of the purport of the Vedas 
and reconciliation of their apparent contradictions. It 
was just such an interpretation, he claims, which suggested 
itself to him by his acquaintance with Ramakrishna. 
It was given to me to live with a man who was as ardent 
a dualist, as ardent an Advaitist, as ardent a Bhakta, 
as a Jnani. And living with this man first put it 
into my head to understand the Upanishads and the texts 
of the scriptures from an independent and better basis 
than by blindly following the commentators; and in 
my opinion and in my researches, I came to the conclusion 
that these texts are not at all contradictory. 80 
Vivekananda's new formula for Vedic exegesis is derived 
from his conclusion that it is possible to trace three 
distinct phases in the evolution of Vedic thought about 
the nature of God. Firstly, there was a very personal 
concept of God as an extra-cosmic deity. This soon gave 
way to an emphasis on the immanence of God in the universe, 
and culminated in identifying the human soul with God. 
This development is one from dualism to qualified monism, 
ending in monism. 
81 He denies that Advaita is the only 
phase of thought in the Vedas. The significant exegetical 
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point about this claim, however, is his denial that these 
three phases of thought are in any way contradictory to 
each other. 
One cannot exist without the other; one is the fulfilment 
of the other; one is the building, the other is the 
top; the one the root, the other the fruit, and so 
on. 82 
Vivekananda sees it as a deliberate method of the Vedas 
to reveal a progressive development to the ultimate goal. 
83 
In these texts, he contends, it is possible to trace the 
development of religious ideas. The reason is because 
old ideas were not discarded when higher truths were discovered. 
The authors realised that there would always be aspirants 
for whom the earlier steps were still necessary. 
84 
Vivekananda 
is alluding to the doctrine of adhikäribheda, the idea 
of different grades of aspirants. He also refers to the 
method of arundhati darsana nyaya which Shankara uses to 
demonstrate a particular method of unfolding brahman in 
the Upanishads. 85 Vivekananda, however, sees it as the 
wider method of progressive development from dualism to 
non-dualism. 
86 
In spite of Vivekananda's powerful advocacy of this 
formula for reconciling conflicting texts in the Vedas, 
there were occasions when he expressed equally strong 
reservations about this view and method. In fact, he seems 
to repudiate it entirely and challenges what he sees as 
the expression of this doctrine in the Bhagavadgitä 
(3: 26) : 
Let no wise man unsettle the mind of the ignorant people 
attached to action; but acting in harmony with Me 
let 
him render all action attractive. 
It is contradictory, he claims, to argue that 
knowledge 
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and enlightenment can lead to error and confusion. It is a 
doctrine of compromise, he avers, born out of a fear of 
challenging local and regional customs and prejudices. 
He accuses the rishis of having a selfish motive. 
They knew that by this enlightenment on their special 
subject they would lose their superior position of 
instructors to the people. Hence their endeavour to 
support this theory. If you consider a man too weak 
to receive these lessons, you should try the more to 
teach and educate him; you should give him the advantage 
of more teaching, instead of less, to train up his 
intellect, so as to enable him to comprehend the more 
subtle problems. These advocates of adhikarivada ignored 
the tremendous fact of the infinite possibilities of 
the human soul. Every man is capable of receiving 
knowledge if it is imparted in his own language-87 
Although it is not within the scope of our study to 
treat in full the wider implications of Vivekananda's theory 
of the progressive development of religious thought in 
the Vedas, we may note briefly that he applied this view 
to the understanding of the growth of ideas in other religious 
traditions as well, and employed it as a central concept 
for inter-religious harmony. The fundamental premise, 
however, is that non-duality is the unavoidable goal of 
the human religious quest. Movement in religious thought 
is not therefore, a growth from error to truth, but from 
a lower to a higher truth. All religions, he claims, from 
the lowest fetishism to the highest absolutism, reflect 
attempts to grasp the infinite. The world of religions 
is, as he puts it, "only a travelling, a coming up, of 
different men and women, through various conditions and 
circumstances, to the same goal". 
88 The end here is the 
infinity of the Self, and this is attained by different 
paths. He distinguishes between the paths and the goal. 
Each one is entitled to choose 
his own path, but the path 
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is not the goal. This is the clue to his often voiced 
concept of unity in diversity. The unifying factor is 
the common goal, and diversity, the means adopted for its 
attainment. Each religion therefore, can be positioned 
at some point along the approach to the final non-dual 
truth . 
All religions are so many stages. Each one of 
them represents the stages through which the human 
soul passes to realise God. Therefore, not one of 
them should be neglected. None of the stages are 
dangerous or bad. They are good. Just as a child 
becomes a young man, and a young man becomes an old 
man, so they are travelling from truth to truth; 
they become dangerous only when they become rigid, 
and will not move further - when he ceases to grow. 89 
In this broad view, he sees the possibility of accepting 
all religious doctrines, not as an act of patronizing, 
but with the full conviction that, "they are true manifestations 
of the same truth, and that they all lead to the same 
conclusions as the Advaita has reached". 
90 
He also traces 
for all religious traditions, the three major phases of 
development which he claimed to have discovered in the 
Vedas. 91 
In the matter of Vedic exegesis, we can draw attention 
to an important contrast between Shankara and Vivekananda. 
We have already discussed in detail Shankara's division 
of the Vedas into the karmakdnda and the j nänakdnda and 
the distinctions which he makes between them. 
92 Vivekananda 
adopts the same two divisions and distinguishes between 
them in several ways. 
93 He identifies the ideal of the 
karmakända as the attainment of enjoyment here and hereafter. 
The aim is not total freedom from karma. He enumerates 
four important differences between both sections: 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The Upanishads posit a belief in God and His unity. 
Although the Upanishads accept the operation of the 
law of karma and man's bondage to it, they do not 
accept that it is absolutely inescapable, and suggest 
a way out. 
The Upanishads condemn rituals and sacrifices, particularly 
those involving the slaying of animals, and point out 
the limitations of what can be achieved through sacrifices. 
The gains are only temporary. 
Finally, the Upanishads enjoin renunciation rather 
than enjoyment. While it is clear that the differences 
pointed out by Vivekananda coincide with those of 
Shankara on the points of aspirant, subject matter 
and fruit or result, Vivekananda never mentions the 
difference of connection (sambandha) which Shankara 
repeatedly alludes to. This appears to us to be an 
extremely significant omission. To quickly remind 
ourselves, Shankara sees the karmakända as providing 
us with knowledge about ends which are not yet existent. 
These must be brought into being by some appropriate 
action. In other words, knowledge is not the end in 
itself. The knowledge unfolded in the jnänakända, 
however, is centred on an already existent brahman. 
Knowledge here is an end in itself, and the connection 
is between a revealed entity and the appropriate means 
of revelation. We are suggesting that this is an 
important point of divergence, for it conclusively 
demonstrates, along with everything we have earlier 
discussed in this chapter, that Vivekananda does not 
see the knowledge that is gained by inquiry into the 
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words and sentences of the Upanishads as an end in itself. 
We have noted his description of these as theoretical 
or second-hand religion, and his call that their claims 
are to be verified by a form of direct perception. 
Although Vivekananda's claim to have discovered a novel 
and more satisfactory way of interpreting and reconciling 
apparently conflicting texts of the Upanishads appears 
at first sight to differ from Shankara's method, the divergence 
does not seem to be an absolutely radical one. Shankara 
does not deny the presence of dualistic texts in the whole 
of the Vedas. He accepts, for example, that the ritualistic 
prescriptions of the karmakända are based on an outlook 
of duality, and that these are intended for aspirants of 
a different order as compared to the jnänakända. Shankara 
therefore, clearly accepts the fact of differing needs 
and capabilities in individuals, and sees the sruti also 
as recognizing this diversity. What he strongly denies, 
however, is the ultimate truth or reality of this duality. 
It appears to us that the really important argument, from 
an exegetical viewpoint, is that non-duality is the final 
and ultimately valid doctrine of the Vedas. On this question, 
there is no difference between Vivekananda and Shankara. 
7.6 Contrasts between the Statements of Vivekananda 
on the Vedas in the West and in India 
In trying to form a composite picture of Vivekananda's 
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understanding of the nature, role and authority of the 
Vedas, one is struck by significant divergences of content 
and tone between views expressed in America and Europe, 
and those in India. The differences are particularly 
apparent from close analysis of the series of talks delivered 
by him in India after returning from his first Western 
visit (15 January 1897 )and before his departure for his second 
lecture tour (20 June 1899). In the Complete Works of 
Swami Vivekananda, the talks are famously titled, "Lectures 
from Colombo to Almora". 94 It is to a consideration of 
the significance of these differences that we now turn 
our attention. 
In India, there was a greater overall emphasis on the 
authority of the Vedas, and this took different forms of 
expression. One of the common methods was a reiteration 
of the orthodox distinction between sruti and smriti. 
95 
The latter, according to him, are written by the sages, 
but they are not the final authority. In instances of 
contradiction between both groups of texts, smriti has 
to be rejected. He saw the declarations of the smritis 
as being binding under particular circumstances, times 
and places. Smritis, in other words, treat the variable 
dimensions of religion, while sruti is concerned with its 
eternal aspects. 
As essential conditions changed, as various circumstances 
carte to have their influence on the race, manners and 
customs had to be changed, and these smritis, as mainly 
regulating the manners and customs of the nation, had 
also to be changed from time to time... The principles 
of religion that are in the Vedanta are unchangeable. 
Why? Because they are all built upon the eternal principles 
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that are in man and nature; they can never change. 
Ideas about the soul, going to heaven, and so on can 
never change; they were the same thousands of years 
ago, they are the same today, they will be the same 
millions of years hence. But those religious practices 
which are based entirely upon our social position and 
correlation must change with the changes in society. 
Such an order, therefore, would be good and true at 
a certain period and not at another. 96 
One of the clear reasons for Vivekananda's reassertion 
of the traditional distinction between sruti and smriti 
was his attempt to employ it as a suitable basis for introduction 
of order, and the standardization of religious belief and 
practice in India. He was disturbed by the prevalence, 
at the local level, of practices which he saw as being 
superstitious, and the tendency to assign an authoritative 
sanction to these. He was particularly incensed by the 
wide prevalence of certain T antra practices in his native 
Bengal, and saw the primacy of the sruti as a way of 
challenging the authority of texts which approved such 
customs. 
97 
In India, he identified orthodoxy with the acceptance 
of the authority of the Vedas. "All the philosophers of 
India who are orthodox have to acknowledge the authority 
of the Vedanta". 
98 He saw clearly that the acceptance 
of the authority of the Vedas was one of the few common 
points around which different religious allegiances in 
India could be united. "The only point where, perhaps, 
all our sects agree is that we all believe in the scriptures 
- the Vedas. This perhaps is certain that no man can 
have 
a right to be called a Hindu who does not admit the supreme 
authority of the Vedas". 
99 Like his employment of the 
distinction between sruti and smriti, Vivekananda's stress 
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on the common authority of the Vedas and his equation of 
it with orthodoxy must be placed in the wider context of 
his anxiety for, and commitment to national and religious 
unity. One of the most common of Vivekananda's themes 
throughout this triumphal lecture tour was the view that 
religion constituted the central, indispensable characteristic 
of national life in India. Almost everyone of his major 
addresses opened on this text. 
I see that each nation, like each individual, has one 
theme in this life which is its centre, the principal 
note round which every other note comes to form the 
harmony. In one nation political power is its vitality 
as in England, artistic life in another, and so on. 
In India, religious life forms the centre, the keynote 
of the whole music of national life; and if any nation 
attempts to throw off its national vitality - the direction 
which has become its own through the transmission of 
centuries - that nation dies if it succeeds in the 
attempt. 100 
In the light of this view on the place of religion in Indian 
life, Vivekananda thought that all kinds of reform, social 
and political, should be preceded by and founded upon religious 
unity and reform. He felt that no other approach would 
have a sufficient impact. Vivekananda saw quite clearly 
the difficulties of trying to found a nation on the basis 
of common ethnicity, language or customs. As far as these 
factors were concerned, India exhibited a bewildering variety. 
He felt that religion could be used as the nucleus of an 
emerging Indian nation. 
The one common ground that we have is our sacred tradition, 
our religion. That is the only common ground, and upon 
that we shall have to build. In Europe, political 
ideas form the national unity. In Asia, religious 
ideals form the national unity. The unity in religion, 
therefore, is absolutely necessary as the first condition 
of the future of India-101 
Even religion, however, was not an obvious common factor. 
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Hinduism presented a challenging medley. This is the 
explanation behind Vivekananda's exertion throughout this 
lecture tour, perhaps for the first time in the history 
of Hinduism, to identify and extol what he saw as the common 
bases of Hinduism. Acceptance of the authority of the Vedas 
was the paramount tenet of the common features he presented. 
Among the other common features mentioned by Vivekananda 
are the concepts of karma and samsära, the cyclical view 
of creation and dissolution, and the acceptance of the 
soul to be free from birth and death. He also points to 
the notion of religion as realization or direct perception. 
Along with a new emphasis on orthodoxy and the Vedas 
as the fountainhead of Hinduism, another revealing contrast 
is also apparent from his Western statements. In the West, 
whenever he made a critical statement about the insignificance 
of scriptural texts, the Vedas were always treated on the 
same footing with the scriptures of non-Hindu religions. 
In India, however, this equality was replaced by an equation 
of non-Hindu scriptures with the smritis. Like the smriti 
texts of Hinduism, their validity is now seen as a secondary 
one, to be evaluated only with reference to the sruti. 
Therein lies the difference between the scriptures 
of the Christians or the Buddhists and ours; theirs 
are all Puranas, and not scriptures, because they 
describe the history of the deluge, and the history 
of kings and reigning families, and record the lives 
of great men, and so on. This is the work of the 
Puranas, and so far as they agree with the Vedas, they 
are perfectly good. So far as the Bible and the scriptures 
of other nations agree with the Vedas, they are perfectly 
good, but when they do not agree, they are no more 
to be accepted. 102 
He describes the Vedas as the best preserved scriptures 
of all religious traditions. 
103 
Like the smritis, non- 
0 
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Hindu scriptures have been written by particular sages. 
104 
Although Vivekananda does not deny the efficacy of other 
texts, he asserts the primacy of the Vedas. 
Although the supersensuous vision of truth is to 
be met with in some measure in our Puranas and Itihasas 
and in the religious scriptures of other races, still 
the fourfold scripture known among the Aryan race as 
the Vedas being the first, the most complete, and the 
most undistorted collection of spiritual truths, deserve 
to occupy the highest place among all scriptures, command 
the respect of all nations of the earth, and furnish 
the rationale of all their respective scriptures. 105 
In India, he asserted that everything necessary for the 
perfection and freedom of man could be found in the Vedas. 
Sruti is presented as the final word on spiritual truth, 
beyond which there is nothing to be known or said. There 
is no religious idea anywhere, he claims, which cannot 
be found in the Vedas. All that needs to be done is to 
apply the dicta of the sruti to the changing needs and 
conditions of societies. 
106 
At the beginning of our present discussion, we presented 
Vivekananda's contention that the Vedas are the results 
of the direct perception of the äptas, and that they are 
valid only because the äptas are competent persons. A 
clear contrast of emphasis with this view emerges from 
scrutiny of his talks in India. Here, he insisted upon 
the impersonal nature of Vedic authority, and differentiated 
this sharply from the personal authoritative foundations 
of all other religious traditions. 
Excepting our own almost all the other great religions 
in the world are inevitably connected with the life 
of one or more of their founders. All their theories, 
their teachings, their doctrines, and their ethics 
are built round the life of a personal 
founder, from 
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whom they get their sanction, their authority, and 
their power; and strangely enough, upon the historicity 
of the founder's life is built, as it were, all the 
fabric of such religions. If there were one blow 
dealt to the historicity of that life, as has been the 
case in modern times with the lives of almost all the 
so called founders of religion - we know that half of 
the details of such lives is not now seriously 
believed in, and the other half is seriously doubted - 
if this becomes the case, if that rock of historicity, 
as they pretend to call it, is shaken and shattered, 
the whole building tumbles down, broken absolutely, 
never to regain its lost status. 107 
In several ways, he contrasts this personal authority with 
what he now highlights as the impersonal character of Vedic 
authority. The Vedas, he says, are not the utterance of any 
persons, and do not owe their authority to anybody. The 
authority of the Vedas, he now claims, is not even dependent 
on reasoning. Whereas he had formerly complained about the 
absoluteness of scriptural authority over even the incarnations, 
he now glorifies this fact. 
That you obey your religion is not because it came 
through the authority of a sage, no, not even of an 
Incarnation. Krishna is not the authority of the Vedas, 
but the Vedas are the authority of Krishna himself. 
His glory is that he is the greatest preacher of the 
Vedas that ever existed. 108 
Vedanta, he stresses, is grounded in impersonal principles, 
for no human being can claim to have created the Vedas, 
but only to have discovered its eternal truths. At the 
same time, he argues that these impersonal principles are 
not opposed to personalities, but allow sufficent scope 
for them. The principles remain unaffected by the lack 
of historicity of particular persons. 
109 
In his lectures in the West, whenever Vivekananda spoke 
about the concept of Vedic eternity, he usually drew an 
analogy with natural or scientific laws. The eternity 
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of the Vedas, he pointed out on these occasions, did not 
mean the eternity of books composed of words and sentences. 
He identified the Vedas with spiritual laws and concluded 
that the concept of Vedic eternity meant the changeless 
and timeless nature of these laws. 
110 This interpretation 
was also presented in India, but there were significant 
differences. In the first place, the idea of eternity 
was more frequently, elaborately and emphatically stated. 
Secondly, he did not always manifestly distinguish between 
the Vedas as spiritual laws and as words and sentences. 
In fact, he seemed on occasions to be moving much closer 
to the traditional orthodox position. 
In India, he voiced his scepticism about Western 
scholarship on the dating of the Vedas. The Vedas, he 
says, can and never have been dated because they are 
eternal. 
ill Hindus, he affirms, do not subscribe to the 
opinion that parts of the Vedas were produced at different 
times, but that they were brought into being as a whole. 
They do not share the view that the Vedas were written 
by men in some remote age. 
112 His stress was upon the 
unwritten and ahistorical nature of the Vedas. He 
advanced non-historicity as an argument in favour of their 
validity. 
113 
Modern writers on Vivekananda generally contend that 
there is little or no deviation in his views from Advaita 
as systematized and given expression by Shankara. T. M. P. 
Mahadevan, a distinguished contemporary Hindu scholar, 
writes, 
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The Advaita which Swami Vivekananda teaches in his 
speeches and writings is, in essence, the same gospel 
whose consolidation and comprehensive exposition we 
owe to Sri Sankaracharya. 114 
Rama Shanker Srivastava comes to the same conclusion. 
The concept of salvation and Jnanayoga as a path or 
discipline leading to it are ancient and traditional. 
The metaphysics and disciplines of Vivekananda do not 
deviate an inch from the standpoint of the Advaita 
Vedänta of Shankaracharya. 115 
These representative judgements posit a very wide consensus 
of opinion between Shankara and Vivekananda. In the present 
chapter, we are specifically concerned with their respective 
understandings of the nature, role and authority of the 
Vedas. We have already explicitly drawn attention to some 
important differences of view. The dissimilarities between 
Vivekananda's statements in India and the West are important 
in any evaluation. It appears to us that whereas, in his 
Western talks, Vivekananda was at liberty to unreservedly 
express his views, in India there were constraints and 
concerns which did not allow the same freedom. The principal 
of these concerns, which we have already noted,. was his 
passion for national unity, and his conviction that this 
could only be achieved on the basis of religious unity. 
We have also remarked, in this respect, on his generalization 
of the common features of Hinduism and the prominence which 
he gave to the acceptance of Vedic authority as one of 
these features. In a tradition of such internal diversity 
and a plurality of authoritative sources, Vivekananda felt 
that a commonly accepted authority was indispensable. 
It could serve both as a focus of unity and a platform 
for the challenge and reform of objectionable religious 
practice. 
3U3 
There is another even more important reason why 
Vivekananda's statements in the West could be seen as more 
truly representative of his position. 
116 These statements 
are fully consistent with a central conviction of all his 
lectures and writings. This is the doctrine that religious 
truth is only acquired by an experience of direct perception 
or apprehension, and not by inquiry into words and sentences 
of any revelatory text. This is a view which he unfailingly 
hammered, and which may, with good reason, be said to 
constitute the pivot of his metaphysics. He was always 
consistent in this position, and did not deviate in India. 
In one of his Indian lectures, he states, 
This is the Rishihood, the ideal in our religion. 
The rest, all these talks and reasonings and philosophies 
and dualisms and monisms, and even the Vedas themselves 
are but preparations, secondary things. The other 
is primary. The Vedas, grammar, astronomy, etc., all 
these are secondary; that is the supreme knowledge 
which makes us realise the Unchangeable One. Those 
who realised are the sages whom we find in the Vedas: 
and we understand how this Rishi is the name of a type, 
of a class, which every one of us, as true Hindus, 
is expected to become at some period of our life, 
and becoming which, to the Hindu, means salvation. 
Not belief in doctrines, not going to thousands of 
temples, nor bathing in all the rivers in the world, 
but becoming the Rishi, the Mantra-drashta - that is 
freedom, that is salvation-117 
From our survey of Shankara and Vivekananda, it is this 
issue which emerges as the central and very radical point 
of departure. 
In Chapters 3,4 and 5, we have examined in detail 
Shankara' s treatment of the Vedas as a valid source of 
knowledge. We have outlined the various arguments tendered 
by him for justifying sabda as the only pramäna of brahman. 
his view of sabda-pramdna as the adequate and self-sufficient 
means for giving rise to brahmajnäna, and his conclusion 
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that nothing beyond the inquiry into the words and sentences 
of the Upanishads is necessary for brahinajnäna. Actions 
may facilitate the gain of knowledge from the pramäna, 
but do not themselves constitute direct sources of knowledge. 
We have seen that in Shankara's commentaries, the authoritative- 
ness of sruti is independent and self-sufficient. The 
authority of the Upanishads does not depend upon verification 
from any other source of knowledge. To suggest this would 
imply, for Shankara, an alternative and superior pramäna 
for brahmajnäna and dethrone the svatah-prämänya (self- 
validity) status of the Upanishads. 
Our earlier scrutiny of Vivekananda's statements on 
the Vedas and scriptural revelation in general reveals 
a point of view which is unqualifiedly opposed to Shankara's 
position. We can conclude our discussion here by bringing 
together and highlighting these antithetical arguments. 
lie have examined several analogies used by Vivekananda 
(e. g. map, almanac), all of which illustrate the contents 
of the Vedas as a poor substitute. He has argued that 
the assertions of the Vedas are only to be considered 
as provisionally true, and that they become knowledge only 
when verified by direct apprehension. His distinction 
between knowledge afforded by sruti and realization reinforces 
this argument, and so does his emphasis on the necessity 
Of going beyond sruti. He speaks of scriptures as 
"theoretical religion", and as one of its non-essential 
aspects. The Vedas, he contends, cannot give knowledge 
of the ätman. All of this stands in unmistakable and remarkable 
contrast to Shankara's svatah-prämänya view of the 
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Upanishads and his related arguments. Vivekananda sees 
Vedanta as a method for attaining superconscious perception 
rather than as a pramdna, and it is revealing that nowhere 
in his work does one find any detailed consideration of 
the pramäna concept. In fact, the term itself has never 
been employed directly by him, except on the one occasion 
of his commentary on the Yoga-sutras of Patanj al i, to which 
we have already referred. 
Like Vivekananda, Shankara also speaks of an ultimate 
transcendence of the Vedas, but in an entirely different 
sense and context. For Shankara, the Vedas are transcended 
in the sense that after producing knowledge, they are no 
longer necessary as a pramäna by the one who has gained 
brahmajnäna. They are also transcended in the sense that, 
for the 'nani, their reality is only an empirical one. 
Unlike Vivekananda, Shankara nowhere speaks of the 
transcending of the Vedas in the manner of positing an 
alternative and superior pramana. In our study of Shankara, 
we have presented his concept of the non-personal (apaurusheya) 
basis of the authority of the Vedas . He does not seek 
to establish the authority of the Vedas from the fact of 
God's omniscience, because of his view that God's existence 
cannot be demonstrated by any independent reasoning. Vivekananda, 
on the other hand, advances, in many places, a personal 
authoritative basis for the Vedas, derived from the competence 
and reliability of the äptas. In respect of the direct 
apprehension of religious truth by the äpta, Vivekananda 
does not suggest any role for 
i vara as revealer. His 
analogy is that of the scientific discovery of natural 
306 
laws. Shankara, as we have seen, ascribes to isvara the 
role of revealing the Vedas at the beginning of each cycle 
of creation. In Shankara, the emphasis is upon the rishis 
receiving rather than discovering. Consistent with this 
scientific analogy, Vivekananda often defines the eternity 
of the Vedas as an eternity of natural spiritual laws, 
whose existence is independent of their discovery. Shankara 
on the other hand, conceives of Vedic eternity in the sense 
of an eternal flow of a fixed body of knowledge. This 
transmission is initiated in each cycle of creation by 
T 
1svara. 
On the basis of Vivekananda's recorded statements, 
it is very difficult to find an unconditional rationale 
for the Vedas. This is not surprising in the light of 
his contention that conclusive and liberating knowledge 
is not gained by inquiry into the texts of the Upanishads. 
The closest he comes to a justification of such texts is 
in his view that they tell us of the spiritual findings 
of others, and the processes by which we discover and verify 
such findings for ourselves. The difficulty is that in 
some of his extreme assertions, he even denies them this 
limited value and function. This becomes apparent in his 
argument that the Vedas are only properly understood when 
one has lifted oneself to the same level of direct perception 
as its authors, that they were not written for the 
intellect, 
and cannot be understood through reasoning. Such statements 
negate their preliminary value, which one assumes to be 
dependent on the possibility of some understanding of their 
claims and methods. If such an understanding cannot 
be 
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sought through the faculty of intellectual reasoning, then 
the scripture seems to be totally deprived of usefulness. 
CHAPTER 8 
KARMA (WORK), BHAKTI (WORSHIP) AND JNANA 
(KNOWLEDGE) AS DIRECT AND INDEPENDENT WAYS 
TO MOKSHA 
In Chapter 7, our study of Vivekananda's understanding of 
the authority and functions of the Vedas revealed that he does 
not see the knowledge which is directly and immediately 
derived from those texts as liberating the individual. 
We noted the important distinction between sruti - derived 
knowledge and knowledge which he claims can be obtained 
by direct spiritual perception. While the content of both 
would be the same, it is the latter alone which carries 
absolute conviction and freedom from doubt. The Shankara 
method of the fully qualified aspirant, inquiring into 
sruti with the aid of a teacher, and following proper exegetical 
procedures is not at all presented by him as a means to 
freedom. We have seen his subordinate regard for the 
words and sentences of the sruti, and his argument that 
as a record of the experiences of others, these are of 
little avail. For Vivekananda, sruti is not a self-validating 
source of knowledge, and we have attempted to highlight 
this very important area of contrast with Shankara. 
It is necessary, however, for the purpose of our discussion 
in the present chapter, to point out the agreement between 
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Shankara and Vivekananda on the nature of the fundamental 
problem of avidyä and its resolution. It is only from this 
perspective that we can reasonably and justly evaluate 
Vivekananda's arguments for different independent ways 
of accomplishing freedom. In Chapter 4.1, we considered 
Shankara's discussion of the entirely notional problem 
of avidyd as the basis of his contention that knowledge 
alone is freedom. Knowledge can alone be freedom where 
bondage is only apparent, and liberation already accomplished. 
In our study of the lectures and writings of Vivekananda, 
we find a clear consensus with Shankara on this issue. 
Vivekananda affirms avidyä as the basic human problem and 
the source of all misery and evil. 
1 
Like Shankara, he 
presents the primary manifestation of this ignorance as 
the erroneous identification of the Self with the body. 
It is the assumption of the limitless to be limited. 
All the different sorts of impressions have one 
source, ignorance. We have first to learn what ignorance 
is. All of us think, "I am the body, and not the Self, 
the pure, the effulgent, the ever blissful", and that 
is ignorance. We think of man, and see man as body. 
This is the great delusion. 2 
Vivekananda follows Shankara in presenting avidyä in the 
light of adhydsa (superimposition) and illustrates it by 
employing Shankara's vivid crystal-ball analogy. Like 
a crystal-ball near a red or blue flower, the Self appears 
to be impure or limited only by association. It is never 
so in reality. Bondage is therefore, for Vivekananda, 
3 
only the thought of being bound, and knowledge alone can 
confer freedom. Liberty involves nothing more than the 
destruction of ignorance and it is this knowledge which 
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is the goal of human endeavour. 
This pure and perfect being, the soul, is one wheel, 
and this external hallucination of body and mind is 
the other wheel, joined together by the pole of work, 
of Karma. Knowledge is the axe which will sever 
the bond between the two, and the wheel of the soul 
will stop - stop thinking that it is coming and going, 
living and dying, stop thinking that it is nature and 
has wants and desires, and will find that it is perfect, 
desireless. 4 
In agreement with Shankara, he continuously asserts 
that freedom and perfection are not to be conceived as 
a new attainment. It is a matter of knowing or not knowing. 
5 
Whereas Shankara often uses the story of the fictitious 
loss of the tenth man, Vivekananda employs a similar analogy 
to illustrate a notional loss through ignorance and a gain 
by knowledge. He frequently tells the story of a pregnant 
lioness who, in search of prey, died while in pursuit of 
a flock of sheep. She gave birth to a cub who lived with 
the flock and thought of itself as a sheep. It ate grass 
and bleated. Another astonished lion noticed this sheep- 
lion in the midst of the flock, but could never get close 
because it always fled in fear with the sheep. One day, 
however, he managed to isolate the sheep-lion and tried 
to convince it of its true identity. Not surprisingly, 
it refused to accept that it was a lion. As a last resort, 
the elderly lion took it to a nearby lake and pointed out 
the identity of their reflections. It immediately owned 
its original nature as a lion. 
For both Shankara and Vivekananda, the content of the 
knowledge which frees is the understanding of the limitless 
and unbound nature of the Self. For Shankara, this 
is 
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the central theme of all the Upanishads, and for Vivekananda 
it is the progressive culmination of the teachings of these 
texts. Both men are therefore, clearly in agreement on 
the fact of knowledge being equivalent to freedom, and 
on the central content of this knowledge. Vivekananda, 
however, does not identify liberating knowledge with what 
is gathered from the exegetical analysis of the Upanishads. 
He is derisive about this knowledge and sees it as second 
hand information which is at best only provisionally valid. 
For him, it is only superficial intellectual knowledge. 
The claims of the Upanishads must be again directly discovered 
in the way in which he feels that they were originally 
apprehended by the authors of these texts. For the attainment 
of knowledge as he conceives it, Vivekananda proposes the 
four yogas or karma, bhakti, jnäna and raja. 
6 He unequivocally 
affirms that the aim of all four Yogas is the removal of 
ignorance. 
There is no becoming with the Absolute. It is ever 
free, ever perfect; but the ignorance that has covered 
Its nature for a time is to be removed. Therefore the 
whole scope of all systems of Yoga (and each religion 
represents one) is to clear up this ignorance and allow 
the Atman to restore its own nature.? 
These four different paths, according to Vivekananda, converge 
at the same point, and he claims the support of the scriptures 
for the view that the attainment of knowledge is possible 
in a variety of ways. Even though he specifically mentions 
the jnänakanda as propounding this argument, he does not 
cite any texts. 
8 
It is important to note that Vivekananda sees each 
one of these methods as directly and 
independently capable 
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of leading to knowledge and freedom. One frequently 
encounters statements of the following kind. 
You must remember that the freedom of the soul is the 
goal of all Yogas, and each one equally leads to the 
same result. By work alone men may get to where Buddha 
got largely by meditation or Christ by prayer. Buddha 
was a working Jnäni, Christ was a Bhakta, but the same 
goal was reached by both of them. 9 
Each one of our Yogas is fitted 
even without the help of the of 
all the same goal in view. The 
wisdom, and of devotion are all 
as direct and independent means 
of Moksha. l0 
to make man perfect 
hers, because they have 
Yogas of work, of 
capable of serving 
for the attainment 
He does not see the different methods as being in conflict 
or in contradiction with each other. His rationale for 
a plurality of means is derived from the variety of human 
personalities. Each one is adapted to a different nature 
and temperament. He generalizes the variety of human beings 
into four types. First of all, there is the active, energetic 
temperament, the worker, for whom is meant karmayoga. 
Secondly, there is the emotional man who discovers his 
method in bhaktiyoga. Finally, jnanayoga is intendend 
for the philosophical and rational mind, while räjayoga 
ll 
satisfies the mystically oriented person. 
We can now turn our attention to considering how Vivekananda 
understands these different methods, and the way in which 
they We are not concerned here with presenting they lead to ., V- 
all that he has to say about each method. We shall be 
focusing on the basic nature of each yoga as he understands 
it and assessing particularly the connection he establishes 
with the removal of avid ä. The, validity of his claim 
that each method is a direct and independent path 
to moksha 
depends on his demonstration of the capability of each 
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one to remove ignorance. The latter is, from his own 
standpoint, the fundamental problem. 
8.1 Karmayoga 
There is no single discussion in the lectures and writings 
of Vivekananda where one can turn to find a clear and 
comprehensive statement of his understanding of karmayoga. 
What exactly constitutes karmayoga is therefore, not as 
obvious and apparent as it is in Shankara. 
Vivekananda defines karma very broadly to refer to 
any kind of action, mental or physical. 
12 
He describes 
various personal motives from which individuals act. Among 
these are the desires for wealth, fame, power and heaven. 
He suggests that higher than all of these motives is work 
for work's sake, which he explains to mean working just 
for the good which comes out of it. Good, in this case, 
appears to indicate results which are beneficial to others . 
13 
In searching for his central definition of karrnayoga, the 
concept which emerges most often, therefore, is the idea 
of unselfish action. 
It is the most difficult thing in this world to 
work and not to care for the result, to help a man 
and never think that he ought to be grateful, to do 
some good work and at the same time never look to see 
whether it brings you name or fame, or nothing at all. 
Even the most arrant coward becomes brave when the 
world praises him. A fool can do heroic deeds when 
the approbation of society is upon him, but for a man 
to constantly do good without caring for the approbation 
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of his fellow men is indeed the highest sacrifice man 
can perform. 14 
Although Vivekananda often speaks of karmayoga as an attitude 
of indifference to the results of action, one has to suppose 
that the unconcern is with personal selfish results only. 
A total unconcern with results will make even action for 
the sake of others impossible, for it is difficult to see 
how any action could be initiated without some end in view. 
In addition to implying actions centred on the welfare 
and service of others, karmayoga also comprises a number 
of attitudes, two of which find frequent mention in 
Vivekananda. The first of these is the recognition of 
work as a privilege of worshipping God by serving Him in 
all men. The karmayogi does not serve others because he 
views his help as being indispensable, but because the 
occasions of service are opportunites for ridding himself 
of selfishness and advancing towards perfection. The act 
of service is ultimately beneficial to the karmayogi. 
Blessed are we that we are given the privilege of working 
for Him, not of helping Him. Cut out this word "help" 
from your mind. You cannot help; it is blaspheming. 
You are here yourself at His pleasure. Do you mean 
to say, you help Him? You worship. When you give a 
morsel of food to the dog, you worship the dog as God. 
God is in that dog. He is the dog. He is all and in 
all. We are allowed to worship Him. Stand in that 
reverent attitude to the whole universe, and then will 
come perfect non-attachment. This should be your duty. 
This is the proper attitude of work. This is the secret 
taught by Karma-Yoga. 15 
This attitude of work as worship, the giving up of all fruits 
of action to God, is one way, according to Vivekananda, 
by which the karmayogi achieves detachment from the results 
of action. 
16 
One suspects, however, that in order to emphasize 
the distinction between karmayoga and bhaktiyoga, Vivekananda 
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insists that this detachment is also possible even for 
one who does not believe in isvara. In this case, he 
insists that detachment has to be accomplished by the force 
of will. He justifies this by a recourse to Sämkhya, where 
T 
isvara is not presupposed, and suggests that detachment 
is also possible by adopting an attitude of the world as 
a temporary place of abode, meant only for the education 
of the soul. Instead of identifying with nature, it should 
be viewed as a book to be read and then disposed Of- Whether 
through the acceptance of isvara or not, the karmayogi's 
attitude is characterized by a detachment from concern 
with the personal rewards of action. 
The Karma-Yogi works because it is his nature, because 
he feels that it is good for him to do so, and he has 
no object beyond that. His position in this world 
is that of a giver, and he never cares to receive 
anything. He knows that he is giving, and does not 
ask for anything in return and, therefore, he eludes 
the grasp of misery. The grasp of pain, whenever it 
comes, is the result of the reaction of "attachment". 18 
The view that karrmayoga does not necessitate a belief in 
isvara highlights an important difference between Shankara 
and Vivekananda. With Shankara, there hardly seems to 
be any distinction between karmayoga and bhaktiyoga. The 
form of detached activity Shankara conceives is that which 
is possible by the dedication of all actions to isvara, 
and the calm acceptance of results as coming from Him. 
Karmayoga is therefore, not possible without an appreciation 
of isvara, and of him as the dispenser of the fruits of 
action. 
19 
The k armayogi's attitude to work is also characterized 
by an absence of fanaticism. He is non-fanatical because 
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of his recognition of the limitations of all that he does. 
He knows that in spite of all of his efforts the world 
will never be made perfect. Vivekananda often describes 
the world as a dog's curly tail, which always bends in 
spite of efforts to straighten it. 
20 
The karmayog1 also 
frees himself from fanaticism and self-importance by the 
awareness of his own dispensability. 
In Vivekananda, as contrasted with Shankara, one notices 
the attempt to enlarge the concept of karmayoga. In most 
cases, however, his rationale for the inclusion of a particular 
concept within the framework of karmayoga is not sufficiently 
clear or justified. The result is that the karmayoga concept 
becomes unwieldly and almost all-inclusive, blurring 
Vivekananda's aim of identifying it as a distinctive path 
to moksha. Without any development of argument, he claims, 
for example, that karmayoga has specially to do with the 
understanding of the three gunas and their employment for 
success in activity. He also identifies karmayoga with 
the idea of variation in morality and duty according to 
life circumstances. 
21 
In the course of the same discussion, 
he contends that the central idea of karmayoga is non- 
resistance. 
The Karma-Yogi is the man who understands that the 
highest ideal is non-resistance, and who also knows 
that this non-resistance is the highest manifestation 
of power in actual possession, and also what is called 
the resisting of evil is but a step on the way towards 
the manifestation of this highest power, namely, non- 
resistance-22 
Vivekananda supports this view by a very unusual interpretation 
of Arjuna' s predicament in the first chapter of the Bhagavaý, 
and Krishna's subsequent instruction to him. His argument 
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is that Arjuna was terrified of the opposing army and masked 
his cowardly feelings by arguments about love. Krishna's 
goal was to lead him to the ideal of non-resistance, but 
this could not be accomplished without initiation into 
resistance to purge him of cowardice. Within the concept 
of karmayoga, Vivekananda also sees a natural place for 
the study and practice of rituals and "symbology", as well 
as for an understanding of the nature and force of words 
and other sound symbols and their use. 
23 
We have already drawn attention to Vivekananda's attempt 
to underline the distinctiveness of karmayoga from bhaktiyoga 
by arguing that the former does not necessarily depend 
on the acceptance of isvara. He conceives the possibility 
of unselfish and detached action without the belief in 
God. For him, the essential factor about karmayoga as 
a path is its emphasis on work. It is meant for those 
whose minds cannot be applied on the plane of thought alone 
and whose natures demand some sort of activity. For such 
people, Vivekananda claims, karmayoga teaches where and 
how to work successfully. In order to further strengthen 
his claim for karmayoga as a direct independent path to 
'näna, Vivekananda distinguishes it, one supposes from 
jnänayoga, by describing it as being free from all doctrines 
and dogma. This a conclusion about karmayoga which he 
reiterates throughout his treatment of this path. 
The Karma-Yogi need not believe in any doctrine whatever. 
He may not believe even in God, may not ask what his 
soul is, nor think of any metaphysical speculation. 
He has got his own special aim of realising selflessness; 
and he has to work it out himself. Every moment of 
318 
his life must be realisation, because he has to solve 
by mere work, without the help of doctrine or theory, 
the very problem to which the Jnani applies his reason 
and inspiration and the Bhakta his love-24 
This is a most puzzling conclusion which critical examination 
of his statements on karmayoga finds very difficult to 
sustain. His views are clearly loaded with explicit and 
implicit doctrinal assumptions. These are clearly evident 
when his discussion presupposes isvara, for there are definite 
concepts of the nature of God involved, but they are no 
less so when this standpoint is not presumed. The obvious 
fact is that one embarks on this path of detached activity 
only after certain conclusions about the nature of existence 
and the ultimacy of moksha as the goal of life. The lack 
of concern with the personal rewards of action is not absolute, 
for karmayoga is presented as a method adopted with a definite 
aim in mind. Through unselfish detached action, the karmayogi 
hopes to be free. In spite of what Vivekananda says therefore, 
the action of the karmayogi is not, and cannot be an end 
in itself. 
We should at this point make the observation that 
Vivekananda nowhere distinguishes between karmayoga as 
means and as end. One gets the impression that the possibility 
of selflessness is assumed from the beginning, without 
considering the very personal aim of the karmayogi. The 
distinction between karmayoga as means and end is more 
clearly preserved in Shankara, who appears to see the 
possibility of unselfish action only after the karmayogi 
has attained to the fullness of Self which brahmajnäna confers. 
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From the logic of Vivekananda's presentation of the problem 
of avidyä, it would appear that he also must accept that 
complete unselfishness is not possible without Self-knowledge. 
The unresolved paradox is that in his presentation of 
karmayoga, he assumes that one cannot attain to Self-knowledge 
unless one is perfectly selfless. In fact, in spite of 
his non-acknowledgement of it, and his claim that karmayoga 
as a path involves no doctrines or dogma, the karmayoga 
he presents is intelligible only in the doctrinal context 
of Advaita. Its rationale is to be found there only. 
This is unconcealed in the following kind of discussion, 
quite common in his karmayoga presentation, and suffused 
with Advaita postulates and premises. 
Therefore Karma-Yoga tells us to enjoy the beauty of 
all the pictures in the world, but not to identify 
ourselves with any of them. Never say "mine"... If 
you do, then will come the misery. Do not say "my 
house", do not say "my body". The whole difficulty 
is there. The body is neither yours, nor mine, nor 
anybody's. These bodies are coming and going by 
the laws of nature but we are free, standing as witness. 
The body is no more free than a picture or a wall. 
Why should we be attached so much to a body? If 
somebody paints a picture, he does it and passes on. 
Do not project that tentacle of selfishness, "I must 
possess it". As soon as that is projected, misery 
will begin. 25 
In these kinds of passages karmayoga appears to be more 
the result of Self-knowledge, to be possible only through 
Self-knowledge, rather than as a means to it. If karmayoga 
is to be distinguished from jnänayoga by the absence of 
any doctrinal postulates, then Vivekananda has not at all 
proved this. The knowledge which is its declared aim to 
discover is already presupposed at the inception. Vivekananda's 
claim therefore, that the karmayogi is or can be indifferent 
to doctrine is unsustainable. As an independent path, 
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it does not exist in a doctrinal vacuum and cannot be said 
to be unique on this basis. Vivekananda has nowhere defined 
what exactly he means by doctrine or dogma, but one wonders 
if his view is not somehow made explicable by proposing 
that the Advaita contentions have such an axiomatic character 
for him, that they easily slip into his discussion as 
unquestionable propositions. 
But perhaps, the most problematical aspect of Vivekananda's 
discussion on this matter is the connection he aims to 
establish between karmayoga and moksha. It is here also 
that other important contrasts with Shankara are evident. 
In evaluating this connection, it is very important to 
bear in mind Vivekananda's consensus with Shankara on the 
apparent nature of bondage through avidyd, and the simple 
necessity of knowledge for its removal. Each different 
path, he claims, is an independent and direct means to 
this knowledge. It is clear therefore, that he presents 
these yogas as having the same function which sruti as 
sabda-pramäna has for Shankara. They are supposed, in 
their distinct ways, to give rise directly to brahmajnäna, 
and remove the notional bondage of the Self. 
In Shankara, the function of karmayoga, as of all other 
methods, techniques and disciplines apart from 'nana, is 
the development of the requisite qualities of intellect 
and emotion, prior to inquiry into sabda-pramäna. The 
disciplines themselves never assume the function of sources 
of knowledge, for only the accepted valid pramänas can 
give rise to knowledge. The disciplines, however, are 
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necessary for mental purity (citta-suddhi). Vivekananda 
also accepts that mental purification is the most important 
aim of karmayoga. Because of his view of karmayoga as 
a path of detached selfless activity, mental purity is 
the attainment of unselfishness and indifference to personal 
rewards. 
We have seen already that in helping the world we help 
ourselves. The main effect of work done for others 
is to purify ourselves. By means of the constant effort 
to do good to others we are trying to forget ourselves; 
this forgetfulness of self is the one great lesson 
we have to learn in life. 26 
Vivekananda's radical departure from Shankara is his contention 
that this unselfishness and detachment directly bring about 
Self-knowledge. He does not mention any intervening need 
for inquiry into a pramana. 
We must do the work and find out the motive power that 
prompts us; and, almost without exception, in the first 
years, we shall find that our motives are always selfish; 
but gradually this selfishness will melt by persistence, 
till at last will come the time when we shall be able 
to do really unselfish work. We may all hope that 
some day or other, as we struggle through the paths 
of life, there will come a time when we shall become 
perfectly unselfish; and the moment we attain to that, 
all our powers will be concentrated and the knowledge 
which is ours will be manifest. 27 
To attain this unattachment is almost a life-work, 
but as soon as we have reached this point, we have 
attained the goal of love and become free; the bondage 
of nature falls from us, and we see nature as she is, * 
she forges no more chains for us; we stand entirely 
free and take not the results of work into consideration; 
who then cares for what the results may be? 28 
This attainment does not depend on any dogma, or doctrine 
or belief. Whether one is a Christian, or Jew, or Gentile, 
it does not matter. Are you unselfish? That is a question. 
If you are, you will be perfect without reading a single 
book, without going into a single church or temple. 29 
Ignorance is presented as somehow falling away with the 
cultivation of selflessness and detachment. We have already 
commented on the fallacy of Vivekananda's assertion that 
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karmayoga is free from and does not necessitate any concern 
with doctrine or dogma. We have shown the presupposition 
and inextricable involvement of Advaita postulates throughout 
his discussion. Even if one were to grant that the 
selflessness and detachment of which Vivekananda speaks 
are possible without any Advaita presumptions, it is still 
difficult to grasp how their accomplishment leads to freedom 
in the Advaita sense. Within the context of Advaita. 
attachment and selfishness are the symptoms of avidyä. 
They are the expressions of avidyä and not the cause of it. 
Their overcoming would still appear to leave the fundamental 
problem of avidyd and bondage unresolved. 
The very few areas of discussion where one encounters 
attempts to develop in more detail the relationship between 
karmayoga and moksha are still not satisfactory. One 
always has to accept the supposition that avidyä, by some 
means or other, spontaneously falls away in the automatic 
manifestation of brahmajnäna. Very often, in making the 
connection between karmayoga and moksha, Vivekananda's 
language becomes hazy and imprecise, and there is a tendency 
to reformulate the nature of the problem and the goal 
to be attained. Selfishness, for example, rather than 
avidyd is described as the root of bondage. 
30 The goal 
is presented as that of self-abnegation, and karmayoga, 
by its emphasis on the service of others, leads to this 
by encouraging self-forgetfulness and humility. This 
is identified by Vivekananda with nivritti (renunciation). 
31 
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We become forgetful of the ego when we think of the 
body as dedicated to the service of others - the body 
with which most complacently we identify the ego. 
And in the long run comes the consciousness of 
disembodiedness. The more intently you think of the 
well-being of others, the more oblivious of self you 
become. In this way, as gradually your heart gets 
purified by work, you will come to feel the truth that 
your own Self is pervading all beings and all things. 
Thus it is that doing good to others constitutes a 
way, a means of revealing one's own Self or Atman. 
Know this also to be one of the spiritual practices, 
a discipline for God-realisation. Its aim is also 
Self-realisation. Exactly as that aim is attained 
by Jnana (knowledge), Bhakti (devotion) and so on, 
also by work for the sake of others-32 
Again, however, one cannot but add that from the Advaita 
viewpoint, avidyä is not simply a problem of exalting or 
humbling oneself. It is the erroneous apprehension of 
the Self in the form of adhyäsa (superimposition). Humility, 
as a virtue which may be concomitant with the service of 
others, might be more conducive to 'nana than the arrogant 
exaltation of oneself above all others, but it is difficult 
to see how it can destroy avidyä and lead to the kind of 
Self-understanding which brahmajnäna implies. Without 
any doctrinal presuppositions, the supposedly natural progre- 
ssion which Vivekananda postulates in the above passage 
from the service of others to a knowledge of the distinction 
of Self and body, Its non-dual and all-pervasive nature, 
is difficult to understand. It is not at all clear how 
such far reaching deductions can be made or how they are 
self-evident. A "feeling" of affinity with others through 
service is not the same as a knowledge of the non-duality 
of the Self. 
On another occasion, moksha is identified as 
"infinite 
expansion", claimed by Vivekananda to be the goal of all 
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religious, moral and philosophic doctrines. He identifies 
this "infinite expansion" with "absolute unselfishness" 
and claims that karmayoga leads to the former by bringing 
about the latter. 
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Again, it is not at all clear whether 
this "infinite expansion" is the same as brahmajnana, with 
its implications about the non-dual nature of the Self, 
and its transcendence of spatial and temporal limitations. 
In Advaita also, one can only speak figuratively about 
the "infinite expansion" of the Self. Being, by definition, 
limitless, such an "expansion" can only be in terms of 
gaining the knowledge of its infinity. The consistency 
of this argument and the preciseness of definition and 
language are not always preserved by Vivekananda in these 
discussions. 
The picture of the relationship between karmayoga and 
moksha in Vivekananda appears to become even more complicated 
when one encounters various statements which seem to deny 
and contradict the position that selfless activity leads 
directly to Self-knowledge. All work is presented by 
him as presupposing ignorance, and one must infer therefore, 
that work is incapable of leading directly to freedom. 
The active workers, however good, have still a little 
remnant of ignorance left in them. When our nature 
has yet some impurities left in it, then alone can 
we work. It is in the nature of work to be impelled 
ordinarily by motive and attachment... The highest 
men cannot work, for in them there is no attachment. 
Those whose soul is gone into the Self, those whose 
desires are confined in the Self, who have become ever 
associated with the Self, for them there is no work. 34 
These are passages in which knowledge is affirmed over 
and above work as the only means of freedom. 
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Salvation means knowing the truth. We do not become 
anything; we are what we are. Salvation (comes) by faith and not by work. It is a question of knowledge! 
you must know what you are, and it is done. 35 
On occasions, the connection between work and freedom is 
presented only as an indirect one, a position identical 
with that of Shankara. 
Question: Can Jiva-seva (service to beings) alone 
give Mukti? 
Answer: Jiva-seva can give Mukti not directly but 
indirectly, through purification of the 
mind. But if you wish to do a thing properly, 
you must, for the time being, think that 
that is all-sufficient. 36 
Are these two sets of statements, arguing respectively 
for a direct and indirect connection between karmayoga 
and moksha, entirely opposed? Is Vivekananda adopting 
here a position identical with Shankara and implying a 
need for inquiry into sruti as sabda-pramäna? To suggest 
this would be to go against the main lines of all his 
arguments about the functions of the sruti, and the 
relationship between karmayoga and moksha. Besides, even 
in these statements where he speaks of work as an indirect 
aid to 'näna, there is definitely no mention of any necessity 
for inquiry into sruti as a means of gaining the knowledge 
of brahman. What then do we make of the suggestions in 
these passages? There is one significant occasion on which 
Vivekananda gives us a clue to his meaning in these passages. 
37 
All work, Vivekananda says here, is only useful for removing 
the "veils" that obscure the "manifestation" of the ätman. 
After the "veils" have been removed, "the Atman manifests 
by Its own effulgence". In this sense, according to Vivekananda, 
work cannot be said to directly lead to ätmajnana. Vivekananda 
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cites Shankara for support of this view, but Shankara's 
position is an entirely different one. For Shankara, there 
is no concept or question of the ätman manifesting in 
this manner, for It is never at any time unmanifest. As 
Awareness, It is always self-revealing, and manifesting 
and unmanifesting would be misleading terms, although they 
are quite frequently used by Vivekananda. 
We have seen that the problem, as far as Shankara is 
concerned, is an incorrect apprehension of an ever-revealing 
ätman. Sabda-pramäna is not necessary for making Its 
existence known, but for correcting false notions about 
It. For Shankara, however, the self-revelatory nature 
of the ätman does not imply or is equivalent to a knowledge 
of Its true nature, and he does not suggest that brahmajnäna 
is somehow spontaneously manifest without pramäna inquiry. 
In this discussion, Vivekananda does not distinguish between 
the so-called "manifestation" of the ätman and the knowledge 
of Its nature. Again, there is a problem of terminological 
and conceptual clarity and consistency. For if "manifestation" 
is identical with self-revelatory character, and this again 
is equal to a knowledge of ätman's nature, there will never 
be a problem of avidyä for anyone at anytime. If, on the 
otherhand, "manifestation" is identical with the knowledge 
of the true nature of the Self, how is this knowledge 
"manifested" by a Self which, by definition, is free from 
and beyond all activity? 
Although this particular passage helps, to some extent, 
to clarify some of Vivekananda's apparently contradictory 
327 
statements about the indirect nature of work, it does not, 
however, reconcile all such passages. Perhaps one must 
also take into consideration what appears to be a tendency 
in Vivekananda to idealize and extol each path as he describes 
it, without attempting to reconcile the contradictions 
arising from this approach. In his discussion, there is 
no attempt to relate the particularity and possibilities 
of each method back to the presuppositions and implications 
of avidyd as the fundamental problem. The result is an 
obscurity of terminology and concept. Ultimately, we remain 
unconvinced about the connection between karmayoga as a 
path of detached selfless activity, and moksha as involving 
a knowledge of the non-duality of the dtman, Its nature 
as ultimate reality, and Its transcendence of spatial and 
temporal limitations. 
8.2 Bhaktiyog a 
Vivekananda provides several definitions of bhaktiyoga, 
showing that its singularity lies in love and worship, 
and that its aim is also identity with the absolute. 
Bhakti-Yoga is a real, genuine search after the 
Lord, a search beginning, continuing, and ending in 
love. 38 
Bhakti is a series or succession of mental efforts 
at religious realisation beginning with ordinary worship 
and ending in a supreme intensity of love 
for Ishvara. 39 
Bhakti-Yoga is the path of systematised devotion 
for the attainment of union with the Absolute. 
40 
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Vivekananda reminds us that love and worship directed 
only to isvara can be properly termed bhakti. 
41 
He is 
clear that love, as a relationship, cannot obtain with 
the impersonal, non-dual brahman, free from all qualities 
(nirguna). As an attitude therefore, bhakti is only 
possible in relation to brahman as personal Lord, possessed 
of qualities (sa una). The impersonal and the personal, 
however, are not conceived of as being distinct. 
Brahman is as the clay or substance out of which an 
infinite variety of articles is fashioned. As clay, 
they are all one; but form or manifestation differentiates 
them. Before every one of them was made, they all 
existed potentially in the clay, and, of course, they 
are identical substantially; but when formed, and 
so long as the form remains, they are separate and 
different; the clay-mouse can never become a clay- 
elephant, because, as manifestations, form alone makes 
them what they are, though as unformed clay they are 
all one. Ishvara is the highest manifestation of 
the Absolute Reality, or in other words, the highest 
possible reading of the Absolute by the human mind. 
Creation is eternal and so is Ishvara. 42 
The worship of minor gods (devas) therefore, cannot be 
described as bhakti. This type of worship is interpreted 
by Vivekananda as ritualistic, aimed at producing some 
limited enjoyable result, but never moksha. In the early 
stages of bhaktiyoga, substitutes and images are necessary 
and useful, but isvara should never be completely identified 
with any of these. Their right role is only to serve 
as suggestions for the worship of isvara, who always remains 
the central focus. Even the lesser gods can, in this 
manner, function as suggestions for the worship of 
isvara, 
but the attitude is not bhakti when any of these are worshipped 
as ends in themselves. 
43 
Whereas karmayoga is meant for the activity-oriented ibý 
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nature, bhaktiyoga is conducive to the largely emotional 
temperament who wants only to love and does not care for 
abstract definitions of God or philosophical speculation. 
Vivekananda often identifies bhaktiyoga with the attitudes 
and ideas of the Puränas and describes the method as a 
concession to the human weakness of dependence. 
So long as there shall be the human weakness of leaning 
upon somebody for support, these Puranas, in some form or other, must always exist. You can change their names; you can condemn those that are already 
existing, but immediately you will be compelled to 
write another Purana. 44 
He constantly affirms the advantage of bhaktiyoga to be 
its naturalness and easiness as a method of attaining moksha. 
45 
This argument is linked with the possibility of renunciation, 
seen by him as a common demand of all paths. In karmayoga 
renunciation is in the form of an indifference to the 
personal rewards of action. In räjayoga it is accomplished 
by looking upon nature as a school of experience, the 
purpose of which is to enable the soul to realise its 
eternal separation from matter. In jnänayoga, which, 
according to Vivekananda, is the most difficult, the individual 
has to detach himself by the strength of his reason alone. 
46 
The renunciation of the bhakta, however, is the smooth 
and spontaneous consequence of his intense love for isvara. 
The renunciation necessary for the attainment of Bhakti 
is not obtained by killing anything, but just comes 
in as naturally as in the presence of an increasingly 
stronger light, the less intense ones become dimmer 
and dimmer until they vanish away completely. So 
this love of the pleasures of the senses and of the 
intellect is all made dim and thrown aside and cast 
into the shade by the love of God Himself . 47 
In bhaktiyoga, the various human passions and feelings 
are not viewed as being essentially wrong, but are given 
a new orientation in a relationship with isvara. Pleasure 
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and pain, for example, should not be responses to the 
gain or loss of wealth, but to the realization or non- 
realization of love. 
Unlike his karmayoga discussion where one finds no 
descriptions of a progressive development of method, 
in bhaktiyoga we are provided with details of qualifications 
required by both student and teacher. 
48 As far as the 
student is concerned, six preparatory qualities are repeatedly 
mentioned. The first of these is viveka, which, following 
Ramanuja, he interprets primarily as discrimination in 
matters of food. 
49 Food can be impure as a result of 
three factors. Firstly, certain kinds of food, meat, 
for example, are impure by nature. So also are some types 
of exciting or stimulating foods. Food can also be rendered 
unsuitable by the presence of external impurities, such 
as dust or dirt. Finally, food is also affected by the 
character of the person who prepares or serves it. The 
idea seems to be that the personality of the individual, 
by some means or other, transmits itself through the food. 
This emphasis on food is the result of a link which Vivekananda 
sees between the quality of thoughts and the nature of 
food . 
The second qualification required of the bhakta is 
vimoha or freedom from desires. Isvara alone must be 
the central ideal of desire. All other ideals and objects 
in life are useful, not as ends in themselves, but to 
the extent that they lead to the attainment of bhakti. 
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The third qualification is abhyäsa or practice. There 
must be a continuous effort to restrain the mind from 
the habit of contemplating objects of enjoyment, and fixing 
its attention on 1svara. In this attempt, he emphasizes 
the value of music. The fourth qualification is k 
or good activities. These embrace the daily study of 
religious texts, the making of offerings to the departed 
ancestors, the worship of God, and the service of human 
and non-human beings. The fifth qualification is kalydna 
or purity, which is realized in attitudes and acts of 
truthfulness, straightforwardness, compassion, non-injury 
and charity. Finally, the bhakta should be of a cheerful 
disposition. A gloomy mind, according to Vivekananda, 
is incapable of love. At the same time, he cautions against 
excessive merriment associated with fickleness and unsteadiness 
of mind. The right attitude is one of calm cheerfulness. 
In his discussion of bhaktiyoga as a path to moksha, 
Vivekananda stresses the role of the guru, and the necessity 
of faith, humility and submission towards the teacher. 
The ideal teacher, by whom he appears to mean the avatära, 
is self-evident and is immediately recognized by the student. 
When the sun rises, we instinctively become aware 
of the fact, and when a teacher of men comes to help 
us, the soul will instinctively know that truth has 
already begun to shine upon it. Truth stands on 
its 
own evidence, it does not require any other testimony 
to prove it true, it is self-effulgent-50 
One can, however, adds Vivekananda, also benefit from 
lesser teachers, but these have to be evaluated by certain 
criteria. Three such norms are supplied by him. Firstly, 
he should know the secret of the scriptures, and 
Vivekananda 
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distinguishes this from a knowledge of syntax, etymology 
and philology. 
51 
To be a bhakta, for example, according 
to Vivekananda, there is no need for conclusive historical 
knowledge of the date of the Bhagavadgita, or the details 
of Krishna's life. "You only require to feel the craving 
52 for the beautiful lessons of duty and love in the Gita" . 
Secondly, the teacher of bhakti must be sinless, for only 
one of an impeccable moral stature can communicate spiritual 
truths. Finally, his motive for teaching must only be 
love for his disciple. Bhakti grows only in the relationship 
of a genuine teacher and a fully qualified aspirant. 
Bhaktiyoga is presented by Vivekananda as progressing 
through two stages. The first of these is gauni or the 
preparatory stage, when there is still a necessity for 
myths, symbols, forms, rituals and the repetition of names. 
All of these are associated with the observance of the 
formal or ceremonial aspects of religion and are necessary, 
he says, for the purification of the soul. From the 
preparatory stages, one moves on to parä bhakti or supreme 
devotion. Vivekananda, however, does not delineate the 
details of this transition. Although para bhakti is 
inexpressible, it could, he claims, be described on the 
analogy of human relationships of increasing emotional 
intensities. 53 The first of these is sänta or the peaceful 
relationship, just above the ceremonial or ritual aspects 
of worship, and lacking in intensity of feeling. Higher 
than this is the dpa or servant attitude, the perception 
of isvara as master, and of oneself as servant. Next 
comes sakh a or the relationship of friendship. Here 
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i svara is viewed as the beloved friend who is always near, 
and to whom one's heart is open. It is almost a relationship 
of equals, and God is sometimes viewed as a playmate. 
Still higher, however, is the vätsalya attitude, or looking 
upon God as one's child. It is a relationship intended 
to remove the association of power from our concept of 
God. 
To conceive God as mighty, majestic, and glorious, 
as the Lord of the universe, or as the God of gods, 
the lover says that he does not care. It is to avoid 
this association with God of the fear-creating sense 
of power that he worships God as his own child... This 
idea of loving God as a child comes into existence 
and grows naturally among those religious sects which 
believe in the incarnation of God. 54 
The highest relationship, however, is that of madhura 
(sweet), in which God is viewed as the husband and the 
bhakta as wife. Sometimes even the analogy of illicit 
and obstructed love is employed to characterize its intensity. 
Parä bhakti is most commonly represented by Vivekananda 
as a triangle of three vital characteristics. 
55 
Its first 
feature is the absence of all bargaining. No real love, 
he points out, is possible in the expectation of some 
return. In parä bhakti, there is not even the hope for 
salvation. It is the ideal of love for love's sake; 
isvara is loved because He is lovable, and the bhakta 
cannot help loving. The second characteristic is the 
absence of all fear. God is not loved or worshipped from 
fear, because they are both incompatible. The worship 
of God through fear of punishment, says Vivekananda, is 
the crudest expression of love. God's role as rewarder 
or punisher is not important at this level of 
devotion. 
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Finally, the love of God is always the highest ideal. 
The most intense love is possible only when its object 
is our highest ideal. 
Along with these three characteristics, parä bhakti 
is also distinguished by responses of reverence, pleasure 
and misery. Everything associated with the Beloved, such 
as temples, pilgrimage sites and teachers are revered. 
The bhakta's delight in God is as intense as the pleasure 
of the sensualist in objects of enjoyment. He is miserable 
because of having not attained the ideal of his love, 
and dissatisfied with anything which draws his attention 
away from God. Ultimately, his life is of value only 
because of this love. There are many very beautiful and 
inspiring passages in Vivekananda's description of pard- 
bhakti. The ideal is attained when the bhakta transcends 
the need for all symbol and forms, and when all thoughts 
and emotions effortlessly centre themselves on God. In 
and through his love for God as the universal, the bhakta 
comes to love everything in the universe. 
In this way everything becomes sacred to the Bhakta, 
because all things are His. All are His children, 
His body, His manifestation. How then may we hurt 
any one? With the love of God will come, as a sure 
effect, the love of everyone in the universe. The 
nearer we approach God, the more do we begin to see 
that all things are in Him. When the soul succeeds 
in appropriating the bliss of this supreme love, 
it 
also begins to see Him in everything-56 
In this state of intense, all absorbing love, the 
bhakta 
is completely resigned to the will of God. The 
incomparable 
peace of this resignation is the result of welcoming all 
experiences, pleasurable and painful, as coming from 
his 
Beloved. 
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There are obviously few difficulties with Vivekananda's 
comprehensive account of the prerequisites and characteristics 
of bhaktiyoga. In this detailing, he acknowledges his 
dependence on Ramanuja and other bhakti writers. 
57 
Ramanuja, 
of course, fiercely challenged many of the conclusions 
of Advaita and his concepts of brahman, ätman and moksha 
differ sharply from both Shankara and Vivekananda. Vivekananda, 
however, presents bhaktiyoga as leading directly to the 
conclusions and goal of Advaita. 
Those who have faith in the Personal God have to undergo 
spiritual practices holding on to that idea. If there 
is sincerity, through that will come the awakening 
of the lion of Brahman within. The knowledge of Brahman 
is the one goal of all beings but the various ideas are 
the various paths to it. 58 
One imagines that by, "the awakening of the lion of Brahman 
within", Vivekananda really means the gain of the knowledge 
of brahman, for there is no question of an arousal of 
brahman. In our karmayoga analysis, however, we have 
remarked on the terminological impreciseness at the same 
point in his discussion, and the tendency to reformulate 
the fundamental problem from one of ignorance of an ever 
available brahman. 
Vivekananda's entire presentation of bhaktiyoga is 
descriptive, and while claiming that the method leads 
directly to brahmajnäna, there is very little discussion 
of how this is brought about. To this effect, two suggestions 
emerge from his writings. The first is that the final 
removal of avid y5 and the freedom of non-duality is effected, 
for the bhakta, by the grace of Thvara. 
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That love of God grows and assumes a form which 
is called Para-Bhakti or supreme devotion. Forms vanish, 
rituals fly away, books are superseded; images, temples, 
churches, religions and sects, countries and nationalities 
- all these little limitations and bondages fall off 
by their own nature from him who knows this love of 
God. Nothing remains to bind him or fetter his freedom. 
A ship, all of a sudden, comes near a magnetic rock, 
and its iron bolts and bars are all attracted and 
drawn out, and the planks get loosened and freely 
float on the water. Divine grace thus loosens the 
binding bolts and bars of the soul, and it becomes 
free. 59 
In passages like these, however, we are not provided with 
any details about the nature of the freedom so gained, 
and they are contradicted by the view expressed elsewhere 
denying the dependence of salvation on grace. 
QUESTION: Can salvation (Mukti) be obtained without 
the grace of God? 
ANSWER: Salvation has nothing to do with God. 
Freedom already is. 60 
There are other passages in Vivekananda which suggest 
a natural progression to freedom through parä bhakti. 
We can do no better than cite one such example. 
We all have to begin as dualists in the religion 
of love. God is to us a separate Being, and we all 
feel ourselves to be separate beings also. Love then 
comes in the middle, and man begins to approach God, 
and God also comes nearer and nearer to man. Man 
takes up all the various relationships of life, as 
father, as mother, as son, as friend, as master, as 
lover, and projects them on his ideal of love, on 
his God. To him God exists as all these, and the 
last point of his progress is reached when he feels 
that he has become absolutely merged in the object 
of his worship. We all begin with love for ourselves, 
and the unfair claims of the little self make 
even love selfish. At last, however, comes the full 
blaze of light, in which this little self is seen 
to have become one with the Infinite. Man himself 
is transfigured in the presence of this Light of Love, 
and he realises at last the beautiful truth that 
Love, 
the Lover, and the Beloved are One. 61 
That the movement from the duality of bhaktiyoga to non- 
duality is a natural and inevitable progression is not 
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at all clearly demonstrated in these passages. In fact, 
these passages seem only to fall into the context of his 
general presupposition that all religious quests will 
eventually end in non-duality, and in the context of the 
progressive development of doctrine which he claims to 
be able to trace in the Vedas. 
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Unless this presupposition 
is accepted, then the inexorable movement from duality 
to non-duality is not clear from his bhaktiyoga discussion. 
The discovery of non-duality occurs from the stage of 
pars bhakti, but even at this level, from his own descriptions, 
there is a clear distinction between worshipper and worshipped. 
One cannot assume this discovery to be in terms of knowledge 
derived from the sruti, for, as in karmayoga, he stresses 
the lack of necessity for doctrines in pars bhakti. The 
transition therefore, without sabda- pramana, from the love 
and worship of God, to a knowledge of the limitlessness 
and reality of one's own Self, remains open to question. 
8.3 Jnänayog a 
It may appear to be very surprising that of all the 
paths to moksha examined in the present chapter, Vivekananda 
offers the least details on jnänayoga. It is true that 
most of his lectures and writings elaborate Advaita theories 
about the nature of God, man and the universe, and could, 
in this sense, be said to be concerned withJnäna. He 
does not provide, however, any clear outline of the method 
of jnänayoga as a path to moksha. One suspects that the 
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difficulty here is that, even from Vivekananda's standpoint, 
j ana is the goal for which all other paths are means. 
In proposing 'nanayoga as a path among other direct paths, 
jnana becomes a means to n6ana. If at the very inception 
one has the knowledge which is the object of the quest, 
then there seems to be no further need to search for that 
knowledge. In Shankara, this difficulty is obviated by 
the fact that knowledge gained from the sruti is both 
means and end. Shankara does not suggest that this knowledge 
must, in some way or other, be further applied or employed 
as a means of gaining the same knowledge. In Vivekananda's 
case, however, any knowledge derived from sruti inquiry 
is not final knowledge, and we have emphasized this contrast 
with Shankara. Final, liberating knowledge is only derived 
through the direct verification afforded by a special 
experience. Only in this sense does 3nänayoga as a means 
to 'nana appear understandable. Even so, Vivekananda 
does not demonstrate how this initial, but inconclusive, 
knowledge is further applied to arrive at the same, but 
conclusive, knowledge. 
In Vivekananda's writings, we are only given vague 
suggestions about what constitutes the distinctiveness 
and development of jndnayoga as a path among other paths. 
We can bring together the suggestions which find frequent 
mention. He presents jnänayoga as a method suitable only 
for the highest and most exceptional minds, the brave, 
strong and daring. It is the way of the minority. In 
contrast with other paths, it is most difficult, but also 
brings the quickest results. 63 
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The object of Jnana-Yoga is the same as that of Bhakti 
and Raja Yogas, but the method is different. This 
is the Yoga for the strong, for those who are neither 
mystical nor devotional, but rational. 64 
While selfless activity seems to be the chief distinctive 
feature of karmayoga, and loving worship of bhaktiyoga, 
Vivekananda presents "pure" reason and reliance on will 
as the singular characteristics of jnänayoga. He describes 
it as the rational and philosophical side of yoga. 
As the Bhakti-Yogi works his way to complete oneness 
with the Supreme through love and devotion, so the 
Jnana-Yogi forces his way to the realisation of God 
by the power of pure reason. He must be prepared 
to throw away all old idols, all old beliefs and super- 
stitions, all desire for this world or another, and 
be determined only to find freedom. Without Jnana 
(knowledge) liberation cannot be ours. 65 
The Jnani is a tremendous rationalist; he denies everything. 
He tells himself day and night, "There are no beliefs, 
no sacred words, no heaven, no hell, no creed, no church 
- there is only the Atman". When everything has been 
thrown away until what cannot be thrown away is reached, 
that is the Self. The Jnani takes nothing for granted; 
he analyses by pure reason and force of will, until 
he reaches Nirvana which is the extinction of all 
relativity. 66 
Occasionally, the path of jnänayoga is briefly alluded 
to as the negative way, "neti, neti" (not this, not this), 
but the exact nature of this negative reasoning is not 
developed. 67 In one place, it is described as a method 
of mind control or destruction, after which the real discloses 
itself. 68 Elsewhere, his description suggests that it 
is a denial of the non-Self and an assertion of the Self. 
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Among other characteristics of jnanayoga, Vivekananda 
twice describes it as "creedlessness". It is, according 
to him, the end to which all creeds should aspire, but 
it is above and beyond creeds. 
7° Perhaps this statement 
has also to be seen in the light of Vivekananda's general 
low estimation of what he regards as doctrines. 
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The most common definition of jnänayoga in Vivekananda 
is his description of it as a method of pure reason and 
will. This definition, however, raises a number of problems 
within the context of his overall views. In describing 
ýnanayoga to be of this nature, he does not indicate the 
source of the propositions upon which the 'näni exercises 
his reason, or whether these propositions are arrived 
at by reason itself. One is left wondering therefore, 
about whether sruti is to be understood as the source. 
If we assume that the original propositions are derived 
from sruti, then the utility or even the possibility of 
reasoning upon these statements seems to be undermined 
by some of Vivekananda's own contentions. We have already 
noted his view that sruti, as the product of an experience 
transcending reason, cannot be understood by reason. 
He has also argued that as a record of other people's 
experiences, sruti is of little benefit to the new aspirant. 
We shall also later see his claim that reason is only 
possible after experience and does not precede it. 
It appears that in order to understand and evaluate 
Vivekananda's definition of jnanayoga as a path to knowledge 
through pure reason, we must take a broader look at the 
nature and functions of reason in his writings. We need 
also to look at specific examples of the kinds of reasoning 
he employs, and the claims which he makes 
for these. 
In spite of his characterization of 
jnanayoga as 
a path of pure reason, Vivekananda, 
like Shankara, argues 
for the limited nature of reason. Its activity, 
he says, 
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is confined only to a narrow sphere, and beyond this it 
cannot reach. The most that reason can do in relation 
to ultimate questions is to adopt a position of agnosticism, 
for the answers to these questions lie outside of its 
field. 
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According to Vivekananda, the highest demonstration 
of reasoning in any branch of knowledge can only make 
a fact probable. 
The truths of religion, as God and Soul, cannot be 
perceived by the external senses. I cannot see God 
with my eyes, nor can I touch Him with my hands, and 
we also know that neither can we reason beyond the 
senses. Reason leaves us at a point quite indecisive; 
we may reason all our lives, as the world has been 
doing for thousands of years, and the result is that 
we find we are incompetent to prove or disprove the 
facts of religion. 72 
The chief limitation of reason therefore, as a faculty 
of deriving knowledge about God is its dependence on sense 
perception for its data. It can only run, he contends, 
within the bounds of perception for one only reasons upon 
data gathered through the senses. This constitutes its 
essential weakness, and binds it to the realms of time 
and space. He sees reason as classified and stored perception, 
preserved in memory. 
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As an intellectual process, it 
comes into being only after perception. This is true 
for both secular and spiritual knowledge. 
All argument and reasoning must be based upon certain 
perceptions. Without these, there cannot be any 
argument. Reasoning is the method of comparison between 
certain facts which we have already perceived. If 
these perceived facts are not there already, there 
cannot be any reasoning. If this is true of external 
phenomena, why should it not be so of the internal. 
The chemist takes certain chemicals and certain results 
are produced. This is a fact; you see it, sense it, 
and make that the basis on which to build all your 
chemical arguments. So with physicists, so with all 
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other sciences. All knowledge must stand on perception 
of certain facts, and upon that we have to build our 
reasoning. 74 
This argument that reason becomes possible only subsequent 
to perception seems to undermine Vivkananda's own claim 
about jnänayoga as a path of reason. If reason is the 
chief tool which the aspirant has to employ from the inception, 
then it appears impossible to do so without a direct 
perception of spiritual truths. If, on the other hand, 
he directly perceives these truths, then, from the logic 
of Vivekananda's own arguments, reason is redundant. 
Shankara shares the view that the primary limitation 
of inferential reasoning is its reliance on perception. 
In Shankara, however, the problem of the limitations of 
reason is overcome by the acceptance of sruti as a pramäna. 
Sruti is the only source of brahmajnäna. For Shankara, 
reason is the tool which we employ in understanding, interpreting 
and reconciling the words and sentences of the 'sruti . 
As a pramäna in the form of words, these must be accurately 
understood, for the meanings of words are not always 
obvious. 
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The contrast in the role ascribed to reason by Shankara 
and Vivekananda is clearly highlighted in their respective 
interpretations of an important sruti text, Katha Upanishad 
1.2.7-9, which is concerned with the problems of expounding 
the ätman and the limits of reason. 
The wisdom that you have, 0 dearest one, which 
leads 
to sound knowledge when imparted only 
by someone else 
(other than the logician)ö not to be endowedgh 
argumentation. You are, Pas 
JIt -) 
with true resolution. 
you, 0 Naciketä. 76 
May our questioner be like 
Vivekananda interprets this text as proscribing the application 
of all kinds of reasoning to the attainment of brahmajnäna. 
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Shankara, on the other hand, sees it as only forbidding 
independent reasoning, conjured by one's own intellect 
and having no basis in the sruti. He does not deny the 
futility of all reasoning. 
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Unlike Shankara, Vivekananda posits the overcoming 
of the limitations of reason through a transcendental 
or superconscious state of mind. The knowledge which 
Shankara gains from the sruti is gained, for him, by an 
experience which goes beyond reason. It is a faculty, 
he claims, which all men possess. 
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Generally speaking, 
because of the overriding importance which Vivekananda 
places upon this special experience as a source of knowledge, 
he ascribes much less importance and esteem to reason 
than Shankara. He groups reason, along with theories, 
documents, doctrines, books and ceremonies, as an aid 
to religion. In relation to the superconscious experience, 
the role of reason is merely preparatory. 
8° 
Vivekananda 
does not elaborate on this function, but it appears to 
be largely negative. It checks and prevents crude errors 
and superstition. 
The intellect is only the street-cleaner, cleansing 
the path for us, a secondary worker, the policeman; 
but the policeman is not a positive necessity for 
the workings of society. He is only to stop disturbances, 
to check wrong-doing, and that is all the work required 
of the intellect. 81 
In the light of Vivekananda's argument that reason cannot 
operate before perception, it is not clear how it can 
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accomplish even this negative role. There is no clear 
indication of the nature and source of the information 
upon which the aspirant exercises his reason, and no suggestion 
of the principles which should guide reason in this pre- 
perception stage. 
Our attempt to study the wider significance of reason 
in Vivekananda seems therefore, to question and raise 
several unresolved issues about his definition of jnänayoga 
as the method of pure reason. These doubts are also supported 
by a consideration of specific examples of his own reasoning. 
The nature of his reasoning can be studied in what is, 
perhaps, one of his most interesting lectures, "Reason 
and Religion" . 
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Religions, argues Vivekananda, have 
very often assumed the superiority of their claims over 
the findings of secular sciences, and refused to be justified 
by the latter. The unfortunate result of this has been 
a perpetual struggle between religion and secular knowledge, 
with the claims of the former being gradually eroded. 
If religion is to survive, there is a necessity, according 
to Vivekananda, to justify itself in the light of rational 
investigation and the findings of secular knowledge. 
Are the same methods of investigation, which we apply 
to sciences and knowledge outside, to be applied to 
the science of Religion? In my opinion this must 
be so, and I am also of the opinion that the sooner 
it is done the better. Ifa religion is destroyed 
by such investigations, it was then all the time useless, 
unworthy superstition; and the sooner it goes the 
better. I am thoroughly convinced that its destruction 
would be the best thing that could happen. All that 
is dross will be taken off, no doubt, but the essential 
parts of religion will emerge triumphant out of this 
investigation. Not only will it be made scientific 
- as scientific, at 
least, as any of the conclusions 
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of physics or chemistry - but will have greater strength, 
because physics or chemistry has no internal mandate 
to vouch for its truth, which religion has-83 
Vivekananda then proceeds to enumerate two principles 
of reasoning or knowledge which, he claims, conclusively 
establish certain Advaita propositions to be scientifically 
valid. The first principle of reasoning is that movement 
in knowledge is from the particular to the general, and 
from the general to the more general until the universal 
is reached. He sees the notion of law or species of beings 
as applications of this principle of generalization. 
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The second principle of reasoning is that the explanation 
of a thing must come from the inside and not from the 
outside. 
This tendency you will find throughout modern thought; 
in one word, what is meant by science is that the 
explanation of things are in their own nature, and 
that no external beings or existences are required 
to explain what is going on in the universe. 85 
Vivekananda sees the concept of evolution as a demonstration 
of this principle. He understands evolution to signify 
the reproduction of the cause in the effect, or the full 
presence of the potentialities of the cause in the effect; - 
He also sees the concept of the personal extra-cosmic 
deity as creator of the universe, as having failed to 
satisfy this scientific demand for an internal explanation. 
Vivekananda sees the brahman concept of Advaita as satisfying 
both of these scientific principles. 
We have to come to an ultimate generalisation, which 
not only will be the most universal of all generalisations, 
but out of which everything else must 'come. It will 
be of the same nature as the lowest effect; the cause, 
the highest, the ultimate, the primal cause, must 
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be the same as the lowest and most distant of its 
effects, a series of evolutions. The Brahman of the 
Vedanta fulfils that condition, because Brahman is 
the last generalisation to which we can come. It 
has no attributes but is Existence, Knowledge, and 
Bliss - Absolute. Existence, we have seen, is the 
very ultimate generalisation which the human mind 
can come to. 86 
Brahman also satisfies the need for an internal explanation, 
for It has nothing outside of Itself. It is identical 
with the universe, and the latter could therefore, be 
described as self-creating, manifesting and dissolving. 
As identical with brahman, the universe is its own explanation. 
For purposes of clarification, it should be stated that 
brahman is not identical with the universe in the sense 
of having undergone a real transformation to become the 
universe. The universe is only an appearance in brahman, 
brought about by mäyä. Maya is identical with brahman, 
and cannot be defined as either real or unreal. Brahman's 
nature is never lost, and It is not limited by the appearance 
of the universe. 
In order to evaluate the achievements of these kinds 
of arguments in Vivekananda, it is better, at this point 
in our discussion, to view them in the much wider context 
of his general attempt to present Advaita as scientific. 
Karma and bhakti yoga are described respectively as the 
science of work and love. 
87 It is obvious that in drawing 
this parallel, Vivekananda was working with a certain 
concept of science. This attempt to harmonize science 
and religion is not, by any means, original to Vivekananda, 
but was an important strand of thought in the Brahmo Samaj 
movement, particularly 
in its early phases, in thinkers 
1 ike Akshay. kumar Dutt, Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar and 
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Brajendranath Seal. 88 To found and justify their religion 
upon rational and scientific grounds was fundamental to 
their approach. Religion and science were not seen as 
incompatible, but as two sides of the same quest for truth, 
and the "science of religion" was an expression often 
used in their writings. As one who moved in the milieu 
of the Brahmo Samaj during the earlier years of his life, 
Vivekananda was undoubtedly influenced by this line of 
thinking and many of these ideas are later echoed by him. 
The difficulty of arriving at the root of his concept 
of science is that he never clearly formulated it in any 
particular lecture or writing. Certain general ideas, 
however, find repeated mention, and these serve as the 
clue to the scientific concept he was using to draw a 
parallel with religion. The most important idea which, 
for him, linked science and religion was the idea of unity. 
The aim and end of the scientific method, according to 
Vivekananda, was the finding of unity, the one out of 
which the manifold is being manifested. As soon as any 
science found such a unity, it would come to an end, for 
it would have reached the highest point beyond which it 
cannot proceed. 
89 
He represented science as having already 
discovered a physical oneness of the universe, in telling 
us that everything is a manifestation of energy, the sum 
total of all that exists. The difference between Advaita 
and science, he says, is that the former had discovered 
this oneness much earlier by its search into internal 
nature, while the latter had discovered it through investigating 
the external. The corollary, of course, is that the discovery 
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of this common goal makes Advaita scientific. 
Physics would stop when it would be able to fulfil 
its services in discovering one energy of which all 
the others are but manifestations, and the science 
of religion become perfect when it would discover 
Him who is the one life in a universe of death, Him 
who is the constant basis of an ever-changing world. 
One who is the only Soul of which all souls are but 
delusive manifestations. Thus is it, through multiplicity 
and duality, that the ultimate unity is reached. 
Religion can go no farther. This is the goal of all 
science. 90 
The issue for query here is whether the aim and method 
of science can be defined by the search for unity. If, 
for the sake of argument, one were to accept this as being 
so, the question as to whether a religion that proposes 
a goal of oneness is justified in being described as scientific, 
still remains open. The scientist, if drawn into this 
controversy, will most certainly contend that his discipline 
cannot only be defined by its general aim, even provided 
that this could be agreed upon. There is the vital question 
of its methodology, the most important aspect of which 
is its agreed means and standards of verification. 
Although Vivekananda is not explicit on this point, 
it seems that he uses the concept of science to refer 
to any rational system which proposes a goal and outlines 
a "practical" method for its accomplishment. "Scientific" 
is equated, by him, with that which is internally consistent 
and practical. It appears that he also describes the 
four yogas as being scientific in this sense. 
This strikes 
one, however, as a loose application of the term. It 
is perhaps more accurate and meaningful to describe such 
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a system as rational, rather than scientific. We have 
already noted his identification of the method of generalization 
and the search for an internal explanation as other features 
of science. 
The search for unity, the movement from the particular 
to the general, and the attempt to explain all phenomena 
by reference to their own natures are perhaps broad features 
of the scientific method, although science does not necessarily 
proceed on the assumption of the existence of any final 
unity. It is another matter, however, to describe as 
scientific any system which proposes unity as the ultimate 
reality, which proceeds from the particular to the general, 
and which offers an internal explanation. 
91 In spite 
of Vivekananda's attempt to show that the method of 
generalization and the criterion of an internal explanation 
renders Advaita scientific, it is obvious that this aim 
is not achieved. While Advaita might proceed on the method 
of moving from the particular to the general, and brahman 
as a universal encompasses everything, these features 
do not make it scientific in the same sense as other 
conclusions of the physical sciences. This is also true 
for the argument that the universe must be explained with 
reference to its own internal nature. These kinds of 
reasoning perhaps demonstrate Advaita to be in line with 
certain general trends in scientific thinking, but they 
are not independently conclusive arguments. They add a 
certain plausibility to the propositions of Advaita and 
reveal them as not being inconsistent with some forms 
of scientific thinking, but one cannot contend that 
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these explanations scientifically demonstrate the validity 
of Advaita. In this sense, Vivekananda's reasoning is 
not different in its achievement from what Shankara conceives 
to be the possibility of reason in relation to sruti. 
This conclusion raises further questions about his definition 
of jnänayoga as a method of pure reason, and his belief 
that religion must be fully justified by the standpoint 
of reason. 
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Our conclusion can be further demonstrated by looking 
at one more example of his reasoning. One of his favourite 
and most frequently employed forms of reasoning is to 
draw parallels between the microcosm and macrocosm. 
93 
In observing the microcosm, Vivekananda says, the pattern 
is that everything begins from certain seed-like or fine 
forms, and then becomes grosser and grosser. They develop 
in this way for some time, before subsiding and reverting 
back to their fine forms. The manifest or gross is the 
effect and the finer form the cause, but the effect is 
simply a reproduction of the cause in a different form. 
The effect is not different from the cause. His second 
conclusion is that all forms in the microcosm are cyclically 
rising and falling. Thirdly, the grosser forms do not 
immediately emerge from the finer ones. Their emergence 
is preceded by a period of unmanifest activity. Finally, 
we never observe anything in the microcosm being produced 
out of nothing. Vivekananda extends these conclusions 
to the nature of the macrocosm. The universe, as a whole, 
has its cause in brahman, from which, as an effect, it 
is not different. It has also emerged out of a finer 
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form to which it will again revert, and this process is 
a cyclical one. Like the other arguments we have considered, 
this is also not independently conclusive. While certain 
generalizations can be made from observation of the microcosm, 
one cannot infallibly infer from these about the nature 
of the macrocosm. The uniformity of nature, as an assumption, 
may not have been refuted, but it is only an assumption 
nevertheless. This argument, however, can add some credence 
to the cosmological views of Advaita. 
Close scrutiny of Vivekananda's arguments show that 
they are all constructed on implicit premises from the 
sruti. He does not directly acknowledge this, and in 
the manner in which his arguments are presented, the sruti- 
derived propositions are not always obvious. We can illustrate 
this by citing an interesting example from his writing. 
The Atman is the only existence in the human body 
which is not material. Because it is immaterial, 
it cannot be a compound, and because it is not a compound, 
it does not obey the law of cause and effect, and 
so it is immortal. That which is immortal can have 
no beginning because everything with a beginning must 
have an end. It also follows that it must be formless; 
there cannot be any form without matter. .. But the 
Self having no form, cannot be bound by the law of 
beginning and end. It is existing from infinite time; 
just as time is eternal, so is the Self of man eternal. 
Secondly, it must be all-pervading. It is only form 
that is conditioned and limited by space; that which 
is formless cannot be confined in space. So according 
to Advaita Vedanta, the Self, the Atman, in you, in 
me, in everyone, is omnipresent. 94 
This excerpt is a splendid example of a logically formulated 
argument, constructed from successive inferences. Its 
movement is swift and complex, but it is all composed 
on the premise of the immateriality of the ätman. The 
validity of all subsequent inferences depend on this. 
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This premise, however, is not arrived at through any kind 
of inference, and we must conclude therefore, that its 
origin is in the sruti. 
Vivekananda's writings reveal that his principal 
concern in elaborating the four yo gas as direct and independent 
means to moksha was to highlight what he saw as the liberal 
and universal claims of V edänta. He wished to contrast 
this with the exclusivism, particularly of Christianity, 
which proclaimed only one way to freedom. It is not within 
the scope of our discussion to present a detailed analysis 
of his theories on religious diversity, but it is important 
to understand his motivation in arguing for different 
ways to moksha. He saw religious strife as the result 
of the adoption by each religion of a narrow self-righteous 
position. It was a special concern of his, and his first 
speech before the Parliament of Religions in 1893 was 
on the theme of sectarianism and bigotry. Vivekananda's 
own solution was to propose the concept of a universal 
religion. By universal religion he does not mean religious 
uniformity or the triumph of one particular tradition 
over all others. He saw certain failure in such attempts. 
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Universal religion, for him, seems synonymous with the 
absence of exclusiveness. In this connection, he distinguishes 
between the terms religion and sect. The former is indicative 
of an all embracing attitude, whereas the latter is exclusive. 
The same distinction he makes between religion and creed, 
and refuses to use the former appellation to designate 
Christianity because of its antagonistic features. 
96 
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By universal religion, Vivekananda means, more than anything 
else, a particular outlook on religious diversity. A number 
of attitudes constitute this outlook. The natural necessity 
of variation must be recognized and accepted. 
Just as we have recognised unity by our very nature, 
so we must also recognise variation. We must learn 
that truth may be expressed in a hundred thousand 
ways, and that each of these ways is true as far as 
it goes. We must learn that the same thing can be 
viewed from a hundred different standpoints and yet 
be the same thing. 97 
In spite of this diversity of expression, religions are 
to be seen as manifestations of a common struggle towards 
God, and each should strive to assimilate the spirit of 
others while preserving its own individuality. 
In his formulation of the concept of universal religion, 
two Hindu ideas have an extended function in the interpretation 
of diversity and the development of a spirit of understanding. 
The first of these is the idea of the avatära or the 
incarnation of God in the human world. The application 
of the idea in this context would result in the recognition 
of the falsity of the assertion that any single prophet 
is alone true. He saw each religious founder as representing 
and emphasizing a great ideal. The second idea centres 
around the principle of the ishta-deva, or the freedom 
to choose a concept or representation of God and a means 
of worship consistent with one's own needs and preferences. 
There is no necessity to impose one's preferences on others. 
It is in the light of his ideal of universal religion 
and what he considered to be its central characteristics 
that one must look at Vivekananda's argument for Advaita 
as fulfilling this ideal. There are several grounds 
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on which he sought to justify this role. We have already 
noted his argument that whereas all other traditions are 
based on the life of a founder and therefore, susceptible 
to any doubts of historicity, Vedänta is founded on impersonal 
principles. Within this impersonal framework, however, 
it has, in the ideas of avatära and ishta, a wide scope 
for the play of personalities. He has argued that it 
is easier to share a common vision on principles rather 
than on personalities. Among other characteristics, he 
sees the idea of tolerance as being well rooted, and the 
harmony of its propositions with the findings of secular 
knowledge. He also considers the spiritual oneness of 
the universe advocated in Advaita as a better foundation 
for ethics than personal authority. It is in this context 
that he proposes the methods of karma, bhakti, 3näna and 
räjayoga, as being wide enough to embrace the active, 
emotional, philosophical and mystical temperaments. He 
sees these four paths within a single tradition as overcoming 
the one-sided nature of other religions. 
In the present chapter, however, we have tried to 
show that he does not conclusively demonstrate karma 
and bhaktiyoga, as formulated by him, to be direct and 
independent paths to moksha. In respect of these two 
methods, our principal line of argument has been that 
in the context of the Advaita definition of avid ä and the 
nature of bondage, as well as its conception of moksha, 
karma and bhaktiyoga raise and leave unanswered many 
questions. There is no clear formulation of the nature 
of jnänayoga as a distinct method, and his characterization 
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of it as a method of pure reason cannot be sustained in 
the light of a wider examination of the functions which 
he assigns to reason. In fact, his own claim for these 
was to be independent paths to brahmajnana appears to 
break down when, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
he argues that räjayoga is the only means through which 
one can gain the unique experience which directly validates 
religious truth. In the light of this claim, all other 
methods appear preparatory for räjayoga, rather than as 
being the self-sufficient means which he presents them 
to be. Throughout his discussion of karma and bhaktiyoga, 
there is the hint or suggestion of these methods suddenly 
culminating in an experience of some kind, which, by itself, 
eliminates avidyd. It is to a consideration of his 
innumerable references to this experience, that we must 
now turn our attention. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE MEANING AND AUTHORITATIVENESS OF ANTJBHAVA 
IN VIVEKANANDA 
In Chapter 7, we sought to present Vivekananda's 
understanding of the nature, role and authority of the 
Vedas, and to deduce relevant contrasts with Shankara. 
It clearly emerged that Vivekananda does not posit the 
knowledge derived from the Upanishads as having any 
immediate or self-sufficient validity for the aspirant. 
At best, such knowledge only stands as a possibility, 
testifying to the spiritual discoveries of others, and 
the methods by which these have been made. To be free 
from all doubts and incontestable, the declarations of 
the Upanishads, according to Vivekananda, must be personally 
verified by each individual through some sort of direct 
perception of their claims. It is only knowledge derived 
through this direct apprehension that he considers to 
be ultimately valid and capable of liberating from avidyä. 
He seems to think that knowledge obtained from any other 
source is second-hand, and will always lack certitude 
and conviction. In our consideration of the methods of 
karma, bhakti and n-ana in Chapter 8, we repeatedly encountered 
suggestions of the progression to a final experience in 
which brahmajnäna spontaneously manifests, and av 
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is overcome. In this connection, we pointed to a certain 
obscurity in Vivekananda's discussion, and to difficulties 
in reconciling the nature of moksha with the peculiarities 
and assumptions of the methods suggested. In the present 
chapter, we seek to draw together and evaluate the many 
statements of Vivekananda on the nature of the experience, 
which, he asserts, leads to valid knowledge of brahman. 
9.1 The Rationale and Significance of Anubhava 
One cannot overestimate the importance of the experience 
of direct perception in Vivekananda' s philosophy of religion. 
It is this which he signifies by the often used expression 
"realisation", and which may, with good reason, be said 
to constitute the central and most outstanding feature 
of his religious thought. It is an idea which he unfailingly 
labours in almost every one of his lectures. In his first 
major address at the Parliament of Religions in 1893, 
for example, he presented this idea as, "the very centre, 
the vital conception of Hinduism". 
The Hindu does not want to live upon words and theories. 
If there are existences beyond the ordinary sensuous 
existence, he wants to come face to face with them. 
If there is a soul in him which is not matter, if 
there is an all-merciful Soul, he will go to Him 
direct. He must see Him, and that alone can destroy 
all doubts. So the best proof a Hindu sage gives 
about the soul, about God, is: "I have seen the soul; 
I have seen God". And that is the only condition 
of perfection. The Hindu religion does not consist 
jai 
in struggles and attempts to believe a certain doctrine 
or dogma, but in realising - not in believing, but in being and becoming-1 
In his quest for the common bases of the diverse religious 
traditions within the wide embrace of the Hindu fold, 
he again and again presented this idea of religion as 
realization or direct perception, as belonging to everyone 
of them. 
The mighty word that came out from the sky of spirituality 
in India was Anubhuti, realisation, and ours are the 
only books which declare again and again; "The Lord 
is to be seen". Bold, brave words indeed, but true 
to their very core; every sound, every vibration is 
true. Religion is to be realised, not only heard; 
it is not in learning some doctrine like a parrot. 
Neither is it mere intellectual assent - that is 
nothing; but it must come into us. Ay, and therefore 
the greatest proof that we have of the existence of 
a God is not because our reason says so, but because 
God has been seen by the ancients as well as by the 
moderns. 2 
Why does realization or the possibility of a direct 
perception of religious claims occupy such an unmistakably 
prominent focus in Vivekananda's thought? What was his 
primary interest in arguing for its necessity and reality? 
It emerges from his lectures and writings that he was 
anxious to find an essential point of reference or appeal, 
by virtue of which the profound issues and claims of religion 
could be placed on the level of fact. He was concerned 
that all of the crucial and significant issues of religion, 
such as the existence and nature of God and the soul, 
could never be finally and satisfactorily established 
by any form of argument or process of reasoning. 
3 
In 
Chapter 7, we have sufficiently emphasized his disdain 
tor "theoretical" religion, doctrine and dogma. Vivekananda 
wanted to demonstrate that religious propositions can, 
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and must be certified by a process of verification not 
unlike that employed by the physical sciences. 
4 
All knowledge, contends Vivekananda, is based upon 
and derived from experience. 
5 Inferential knowledge, 
for example, has its basis in sense experience. The appeal 
of the physical sciences, according to Vivekananda, lies 
in the fact that claims can be referred to particular 
experiences of all human beings. 
The scientist does not tell you to believe in anything, 
but he has certain results which come from his own 
experiences, and reasoning on them when he asks us 
to believe in his conclusions, he appeals to some 
universal experience of humanity. In every exact 
science there is a basis which is common to all 
humanity, so that we can at once see the truth or 
fallacy of the conclusions drawn therefrom-6 
The problem of religion, argues Vivekananda, is that it 
is generally presented as founded upon faith and belief, 
and lacking central and universal experiences by reference 
to which its claims could be verified. He strongly denies 
this, and affirms that religious beliefs are also derived 
from certain generic experiences. All religions, according 
to Vivekananda, make the claim that its truths originate 
from the experiences of certain persons. 
The Christian asks you to believe in his religion, 
to believe in Christ and to believe in him as the 
incarnation of God, to believe in a God, in a soul, 
and in a better state of that soul. IfI ask him 
for reason, he says he believes in them. But 
if you 
go to the fountain-head of Christianity, you will 
find that it is based upon experience. Christ said 
that he saw God; the disciples said they felt God; 
and so forth. Similarly, in Buddhism, it 
is Buddha's 
experience. He experienced certain truths, saw 
them, 
came in contact with them, and preached 
them to the 
world ... Thus 
it is clear that all the religions of 
the world have been built upon that one universal 
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and adamantine foundation of all our knowledge - direct experience.? 
The unfortunate fact, argues Vivekananda, is the claim 
in the present time that these experiences were unique 
to certain people, and are no longer possible, so that 
religious conviction must now be founded on faith. His 
strong contention is that any experience in a particular 
branch of knowledge must be repeatable. 
Rdjayoga is the method proposed by Vivekananda for 
enabling us to attain direct perception of religious truths. 
In fact, he claims that this is the method advanced by 
all schools of Indian philosophy for gaining moksha. 
8 
In his discussion of räjayoga, we also find the declaration 
that it is "as much a science as any in the world", with 
its own unique methods for producing results when properly 
applied. Like his claim for the method of karmayoga, 
he emphasizes that no faith or belief is necessary. 
9 
This, one assumes, is linked to his urge to demonstrate 
this method to be scientific. We must now concern ourselves 
with the outline and steps of räjayoga as presented by 
Vivekananda. 
9.2 The Method of Räjayoga 
Räjayoga, based primarily on the Yoga-sutras of Patanjali, 
comprises eight disciplines. We shall'briefly look at 
how Vivekananda understands each of these procedures. 
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The first steps are the ethical and moral disciplines 
of yama and niyama. Yama incorporates non-killing, truthfulness, 
non-stealing, continence, and the non-receiving of gifts. 
Niyama comprises cleanliness, contentment, austerity, study 
and self-surrender to God. These disciplines, according 
to Vivekananda, are the very basis of the successful practice 
of Yoga. 
l° 
The second step is äsana (posture). Vivekananda 
explains that a comfortable posture is necessary for the 
daily execution of physical and mental exercises. The 
posture which is easiest should be chosen, as long as 
the spinal column is kept erect. 
The practice of pränäyama follows facility in äsana. 
It is one of the procedures of räjayoga for which a considerable 
discussion occurs in Vivekananda. He is most concerned 
to refute the popular view that pränäyama is essentially 
a routine aimed at the control of breathing. The universe, 
according to Vivekananda, is composed of two basic materials, 
äkäsä and präna. Akasa is the original substance out 
of which everything possessing form or produced as a result 
of combination is evolved. It is, in other words, conceived 
by Vivekananda as the basic subtle stuff of the universe. 
Präna on the other hand, is the power by which äkäsa is 
manufactured into a diversity of forms. Out of prdna 
emerges everything called force or energy, and among its 
manifestations are motion, gravitation and magnetism. 
11 
Vivekananda explains therefore, that pranayäma is really the 
knowledge and control of präna. In the human body, adds 
Vivekananda, the most ostensible demonstration of the activity 
of präna is the rhythmic motion of the lungs 
in breathing. 
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P räna is responsible for this movement, and not vice- 
versa. Pränäyäma is a vast attempt, through the mastery 
of the breathing process, to gain control of all conscious 
and unconscious activity in the body. 12 
The next three processes in rajayoga are the largely 
mental disciplines of pratyähära, dhärana and dhyäna. 
P ratyahara is the continuous process of restraining and 
controlling the mind by curbing its attachment to the 
internal and external organs of perception . Pratyähära 
is followed by dhärana, the practice of focusing the 
mind's attention on certain fixed points. One may centre 
attention, for example, exclusively on some parts of 
the body. 13 Dhygna follows directly from this exercise. 
When the mind has been trained to remain fixed on 
a certain internal or external location, there 
comes to it the power of flowing in an unbroken current, 
as it were, towards that point. This state is called 
Dhyana. 14 
It is through the steady practice of dhyäna that the 
aspirant eventually attains to samädhi, the culmination 
of all the disciplines of räjayoga. The entire procedure, 
claims Vivekananda, is designed to bring us scientifically 
to this all-important state. 
From the lowest animal to the highest angel, some 
time or other, each one will have to come to that 
state, and then, and then alone, will real religion 
begin for him. Until then we only struggle towards 
that stage. There is no difference now between us 
and those who have no religion, because we have no 
experience. What is concentration good for, save 
to bring us to this experience? Each one of the 
steps to attain Samadhi has been reasoned out, properly 
adjusted, scientifically organised, and when faithfully 
practised, will surely lead us to the desired end. 
Then will all sorrows cease, all miseries vanish; 
the seeds for actions will be burnt, and the soul 
will be free for ever. 15 
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Samadhi is the result, attests Vivekananda, of the 
awakening of the kundalini. 
16 
This is the single way, 
he says, of attaining spiritual knowledge through direct 
perception. He sees all religious disciplines as leading 
consciously or unconsciously to this end, and proclaims 
räjayoga as, "the science of religion, the rationale 
of all worship, all prayers, forms, ceremonies, and 
miracles". 
Thus the rousing of the Kundalini is the one 
and only way to attaining Divine Wisdom, superconscious 
perception, realisation of the spirit. The rousing 
may come in various ways, through love for God, through 
the mercy of perfected sages, or through the power 
of the analytic will of the philosopher. 17 
Although the concept of the samädhi-experience is derived 
by Vivekananda from the Yoga-sutras of Patanjali, Patanjali 
does not refer to the kundalini. The idea of the kundalini 
appears to have been unknown to him, and belongs to the 
schools of T antra. 
18 
Samädhi occupies, for Vivekananda, the same function 
and status as a source of knowledge for brahmajnäna, 
which Shankara ascribes to the Vedas as sabda-pramdna. 
In fact, he presents samädhi as the only satisfactory 
source of brahmajnäna. It is important therefore, that 
we seek to understand the exact manner in which he sees 
knowledge as occurring in this state. 
9.3 The Nature of S amädhi as a Source 
of Knowledge 
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(I) . Samädhi as Highest Level of Mental Activity 
Vivekananda very often describes the nature of samädhi 
by distinguishing three gradations of mental activity. 
The lowest of these is the level of instinctive behaviour, 
most highly developed among animals. Here, according 
to Vivekananda, thought is largely unconscious, and actions 
are unaccompanied by any feelings of egoism or self- 
awareness. Instinctive activity includes all reflex 
actions. Although he describes instinct as the lowest 
instrument of knowledge, he speaks of it as being almost 
infallible. The impulse of an animal rarely fails. 
19 
The problem with instinct, however, says Vivekananda, 
is the limited sphere of knowledge and activity within 
which it operates. Its responses are mechanical and 
incapable of dealing readily with anything new or uncharted. 
Reason is a more highly developed instrument of knowledge 
than instinct. It is conscious mental activity, most 
efficient in man, and accompanied by a sense of egoism 
and self-awareness. 
20 
It is the level of thought and 
judgement, gathering facts and generalizing. Even though 
its sphere of operation, says Vivekananda, is much wider 
than the confines of instinct, it is nevertheless very 
1 invited. 21 In contrast with the accuracy of instinct, 
Vivekananda describes reason as being slower and more 
liable to error. 
Higher than unconscious instinct and conscious reason 
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is the superconscious state of mind or samädhi. It is 
described by Vivekananda as the most elevated plane on 
which the mind can function, and here it completely transcends 
the limits of reason and instinct and apprehends facts 
inaccessible to these. He characterizes the superconscious 
as being infallible and far more unlimited in its scope 
than reason. The superconscious, according to Vivekananda, 
shares with instinct the quality of being free from the 
sense of egoism, but the two levels are completely opposed. 
He admits the danger and difficulty of mistaking instinct 
for inspiration, and suggests a set of criteria by which 
these two could be distinguished. Using sleep as an 
example of unconscious mental activity, he points out 
the primary difference from samädhi. 
When a man goes into deep sleep, he enters a plane 
beneath consciousness. He works the body all the 
time, he breathes, he moves the body, perhaps, in 
his sleep, without any accompanying feeling of ego; 
he is unconscious, and when he returns from his sleep, 
he is the same man who went into it. The sum total 
of the knowledge which he had before he went into 
the sleep remains the same; it does not increase 
at all. No enlightenment comes. But when a man 
goes into Samadhi, if he goes into it a fool, he 
comes out a sage-22 
The second norm tor distinguishing the superconscious 
from instinct, according to Vivekananda, is that the 
former never contradicts reason. If it ever does, he 
argues, it cannot be the superconscious, and reason has 
to be the basis for making this distinction. The explanation, 
adds Vivekananda, lies in the fact that these three states 
progressively evolve. 
There are not three minds in one man, but one state 
of it develops into the others. Instinct develops 
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into reason, and reason into the transcendental 
consciousness; therefore, not one of these states 
contradicts the others. Real inspiration never 
contradicts reason, but fulfils it. 23 
The third standard, proposed by Vivekananda, has to do 
with the integrity of the individual who claims to be 
inspired. Such a person should be seen to be perfectly 
unselfish, not motivated by any desire for fame or material 
gain, and the content of his experience should be for 
the good of all. It is Vivekananda's view that the state 
of superconsciousness, though attained by few, is possible 
for all. 
(II). Samadhi as Method of Concentration 
As a means of knowing the Self, samädhi is usually 
presented by Vivekananda as a method of concentration 
or meditation. This is again clearly associated with 
his concern to present räjayoga as a scientific method 
of gaining brahmajnana. 
To do this, Vivekananda speaks in universal terms 
about the acquisition of different kinds of knowledge. 
The process of acquiring knowledge, he contends, begins 
with the gathering of facts through observation. On 
the basis of these facts we then generalize and deduce 
conclusions. 
24 
Vivekananda emphasizes observation or 
concentration as the primary and paramount act in the 
operation of acquiring any knowledge. In the physical 
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sciences, it is a question of concentrating the mind 
on external phenomena. 
There is only one method by which to attain this 
knowledge, that which is called concentration. The 
chemist in his laboratory concentrates all the energies 
of his mind into one focus, and throws them upon 
the materials he is analysing, and so finds out their 
secrets. The astronomer concentrates all the energies 
of his mind and projects them through his telescope 
upon the skies; and the stars, the sun, and the moon, 
give up their secrets to him. 25 
No real science, continues Vivekananda, is possible 
without this power of concentration, and it is similarly 
presented by him as the key to the knowledge of the essential 
nature of man. In this case, however, the observation 
is internal. 
The powers of the mind should be concentrated and 
turned back upon itself, and as the darkest places 
reveal their secrets before the penetrating rays 
of the sun, so will this concentrated mind penetrate 
its own innermost secrets. Thus will we come to 
the basis of belief, the real genuine religion. 
We will perceive for ourselves whether we have souls, 
whether life is of five minutes or of eternity, 
whether there is a God in the universe or none. 
It will be all revealed to us. 26 
Internal observation, admits Vivekananda, is not as easily 
attained as the observation of external nature in science, 
but he sees in räjayoga a method of developing this capacity. 
27 
The common quality, identified by Vivekananda, of deriving 
knowledge through observation is one of the principal 
arguments used by him in seeking to show räjayoga to 
be scientific. Because it derives its facts simply by 
observing, says Vivekananda, there is no necessity for 
reliance on faith or blind belief. 
28 
The uniqueness and chief characteristic of räjayoga 
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as a method of procuring knowledge through observation 
is that the object of study as well as the instrument 
is the mind. 
29 It is the study of the contents of the 
mind which reveals to us our true natures. Sometimes, 
without distinguishing between mind and soul, Vivekananda 
speaks of the necessity for analyzing or anatomizing, 
by observation, the nature of the soul. Through this 
method alone, he attests, does one discover its immortality 
and omnipresence. 
30 
Vivekananda's conception of räjayoga as a mode of 
acquiring knowledge through concentration of the mind 
has to be seen in the context of his repeated assertion 
that all knowledge, secular or spiritual, is within. 
No knowledge, he contests, ever comes from outside. 
Using the terms mind and soul interchangeably, he describes 
both as repositories of infinite knowledge. 
31 Past, 
present and future knowledge, he says, is inherent in 
man, and pre-existing through eternity. The entire process 
of knowing, according to Vivekananda, is more accurately 
described as one of discovery or unveiling, for knowledge 
is never really created. 
We say Newton discovered gravitation. Was it 
sitting anywhere in a corner waiting for him? It 
was in his own mind; the time came and he found it 
out. All knowledge that the world has ever received 
comes from the mind; the infinite library of the 
universe is in your own mind-32 
Vivekananda describes the external world as simply 
the suggestion or stimulus which drives one to study 
the contents of his own mind. He affirms that knowledge 
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is never to be found in insentient matter. Vivekananda, 
however, still justifies the necessity for the spiritual 
teacher by proposing a similar argument. While never 
compromising his stand that every kind of knowledge is 
inherent, he contends that this inborn knowledge can 
only be called out or made manifest by another knowledge. 
Dead, insentient matter never calls out knowledge, 
it is the action of knowledge that brings out knowledge. 
Knowing beings must be with us to call forth what 
is in us, so that these teachers were always necessary. 
The world was never without them, and no knowledge 
can come without them. 33 
In all of these discussions, his emphasis is upon the 
teacher within who really teaches, and without whom all 
teachers are useless. Vivekananda claims the support 
of the Bhagavadgitä for this view, and speaks of the 
imperative for getting the knowledge contained in the 
Upanishads from within oneself. 
34 
In fact, Vivekananda 
presents this argument about the innate nature of all 
knowledge as a doctrine of V eddnta, and describes all 
spiritual disciplines, including karmayoga, bhaktiyoga 
and jHäna oga, as being meant only for its awakening. 
35 
Through samädhi, contends Vivekananda, is this intrinsic 
knowledge directly gained. He goes to the extent of 
claiming that samddhi is the means of spiritual knowledge 
in every religious tradition. In all cases, according 
to Vivekananda, where religious teachers claimed to have 
received knowledge "from beyond", the source has always 
within themselves. Knowledge is often described as coming 
from the outside because individuals can stumble upon 
the samädhi state without understanding its nature. 
36 
370 
The accidental discovery of sämadhi, and its interpretation 
according to different levels of belief and education 
is Vivekananda's explanation for the quaint mixture 
of truth and superstition in religion. 
37 
(III). Sämadhi as Death of the Mind and 
Absence of Duality 
In our study, so far, of Vivekananda's description 
of the nature of sdmadhi as a source of knowledge, the 
impression is that he identifies the state with a particular 
level of mental activity. Even in what he defines as 
the superconscious condition, the mind still appears 
to be operative. This description, however, seems to 
be modified, if not contradicted, by several passages 
in which he repeatedly affirms that sdmadhi is consequent 
upon the death of the mind, and that it is characterized 
by a total absence of all mental functions. There is 
a constant tension in Vivekananda's writings between 
his portrayal of samddhi as a state in which the mind 
still obtains, and one in which it ceases to exist. 
Vivekananda describes the goal of räjayoga as the 
total supression of all thought forms in the mind. He speaks 
of the necessity to curb each thought as it enters into 
the mind, making the mind a vacuum. 
38 
A disciple is 
advised by him to "kill the mind". 
39 
He repeatedly contends 
that the knowledge of the dtman naturally and spontaneously 
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follows the extinction of the mind. In fact, he presents 
atmajnana as being dependent on this extinction. 
Yoga is the science by which we stop Chitta from 
assuming, or becoming transformed into, several 
faculties. As the reflection of the moon on 
the sea is broken or blurred by the waves, so 
is the reflection of the Atman, the true Self, 
broken by the mental waves. Only when the sea 
is stilled to mirror-like calmness can the reflection 
of the moon be seen, and only when the "mind- 
stuff", the Chitta is controlled to absolute 
calmness is the Self to be recognised. 40 
The mind has to be divested of all modifications 
(Vrittis) and reconverted into a transparent 
lake, so that there remains not a single wave of 
modification in it. Then will Brahman manifest 
Itself. 41 
There are several occasions on which Vivekananda enthusiastically 
professed that even a momentary cessation of the mind 
leads to the full knowledge of the Self. 
42 
There are not many descriptions in Vivekananda's writings 
of the actual state of samädhi. He describes it as being 
"sensationless", and characterized by the cessation of 
all mental modifications. 
43 
All duality disappears and 
the Knower and known become one. 
44 
We are afforded, 
however, two personal accounts of the samädhi state 
by Vivekananda, both strikingly similar. On the basis 
of Vivekananda's own discussions, we can consider the 
first account, where even his ego-sense disappeared, 
to be truer to the samädhi ideal. The confession of 
his inability to recollect anything in the absence of 
his ego consciousness is significant. 
One day in the temple-garden at Dakshineswar Shri 
Ramakrishna touched me over the heart, and first 
of all I began to see that the 
houses - rooms, doors, 
windows, verandahs - the trees, the sun, 
the moon 
- all were flying off, shattering 
to pieces as it 
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were - reduced to atoms and molecules - and ultimately became merged in the Akasha. Gradually again, the Akasha also vanished, and after that, my consciousness 
of the ego with it; what happened next I do not 
recollect. 45 
(IV) . Samddhi as Direct Perception or Objective 
Knowledge 
The analogy almost invariably used by Vivekananda 
to describe the gain of ultimate knowledge in samädhi 
is pratyaksha (direct perception). He argues throughout 
for the possibility of a direct perception of religious 
truths. He fervently asserts that this alone can be 
convincing and satisfactory proof of the verity of religious 
claims. 
46 
This direct perception is always particularly 
distinguished by him from intellectual assent or dissent, 
and belief in doctrines. He is derisive towards the 
latter kind of religious commitment, classifying it as 
not being different from atheism. The goal is always 
affirmed to be direct perception, which alone constitutes 
real knowledge. This perception is, of course, not described 
by him to be the same as ordinary sense perception. 
He is clear that normal sense perception cannot apprehend 
religious truth. What is required is superconscious or 
"superfine" perception. This similarity lies in what 
he sees as the immediate verification which perception 
of both kinds afford. 
What is the proof of God? Direct perception Pratyaksha. 
The proof of this wall is that I perceive it. God 
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has been perceived that way by thousands before, 
and will be perceived by all who want to perceive 
Him. But this perception is no sense-perception 
at all; it is supersensuous, superconscious, and 
all this training is needed to take us beyond the 
senses. 47 
Facts have to be perceived, and we have to perceive 
religion to demonstrate it to ourselves. We have 
to sense God to be convinced that there is a God. 
We must sense the facts of religion to know that 
they are facts. Nothing else, and no amount of 
reasoning, but our own perception can make these 
things real to us, can make my belief firm as a rock. 
That is my idea, and that is the Indian idea. 48 
Religion is based upon sense contact, upon seeing, 
the only basis of knowledge. What comes in contact 
with the superconscious mind is fact. Aptas are 
those who have "sensed" religion. 49 
The notion of realization, which we have noted to 
be a prominent feature of Vivekananda's thought, is equivalent 
to this direct perception. He makes even the proof of 
the very existence of the ätman dependent on perception. 
50 
The possibility of coming into direct contact with the 
facts of religion is seen by him as putting the basis 
of verifying religious truth on the same level with science. 
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This direct encounter occurs in the state of samädhi. 
The highest grade of Samadhi is when we see the real 
thing, when we see the material out of which the 
whole of these grades of beings are composed, and 
that one lump of clay being known, we know all the 
clay in the universe. 52 
He makes the same point with reference to the movement 
of the kundalini. 
It is supersensuous perception. And when it reaches 
the metropolis of all sensations, the brain, the 
whole brain, as it were, reacts, and the result 
is 
a blaze of illumination, the perception of the 
Self. 53 
The image of a flash or "blaze of illumination" is quite 
frequently employed by Vivekananda to describe the gain 
of knowledge in samädhi. He describes 
inspiration as 
5 
the process of gaining knowledge 
"by flashes" .4 
374 
Purification and preparation through Yoga and meditation 
make clearer the "flashes or realization". 
55 
The conception 
of monism "flashes" into the human soul, and on one occasion 
he describes as "the full blaze of light", the moment 
in which "this little Self is seen to have become one 
with the Infinite", 
56 
Although it has been alluded to in our discussion, 
it is important to specifically emphasize the self-valid 
status which Vivekananda ascribes to knowledge gained 
through this process of direct perception. His disdain 
for dogma, doctrine, theory, books and intellectual assent 
and dissent is directly related to his view of the self- 
valid nature of knowledge gained through realization. 
Throughout his writings, he upholds the supreme value 
of realization in contrast with all of these. 
Talking is one thing, and realising is another. 
Philosophies, and doctrines, and arguments, and books, 
and theories, and churches, and sects, and all these 
things are good in their own way; but when that real- 
isation comes, these things drop away. For instance, 
maps are good, but when you see the country itself, 
and look again at the maps, what a great difference 
you find! So those that have realized truth do not 
require the ratiocinations of logic and all other 
gymnastics of the intellect to make them understand 
the truth, ; it is to them the life of their lives, 
concretised, made more tangible. 57 
He affirms that the superconscious state never makes 
an error, and that inspiration requires no external test, 
but is immediately recognized. 
58 
It is only through 
this kind of experience that all doubts finally vanish. 
What is intellectually grasped, he declares, may be dislodged, 
but what is directly perceived can never be supplanted. 
59 
He has stated positively on many occasions that only 
through realization can there be any reality in religious 
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life or any genuine moral values. 
9.4 A Critical Overview of Räjayoga as 
Means to B rahma j nana 
Our attempt to bring together the various dimensions 
of Vivekananda's conception of räjayoga as a means to 
the direct knowledge of brahman highlights certain problematic 
and unresolved aspects of his argument. Many of these 
are closely connected to crucial contrasts with Shankara's 
understanding of the nature of brahmajnäna and the means 
of its attainment. It is on these issues we must now 
focus our discussion. 
In Chapter 8, we considered some of the reasons behind 
Vivekananda's proposal of distinct direct paths to moksha. 
We saw his argument that the yo gas of karma, bhakti and 
'näna were each independently capable of leading to freedom. 
We encountered, however, difficulties in reconciling 
the details of these methods with the nature of moksha 
as understood in Advaita. Vivekananda's rationale for 
räjayoga also appears to undermine this central argument 
of his. Here, he professes that direct perception is 
the only acceptable way of ascertaining religious truth, 
and this is attained solely through samddhi, the culmination 
of the discipline of rajayoga. We have seen that "all 
worship consciously or unconsciously leads to this end", 
and that rä 'ayoga is "the science of religion, the rationale 
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of worship, all prayers, forms, ceremonies and miracles". 
In the face of these paramount and exclusive claims for 
räjayoga as the means par excellence, what are we to 
make of the view that karma, bhakti and 'nana lead directly 
to the desired end? Are we to understand now that these 
approaches are really only preparations for räjayoga, 
even as Shankara argues for the relationship between other 
methods and 'näna? In his discussion of these paths, 
however, Vivekananda does not make any mention of the 
necessity for a subsequent undertaking of the disciplines 
of räjayoga. He presents them as self-sufficient means 
for the gain of moksha. If samadhi is the only valid 
source of religious knowledge, and if karma, bhakti and 
'nana are not to be understood as merely preparatory 
to räjayoga, then it would seem that we ought to comprehend 
these as also leading to samädhi. We have seen , however, 
Vivekananda's claims that the different steps of räjayoga 
are designed to lead the aspirant scientifically to the 
state of samädhi. He has also argued about the dangers 
of accidentally encountering this state without following 
the prescribed procedures of räjayoga. One is likely 
to be deranged, the source of knowledge will be misunderstood, 
and with knowledge will come superstition. 
To get any reason out of the mass incongruity we 
call human life, we have to transcend our reason, 
but we must do it scientifically, slowly, by regular 
practice, and we must cast off all superstition. We 
must take up the study of the superconscious state 
just as any other science. 60 
If these dangers can be averted only by understanding 
and adopting the scheme of räjayoga, are they not present 
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as real possibilities for the aspirant in karma, bhakti 
and 'näna, where Vivekananda does not make räjayoga 
imperative? Will there not also be errors in knowledge 
and therefore, non-attainment of moksha? Vivekananda's 
arguments for the independence and self-sufficiency of 
these other means seem now under question. 
We have referred from time to time in our discussion 
to Vivekananda's attempts to equate the gain and verification 
of knowledge through rdjayoga with the methods employed 
in science. The grounds, however, upon which he draws 
his parallels leave many questions unanswered. 
61 
Vivekananda's 
analogy with science is basically an analogy between 
religious experience and sense perception. The assumption 
is that both are verifiable in the same way. Almost 
all of his examples, as well as his terminology, are 
drawn from the world of sense perception. There appears, 
however, to be very important differences between sensory 
experience and religious experience. Sense perception 
is not as simple as Vivekananda assumes, and it is certainly 
not always self-validating. The possibilities of sense 
illusion and deception are very well accepted. Even 
though these may not be readily apparent, there are definite 
criteria which are imbibed and employed in validating 
sense experience. It might be argued that definite criteria 
are also available for verifying religious experience. 
But the problem here is reaching agreement on those criteria. 
In the case of sense perception, the criteria are widely 
accepted, but the criteria for evaluating religious experience 
in any particular community of shared beliefs may not 
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be considered reliable in a community with different 
traditions. 
In drawing the analogy between sense experience and 
religious experience, Vivekananda's comparison usually 
rests on the sense of sight alone. The fact, for example, 
that there are five distinct organs operating in a combined 
way, reinforcing and correcting each other, is not taken 
into account. In the case of his common example of the 
wall, sight could be reinforced by touch and sound. The 
absence of anything to compare with this in religious 
experience has to be taken into account whenever a parallel 
is drawn with sense perception. Agreement within 
a religious community on the criteria to be used in evaluating 
spiritual experience may be valid and genuine. There 
is always, however, the possibility that such agreement 
may be the result of lack of awareness of alternatives, 
the sharing of erroneous beliefs, or the use of the same 
techniques to produce similar results. 
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We have seen 
Vivekananda's acceptance of the possibility that instinct 
could be mistaken for the superconscious. 
As we have noted earlier, Viv ekananda suggests three 
criteria by which we could distinguish the samadhi experience 
from anything involving the unconscious or instinct. 
Out of samadhi, says Vivekananda, one emerges with wisdom. 
This, however, does not help us very much unless there 
is some prior agreement on what constitutes wisdom. 
It 
is these very truth-claims that need to be evaluated. 
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If we try to apply his second criterion that the experience 
must be in accord with reason, other problems emerge. 
What are the agreed forms or premises of reason to be 
applied? Where are these to be derived from? How can 
reason be employed in validating claims to which reason 
has no direct access and is incapable of apprehending? 
If the validity of the experience is dependent on its 
conformity to reason, providing such standards of reasoning 
could be agreed upon, this would seem to elevate reason 
to a status above that of the experience. It would also 
challenge Vivekananda's argument about the self-valid 
nature of the experience and its infallibility. 
In seeking to present räjayoga as conforming to the 
methods of science, Vivekananda is constrained to considerably 
modify, if not misrepresent, the scientific process of 
gaining knowledge. He uses the word "experience" in the 
most general sense possible, when he speaks of all knowledge 
as being derived from experience. He does not specify 
the uniqueness and complexity of the "experience" through 
which knowledge is gained and corroborated in the physical 
sciences. The claims of science are not always as easily 
verifiable in the experiences of ordinary people as Vivekananda 
suggests. In the same way, Vivekananda speaks of all 
religious traditions as being founded on "experience", 
without taking into account the great diversity among 
and within religious traditions about their origins and 
the nature of their authoritative sources. But perhaps 
the most significant point about his loose use of the 
word "experience" is the fact that, in respect of sariadhi, 
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he is making claims for a singular and unique experience, 
totally unlike any other. He speaks generally about science 
and all other religious traditions as being founded on 
experience, and ignoring all diversity and differences, 
slips into making assertions about the distinctive experience 
of samädhi. Another very clear example of Vivekananda's 
over-simplification of the methodology of science in order 
to underline parallels with räjayoga is his highlighting 
of observation or concentration as the only formula for 
gaining knowledge. As important as this quality of mind 
is in most fields of endeavour, one cannot assert that 
the insights gained by the scientist in the laboratory 
are simply the results of his concentration, or that the 
latter is the chief element of his methodology. 
Vivekananda's analogy between samädhi and sense experience 
provokes another crucial question. We have seen that 
he speaks repeatedly about the necessity for a direct 
perception of the ätman, if Its very existence is to be 
certified beyond any doubt. Perception, however, whether 
ordinary or supersensuous, involves knowledge gained through 
objectification. It also implies a duality between the 
Knower and known. In Advaita, the definition of the ätman 
as the ultimate and only Knower, incapable of being objectified 
by any faculty, is one of its fundamental tenets. 
63 There 
is no other Knower for whom the ätman can become an object. 
To suggest that the ätman must be known through a form 
of objective perception is to posit the existence of some 
other Knower. The objectification of the ätman by another 
knowing entity would also signify Its limitation, for 
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only a delimited thing can be objectified. Thus a suggestion 
about acquiring knowledge of the ätman through any kind 
of perception appears to deny Its very nature. Vivekananda 
himself argues this position very lucidly. 
You cannot by any possibility say you know Him; it 
would be degrading Him; You cannot get out of yourself, 
so you cannot know Him. Knowledge is objectification. 
For instance, in memory you are objectifying many 
things, projecting them out of yourself. All memory, 
all things which I have seen and which I know are 
in my mind. The pictures, the impressions of all 
these things, are in my mind, and when I would try 
to think of them, to know them, the first act of 
knowledge would be to project them outside. This 
cannot be done with God, because He is the essence 
of our souls; we cannot project Him outside ourselves... 
He is one with us; and that which is one with us is 
neither knowable nor unknowable, as our Self. You 
cannot know you own Self; you cannot move it out 
and make it an object to look at, because you are 
that and you cannot separate yourself from it. Neither 
is it unknowable, for what is better known than yourself? 
It is really the centre of our knowledge. In exactly 
the same sense, God is neither unknowable nor known, 
but infinitely higher than both; for He is our real 
Self. 64 
Vivekananda's proposal, through räjayoga, of the necessity 
and possibility of ätmajnäna by a direct perception of 
the existence and nature of the ätman cannot be reconciled 
with the fundamental Advaita position which he unequivocally 
formulates in the passage quoted above. It is difficult 
to make sense of his call for analyzing or anatomizing, 
by observation, the nature of the ätman. We have stated 
before that he draws a parallel between rajayoga and the 
method of science by asserting that both depend upon observation 
or concentration. In the case of räjayoga, the observation 
is supposed to be internal. We fail to see, however, 
how full knowledge of the ätman can be gained by any kind 
of observation, internal or external. As Awareness 
(cit), 
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It is the very content and basis of the observer, and 
not available as an object of observation. If, as Vivekananda 
also suggests, the content of the mind is the object of 
observation in räjayoga, it is not at all clear how this 
can afford us knowledge of the Self, the very witness 
of all mental processes. We gain knowledge through observation 
only when an object is available for scrutiny. 
Vivekananda's concern for positing the possibility 
of a direct perception of religious truth is undoubtedly 
motivated by what he thinks to be the drawbacks of other 
arguments and approaches. The basis of his attempt to 
do this involves the creation of a sharp dichotomy between 
experience and doctrine, accepting, in doing so, the 
possibility of a pure uninterpreted experience. We have 
already noted, from many different standpoints, his belittling 
of everything which he considers to be doctrine and dogma. 
This attitude is directly related to the fact that he 
presupposes the existence of a pure self-interpretative 
experience. Recent studies on mysticism and religious 
experience have sharply brought into focus the flaws 
of this assumption, and highlighted the complexity of 
the interplay between experience and doctrinal interpretation. 
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In Vivekananda's view, a clear experience is followed 
later by the recording, in words, of its implications 
and significance. This is how he conceives, for example, 
the origin of the Vedas. 
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The assumption is that having 
an experience is a distinct matter from giving 
it expression 
in language. In reality, however, no such dichotomy can 
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be easily demonstrated, for language and experience are 
inseparable. Language does not merely provide labels 
for describing, but, in fact, makes experience possible. 
It broadens the range of experience. To merely describe 
an experience as "religious" involves a tremendous interpre- 
tative process. Anyone, for example, lacking familiarity 
with the language, imagery or theology of a religion 
cannot describe himself as having a "religious" experience. 
The simplest interpretation of experience in religious 
terms takes for granted complex doctrinal claims with 
which it is heavily laden. In fact it would seem that 
an "uninterpreted experience" is a contradiction in terms. 
An experience always belongs to someone who is never 
free from a belief system of some kind. Experience therefore, 
seems to imply interpretation and never occurs in a vacuum. 
Even in the case of science, from which he draws most 
of his analogies, an uninterpreted experience is not 
usually a means of objective knowledge. It is only when 
the "simple" experiences of the physical world are seen 
in wider theoretical frameworks, that meaningful conclusions 
are drawn. It seems reasonable to suggest that experience, 
of itself, is not knowledge, but it puts one in a position 
where knowledge can be increased. 
There are many issues in Vivekananda's own writings 
which suggest a far more dynamic and intricate 
interplay 
between experience and doctrine, than the simple one 
he argues for in räjayoga. In our study of 
his treatment 
of karmayoga, we noted that in spite of his claim 
that 
this method required no belief in doctrines, 
his entire 
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discussion was suffused with Advaita postulates and premises. 
Vivekananda also makes the same claim for the method 
of räjayoga as part of his plea for its scientific character. 
His writings on ra3ayoga, however, are permeated particularly 
with doctrinal postulates of the Sämkhya school. The 
entire system of discipline is unfolded with a specific 
view of the nature of man and his ultimate goal. 
The aim, the end, the goal, of all this training is 
liberation of the soul. Absolute control of nature, 
and nothing short of it, must be the goal. We must 
be the masters, and not the slaves of nature; neither 
body nor mind must be our master, nor must we forget 
that the body is mine, and not I the body's. 67 
Very important questions are raised by the fact that 
Vivekananda turns to the rajayoga system of Patanjali 
to find the veridical experience upon which he places 
all of his emphasis. The system of Patanjali derives 
its interpretative framework almost entirely from Sämkhya, 
and both exhibit fundamental doctrinal differences with 
Advaita. Vivekananda was not unaware of these differences. 
68 
The culminating experience of samädhi carries for the 
follower of Patanjali totally different doctrinal implications 
from what Vivekananda proposes. It is significantly 
strange that the implications of this are not considered 
by Vivekananda at those points in his räjayoga discussion 
where he deals with matters of S amkhya doctrine. If different 
conclusions can be inferred from an identical experience, 
this would seem to suggest that the experience is not 
self- interpretative. The meaning of the experience would 
depend on the prior doctrinal stand of the aspirant. 
Vivekananda clearly seems to think that the experiences 
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of mystics in all religious traditions are the same. 
69 
What their radical differences tell us about the self- 
valid nature of the experience are not fully explored 
by him. His suggestion, earlier discussed, that the 
nature of samädhi is easily misunderstood by someone not 
properly trained in its method and meaning, only reinforces 
the argument that the experience is not self-explanatory. 
Other questions about the nature of samadhi as a 
self-valid source of knowledge are raised by Vivekananda' s 
own descriptions of the experience. We have already 
made reference to the tension between his portrayal of 
samädhi as a state in which the mind is actively existent, 
even if at a higher level, and one in which it ceases 
to exist. Arguing from Vivekananda's own standpoint, 
we are obliged to accept that the latter description 
is more accurate if samädhi is to be conceived as a state 
wherein one is identical with the non-dual reality of 
the universe. The difficulty, however, is that a state 
in which the differences between the Knower, object known, 
and process of knowing are transcended cannot be described 
as involving any kind of perception. Even the word "experience", 
suggesting duality, is an inappropriate description. 
If knowledge is an activity and affirmation of the mind, 
how can such a state be described as one involving the 
gain of knowledge? Who is there to perceive, to 
know 
anything, to be enlightened? Even as the B rihadäranyaka 
Upanishad (2.4.14) defines the non-dual dtman: 
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Because when there is duality, as it were, then one 
smells something, one sees something, one hears something, 
one thinks something, one knows something. (But) 
when to the knower of Brahman everything has become 
the Self, then what should one smell and through 
what, what should one see and through what, what 
should one hear and through what, what should one 
speak and through what, what should one think and 
through what, what should one know, and through what? 
Through what should one know That owing to which 
all this is known - through what, 0 Maitreyi, should 
one know the Knower? 
Chandogya Upanishad (7.24.1) offers a similar definition. 
Wherein one sees nothing else, hears nothing else 
and understands nothing else, - that is the Infinite; 
wherein one sees something else, hears something 
else, and understands something else, - that is Finite. 
If there is any possibility of a return from the state 
of samddhi, there is also the difficulty of explaining 
how the conscious mind can make any affirmation or inferences 
about an experience which involved its total transcendence. 
In this context, Vivekananda's inability to recall much 
of his own experience is perhaps significant. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, we tried to present some of 
the significant areas of divergence between Shankara 
and Vivekananda, with respect to the means of attaining 
moksha. Further points emerge from considering Vivekananda's 
räjayoga discussion. The most obvious is, of course, 
Vivekananda's insistence on samädhi as the authoritative 
source of brahmajnäna. This is in radical contrast to Shankara's 
entire justification of sruti as the only conceivable 
medium of this knowledge. Related to this fundamental 
disagreement over the source of brahmajnäna are other 
very interesting matters of dissimilarity. 
Along with Vivekananda's plea for samädhi as the 
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only self-valid source of knowledge, we get the impression 
that he conceives of moksha as only obtaining in that 
state . 
When a man reaches the superconscious state, all 
feeling of body melts away. Then alone does he become 
free and immortal. 70 
That is the goal - the superconscious . Then, when that state is reached, this very man becomes divine, 
becomes free. 71 
In fact, Vivekananda uses the word liberation as synonymous 
with samadhi. 
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This state, as we have seen, is attained 
only when the conscious mind is completely transcended. 
Vivekananda emphasizes that religion and spirituality do 
not belong to the field of the senses or the intellect; 
they belong to the supersensuous. 
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With Vivekananda, 
the mind overcomes its inherent limitations to apprehend 
truth independently, by transcending itself, or even 
dying. There is also another significant feature of his 
characterization of moksha, which emerges from his räjayoga 
discussion. This appears to be associated with his view 
of moksha as obtaining only in samädhi. Vivekananda mentions 
the goal as the real separation of the Self from the body 
and from all of nature. 
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It is described also as only 
being attained when the Self attains complete mastery 
over internal and external nature. 
75 
These conclusions 
appear to us to be clearly different from Shankara's 
understanding of what constitutes moksha, and seem more 
congenial in the Sämkhya-Yoga doctrinal context that in 
Advaita. 76 
In our study of Shankara, we found no evidence to 
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suggest that he conceived of brahmajnana as occurring only 
through the transcendence of the ordinary level of mental 
functioning. On the other hand, the overwhelming evidence 
of the manner in which he understands the problem of avidyä 
and its resolution through inquiry into the sruti indicates 
that he saw brahmajndna as occurring only in and through 
the mind. 
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In Chapter 4.1, we have shown that Shankara 
does not see the necessity for any pramäna, even the sruti, 
to reveal the existence of the ätman. As Awareness, the 
dtman is always self-revealing and not completely unknown. 
This is in contrast to Vivekananda, who sees the superconscious 
experience as necessary for establishing both the existence 
and nature of the dtman. The problem of avidyä therefore, 
for Shankara, is one of incomplete and erroneous knowledge 
of an ever available and manifesting ätman, arising out 
of the inability to distinguish It from the non-Self. 
At the individual level, avidyä is also a mode or modification 
(vritti) of the mind, where the problem of false knowledge 
lies, and where alone it can be corrected. For this, 
another mental mode, truly coinciding with the entity 
to be known has to be produced by an adequate means of 
knowledge. For Shankara, the sruti is this source of 
knowledge. Although Shankara shares with Vivekananda 
the view that the reasoning process of the mind 
is 
independently incapable of arriving at a true knowledge 
of the atman, he proposes that these limitations can 
be 
overcome by recourse to sruti as 
sabda-pramana. He nowhere 
advances that these limitations can be surmounted 
by the 
mind transcending itself or entering a higher state 
in 
the sense in which Vivekananda submits. 
Because reason 
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is an important tool which we employ in understanding 
the meaning of the sruti, in removing, as far as possible, 
all doubts, and in dealing with contradictory views, it 
appears to have a much more positive and valued role in 
Shankara with respect to the gain of brahmajnana. 
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There 
is an impassioned derogation and belittlement of the human 
intellect in Vivekananda, which we do not at all find 
in the commentaries of Shankara. 
It is very significant to note that some texts of 
the Upanishads which Vivekananda identifies as describing 
the superconscious experience are interpreted by Shankara 
as sruti attempts to define the ätman. 
79 K. E. U. 1 .3, 
"There the eyes cannot reach nor speech nor mind", is 
seen by Shankara as a sruti definition of brahman as Subject 
or Knower of the eyes, the organ of speech and the mind. 
It expresses for him the impossibility of knowing brahman 
as an object of cognition. He sees K. E. U. 2.2, "We cannot 
say that we know it, we cannot say thatwe do not know it", 
as identical in purport K. E. U. 1.4, "It is different from 
the known and is also above the unknown". Brahman's difference 
from the known is seen by Shankara as again denying the 
availability and nature of brahman as one of the objects 
of the world. That brahman is different also from the 
unknown points, for Shankara, to Its nature as 
the Self. 
When it is affirmed that It is different from the 
unknown, it ariounts to saying that It 
is not a thing 
to be obtained. It is for the sake of getting an 
effect that somebody acquires something 
different 
from himself to serve as a cause. For this reason, 
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too, nothing different from the Self need be acquired to serve any purpose distinct from the knower (Self). 
Thus the statement, that Brahman is different from 
the known and the unknown, having amounted to Brahman 
being denied as an object to be acquired or rejected, the desire of the disciple to know Brahman (objectively) 
comes to an end, for Brahman is non-different from 
the Self . For nothing other than one's own Self can 
possibly be different from the known and the unknown. 
Then it follows that the meaning of the sentence is 
that the Self is Brahman-80 
T. A. U. 2.9.1, "Whence words fall back with the mind without 
reaching it", expresses for Shankara the difficulty of 
defining brahman through the generally accepted forms 
of word usage. 
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Vivekananda's identification of moksha with the state 
of samädhi leaves us with a certain ambiguity as far as 
his attitude towards the concept of the jivanmukta is 
concerned. Except for fundamental differences in the 
way knowledge is gained, there are occasions when he formulates 
the concept in general agreement with Shankara. 
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On 
these occasions, he explains that the body is retained 
after brahmajnäna because of the persistence of unexhausted 
karma. Because of the jnäni' s knowledge, however, the 
world no longer causes him any pain, misery or grief. 
Elsewhere, Vivekananda speaks of the impossibility of 
any return from the state of samädhi. 
The conclusion of the Vedanta is that when there is 
absolute Samadhi and the cessation of all modifications, 
there is no return from that state. 83 
Only avatdras, explains Viv ekanand a, who retain desires 
for the good of the world return from samädhi. This position 
seems to negate the possibility of the state of 
jivanmukta, 
unless one proposes that every jivanmukta is an avatara. 
There is no evidence, however, that Vivekananda equates 
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both concepts. 
If one sticks rigidly to Vivekananda's contention, 
one would have to admit that only avatäras can be teachers 
and transmitters of brahmajnäna, for no one else would 
survive the gain of knowledge in samddhi. If anyone else 
did, his experience and knowledge would have to be considered 
incomplete. Perhaps this stand of Vivekananda has to 
be seen in relation to the view, noted earlier, that freedom 
involves a real detachment or separation of the Self from 
the body and all of nature. If this occurs only in sanädhi, 
then any other state is bondage. 
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With Shankara, on 
the other hand, where the problem of avidyä is defined 
as adhyäsa (superimposition) , the presence of the body 
or the world does not constitute or imply bondage. The 
limitation of the Self is always only notional, and the 
state of jivanmukta becomes possible with the removal 
of avidyä. 
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In support of his claim that there is no 
return from the state of samadhi, Vivekananda simply cites 
B. S. 4.4.22, "There is no return for released souls on 
the strength of the Upanishadic declaration; there is 
no return for the released souls on the strength of the 
Upanishadic declaration" . 
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Shankara, however, sees this 
sutra as affirming the non-return to the world of transmigration 
of two classes of aspirants. Those who have attained the 
world of brahrna (brahma-loka) dwell there until the 
dissolution of the creation, after which they are no longer 
subject to rebirth. The verse also affirms freedom for 
those, on the other hand, who have attained brahmajnäna 
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here, and for whom moksha is an already accomplished fact. 87 
Vivekananda's argument that knowledge of the Self 
can be gained through independent internal observation 
by the mind of its own contents has no parallel in Skiankara. 
In our study of Shankara, we tried to highlight the fact 
that his entire rationale for the sruti is focused on 
the argument that the knowledge which it affords is not 
otherwise obtainable. Neither have we found any corresponding 
view in Shankara for Vivekananda's assertion that knowledge 
of the Self spontaneously follows the concentration or 
silencing of the mind. In fact, it is difficult to know 
what exactly Viv ekananda means when he speaks of brahman 
as becoming manifest when mental modifications are extinguished. 
That brahman is not always manifest and available would 
imply some kind of limitation. While it is clear in Shankara 
that what is to be attained is brahmajnana and not brahman, 
with Whom identity already exists, Vivekananda often leaves 
one wondering. He does not always distinguish the necessity 
for gaining brahmajnäna, as opposed to brahman. We have 
already cited Shankara's refutation of Yoga and its disciplines 
as direct means to brahmajnäna, and his specific rebuttal 
of the argument that moksha can be obtained through concentration 
of the mind. 
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This clearly undermines Vivekananda' s 
assertion that rdjayoga is the method advocated by all 
schools of Indian philosophy for gaining moksha. Shankara's 
position is that the purity and steadiness of mind discovered 
through the practices of Yoga are indirect aids to the 
gain of knowledge, but cannot themselves give rise to 
knowledge. 
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We associated Vivekananda's view that knowledge naturally 
follows the silencing of the mind, with his theory that 
all knowledge is already within the individual. It appears 
to us that while it is feasible to argue that all knowledge 
occurs in the mind, it is difficult and different to assert 
that all knowledge is already there. Vivekananda's view 
is contradictory to Shankara's position that brahmajnäna 
springs from inquiry into the words and sentences of the 
Upanishads. His related view that the role of the spiritual 
teacher is only to arouse an inherent knowledge is also 
opposed to the function of the teacher in Shankara, as 
we have understood it. 
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It is the teacher who, through 
his exegesis of the sruti and skilful handling of words, 
generates a hitherto unknown knowledge. He is not merely 
a stimulus or suggestion. 
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Vivekananda's view that this 
doctrine represents the stand of Vedanta is therefore, 
difficult to sustain. It is also difficult to find the 
support which he claims for this doctrine in the Bhagavadgitä, 
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Vivekananda's attempt to present several direct and 
independent ways for the attainment of moksha leaves many 
questions unanswered and reveals inherent contradictions. 
In terms of the Advaita formulation of the nature of avid 
ä, 
and its conception of the ätman and moksha, Vivekananda 
has not clearly demonstrated how these different means 
lead to freedom. In Chapter 8, we examined these difficulties 
in relation to the methods of karma, bhakti and]näna. 
In the present discussion we sought to outline and evaluate 
the method of rdjayo a. In addition to 
highlighting radical 
differences from Shankara, the case which Vivekananda 
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makes out for the necessity and possibility of a direct 
perception of the truths about the ätman presents us with 
numerous inevasible problems. Among the many problematic 
issues we have considered, the very idea of perception in 
relation to the ätman contradicts Its fundamental nature 
as Awareness, incapable of any objectification 
[The reader might wonder whether the many contradictions 
in 
Vivekananda's thought could be explained by the chronological 
development and change of his views. Such an explanation, 
however, is not tenable, since close study of his lectures and 
writings does not reveal that these views have undergone any 
consistent development. ] 
CONCLUSION 
Vivekananda's attitude towards scriptural authority 
was moulded in an atmosphere where the most progressive 
movement of the day, the Brahmo Samaj, of which he was 
a member for a short time, had unequivocally rejected 
the ultimate authority of the sruti. This is undoubtedly 
one of the most significant and dramatic developments 
in the recent history of Hinduism, and one which has 
played a major part in influencing the contemporary unders- 
tanding of the sruti. The environment of Vivekananda's youth 
was surcharged with a scepticism and mistrust of the 
authority and value of scriptural texts, voiced particularly 
by the very popular and influential Keshub Chandra Sen. 
There can be little doubt that this prevailing and almost 
unanimous orientation among the leading liberal reformers 
and thinkers affected Vivekananda's own approach to 
scriptural authority. Along with the theology of the 
Brahmo Samaj, the distinct influence of Keshub Chandra 
Sen on Vivekananda is a fruitful area for more detailed 
study . 
Paradoxically, the resolution to revoke the Vedas 
as the supreme authoritative source of Hinduism came 
in response to Christian missionary 
invective against 
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the doctrine of Vedic infallibility. Adherence to the 
authority of the Vedas became a cause for positive 
embarassment to the Brahmo Samaj. In responding to 
missionary censure, the Samaj utilized arguments and 
doctrines derived from Unitarian Christianity and also 
found there congenial suggestions about alternative sources 
of religious knowledge. In particular, they seized upon 
the concepts of intuition and nature as such sources 
and sought, with very little success, to construct a 
theology on the basis of what could be known through 
these means. The consequence was that while the movement 
initiated and contributed to various social reform measures, 
there was minimal theological development. This is reflected 
in their failure to establish and maintain a regular theological 
school. The absence of any theological originality or 
uniqueness which the Samaj might have creatively derived 
from its Hindu roots is further demonstrated by the fact 
that it could accept, with no contradiction, the training 
of its teachers at a Unitarian institution in England. 
While the roots of many of Vivekananda's ideas could 
be traced back to the Brahmo Samaj, there is an essential 
difference which explains Vivekananda's more widespread 
appeal. The Brahmo Samaj openly ridiculed many of the 
doctrines and practices of Hinduism and was not generally 
concerned to preserve a Hindu identity. Keshub 
Chandra 
Sen, in fact, consciously sought to terminate links 
between 
the Brahmo Samaj of India and the wider Hindu tradition. 
The influence and example of Ramakrishna distinguished 
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Vivekananda's approach to Hinduism from the Brahmo Samaj. 
In Ramakrishna, he perceived someone who, without any 
of the Western learning which characterized most of the 
Brahmo leaders, had attained to the pinnacle of Hindu 
spirituality by adopting many of the beliefs and practices 
vehemently condemned by the reformers. In Ramakrishna's 
eclectic vision an explanation and justification was 
found for almost everything which had become a part of 
Hinduism. In almost everyone of his major public addresses 
in India, Vivekananda scathingly denounced many reformist 
views and deliberately disassociated himself from their 
methods. The following two examples of his outbursts 
reflect the intensity of his disapproval of certain reformist 
approaches, especially those that were European-inspired. 
For nearly the past one hundred years, our country 
has been flooded with social reform proposals. 
Personally, I have no fault to find with these reformers. 
Most of them are good, well-meaning men, and their 
aims too are very laudable on certain points; but 
it is quite a patent fact that this one hundred years 
of social reform has produced no permanent and valuable 
result appreciable throughout the country. Platform 
speeches have been made by the thousand, denunciations 
in volumes have been hurled upon the devoted head 
of the Hindu race, and its civilization, and yet 
no practical result has been achieved; and where 
is the reason for that? The reason is not hard to 
find. It is in denunciation itself. 1 
There are among us at the present day certain 
reformers who want to reform our religion or rather 
turn it topsyturvy with a view to regeneration of 
the Hindu nation. There are, no doubt, some thoughtful 
people among them, but there are also many who follow 
others blindly and act most foolishly, not knowing what they 
are about. This class of reformers are very enthusiastic 
in introducing foreign ideas into our religion. 
They have taken the word 'idolatry', and aver that 
Hinduism is not true, because it is idolatrous. 
They never seek to find out what this so-called 
'idolatry' is, whether it is good or bad; only taking 
their cue from others, they are bold enough to shout 
down Hinduism as untrue. 2 
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While he did not reject the urgent necessity for 
change and innovation in Hinduism, Vivekananda subtly 
emphasized that what he desired was "growth" and "expansion" 
rather than "reformation". Describing himself as a non- 
believer in reform, he defined the reformist method as 
one of "destruction", while his was an attempt at "construction". 
3 
This delicate and astute distinction enabled Vivekananda 
to be critical of the Hindu tradition while never alienating 
himself from it. He struck a very original and fine 
balance between an aggressive defence of Hinduism and 
a vociferous cry for transformation. This fact provides 
the most important clue to understanding Vivekananda's 
popularity and the nature of the reinterpretations which 
he formulated. Vivekananda also distinguished himself 
from his Brahmo contemporaries by his linking of Hindu 
revival with Indian nationalism and patriotism and his 
greater appeal to these sentiments. The way in which 
his presentation of Hinduism was shaped by this identification 
of religion and nationalism needs more detailed study. 
The general orientation of the Bralimo Samaj towards 
scriptural authority provided a strong stimulus to Vivekananda' s 
reinterpretation of the nature and basis of the authority 
of sruti. From this source also, he might have derived 
suggestions about an alternative source of spiritual 
knowledge. The crucial difference, however, is that 
Vivekananda sought the elements of his reinterpretation 
within the Hindu tradition. If one had to seek for a 
single model in the light of which Viv ekanand a attempted 
to formulate his view of the sruti and the process of 
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attaining brahmajnäna, one must turn to his understanding 
of the nature of the scientific method. It is his use 
of this model, however, which also gives rise to many 
of the problems presented by his formulation. Science 
as a method of attaining knowledge about man and the 
universe, and as the key to human progress was enjoying 
considerable prestige among the Bengali intelligentsia 
in the nineteenth century. It was widely felt that all 
systems of human thought, including religion, had to 
be validated by the scrutiny of science and reason. 
4 
This prompted attempts within the Brahino Samaj to seek 
a reconciliation of their religious views with what they 
understood to be the propositions and methods of science. 
A. K. Datta, for example, suggested that the approach 
to God should be through the study of the natural sciences, 
and Keshub Chandra Sen tried to justify his views in 
the name of science. 
The impact of science on Vivekananda's views and 
the esteem with which it was regarded are evident in his 
lectures and writings. He continuously seeks to demonstrate 
the compatibility of Advaita with the findings of science, 
and presents this as one of the principal arguments in 
favour of this system. His understanding of science 
is the paradigmatic basis upon which he constructs a view 
of the sruti and the method of attaining brahmajnana, 
and his interpretations are most explicable in this context 
and background. The frequent attempts in recent studies, 
noted in Chapter 1, to draw analogies between Shankara's 
epistemology and the method of science is a reflection 
400 
of Vivekananda's continuing influence. While Vivekananda's 
concern to express his views in relation to science might 
have been partly influenced by certain approaches within 
the Brahmo Samaj, the resulting synthesis was an original 
one. 
It is very interesting therefore, to venture a brief 
reconstruction of Vivekananda's thought against the background 
of what he understood to be the scientific method. The 
influence of this method is primarily evident in his 
aim to demonstrate that the validity of religious propositions 
need not depend on what he considered to be the weak 
foundation of faith and belief. Vivekananda represented 
the Vedas as a collection of spiritual laws, often emphasizing 
that they were not books. These spiritual laws are portrayed 
to be like the natural laws governing our physical universe 
in that their existence is independent of human apprehension. 
The doctrine of Vedic eternity therefore, can now be 
represented as the timelessness of impersonal laws, rather 
than of a word-revelation. Even as scientists do not 
create physical laws, but only discover these by the 
application of proper methods, Vivekananda portrays the 
ä tas or rishis as only the "discoverers" of spiritual 
laws. Like a scientific manual then, the Vedas, as books, 
are just the written records of these spiritual laws 
discovered by different persons in different times. 
The representation of the Vedas as records or reports 
of spiritual findings and the rishis as 
discoverers provide 
the foundation for the deepening and development of 
the 
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scientific paradigm. One is not obliged, according to 
Vivekananda, to accept scientific propositions as valid 
because of faith in the individual scientist. As a method 
of gaining knowledge, he sees science as being distinguished 
by the fact that it offers the possibility of verification. 
One can personally confirm the findings of a scientist 
by the application of proper methods. In the same way, 
according to Vivekananda, the spiritual aspirant is not 
condemned to establishing his convictions on the basis 
of his faith in the äpta or in the äpta's reports as 
recorded in the Vedas. Neither the scientist nor the 
Apta is genuine, says Vivekananda, if a claim is made 
for a unique access to knowledge. Verification is the 
all-important factor and the äpta must hold out such 
a possibility. In the Vedas, just as in the report of 
a scientist, the äpta only has the right to tell us what 
he has discovered and the methods which he employed. 
If we have confidence in the äpta and the scientist, 
we may accept their claims as provisionally true. These 
claims, however, especially in the case of the spiritual 
aspirant, can never have any ultimately convincing validity 
unless they are personally rediscovered and verified 
by an application of the same methods. In the case of the 
Vedas, Vivekananda not only emphasizes the possibility 
of verification, but also its necessity. The foundation 
of knowledge therefore, for Vivekananda, is not the authority 
of the Vedas as a word-revelation, since the texts only 
indicate a method for the direct apprehension of spiritual 
f acts. 
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It is within this context of his endeavour to reconstruct 
the process of attaining brahmajnäna in Advaita on the 
model of the scientific method that we can best see and 
understand Vivekananda's version of the significance 
of the sruti. S ruti, he affirms, may stimulate a desire 
for first-hand knowledge, but it is in itself only "theoretical" 
or second-hand knowledge. Sruti is not, as in Shankara, 
a pramana for the conclusive knowledge of brahman, but 
the unfolding of a method for the direct and independent 
discovery of spiritual facts. While in spiritual childhood 
we may rely on the sruti, we must eventually transcend 
it and certify its claims. Even as a scientific experiment 
can be repeated if we wish to personally substantiate 
its hypothesis, so also the discovery of brahmajnana 
by one person is evidence of the competence and necessity 
of every other human being to attain it by the same method. 
The scientific analogy continues and is further elaborated 
by Vivekananda when he details the method by which brahmajnäna 
is gained. He very consciously sets out to demonstrate 
that this method is like the process of attaining and 
verifying knowledge in the physical sciences. It is 
very significant that Vivekananda finds this method 
in the räjayoga system of Patanjali, and not in the 
Upanishads on which Shankara bases his interpretation 
of Advaita. We have examined the enormous difficulties 
presented by the method of räjayoga in relation to Vivekananda' s 
attempts to identify it with the procedures of science. 
His parallels are possible only through a radical simplification 
of the scientific method. The scientific analogy revolves 
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around his key concept of "experience" (anubhava). In 
designating "experience" as the common basis of knowledge 
in both räjayoga and science, Vivekananda overlooks the 
complexity of the so-called "experience" through which 
knowledge is gained in the sciences. The scientific 
technique is even further simplified in the interests 
of superficial similarities when he argues for observation 
or concentration as its chief feature. The self-valid 
quality which he posits of both sense perception and 
religious experience disregards the difficulties which 
both present. In the case of religious experience it 
presumes a self-interpretativeness which glosses over 
the influence of doctrinal assumptions on interpretation, 
an influence strongly demonstrated in Vivekananda's own 
writings. In fact, it is indeed strange that, as an 
Advaitin, Vivekananda so strongly argues for the immediate 
validity of sense perception. Advaita contends that 
the universe which is apprehended through the senses 
is an inexplicable appearance of brahman. In positing 
that brahman, in reality, is free from the characteristics 
possessed by the objects of the universe, Advaita questions 
the ultimate validity of the impressions we form of the 
world on the basis of sense perception. 
The problems of using räjayoga as the method of attaining 
brahmainäna are not only confined to drawing dubious 
analogies with science. The approach is also undermined 
by serious problems originating mainly 
from two sources. 
The first of these relate to the fact that räjayoga and 
its culminating experience of samädhi 
have their doctrinal 
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basis in the system of Sdmkhya which differs from Advaita 
on crucial issues concerning the nature of the ätman 
and moksha. In spite of his awareness of these divergences, 
Vivekananda neglects their significance in proposing 
samadhi as the authoritative source of brahmajnäna. 
We have specified another set of problems deriving from 
Vivekananda's very definition of samädhi, and his claims 
for it as a state and source of knowledge. It is not 
only contradictory to speak of a state of non-duality 
as involving "perception", but it is also untenable, 
within the context of Advaita, to propose a direct perception 
of the atman in samädhi. Such a proposition presupposes 
another Self for which the atman must become a limited 
object of knowledge. 
Vivekananda's assertion that karmayoga, bhaktiyoga, 
jnanayoga and rajayoga can be direct and independent 
ways to the attainment of moksha is closely linked to 
his reinterpretation of the significance of the 
sruti 
and his upholding of the samädhi-experience as the ultimately 
valid source of brahmajnäna. For Shankara, who advocates 
the sruti as the unique source of this knowledge, inquiry 
( jijnäsä) into the words of the sruti with the help of 
a teacher is the only means of attaining brahmajjana. 
There are disciplines and aids for assisting the 
inquirer 
in gaining and assimilating the knowledge 
born out of 
the sruti, but there is no substitute for the 
sruti as 
the valid source. For Vivekananda, who endorses an 
experience 
(viz. samadhi), rather than sruti, as the valid source 
of knowledge, it is perhaps more plausible 
to posit different 
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ways of attaining this experience. This is what Vivekananda 
sets out to do in his elaboration of the methods of karmayoga, 
bhaktiyoga, j'dnayoga and rdjayoga. 
The thesis that there are four different paths to 
the attainment of moksha was employed by Vivekananda 
to demonstrate the superiority of Hinduism in its capacity 
to be able to cater for different spiritual needs and 
temperaments. Today, like so many of Vivekananda's interpretations, 
it has become a standard argument in Hindu apologetic 
writing and even in scholarly studies written by both 
Hindus and non-Hindus. When, however, Vivekananda's 
arguments are subjected to close scrutiny in relation 
to basic Advaita propositions about the nature of avidyd 
and moksha, they are unconvincing. There is no attempt 
to carefully relate the nature of each method to the 
assumptions of avidya as the fundamental problem. At 
crucial points in his discussion, where it is necessary 
to clearly demonstrate the connection between a particular 
method and the attainment of moksha in the Advaita sense, 
he becomes vague and obscure in his terminology and 
concepts. In the case of bhaktiyoga, for example, he 
claims, but fails to establish that the movement from 
the dualism of worship to the unity and identity of brahmajnäna 
is a natural one. He argues for jnänayoga as a method 
of pure reason, but presents a wider view of the limitations 
of reason which nullifies this argument. While arguing 
that belief in doctrines is dispensable, his characterization 
of each method is permeated with doctrinal assumptions. 
We appear to have to accept that avidy_a inexplicably 
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and spontaneously vanishes. Ultimately Vivekananda contradicts 
his own thesis that each of the four paths can independently 
lead to moksha when he argues that the samädhi-experience 
afforded by the discipline of räjayoga is the only valid 
source of brahmajnana. While the assertion about different 
ways of attaining moksha has a certain liberal appeal, 
it requires far more than this to be rationally convincing, 
and there is no evidence that the many difficulties were 
carefully considered by Vivekananda. 
In an age of scepticism, we can readily understand 
and perhaps even identify with Vivekananda' s compelling 
desire to propose a means to the attainment of spiritual 
knowledge which did not depend on faith (6raddhd) in 
the sruti as a pramäna. He felt that this means offered 
the possibility of doubtless knowledge, as objective 
and verifiable as knowledge gained by the application 
of the scientific method. This is the motive which led 
to his radical divergences from Shankara, and his attempts 
to reinterpret the significance of the sruti and suggest 
alternative means for the attainment of brahmajnäna. 
It is clear, however, that his reconstruction of the 
basis of knowledge of Advaita and Hinduism is far from 
successful. Although his synthesis has been uncritically 
adopted into modern Advaita and Hindu writings, it presents 
innumerable problems, leaves many questions unanswered 
and on several crucial issues contradicts fundamental 
Advaita. propositions which he himself accepts. His aim 
to suggest a more convincing source of brahma 
' ný äna remains 
unaccompl ished . 
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Vivekananda lived at a time of tumult and trauma 
in the history of Hinduism resulting from the impact 
of the West. In his reformulation of Advaita, he responded 
to and incorporated many of the diverse influences which 
were exerting themselves on Hinduism. The turbulence 
of his times is reflected in the synthesis which he attempted. 
In a very short career, he injected a spirit of confidence 
into Hinduism, and his many positive achievements must 
be acknowledged. One of his most progressive concerns 
was to elicit from Advaita the justification for a life 
of commitment to the service of society. He also sought 
to challenge the widespread indifference of Hindu society 
to poverty and suffering. It is understandable, but 
unfortunate, that his presentation of Advaita was not 
more critically appraised during his lifetime so that 
he could have responded to many of its problems and contradictions. 
Such an approach, however, cannot be condoned today, 
in view of the fact that the Vivekananda legacy is not 
all positive. 
Vivekananda's championing of an experience (anubhava) 
as the ultimate source of spiritual knowledge encouraged 
the divorce of scholarship from spirituality in modern 
Advaita and Hinduism. This effect can be best demonstrated 
by contrast with the approach and methods of Shankara. 
For Shankara, sruti is the definitive source of brahmajnäna, 
and the immediate result of this knowledge is moksha. 
As a pramäna, sruti is constituted of words, and these 
must be understood as they are intended to be. Scriptural 
learning, study and exegesis therefore, become very important, 
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along with the disciplines such as grammar and etymology 
which aid interpretation. Proper principles for arriving 
at the right meaning of texts are necessary. It is very 
important to note that the acceptance of sruti as an 
authoritative pramdna did not mean the abandonment of 
a very significant role for reason. Reason is important 
in deciding between different interpretations of particular 
sruti texts and in reconciling apparently conflicting 
ones. Reason also has a major part to play in demonstrating 
that the affirmations of sruti are not inconsistent with 
what we know about the world and ourselves from other 
pramänas. It also plays a crucial role in assessing 
and responding to rival views. Shankara obviously takes 
doctrinal differences very seriously, and in responding 
to the claims of rival systems which do not accept the 
authority of the sruti, he is constrained to try to demonstrate 
the validity of Advaita on the basis of the reasonableness 
of its propositions. Opposing views are carefully outlined 
by Shankara, and the significance and development of 
doctrinal and philosophical argument are evident in his 
commentaries. 
The decline of the significance of the sruti during 
the ascendancy of the Brahmo Samaj and Vivekananda's 
own characterization of it as second-hand religion contributed 
to a low estimation of the value of scriptural scholarship. 
Because sruti is no longer seen as the definitive source 
of brahmajnäna, its, study, exegesis and right 
interpretation 
are not of the utmost importance. The 
intellectual disciplines 
which aid interpretation are also less valued. 
In 
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our examination of Viv ekananda 's attitude towards the 
Vedas, we have seen how he fervently and repeatedly denounces 
the value of scriptural study, learning and scholarship 
in the quest for moksha. These are contemptuously dismissed 
as activities at a "theoretical" and "intellectual" level, 
and Vivekananda even classifies scriptures as belonging 
to the non-essentials of religion. The full impact 
of this attitude on contemporary Hinduism has not attracted 
sufficient attention. 
The upholding of the samädhi-experience, instead 
of the s ruti , as the self-valid source of brahma j 
nana 
is also connected to a low esteem of the value of reason. 
For Shankara, conclusive knowledge is gained by the application 
of one's reason to the analysis of a valid source of 
knowledge. Since knowledge occurs in the mind, and is 
mediated through reason, the demands of the latter, as 
far as possible, must be satisfied. With Vivekananda, 
on the other hand, knowledge is not gained by the mediation 
of reason, but by its transcendence. This transcendence 
is, in fact, the very condition for the gain of that 
knowledge. In Vivekananda therefore, reason, argument 
and intellectual activity, in general, assume more of 
an obstructive character in relation to the gain of brahmajnana. 
Since conclusive knowledge can only be attained through 
a special experience, doubts can never be resolved by 
rational argument. Paradoxically, it would seem that 
where, as in Shankara, faith (sraddhd) in the sruti as 
a pramana is necessary for the gain of 
knowledge, reason 
has a much more positive role in clarifying, explaining 
and defending the propositions of that pramäna. 
On the 
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other hand, where an attempt is made, as in Viv ekananda, 
to supersede the necessity for faith, in the interest 
of being more rational, reason becomes less significant 
and so does philosophical argument. The lack of development 
in contemporary Hinduism of philosophic argument must 
be connected to the emphasis on an experience as the 
ultimate source of knowledge, and this link needs to 
be studied more closely. 
Vivekananda' s derision for scholarship, his ridicule 
of doctrine and dogma, and his belittling of reason 
are reflected in his treatment of doctrinal differences. 
On the whole, he attaches little importance to the reality 
and implications of these. This attitude is most evident 
in his discussion of the yogas of karma, bhakti, 'näna 
and raja as means to the attainment of moksha. His outline 
of the method of bhaktiyoga, for example, is almost entirely 
derived from Ramanuja, and yet he unhesitatingly glosses 
over the import of Ramanuja's many doctrinal differences 
with Shankara and affirms that the method naturally culminates 
in non-duality. He extracts the samädhi-concept from 
the Sämkhya f-Yoga system and presents it as the authoritative 
source of knowledge in Advaita, overlooking the implications 
of crucial philosophical divergences between both schools. 
It would seem that because Vivekananda posits the gain 
of valid spiritual knowledge only through an experience 
transcending the rational mind, he is able to dismiss 
the importance of differences born out of and existing 
at this level of the mind. He has not proved, however, 
that this experience is a self-valid one, and that its 
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meaning is independent of doctrinal influence and interpretation. 
Vivekananda's minimizing and underplaying, in contrast 
to Shankara, of the significance of the deep doctrinal 
differences between different schools of Indian philosophical 
thought must also be related to his concern to emphasize 
the unity and common basis of the Indian spiritual tradition. 
This again has to be seen in the context of his wider 
concern for Indian national unity. 
It is only by overlooking and dismissing the importance 
of different doctrinal and philosophical claims that 
one can so easily assert, as Vivekananda does, that all 
spiritual paths and methods lead to the same goal. This 
argument which owes its elaboration to Vivekananda, and 
which, in its various formulations, has become a standard 
claim in contemporary Hindu rhetoric has to be seen and 
evaluated in the light of his approach to epistemology 
and his scant regard for divergent doctrinal claims. 
In view of the importance of this argument in the modern 
Hindu approach to other religious traditions, it is well 
worth more detailed study and appraisal. A valued tolerance 
of doctrinal differences need not lead to the dismissal 
of their reality and significance. 
It is true that in the quest for moksha, the value 
of scholarship and learning has to be placed in proper 
perspective. Scholarship is only a means and never an 
end in itself. Viewed as an end, it can easily degenerate 
into sterile pedantry. Sruti affords a 
knowledge which 
leads to the gain of moksha, and scholarship 
is chiefly 
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an aid to its proper understanding. It is more important 
to the individual who aims to be a teacher. Mundaka 
Upanishad 1.2.12 mentions proficiency in the meaning 
of the sruti (srotriyam) as one of the two qualities necessary 
for the teacher (guru). The other is establishment in 
the knowledge of brahman (brahmanishtham) . In view of 
Vivekananda's influence on modern Hinduism, it is unfortunate 
that he did not adopt a more balanced view of the value 
of scholarship in the quest for moksha. The decline 
of scholarship and its dissociation from spirituality 
is one of the most lamentable trends in the recent history 
of Hinduism. Its reflection in the poor state of theological 
education in Hinduism needs further study. There is 
also a need for an examination of the Upanishadic ideal 
of the nature, qualifications and functions of the teacher 
(guru), and a contrast of this with Vivekananda's presentation 
of Ramakrishna as the model teacher in Hinduism. How 
far the emphasis on the gain of spiritual knowledge through 
an experience, rather than through the sruti, has altered 
the understanding of the nature of the guru needs to 
be studied, as well as its connection with the confusing 
proliferation of gurus in contemporary Hinduism. We 
need to examine the claim which the modern teacher makes 
on behalf of his own authority, along with the expectations 
which the student has of the teacher. All this should 
be interestingly related to the functions and expectations 
of the teacher when sruti is maintained as the authoritative 
source of knowledge. 
The great challenge to the Pürva-Mimansä system was 
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to provide a rationale for the authority of the Vedas 
which was not connected to the nature or character of 
a personal author. Purva-Mimänsa is atheistic in outlook 
and posits the view that the Vedas are authorless 
(apaurusheya). It is as a response to this dilemma that 
one best understands the arguments of this school for 
the validity of the Vedas. The fact that these texts 
are authorless, Piirva-Mimansa claims, is precisely why 
they are authoritative. They are free from any possible 
defects and limitations of authorship. Purva-Mimansa 
asserts that the Vedas, as a source of valid knowledge, 
are eternal and uncreated. This view is supported 
by the doctrine that the words of the Vedas, since they 
primarily signify eternal universals and not the transitory 
particulars of the creation, are also eternal. The connection 
between Vedic words and their referents is eternal and 
free from error. 
The Purva-Mimänsä justification of the Vedas by reference 
to their eternity is adopted and defended by Shankara 
and forms part of his own rationale for the authoritativeness 
of this pramana. Unlike Purva-Mimansa, however, 
Advaita 
accepts the existence of isvara, and posits Him as the 
r ev eal er of the Vedas. I svara only reveals 
the Vedas 
as they were revealed in previous creations. 
Despite 
the ascribing of this function to 
isvara, Shankara does 
not argue for the authority of the 
Vedas on the basis 
of isvara's omniscience. Because the 
latter fact is known 
414 
only from the Vedas, to use it to justify the Vedas would 
be to employ a circular argument. When, however, we learn from 
the Vedas, of isvara's existence and nature, and of Him as 
the source of the Vedas, we can use rational arguments 
to support this knowledge, since it is not contradictory 
to reason. This is the kind of argument used by Shankara 
in Brahma-sutra 1.1.3 to demonstrate why brahman alone can be the 
source of the Vedas. It is an important dimension of 
Shankara's rationale for the Vedas which is different from 
Pürva-Mimänsä. 
The system of Piirva-M-imansa, however, does not accept 
that the Vedas are a pramdna for the knowledge of brahman. 
In their view, the purport of the Vedas lies only in the 
inculcation of dharma. Dharma is accomplished through 
appropriate action, physical and mental, and so this 
system asserts that a direct and independent authority can 
only be ascribed to injunctions (vidhi) inculcating the 
performance of acceptable acts and prohibitions (nishedha) 
instituting restraint from acts opposed to dharma. Sentences 
which do not exhort us to perform a desirable action or 
restrain us from an undesirable one are, by themselves, 
meaningless, and are meant only to subserve injunctive 
sentences. This view of Pürva-Mimänsa about the authority 
of the Vedas is entirely opposed to Shankara's claim that 
the Vedänta-väkyas have an independent authority in 
revealing an already existent brahman and do not seek to 
impel us into any activity. While Shankara therefore, , 
used 
Purva-Mimansa arguments about the eternity of the Vedas as part 
of his proof for their authority, he was obliged to 
develop 
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an entirely independent rationale and justification for 
sruti as a pramäna of brahmajnana. It is here that the 
originality of Shankara is very evident, and the forcefulness, 
consistency and appeal of his arguments are best demonstrated. 
It is this rationale which underlines the radical divergences 
of Vivekananda, and which this study has sought to highlight. 
It is the significance of this rationale which modern 
commentators seem largely to have missed, and which falsifies 
the argument that Shankara appealed to the sruti merely 
to gain the support of an established authority for his 
views. 
Sruti, according to Shankara, affords a knowledge which 
is necessary for the happiness naturally persued by all 
human beings and which cannot be obtained through any 
other source. It is not the concern of the sruti to inform 
us of ends and means which we can learn about through 
other pramänas. For Shankara, the sphere of the sruti's 
authority is confined to the revelation of dharma and 
brahman. Dharma is the authoritative concern of the karmakända 
sections of the Vedas, while the Upanishads (i. e. Vedanta- 
vakyas) have an entirely independent purpose in the revelation 
of the knowledge of brahman. 
The cornerstone of Shankara' s case for sruti as the 
only valid means of knowing brahman is that because of 
the very nature of brahman, sruti as a pramana in the 
form of words is the only logical means. While his contention 
for sruti as the only pramana of brahmajnäna is not divorced 
from his wider views about its authoritativeness, in this 
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case the argument is as much centred on the logic of words 
( sabda) as the only conceivable means through which this 
knowledge could be imparted and attained. It is really 
a justification of sabda as opposed to any other pramana, 
and this fact lends to his rationale a certain undogmatic 
character. What gives Shankara' s argument its force and 
makes it difficult to dismiss is the logical interdependence 
which he demonstrates between the appropriateness of the 
pramäna and the nature of the entity to be known. The 
relationship here is between brahman as the entity to 
be known, and sabda as the means of knowledge. It is 
extremely significant that there is no place in Vivekananda's 
writings and lectures where this dimension of Shankara's 
rationale is brought out and considered. One must wonder 
therefore, about the depth of his scholarship in Shankara's 
commentaries. Modern commentators, following Vivekananda, 
and upholding anubhava as the ultimate pramäna of brahmajnäna 
in Shankara, seem, on the whole, to have missed the significance 
of this logical interdependence between sabda and brahman. 
It is also most revealing to note that one of the main 
sources of contradictions, and a principal weakness in 
Vivekananda's attempt to replace the authority of the 
sruti with alternative means for the attainment of brahmajnäna, 
is precisely his failure to demonstrate a logical relationship 
between pramäna (means of knowledge) and prameya 
(object 
to be known). 
The case for sabda or the word as the only appropriate 
vehicle of brahmajnäna consists also of showing why 
this 
knowledge cannot be attained through other ways of knowing, 
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and this Shankara convincingly does at every available 
opportunity in his commentaries. Brahman cannot be known 
through sense perception because It is nirguna (quality-less). 
It is free from all the qualities (form, taste, smell, 
touch and sound) through which the various sense organs 
apprehend their respective objects. In addition, the sense 
organs can only know the nature of things by objectifying 
them. Brahman, being the Knower, the Awareness in the 
sense organs, can never become the object of their knowledge. 
It can never be the object of any organ or kind of perception. 
This is one of the major inconsistencies of Vivekananda's 
use of the analogy of perception to describe the gain 
of brahmajnäna in samädhi. Even if it is superconscious 
rather than ordinary perception, Vivekananda still posits 
the mind as the organ of knowledge and ends up postulating 
brahman as an object. To claim any kind of experience 
as the means through which the knowledge of brahman can 
be gained requires proof that this is possible without 
presupposing brahman as an object. Vivekananda has failed 
to offer any such proof. 
The impossibility of knowing brahman through any of 
the senses means that the other four pramänas 
(inference, 
comparison, postulation, and non-cognition), dependent 
as they are on sense perception for their data, cannot 
either afford any conclusive knowledge of 
brahman. It 
is Shankara's often-stated view that independent reasoning 
cannot establish anything final about the nature 
of brahman. 
The summation therefore, is that 
if brahman is to be known 
it can only be through an authoritative source 
of knowledge 
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consisting of words (sabda) . This, affirms Shankara, 
is what the Upanishads are, and what they declare themselves 
to be. This dimension of Shankara's rationale for the 
sruti as the pramäna of brahman, although it goes beyond 
the simple dogmatic assertions about the eternity of the 
Vedas, will still have little appeal for the sceptic who 
doubts even the existence of brahman. This fact, however, 
does not invalidate the reasoning behind it, and one imagines 
that it is intended for someone who accepts the existence 
of brahman but has doubts about the appropriate means 
of knowledge. 
The aspect of Shankara' s rationale which we are emphasizing 
at this point is that given the nature of brahman, sruti, 
as a means of knowledge consisting of words, is the only 
logical and credible pramäna. The other important and 
complementary dimension of this rationale is that given 
the nature of brahman and the fact that the fundamental 
human problem is one of avidyd (ignorance), the knowledge 
derived from the words of the sruti is a fully adequate 
solution. For Shankara therefore, sruti as a pramäna is 
both logical and adequate. Shankara's view that the knowledge 
derived from the words of the sruti is sufficient for 
the immediate gain of moksha contrasts radically with 
the position of Vivekananda. Vivekananda repeatedly affirms 
that sruti-derived knowledge is inconclusive and in need 
of further verification. He argues for anubhava as the 
additional pramäna needed for verifying the claims of 
the sruti. Modern commentators, influenced by Vivekananda, 
argue that Shankara himself posits anubhava as 
the ultimate 
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pramana which certifies the provisional statements of 
the sruti. This view not only falsifies Shankara's epistemology, 
but also misses the substance of his assertion that the 
knowledge afforded through words is adequate. It is unfortunate 
that this significance has not been apprehended even by 
scholars such as de Smet and K. S. Murty who have treated 
Shankara's exegesis in some detail. 
5 
Shankara' s arguments for the logic of words (sabda) 
as the pramäna of brahmajnäna centre on the nature of 
brahman. His arguments for the adequacy of sabda also 
derive from the same fact. The gist of these arguments 
is that sruti is not required to reveal brahman in the 
sense of demonstrating Its existence. As Awareness, the 
content and basis of the "I" notion, brahman is self- 
revealing and always manifest. Because brahman, as the 
Self, is self-illumining, no one doubts his or her own 
existence. While no human being is unaware of the existence 
of the Self, Its true nature remains unknown. The consequence 
of this ignorance (avid ä) is that the limited attributes 
of the body and mind are wrongfully superimposed on the 
Self. The task of the sruti therefore is not the revelation 
or production of an unknown entity, but the imparting 
of correct knowledge about a Self which is misunderstood. 
This is all that is required. In Shankara, the 
sruti, 
rather than being subservient to the authority of an experience, 
interprets and corrects the meaning of experience. This 
suggests that our experiences do not necessarily give 
rise to right knowledge, and that, in relation to the 
knowledge of brahman, they do not provide a valid self- 
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interpretation. 
It is clear that as far as Shankara is concerned, 
valid knowledge ( ramä) is attained only by the application 
of a valid means of knowledge (pramäna), and he nowhere 
posits an experience as a spontaneous source of brahmajnäna. 
This is in contrast to Vivekananda's claim that the samädhi- 
experience is a self-valid source of brahmajnäna. We 
cannot therefore, emphasize strongly enough the misleading 
nature of the common contemporary tendency to classify 
Shankara's Advaita as a form of mysticism on the basis 
that he posits a special experience as the source of ultimate 
knowledge. Human experiences, in the widest sense, may 
be employed in a secondary manner to support and clarify 
the propositions of the sruti and this is what Shankara 
does in his commentaries. The experiences of dream and 
deep sleep, for example, are analyzed by him to elucidate 
and reinforce sruti revelations about the nature of the 
Self. This is possible, however, only after the Self 
is known from the sruti, and these experiences are not 
affirmed by Shankara to be independent authoritative sources 
of knowledge. 
Knowledge derived from inquiry (jijnäsä) into the 
meaning of words can be an adequate solution if the problem 
involved is merely one of ignorance (avidyä) . In Advaita, 
Brahman does not have to be attained. As the very Self 
of every human being, It is already fully accomplished. 
Actions (karma) which are necessary if one wants to create, 
modify, purify or reach an object are redundant in the 
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case of brahman. No actions are required for the attainment 
of one's own Self, and the problem is only an incorrect 
apprehension of Its nature. Knowledge is the sufficient 
solution to a problem of ignorance, and in this case the 
words of the sruti afford valid knowledge of the Self. 
B rahmajnana is fully identified by Shankara with knowledge 
gained from the sruti. Like the connection between brahman 
and the means through which it can be known, there is 
also a logical interrelationship in Shankara between avidyd 
as the problem and knowledge (' näna) derived from the 
words of the sruti as the solution. While Vivekananda 
accepts this fundamental Advaita proposition of avidyd 
as the problem, he does not consistently follow its implications 
in his discussions, and this is a cause of contradictions 
in the sources of knowledge proposed by him. It is not 
surprising that when Vivekananda changes the pramäna, 
there is a tendency in him to reformulate the nature of 
the fundamental problem. We have especially noted this 
in his karmayoga discussion. 
Shankara's argument about the adequacy of knowledge 
derived from the sentences of the sruti as a solution 
to a problem of ignorance is underlined by his emphasis 
on the fruitfulness of these sentences. This is a further 
point of contrast with Vivekananda, and another element 
of Shankara's understanding of the 
sruti overlooked by 
modern commentators. Sruti, according to Vivekananda, 
only stimulates the desire for first-hand 
knowledge, even 
as a map can excite one's curiosity to see a country. 
Shankara, on the other hand, reiterates the 
immediate 
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fruitfulness of the knowledge derived from the sentences 
of the sruti. Even as the comprehension of the sentence, 
"This is a rope, not a snake", can at once eliminate the 
fear of someone who mistakenly takes a rope for a snake, 
the knowledge gained from the sentences of the sruti directly 
removes the ignorance, grief and fear associated with 
erroneously taking oneself to be the finite body. The 
fruitfulness of this knowledge, contends Shankara, is 
apparent in the transformed life of one who appreciates 
the true nature of the Self. 
It is significant and interesting that the argument 
about the efficacy of the Vedanta-väkyas in eliminating 
fear and sorrow is a principal one employed by Shankara 
in responding to the Purva-Mimänsa challenge of the independent 
authority of these sentences. Purva-Mimänsä, it must 
be remembered, contend that the V edanta-vakyas do not 
have a purport of their own, but are subservient to sentences 
enjoining ritual (karma). This is a challenge which Shankara 
could not answer by a dogmatic assertion about the authority 
of the Vedas as derived from their eternity, since this 
is the very basis on which the Vedas are accepted by Pürva- 
Mimänsä. He seeks therefore to demonstrate the authority 
of these sentences by reference to their independent fruitfulness 
as a viable solution to the human problem of existential 
fear and sorrow. In the light of this fact, we wonder 
whether Shankara, if he were alive today, might not 
have 
employed this as a leading argument in his appeal to 
those, 
Hindu or non-Hindu, lacking a traditional 
faith (sraddha) 
in the authority of the sruti. Perhaps 
the argument about 
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the obvious and immediate fruitfulness of brahmajnäna 
in the lives of those who have understood and accepted 
it, might have been combined with the less dogmatic aspects 
of his rationale. It might have been connected with arguments 
that the knowledge afforded by the sruti is otherwise 
unobtainable, that it is reasonable, and that it is neither 
refuted nor contradicted by what is known through other 
pramänas. In other words, for Shankara, novelty, fruitfulness 
and non-contradiction might have been sufficient as the 
leading elements of a contemporary rationale for the sruti. 
A further dimension of the contrast between Shankara 
and Vivekananda centres on Shankara's affirmation that 
moksha is coincident with the gain of knowledge from the 
sruti. Here again, modern commentators have failed to 
grasp the significance of this claim with reference to 
Shankara's epistemology. Vivekananda treats knowledge 
derived from the sruti as having a provisional, hypothetical, 
theoretical or second-hand quality. Modern commentators, 
following Vivekananda, treat the attainment of brahmajnäna 
in Shankara as proceeding in three stages. Sravana (listening), 
the first of these, is described as acquainting us with 
the teachings of the sruti. In the second stage of manana 
(reflection), one seeks through reason to remove any doubts 
about these teachings. At the end of these two stages, 
however, knowledge still only has a tentative and provisional 
validity. It is really the final stage of nididhyäsana 
(translated generally as meditation) which affords an 
experience through which the claims of the 
sruti are directly 
apprehended and verified beyond all doubt. 
This experience 
therefore, is presented as the true pramana of 
brahmajnäna. 
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We have emphasized strongly in this study that Shankara 
oes not distinguish the nature and aims of these three 
processes in the manner of Vivekananda and modern commentators. 
'hey are all intended for the understanding and assimilation 
)f knowledge derived from the sruti sentences, and not 
: rom any alternative source. Consistent with his view 
: hat brahman, as the Self, is immediately available and 
"unattained" only because of ignorance, he sees this clear 
inderstanding as all that is required. The relationship 
)btaining between brahman and sruti is one between an 
existent but incorrectly known entity and the appropriate 
neans of its knowledge. It is not the creation or attainment 
: )f anything new, but the right knowledge of something 
already there. 
Shankara repudiates the need for any action, mental 
physical, beyond the understanding of the sruti-sentences. 
In this he is very specific about the redundancy of meditation 
(upasanä). In view of the indispensable function ascribed 
by Vivekananda and modern commentators to meditation in 
the attainment of brahmajnäna, Shankara's lucid distinction 
between 'näna (knowledge) and meditation (upäsanä) is 
, Host revealing. He categorically distinguishes the nature 
and functions of these two processes. The substance of 
this distinction is focused on his understanding of meditation 
(upäsanä) as a mental activity in which the true nature 
Df the object meditated upon is irrelevant. The object 
is conceived to be different from its actual nature, and 
'ach form of upäsana has as its aim a hitherto non-existent 
result. This is one important reason why meditation 
is 
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classified as a variety of action by Shankara, and not 
identified with jnäna. Meditation is not envisaged by 
3hankara as concerned with or as having as its aim the 
attainment of knowledge corresponding with the exact nature 
of an object. It is extremely important to note that 
Shankara condemns the view that after the knowledge of 
brahman is gained from the sruti, this knowledge must 
then be meditated upon to produce a further knowledge 
which is truly valid and capable of eliminating avidyä. 
This is the function which modern commentators ascribe 
to nididhyäsana in Shankara. Following Vivekananda, a 
theory/practice dichotomy is posited in which sruti- derived 
knowledge is affirmed as theory, and meditation as the 
practice which leads to a verification of this theory. 
Shankara's unmistakeable position, however, is that the 
clear understanding of the nature of brahman from the 
sentences of the sruti is all that is required. This is 
the aim of inquiry into the sruti, the significance of 
which modern commentators who have worked on Shankara's 
exegesis have overlooked. Even though, in considering 
Shankara's epistemology, this study has had to cover certain 
common exegetical grounds with some of these commentators, 
it differs radically in its understanding of the aim of 
exegesis in Shankara, and of the status of knowledge gained 
at the end of it. 
Meditation then, in the view of Shankara, has for 
its aim the creation of a previously non-existent result, 
and its nature is not to concern 
itself with true character 
: )f objects. J 
näna (knowledge), on the other hand, has 
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for its aim the proper understanding of the true nature 
of existing objects. It cannot create or alter these 
objects, but seeks simply to know them as they are. The 
indispensable requirement for any kind of 'näna is an 
appropriate and valid means of knowledge (pramana), capable 
of revealing the entity as it is. For taste it is the 
tongue, for sound it is the ear, and for forms it is the 
eye. Brahman is the ever-manifest Self of every human 
being, and indeed of everything that exists. As the Self, 
brahman is already attained, but incorrectly known. The 
words of the sruti constitute, for Shankara, the valid 
means of knowing brahman. What is required therefore, 
is the knowledge of brahman, derived from inquiry into 
the meanings of these words. This is the attainment of 
brahmajnäna, and the joyful freedom of moksha. 
Vivekananda's widely influential view of the significance 
of the sruti in Advaita and in Hinduism is not an attempt 
to build on Shankara's interpretation. There is little 
continuity with Shankara in respect of the relationship 
between sruti and brahmajnana. His reconstruction represents 
a radical break rather than a continuation. In an age 
when science, in the enthusiasm and arrogance of its youth, 
seemed ready to subject all the areas of human knowledge 
to its criterion and methods, Vivekananda felt that faith 
in the sruti as the source of brahmajnäna was irrational. 
He sought to posit a process of attaining brahmajnäna 
which he felt had satisfied the demands of science. 
It 
not only fails to do this, but, 
in a much wider perspective, 
his analysis is unsatisfactory and unconvincing. 
It is 
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true that faith (sraddhä) in the sruti as a pramanä is 
indispensable for Shankara, but this is not a faith which 
proscribes all use of human reason. 
Today, in Advaita, and more widely in Hinduism, the 
status of the sruti is ambiguous and contradictory. There 
is a disposition, noted in many of the studies reviewed 
in Chapter 1., to assert its authority while simultaneously 
positing a view which undermines that authority. Hinduism 
seems, in general, to be embarassed by the authority of 
the sruti, without proper critical evaluation of the alternative 
sources of spiritual knowledge set before it. There is 
a rational justification for sruti as a pramäna of brahmajnäna 
in Shankara, centred on its logicality, its adequacy, 
and its fruitfulness. Much more positive results would 
have been achieved by Vivekananda, had he sought to clarify, 
develop and build upon these arguments. They were neither 
presented clearly by him, nor refuted. 
In view of the many drawbacks of the alternative offered 
by Vivekananda, there is an urgent need in Advaita and 
in Hinduism to take a fresh look at the traditional under- 
standing of the sruti as a pramdna, and to unfold, clarify 
and evaluate this understanding. This process needs to 
be undertaken, even as Shankara did in his time, with 
reference to contemporary views and concerns. It 
is a 
task which calls for a unity between the commitment of 
both faith and scholarship. The elements of this traditional 
understanding derived from Purva-Mimänsa need, 
in particular, 
to be studied and reinterpreted. Must the concept of 
the sruti as sabda-pramana be necessarily linked 
to the 
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eternity of a language (viz. Sanskrit) ? Is the argument 
for the eternity of a language necessary to show that 
the sruti is of a non-human origin? In a secular and 
sceptical age many difficult questions will have to be 
asked, but as Hinduism will unhesitatingly admit, meaningful 
answers will never be given or discovered until meaningful 
questions are asked. 
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Apologetic Patterns", Journal of Asian Studies 29 
(1970), p. 278. 
11. For a comprehensive list of studies on Shankara see 
K. H. Potter, ed. , The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosop- 
hies, vol 1: Bibliography (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
1970), pp. 82-124. 
12. See K. H. Potter, ed. , The Encyclopedia of Indian Philos- 
ophies, vol 3: Advaita Vedanta (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
1981), pp. 18-19. Potter provides a useful summary of 
the opinions expressed on the authenticity of the 
various works attributed to Shankara. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. Swami Prabhavananda, The 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 
Spiritual Heritage of India 
2. 
1962) p. 15. 
S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1927; Unwin Paperbacks, 1980), p. 13. 
3. C. Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy 
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), p. 13. Not all 
writers, however, accept this use of the word, darsana. 
Hiriyanna, for instance, uses the word to mean, 
"philosophic opinion", and sees it as specifying a 
school of thought. See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of 
Indian Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932; 
first Indian reprint ed., Bombay: Allen and Unwin, 
1973), p. 182. 
4. Radhakrishnan's main discussion of Shankara occurs in 
his work, Indian Philosophy, 2 vols. (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1971), 2,445-658. Of all the thinkers 
treated by Radhakrishnan in the two volumes, Shankara 
has been accorded the most detailed analysis. 
Radhakrishnan is himself regarded as an Advaitin, and 
his exposition of Shankara is in a large measure an 
attempt to defend Advaita against many common criticisms. 
5. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 2,494-96. 
6. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life, pp. 14-15. See 
also, Prabhavananda, The Spiritual Heritage of India, 
p. 17. 
7. T. M. P. Mahadevan, "The Place of Reason and Revelation 
in the Philosophy of an Early Advaitin", in Proceedings 
of the Tenth Philosophical Conqress of Philosophy, 
Amsterdam, August 11-18,1948 (Amsterdam: North Holland 
Publishing Co., 1949), p. 248. 
8. See M. A. Buch, The Philosophy of Samkara (Baroda: 
A. G. Widgery, 1921), p. 271. 
9. See M. K. Iyer, Advaita Vedanta (New York: Asia 
Publishing House, 1964), pp. 152-53. 
10. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 2,518. 
11. Mahadevan, "The Place of Reason", p. 248. 
12. Y. K. Menon and R. F. Allen, The Pure Principle: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Shankara (Michigan 
State University Press, 1960), pp. 17-18. 
13. See R. P. Singh, The Vedänta of 
S 
ankara -a Metaphysics 
of Value, vol. 1. (Jaipur: Bharat Publishing House, 
Y949), pp. 202-3. 
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14. Radhakrishnan, 
15. Ibid. 
Indian Philosophy, 2,514. 
16. Mahadevan, "The Place of Reason", p. 249. See also, 
S. K. Belvalkar, Vedanta Philosophy (Poona: Bilrakunja 
Publishing House, 1929), p. 14. 
17. Menon and Allen, The Pure Principle, p. 18. 
18. Iyer, Advaita Vedanta, p. 153. 
19. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 2,518. 
20. Ibid., p. 514. 
21. Belvalkar, Vedanta Philosophy, pp. 15-16. 
22. Buch, The Philosophy of Samkara, p. 274. 
23. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 2,510. 
24. Ibid., p. 617. 
25. Ibid., p. 534. Radhakrishnan's concern to emphasize the 
mystical origin and foundation of Shankara's conclusions 
seems to conflict with his equal concern to characterize 
Advaita as a "purely philosophical scheme". This 
description, whenever employed, is intended to distinguish 
it from a theological scheme. The distinction is 
obviously based on his own view of the respective roles 
of the theologian and the philosopher, the nature of the 
two disciplines, and his own interpretation of Shankara's 
position. In Radhakrishnan's view, the theologian is 
one who takes his stand on a particular denominational 
basis. He is identified with a particular religious 
tradition and his purpose is to systematize, expand and 
defend the doctrines of his tradition. The philosopher, 
on the other hand, is not bound by any particular 
religious tradition which he considers to be true. 
Religion in general is the province of his investigation. 
It is interesting to note that this is a quite common 
description of Advaita employed by many writers, most 
of whom do not provide any clear definitions of 
philosophy or theology. See, for example, Prabhavananda, 
The Spiritual Heritage of India, p. 293. 
26. Prabhavananda, The Spiritual Heritage of India, pp. 293- 
94. Very revealing of the authority attributed by 
Prabhavananda to direct experience is the manner in 
which he treats anubhava as non-different from 
sruti, 
or as an additional pramäna. He subjects anubhava to 
the criteria normally used' for certifying a pramäna. 
He 
argues that for the experience to be genuine, it 
must 
reveal an entity unknowable through any other means, and 
that the content of its revelation must not be contradic- 
ted by any other means of knowledge. See p. 16. 
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27. Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p. 289. 
28. R. P. Singh, The Vedanta of Sankara, p. 186. The 
determination of epistemology by experience is, according 
to Singh, what Shankara means by the concept of 
vastutantram. We submit, however, that this is a 
misunderstanding of this concept. In Shankara, the 
idea of vastutantram as opposed to purushatantram 
is used to distinguish the entire process of knowledge 
from the process of activity. The distinction and 
its significance will be considered subsequently. 
29. Ibid., p. 168. 
30. S. K. Belvalkar, Veddnta Philosophy, pp. 17-18. One 
wonders about the validity of Belvalkar's argument 
for the superiority of experience over reason in 
ordinary life. It is very common for experience 
to be corrected and interpreted by reason. Even 
while seeing a mirage of water, for example, one 
knows it to be false. 
31. N. K. Devaraja, 
of Knowledge, 
1972). 
32. Ibid., p. 66. 
An Introduction to Sankara's Theo 
2nd ed., rev. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
33. One wonders here whether Devaraja has apprehended 
the special sense in which the word "object" is used 
by Shankara in this context. This significant point 
will be discussed later. 
34. Ibid., p. 67. 
35. Shankara, quoted in ibid., p. 57. 
36. Sh ankara, quoted in ibid., p. 62. Devaraja, however, 
refrains from discussing Shankara's reply to this 
contention. For full discussion, see B. S. B. 2.1.4-6, 
pp. 307-15. 
37. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 
336-82. 
38. Ibid., p. 358. 
39. Ibid., pp. 380-81. 
40. See M. Hiriyanna, Indian Philosophical Studies 
(Mysore: 
Kavyalaya Publishers, 1957), pp. 48-49. 
41. N. Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philoso 
h 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1964F, p. 98. 
42. Ibid., p. 104. The view that Advaita is essentially 
non-different from Mahayana has 
been seriously questioned. 
Devaraja, 
Sankara's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 12- 
22, discusses very central differences of method 
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and content between the two schools. It is a theme 
to which he returns throughout his study. 
43. N. Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, 
p. 150. 
44. Smart, The Yogi and the Devotee (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1968). In this work, Smart traces the development 
of Advaita from a synthesis between the non-Vedic 
religions (Buddhism, Jainism, Sdmkhya-Yoga) and Vedic 
religions. The latter contributed the concept of 
brahman, and the former the idea of Self etc. He 
traces a similar process in Mahäydna Buddhism. In 
both cases, the distinctive element is the higher 
role assigned to dhydna as the ultimate means of 
freedom. This distinguishes it from the theism of 
Madhava and Ramanuja. Smart's thesis rests upon 
his presupposition about the place of dhyäna in Shankara. 
One wonders also whether the differences between 
Shankara and Ramanuja could be explained as the results 
of the application of the different techniques of 
dhyäna and bhakti. Smart reduces his thesis to a 
mathematical-like formula: 
2 dhyäna +1 bhakti = Absolutism 
2 bhakti +1 dhyäna = Theism 
2 dhydna +0 bhakti = Non-theistic 
Pluralism. 
See p. 50. 
45. R. V. de Smet, "Sankara's Non-Dualism", in R. V. de 
Smet and J. Neuner, eds., Religious Hinduism 
(Allahabad: 
St. Paul Publications, 1964), pp. 52-61. 
46. Ibid., p. 55. 
47. Ibid., p. 56. This conflict is also very evident 
in a most recent work of E. Lott. There 
is a clear 
statement of Shankara's assertion that knowledge 
of brahman follows immediately on grasping the meaning 
of the Vedic statements indicating identity, 
followed 
by an affirmation of the finality of intuition. 
See Eric Lott, Vedantic Approaches to God 
(London: 
The Macmillian Press, 1980), p. 169. 
48. BR. U. 2.4.5. 
49. Jacob Kattackal, Religion and Ethics in Advaita 
(Freiburg: Herder, 1980), pp. 122-23. 
50. Mahadevan, "The Place of Reason", p. 
251. 
51. Iyer, Advaita Vedanta, p. 174. Also, Menon and 
Allen, The Pure Principle, pp. 21-22. 
5 2. De Smet, R. V. "The Theological Method of 
Samkara" 
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(Ph. D. thesis, Gregorian University, 1953), p. 
333. 
53. Singh, The Veddnta of Sankara, p. 186. The only 
difference, according to this writer, between sensuous 
perception and internal perception is that the latter 
is also a consciousness of value. Singh's claim 
that Shankara describes sruti as intuitional perception 
is based on a misreading of B. S. B. 1.3.28. Shankara's 
description of sruti as pratyaksa is in relation 
to his reference to smriti as inference. Smriti 
is related to sruti as'even inference is to direct 
perception. The former is dependent on the latter 
for its data and authority. See B. S. B. 1.3.28, 
p. 210. 
54. Singh, The Vedanta of Sankara, p. 197. 
55. Iyer, Advaita Vedanta, p. 188. 
56. Buch, The Philosophy of Samkara, p. 260. 
57. S. N. Dasgupta, Hindu Mysticism (Chicago: Open Court 
Publishing Co. , 1927). 
58. Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
59. Ibid., preface, viii. 
60. Ibid., p. 81. 
61. R. C. Zaehner, Mysticism Sacred and Profane (Clarendon 
Press, 1957; reprint ed., London: Oxford University 
Press, 1978). Also Hindu and Muslim Mysticism (London 
School of Oriental and African Studies, 1960; New 
York: Schocken Books, 1972). Zaehner arrives at 
what he considers to be three distinct types of 
mystical experiences: 
1. Panenhenic Mysticism 
2. Monistic Mysticism 
3. Theistic Mysticism 
Under his second category of monistic mysticism, 
Zaehner includes a variety of mystical experiences, 
Sdmk, hya, Yoga, and Advaita. He does not distinguish 
between S dmkhya and Yoga because they are generally 
combined, 8ämkhya providing the theoretical 
basis 
for the practical techniques of Yo a. Sämkhya 
is distinct from the panenhenic experience and, 
in fact, according to Zaehner, marks an advance 
beyond it because of its clear distinction between 
nature (prakriti) on the one hand, and 
the immortal 
soul (purushä on the other. Purusha 
is essentially 
different from prakriti and the ultimate aim 
is 
the complete freedom of the former from the 
latter. 
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62. 
There is no vision here of the unity of man with 
nature, and it is the complete opposite of the 
panenhenic vision. In the experience of oneself 
as brahman is involved the destruction of all 
illusory adjuncts and no further participation in 
them. There is the realization of oneself as "the 
only true One without a second", and therefore the 
Advaita experience is also distinguishable from 
the panenhenic identity with all of nature. Zaehner 
is very much aware of the deep philosophical gaps 
between Sdmkhya and Advaita, but includes them both 
in the category of monistic mysticism because he 
considers them identical in terms of actual experience. 
The experience could be interpreted in terms of 
Sdmkhya as the isolation of one's essential being 
or ' in terms of Advaita as the identity of one's 
being with the ground of the universe, brahman, 
for in both cases the experience is one of "totally 
undifferentiated oneness". Zaehner also includes 
Buddhism in his category of monistic mysticism. 
Geoffrey Parrinder, Mysticism in the World's Religions 
(London: Sheldon Press, 1976). 
63. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
64. Ibid., p. 32. 
65. Ibid., p. 37. 
66. For a most recent and typical consideration of Advaita 
as mysticism, see Kattackal, Religion and Ethics 
in Advaita, Chs. 1-2. According to Kattackal, the 
transcendental experience is regarded by Advaita 
as the true state of j näna and the major conclusions 
of Advaita are deducted from the nature of this 
experience. 
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CHAPTER 2 
1. Advaita Vedanta epistemology borrows a great deal 
from the orthodox Pürva-Mimänsä school. The word 
Mimänsa means inquiry and this system undertakes 
a systematic analysis of the first (pürva) parts 
of the Vedas, the mantras (hymns in praise of various 
deities), the brdhmanas (guide books for the performance 
of sacrifices) , and the äranyakas (philosopical interpretations of the sacrifices). Vedanta is 
referred to as Uttara-Mimänsa because its concern 
is with the analysis of the last (uttara) sections 
of the Vedas, the Upanishads. 
The sutras of Jaimini (ca. 200 B. C. ) are the earliest 
work of this system and form its basis. There are 
over two thousand and five hundred sutras, discussing 
one thousand topics. Jaimini's work was commented 
upon by Sabara Swami (ca. 400A. D. ) and his work 
was further commented upon by Prabhäkara and Kumärila 
Bhatta, who differ from each other in certain important 
respects and form the two principal schools of Mimänsd 
named after them. Shankara generally follows the 
Bhatta school, but with considerable differences 
as will become evident later. 
2. For Shankara and his immediate disciples, epistemology 
and metaphysical issues were treated together. 
The Vedanta-Paribhasä of Dharmaraj a, a seventeenth 
century Advaitin, is the first systematic exposition 
of Advaita epistemology. It is a classic work in 
the history of Advaita and its study is a must for 
all serious students of this system. It discusses 
the pramänas in detail and offers an Advaita interpretation 
of the nature and validity of knowledge. The V edänta- 
Paribhasä is divided into eight chapters. In the 
first six chapters, he defines and discusses the 
six means of knowledge accepted in common by P -urva- 
Mimdnsä and Advaita. The seventh chapter is devoted 
in the main to an analysis of the terms "tat" and 
"tvam" and the final chapter discusses the nature 
of moksha and the means of its attainment. Frequent 
references will be made to this important work in 
the course of our discussions. See Ch. 1, p. 5. 
3. D. M. Datta, Six Ways of Knowing (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1932), p. 27. 
4. Ibid. 
5. BR. U. B. 2.1.20, p. 214. 
6. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 34. 
7. B. S. B. 1.1.2, pp. 16-17. 
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S. 
9. 
V. P. Ch. 1, p. 5. 
Ibid., p. 7. 
10. Advaita posits three orders of existence. 1. Absolute 
pärämarthikam) existence belongs to non-dual brahman 
alone. 2. Empirical (vydvahärikam) is the objective 
universe, the independent reality of which endures 
until brahman, its substratum, is known. 3. Illusory 
(prdtibhäsikam) existence is the false appearance 
of something where it does not exist, such as the 
perception of mirage water in the desert. It comes 
to an end as soon as the obstacles to proper perception 
are removed and its locus is correctely apprehended. 
See, V. P. Ch. 2, p. 81. 
11. B. S. B. intro., p. 4. 
12. The word "generally" is used because of the exceptional 
case of the jivan-mukta, who, having gained Self- 
knowledge, continues in the embodied state. It should 
not be thought that access to information through 
the pramanas is impossible for him. The difference 
is that his employment of the instruments of knowledge 
proceeds from the clear understanding of the distinction 
between Self and non-Self and is therefore not founded 
in avidyd. It will be absurd to contend that having 
gained Self-knowledge, the jIvan-mukta is incapable 
of any further kind of knowledge because the pramdnas, 
founded in avidyd, cease to be operative. This is 
why it was important to point out the nature of the 
relationship between avidyd and the pramänas. The 
pramänas are operative both in the presence and absence 
of the notion of superimposition. The Bhagavadgita 
beautifully describes the attitued of the jivan- 
mukta to the pramdnas. 
'I do nothing at all'; thus would the truth- 
knower think, steadfast, - though seeing, hearing, 
touching, smelling, eating, going, sleeping, 
breathing, speaking, letting go, seizing, opening 
and closing the eyes, - remembering that the 
senses move among sense-objects (B. G. 5: 8-9). 
13. BR. U. B. 4.3.6, p. 425. 
14. B. S. B. 2.2.28, pp. 419-20. 
15. V. P. Ch. 6, pp. 143-49. 
16. Some general text books carry brief summaries of 
this theory. See Sharma, A Critical Survey of 
Indian 
Philosophy, Ch. 13. 
17. 
18. 
V. P. Ch. 6, pp. 144-45. 
Ibid., pp. 146-48. 
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19. For a brief summary, of the Näa position see, Devaraja, An Introduction to Sankara' s Theory of Knowledge, 
pp. 122-26. 
20. See Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, p. 21. 
21. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 23. This argument will become even 
clearer when the nature of scripture as a ramäna is subsequently discussed. 
22. Ibid., 2.2.31, p. 426. 
23. B. G. 13: 1-2. 
24. Ibid., 9: 18. 
25. See N. K. Devaraja, An Introduction to Sankara' s 
Theory of Knowledge, pp. 112-13. Also G. P. Bhatt, 
Epistemology of the Bhdtta School of Pürva Mimänsä 
(Varanasi: The Chowkharnba Sanskrit Series Office, 
1962), pp. 51-56. 
26. B. G. B. 18: 50, pp. 488-49. 
27. PR. U. B. 6.2, p. 487. 
28. The schools of Indian philosophy have defined the 
nature and number of the pramdnas differently and 
a discussion of considerable sophistication and 
detail has developed concerning each one. It is 
neither possible nor relevant for us to attempt 
a detailed and comparative treatment of each pramdna. 
Our concern here is primarily with sabda-pramäna 
and our purposes will be served by a general outline 
of the nature and function of each one. A few 
references will be made to other schools where they 
highlight the Advaita definition. For a detailed 
comparative treatment and attempt to vindicate the 
six pramanas, see Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing. 
29. V. P. Ch. 1, p. 66. 
30. Ibid., p. 12. 
31. T. B. pp. 17-22. 
32. The five organs of action (karmendriyas) evolve from 
the rajas aspect of the five elements. The organ 
of speech is born from the rajas aspect of space, 
the hands from the rajas aspect of air, the legs 
from the rajas aspect of fire, the genitals from 
the rajas aspect of water, and the anus from the 
rajas aspect of earth. From the total ra 'as aspect 
of these five elements is evolved the five 2rnas. 
The tamas aspect of the five elements, by undergoing 
the process of grossification, evolve into the five 
gross elements. The first stage in this process 
is the division of each element into two equal halves. 
One half of each element remains intact, while the 
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other half divides into four equal parts. In the 
final stage, the intact half combines with one part 
of each of the other four elements and the process 
if completed. From these grossified elements, the 
visible physical body is formed. 
33. BR. U. B. 2.4.11, p. 254. 
34. Ibid., 1.5.3, p. 148. It should be noted that terms 
such as manas and buddhi, which strictly speaking 
denote functions of the antahkarana, are sometimes 
used by Shankara to denote the entire organ. Manas 
is that mode (vritti) of the antahkarana characterized 
by doubt and indecision, while bud'dhi indicates the 
function of decision and determination. 
35. Ibid. 
36. B. S. B. 2.3.32p p. 493. 
37. The dtman and the antahkarana are entirely distinct. 
Like the sense objects; the'states of the mind are 
knowable and the antahkarana stands in relation to 
the ätman as known and Knower. Being composed of 
the subtlest substance, the antahkarana easily reflects 
the Light that is the Self. Through the contact 
with the antahkarana, the sense organs receive Consciousness 
and through these It is transmitted to the physical 
body. The Self thus successively illumines the aggregate 
of body and organs. See, BR. U. B. 4.3.7, p. 428. 
38. Two of the organs, the senses of seeing and hearing, 
reach out to their objects, while the organs of touch, 
taste and smell generate cognitions while abiding 
in their locations. See, V. P. Ch. l, p. 66. For 
an argument in favour of this view see, D. M. Datta, 
The Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 39-71. Datta tries 
to show it as a more favourable explanation of 
perception than other available theories. 
39. B. S. B. 2.2.13, p. 391. 
40. V. P. Ch. 1, pp. 32-33. 
41. We shall be looking at the Advaita interpretation 
of "tat tvam asi" as non-relational knowledge, 
in 
greater detail later on. 
42. BR. U. B. 1.4.10, p. 103; 5.14.4, p. 592. 
43. "Invariable concomitance is co-existence with the 
thing to be inferred that must abide in all substrata 
of the reason" (V. P. Ch. 2, p. 
73). 
44. There is a broad consensus among Indian schools of 
philosophy about the general principles of 
inference, 
but important differences as regards its particulars. 
While vii, for instance, is accepted as the essential 
It It i 
element of anumäna, there is disagreement about its ascertainment. Nyäya as one would expect, has taken the lead in the methodic study of this source of knowledge. 
45. V. P. Ch. 2, p. 73. 
46. Ibid., p. 74. Advaita sees negative invariable concomitance as a case of postulation. 
47. BR. U. B. 4.3.7, p. 436,433; B. S. B. 2.3.26, p. 485. 
48. V. P. Ch. 2, p. 76. Shankara himself is usually satisfied with stating the first two stages and occasionally 
adding the example. 
49. V. P. Ch. 3, p. 83. 
50. Ibid., p. 85. 
51. "It is the assumption of an explanatory fact (upapädaka) 
from a knowledge of the thing to be explained (upapädya)" N. P. Ch. 5, p. 117). 
52. Ibid. , p. 119. 
53. CH. U. B. 7.1.3, p. 369. 
54. V. P. Ch. 5, p. 120. 
55. Ibid., p. 122. 
56. See D. M. Datta, Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 236-37. 
57. V. P. Ch. 5, p. 124. 
58. See, for example, BR. U. B. 3.3.1, pp. 311-19; B. G. B. 
18: 67, p. 517. 
59. V. P. Ch. 6. 
60. This view of Advaita contrasts strongly with the 
Nyäya argument that non-existence is available for 
sense perception. According to Nyäya, each sense 
organ can perceive the existence as well as the non- 
existence of its respective object. It argues that 
the non-existence of an object in a particular locus 
is related to the locus as an attribute. The room, 
for example, has as its attribute the non-existence 
of the table. Because of this relation, the perception 
of the floor leads to the perception of the non- 
existence of the table through a special contact 
between the organ of vision and the non-existence 
of the table. Advaita argues, however, that in no 
case can the sense organ. come in contact with any 
kind of non-existence. See V. P. Ch. 6, p. 133. 
q14 /- 
61. "Only a non-apprehension that is possessed of capacity 
is (to be regarded as) the instrument of an apprehension 
of non-existence" (V. P. Ch. 6, p. 126). See also 
pp. 127-28. 
62. Ibid., pp. 137-42. 
63. Ibid., p. 138. There is a difference of opinion 
here between Advaita and Nyäya. In the latter view, 
non-existence as destruction has a beginning but 
no end. In the view of Advaita, brahman alone is 
without beginning and end. 
64. Sabda-pramdna can be viewed in two ways. It can 
be seen as inclusive of all knowledge, secular and 
sacred, transmitted through langauge. It can also 
be seen as referring specifically to the Vedas as 
a unique form of sabda-pramana. It is with the 
analysis and understanding of sabda-pramana in the 
latter sense that Advaita is primarily concerned. 
There are important differences between the understanding 
of the concept in the general and specific senses. 
In the former sense, for example, sabda is of human 
origin (paurusheya), while in the latter sense it 
is of non-human origin (apaurusheya). These terms 
will be considered in more detail later. In the 
discussion which immediately follows, sabda is treated 
in the general sense. 
65. Sabda-pramäna is commonly translated as "testimony" 
or "authority". We find, however, as we hope to 
demonstrate, that neither of these two terms reflect 
the complexity of the concept. It is difficult to 
find a simple expression which accurately communicates 
the notion. We have chosen therefore, to leave the 
expression untranslated. 
66. It is neither possible nor relevant to review all 
of the linguistic speculations which have occurred 
in the history of Advaita thought. We have selected 
therefore, those which shed light on the Advaita 
understanding of sruti as sabda-pramäna. 
67. See B. S. B. 1.3.28. 
68. Ibid., p. 212 
69. The word sphota is derived from s_phut - to express. 
It can mean either that which is expressed 
by the 
sound series, or that which expresses the meaning. 
70. It was earlier indicated that there is a sphota corresp- 
onding to each word and sentence. According 
to the 
sphota advocates, however, it is ultimately one 
and 
identical with brahman. The plurality of the sphota, 
as revealed by different words, 
is a fact of the 
empirical sphere only. There is a parallel 
here, 
of course, with brahman's non-duality and 
Its apparent 
diversity. 
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71. B. S. B. 1.3.28# pp. 215-16. 
72. V. P. Ch. 4, p. 86. 
73. It is conceivable that a single word can comprise 
a sentence, if the other words are implicit from the 
context. 
74. V. P. Ch. 4, p. 86. 
75. Ibid., p. 87. 
76. Ibid., p. 91. 
77. Ibid., p. 92. 
78. Ibid., p. 107. 
79. We shall discuss later the concept of tatparya with 
reference to its importance in scriptural exegesis. 
80. The Upanishadic sentence, "tat tvam asi", is also 
seen as an example of an akhandärthakam väkyam. 
81. See V. P. Ch. 4, pp. 93-106. 
82. Ibid., p. 93. The primary meaning is referred to 
as mukhydrtha, sakyärtha, abhidheyärtha, or vacyartha. 
See also, BR. U. B. 3.4.1, p. 325. 
83. V. P. Ch. 4, p. 96. Secondary meaning is referred 
to as lakshyärtha. 
84. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
85. Ibid., p. 98. 
86. The term jahallakshanä is composed of jahad and lakshand. 
Jahad is the present *participle of the root hä, meaning 
to remove or abandon. 
87. Jahadajahallakshanä, also referred to as bhä alakshana, 
is for our purposes the most significant kind of 
implication. It is this method which is used in 
the exegesis of "tat tvam asi". 
88. V. P. Ch. 4, p. 102. 
89. B. S. B. 1.4.11, p. 264. 
90. See ibid., 3.3.9, p. 660; 4.1.6, p. 829. 
91. This argument is central to the claim that brahman 
can be known from sruti as sabda-pramäna. 
92. See, D. M. Datta, Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 330-32. 
Datta's work provides many useful insights, but 
its 
main limitation is that it discusses 
sabda-pramäna 
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and its associated theories with little or no reference 
to the justification of sruti as a pramana. It is 
apparent that most of the Advaita arguments evolved 
with this concern in mind and their rationale can 
only be understood in this context. 
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CHAPTER 3 
1. This does not contradict our previous argument that 
the nature and method of sabda-pramäna distinguishes 
it as an independent source of knowledge. 
2. Some Advaitins, however, argue that even in the empirical 
world, sabda-pramäna alone can inform us of another 
person's thoughts änd emotions. 
3. The Vedas are collectively referred to as sruti (lit. 
that which is heard) . This term suggests the oral 
transmission of knowledge in a succession of teachers 
and students. It is suggested that the reason for 
the oral transmission of Vedic knowledge was the 
absence of a written script at the time when the 
Vedas were composed. It appears that even long after 
writing was introduced, there was a clear preference 
for the oral transmission of scripture, and religious 
learning through the written word was looked down 
upon. Perhaps it was felt that the oral transmission 
of a tradition was a far better way of ensuring its 
living continuity. Vedic words had to be handed 
down exactly as they had been heard, and correct 
sounds and pronunciation became all-important. Continuous 
repetition became the mode of learning, and sravana 
(listening), the first procedure in assimilating 
knowledge. See William Cenker, "The Pandit: The 
Embodiment of Oral Tradition", Journal of Dharma, 
5 (1980), pp. 237-51. 
4. B. G. B. intro., pp. 2-3. 
5. B. G. 4: 7-8. 
6. Ibid. , 4: 6. 
7. Ibid., 4: 5. 
8. Ibid., 7: 7: 26. 
9. Ibid., 3: 22. 
10. Ibid., 3: 23-24. 
11. B. G. B. intro., p. 4. 
12. Ibid. 
"Know this by long prostration, by inquiry, by service, 
those men of wisdom who have realised the truth will 
teach thee wisdom" (, bid., 4: 34). 
13. B. G. 4: 1-3. 
14. B. S. B. 1.1.1, p. 12. 
zzv 
15. Ibid., intro., p. 3. 
16. B. G. B. 2: 16, pp. 34.37. 
17. B. S. B. 1.1.1, p. 12. 
18. Ibid., 1.3.28, p. 209. 
19. This contrasts with the Nydya view of universals 
as real, eternal and independent of their respective 
particulars, to which they are related by inherence. 
20. For a summary of these views see Datta, The Six Ways 
of Knowing, pp. 259-73. 
21. B. S. B. 1.3.28, p. 209. 
22. V. P. Ch. 4, p. 94. 
23. B. S. B. 1.3.28, p. 209. Purva-Mimansa deals with 
this objection by arguing that sucfi words as Vasu refer 
to unique individuals who are eternal, and thus the 
connection between them and the words signifying 
them is eternal. They also contend that gods are 
birthless, deathless and unembodied. This theory, 
however, is not acceptable to Shankara. On the 
evidence of various texts, he argues that gods are 
also embodied. It is only through extraordinary 
merit that this status is achieved, and it is, in 
fact, lost when this merit is exhausted. See, ibid., 
1.3.26-27, pp. 204-7. 
24. Ibid., 1.3.28, p. 213. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ibid., 
27. Ibid. , p. 214. 
28. The doctrine of the eternity of the word and its 
connection with its referent is taken over by Shankara 
from the Pürva-Mimänsä school. See M. S. J. 1.1.5- 
23, pp. 8-16. Sütrds 6-11 detail several arguments 
against the eternity of the word. In sutras 12- 
17, Ja imin i attempts to refute each argument individually 
and follows this in sutras 18-23 with independent 
arguments for the eternal word. According to Jaimini, 
the momentary nature of the word is not due to its 
non-eternity, but is the result of the function of 
its manifesting agency. Utterance only manifests 
what is already existing. When we speak of the production 
of a word, we only indicate its utterance and not 
its creation anew. Changes in pronunciation are 
only indicative of changes in tone and not in the 
word itself. If the uttered word was transient, 
it would vanish immediately and there would be no 
possibility of comprehension. We should be reminded 
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that the intention behind the Mimänsa view is the justification of the Vedas as a defect-free source of knowledge. The view here seems to be that if 
the relationship between words and their meanings is fixed by human convention, like everything human, it will be liable to error. The argument therefore, is that this relationship is natural, eternal and free from error. 
29. B. S. B. 1.3.29, p. 216. 
30. See Ganganatha Jha, The Pürva-Mimansä in its Sources (Benares: Benares Hindu University,, 1942), p. 153. 
31. M. S. J. 1.1.27, p. 19. 
32. Ibid., 1.1.30, p. 20. 
33. B. S. B. 1.3.28, p. 211. 
34. Ibid., pp. 209-10. 
35. Ibid., pp. 210-11. 
36. Ibid., 1.3.30, p. 217. 
37. Ibid., pp. 217-21. 
38. Ibid., pp. 218-19. 
39. Ibid., 4.1.4, p. 821. Shankara cites BR. U. 4.3.22, 
"The Vedas are no Vedas". See also, V. P. Ch-4, p. 
113. 
40. The attitude of early Mimänsä writers to God is a 
matter of some controversy.. It is sometimes argued 
that they did not discuss God because they were primarily 
concerned with establishing the Vedas as a self- 
evident, eternal source of knowledge and inquiring 
into ritual. Jaimini says nothing about God. Kumärila 
Bhatta, on the other hand, severely criticized theistic 
arguments for God and an omniscient person and seems 
to find the concept absurd. It is of interest to 
note a few of his arguments. It is not proper, he 
argues, to attribute the creation of a world that 
is full of pain and suffering to God. Suffering 
cannot be traced back to merit and demerit which are 
not existent at the beginning of creation. Compassion 
cannot be the motive for creation, since there are 
no beings to whom compassion can be shown. Besides, 
on this view, the world would be made entirely happy, 
for there is nothing that could deter the compassionate 
activity. If it is deterred, He could not be omnipotent. 
Why should God create? If his activity is purposeless, 
He is not an intelligent person. If He creates because 
of His desire for sport (lila) , He cannot 
be regarded 
as one who is complete. If the theist is concerned 
about finding a cause to explain the world process, 
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karma can be regarded as a sufficient cause. Against 
the notion of an omniscient person, Kumdrila argues 
that whether a person knows all, can only be verified by someone who is himself omniscient. Logically 
therefore, there should be many omniscient persons. 
See Jha, The Pürva-Mimämsa in its Sources, pp. 47- 
52. 
41. B. S. B. 1.2.2, p. 111. 
42. Ibid., 1.1.3, pp. 18-19. 
43. "Those that are called the Rg-Veda (Yajur-Veda, etc. ) 
are but the exhalation of this great Being" (BR. U. 
2.4.10). 
44. BR. U. B. 2.4.10, p. 251. 
45. B. S. B. 1.3.28, p. 210. See also, B. G. B. 15: 15, p. 
409. Here also, he interprets authorship in the 
sense of initiating the regular succession of teaching. 
46. "The sacrificers, having acquired fitness to receive 
the Veda as a result of the earlier performance of 
good deeds, received it as it had already existed 
among the rsis" (Rig-Veda mantra, quoted in B. S. B. 
1.3.29, p. '217). "Or, "In the days of yore, the great 
rsis received through austerities, with the permission 
of the self-born One, the Veda, together with the 
anecdotes, that had remained withdrawn during dissolution" 
ibid. See also, 1.3.30, p. 219. 
47. V. P. Ch. 4, pp. 115-16. 
48. Väcaspati Misra flourished in the first half of the 
9th. century A. D. He occupies a very important place 
in the history of Advaita thought. His two most 
_ important works are Bhamati and Tattvasmiksä. Bhamati 
is a commentary on a portion of Shankara' s 'commentary 
on the Brahma-sutra, while Tattvasmiksa is a commentary 
on the Brahma-siddhi of Mandanamiira. ' The first 
work is supposed to have been named in honour of 
his wife. 
49. Bhamati, 1.1.2, pp. 141-42. 
50. BR. U. B. intro., 1.1, pp. 1-5. 
51. B. S. B. 2.1.6, p. 314. 
52. Ibid., 3.1.25, pp. 585-86. 
53. Mimänsä is in full agreement with Shankara on this 
point, even though they do not agree, as we shall 
see, that the Vedas are also a pramdna 
for brahman. 
The Mimänsa argument is that although dharma is an 
object of knowledge, it is not amenable 
to sense- 
perception. Perception can only apprehend objects 
which are in existence at the time and are 
in contact 
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with the organs. Dharma, however, is not in existence 
at the time of perception and has to be brought into 
being by certain acts. In addition, it has no external 
or tangible form and cannot be in contact with any 
of the sense organs. The other pramänas such as 
inference, presumption, etc. are more ör less dependent 
on perception and are not therefore, applicable. 
See, M. S. J. 1.1.4, pp. 6-7. Also, Jha, The Pürva- 
Mimämsä in its Sources, pp. 175-76. 
54. BR. U. B. intro., 1.1, pp. 1-2. 
55. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
56. It is very important to note the specific sense 
in which Shankara is using the concepts of dharma 
and adharma in this discussion. Here it implies 
pun rya (merit) and papa (demerit) accruing particularly 
from the performance and non-performance of recommended 
ritual activities. Actions are understood as having 
a twofold result: seen (drishta) and unseen (adrishta). 
Shankara's contention is that 'the unique relation 
between any action and its unseen result can be known 
only from the Vedas. The adrishta result is conceived 
of as a subtle, persisting impression that has the 
potency of bearing good or evil in the course of 
time. 
57. BR. U. B. intro., 1.1, pp. 3-5. Shankara's attribution 
of an independent authoritative aim to the jndnakdnda 
of the Vedas is perhaps the most important ex eg etic il 
divergence from Purva-Mimänsä, whose_views he adopts 
on so many other matters. -Pürva-Mimansa considers 
only the injunctive statements of the-Vedas to be 
authoritative. All other passages serve as auxiliaries 
to injuctions. We shall consider the details of 
this interesting controversy later. For further 
statements of Shankara on the limitations of the 
ritual portions of the Vedas see, B. G. B. 2: 42-44, 
p. 61; MU. U. B. 1.2.12, pp. 109-11. 
58. BR. U. B. 2.3.6, p. 236. 
59. Ibid., 4.4.6, p. 504. 
"The ultimate aim of the Upanisads is to teach Self- 
knowledge" (BR. U. B. 3.5.1, p. j36). 
60. The terms brahman and ätman are interchangeable here 
because of their identity. 
61. B. S. B. 1.1.2, p. 17; 1.1.4, p. 22. 
62. BR. U. B. 3.9.26, pp. 388-89. 
63. See above, Ch. 2.4. pp. 59-60. 
64. The other elements, the particular qualities 
which 
they manifest, and the organs evolved out of 
them 
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are as follows: 
Space Sound Ear 
Air Touch Skin 
Water Taste Tongue 
Earth Smell Nose 
65. "One becomes freed from the jaws of death by knowing 
that which is soundless, touchless, colourless, 
undiminishing and also tasteless, eternal, odourless, 
without beginning and without end, distinct from 
Mahat, and ever constant" (KA. U. 1.3.15). 
66. B. G. B. 13: 12, pp. 345-46. Also 2: 25, p. 51. 
67. "This body, 0 son of Kunti, is called the Field 
(Kshetra); that which knoweth it is called the Knower 
of the Field (Kshetrajna) " (B. G. 13: 1). 
68. Ibid., 13: 17. 
69. BR. U. B. 2.4.14, p. 261. Also, KE. U. B. 2.1, pp. 59- 
60. 
70. "It being an established fact that the object and 
the subject, that are fit to be the contents on the 
concepts 'I' and 'it' (respectively), and are by 
nature contradictory as light and darkness cannot 
logically have any identity, it follows that their 
attributes can have it still less. Accordingly, 
the superimposition of the object, referable through 
the concept 'it', and its attributes on the subject 
that is conscious by nature and is referable through 
the concept 'I' (should be impossible), and contrariwise 
the superimposition of the subject and its attributes 
on the object should be impossible" (B. S. B, intro., 
p. 1). 
71. AI. U. B. 2.1, pp. 48-49. 
72. See above, Ch. 2.4. pp. 63-66. 
73. B. S. B. 2.1.6, p. 314. 
74. Ibid., 2.1.27, p. 355. 
75. Ibid. , 2.1.11, p. 322. 
76. It should be pointed out that there is no twisting 
of the text here, for the compound does indeed offer 
both possibilities of meaning. 
77. B. S. B. 1.1.3, pp. 18-20. 
78. The possibilities and limitations of reason 
in relation 
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to the acquisition of brahmajnäna will be considered later. It must be mentioned that although Shankara 
dismisses perception, etc . as valid primary sources 
of the knowledge of brahman, this does not imply 
that they have absolutely no role in the process 
of gaining this knowledge. The subsidiary functions 
which they are assigned will become apparent as we 
proceed. 
79. See, for example, S. K. Mukherjee, "Shankara on the 
Limits of Empirical Knowledge", in Annals of the 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 12 1930- 
31 , 68. 
80. KE. U. 2.1-3. For one of Shankara's finest discussions 
on this paradox, see his full commentary on Part 
2 of this Upanishad. 
81. BR. U. B. 3.6.1. p. 343. 
82. Ibid., p. 344. 
83. KE. U. B. 1.3, p. 49. The word Oma literally means, 
"traditional knowledge". See also, B. G. B. 18: 50, 
p. 487. 
84. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II, 617. 
85. N. K. Devaraja, An Introduction to Sankara's Theory 
of Knowledge, p. 66. 
86. B. B. S. B. 1.1.1, p. 9. 
to be understood with 
svatah-prdmanya-vdda. 
55. 
These views of Shankara are 
reference to the theory of 
See above, Ch. 2.3. pp. 50- 
87. B. S. B. 2.1.1, p. 304. 
88. Ibid., 1.1.4, p. 23. The argument here is that the 
dependence of one pramana on another leads to infinite 
regress. 
89. Ibid. , 2.1.4, p. 
307. In support, he cites a well 
known text, I ask you of that Being who is to be 
known only from the Upanisads" (BR. U. 3.9.26). 
90. BR. U. B. 1.4.14, p. 123. 
91. B. S. B. 2.3.6, p. 453. 
92. B. G. B. 13: 4, pp. 336-37. 
93. BR. U. B. 1.3.1, p. 32. See also, B. S. B. 2.1.1, p- 
302, "One cannot surmise the possibility of perceiving 
supersensuous things without the Vedas". 
"Vedic texts are the valid means to us in the matter 
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of generating knowledge about supersensuous things" (B. S. B. 2.3.32, p. 445). 
94. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 92. 
95. CH. U. B. 8.12.1, p. 475. This should be seen in the 
context of our discussion on the criterion of valid knowledge. See above, Ch. 2.1. pp. 45-50. 
96. Su resvara (ca. A. D. 800) is a direct disciple of 
Shankara and was installed by him in charge of the 
Math at Sringeri. It was until very recently thought 
that he was identical with Mandanamisra, the disciple 
of Kumdrila Bhatta. It is now held, however, that 
Suresvara is closer in view to Shankara than Mandana. 
See E. Deutsch and J. A. B. van Buitenen, A Source 
Book of Advaita Vedanta, (Honolulu: University Press 
of Hawaii, 1971), pp. 223-24. Suresvara's chief 
works are, Naishkarmya-Siddhi and Brihadäranyakopanishad- 
badshya-vdrttika. 
97. See N. S. 3: 34-38, pp. 168-70. 
98. Bhamati, 1.1.4, pp. 157-60. 
99. B. S. B. 2.2.38, p. 436. 
100. For a summary of some of the Nydya arguments about 
God, see Radhakrishnan, Indian Philsophy, II, 165- 
73. Also G. Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology, 
(Vienna : De Nobili Research Library, 1972 . 
101. B. S. B. 1.1.2, p. 17. The Nyäya argument might have 
difficulty in proving that there is a single creator. 
On the analogy of common experience, one could argue 
that complex effects are generally produced by several 
agents acting in coordination. 
102. See ibid., 2.2.37-41, pp. 434-38. We may notice 
here the parallels in argument with Kumärila Bhatta. 
103. Ibid., 2.2.38, pp. 435-36. 
104. Ibid., 2.1.31, pp. 359-60. 
105. Perhaps the best examples of this are to be 
in those parts 
he sets out to 
evolution 
example, 
found 
of his Brahma-sutra commentary where 
refute the Sdmkhya doctrine of the 
of the world from insentient matter. rQ. L 
It is not seen in this world that any independent 
insentient thing that is not guided by some sentient 
being can produce modifications to serve some 
special purpose of man; for what is noticed 
in 
the world is that houses, palaces, beds, seats, 
recreation grounds etc., are made by the 
intelligent 
engineers and others at the proper time and 
in 
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a way suitable for ensuring or avoiding comfort 
or discomfort. So how can insentient Pradhäna 
create this universe, which cannot even be mentally 
conceived of by the intelligent and most far- 
famed architects, which is seen in the external 
context to consist of the earth etc. that are 
fit places for experiencing the results of various 
works, and in the context of the individual person, 
of the body and other things having different 
castes etc., in which the limbs are arranged 
according to a regular design, and which are 
the seats for experiencing various fruits of 
actions? (B. S. B. 2.2.1, p. 369). 
106. See above, Ch. 1. 
107. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 11,518. Radhakrishnan's 
views are contrary to the main argument of Shankara 
for justifying the Vedas. According to Shankara, 
the Vedas as sabda-pramäna are necessary because 
the knowledge which they'afford is not available 
through any other means. If this knowledge was 
available through human faculties, Shankara's argument 
would not stand. 
108. The term includes texts like the Manu Smriti, the 
Bhagavadgitä, the Purdnas and the Mahäbharata. It 
is also used with reference to the works of other 
schools such as Nyäya, Vaiseshika and Yoga. 
109. B. S. B. 1.3.28, p. 210. 
110. Ibid., 2.1.1, p. 304. 
111. Ibid., pp. 303-4. 
112. Ibid., 2.1.3, pp. 306-7. 
113. B. G. B. 18: 19, p. 461. 
114. B. S. B. 1.2.25, p. 149. Shankara's conclusions on 
the respective authority of sruti and smriti are 
derived from Purva-Mimänsa writers who have discussed 
this matter in interesting detail. See M. S. J. 
1.3.1- 
6, pp. 55-68. With regard to the smritis composed 
by Manu and others, Kumärila has proposed five alternatives: 
(i) That the authors of these texts were entirely 
mistaken about what they wrote. (ii) That their 
assertions were derived from personal observation. 
(iii) That they learnt about what they wrote from 
others. (iv) That they intentionally made wrong 
statements to mislead others. 
(v) That their assertions 
are based on Vedic injunctions. He advances 
various 
arguments for the rejection of all alternatives, 
except the last. For most of the smriti 
injunctions, 
Kumärila says, corroborative Vedic texts are easily 
found. In the case of texts for which no such 
corroboration can be found, we must presume 
that 
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such Vedic texts were known to the smriti compilers 
but are now lost along with many others. The basis 
of this presumption is the fact that the compilers 
of the smritis had also learnt and studied the Vedas. 
Kumärila, 'however, does not accept all smriti literature 
to be equally authoritative. Only those parts of 
the smritis which are concerned with dharma have 
their origin directly in the Vedas. Those that relate 
to pleasure and pain as experienced in the world 
are derived from direct perception. Stories, which 
are encountered from time to time, are meant for 
praising dharma and condemning adharama. See Jha, 
Pürva-Mimamsä in its Sources, pp. 214-18. 
115. B. G. B. 18: 66, p. 513. 
116. Ibid. Also B. S. B. 2.1.12, p. 324. 
117. PR. U. B. 6.2, p. 490. 
118. BR. U. B. 2.1.20, p. 209. Purva-Mimansa writers have 
also considered the question of whether Vedic words 
and their denotations are the same as those in common 
use. They have concluded that the words must be 
the same if Vedic injunctions are to be understood 
and meaningful. See M. S. J. 1.3.30, p. 91. In fact, 
Purva-Mimänsä accepts that there are cases 
the 
where 
meaning of a Vedic word may have to be sought 
among non-Aryan people. such a situation arises 
if the word used by a non-Aryan is exactly the same 
as used in the Vedas, but unknown to the Aryan 
vocabulary. See M. S. J. 1.3.10, p. 74. 
119. BR. U. B. 2.1.20, p. 209,217. 
120. See, N. S. 3: 84-86, pp. 207-8. 
121. Ibid., p. 208. 
122. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, pp. 81-82. Also N. S. 3: 44-45, pp. 
173-74. 
123. BR. U. B. 2.1.20, pp. 218- 
Advaita on this point is 
and sruti are different. 
with the empirical world 
reality. Sruti does not 
of perception. 
19. The general view of 
that the fields of perception 
Perception is concerned 
while sruti discloses absolute 
deny the empirical validity 
124. "As for the argument that creation after deliberation 
is seen in the world only in cases of such efficient 
causes as the potter and others, but not 
in the case 
of materials, that is being answered. 
Any argument 
from common sense is not applicable here; 
for this 
is not a truth to be arrived at from through 
inference. 
Rather, it being known from the Vedas 
(alone), its 
meaning should conform to Vedic statements" 
(B. S. B. 
1.4.27, p. 296). 
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125. BR. U. B. 3.3.1, pp. 318-19. 
126. B. S. B. 1.4.14, pp. 272-73. 
127. Ibid., 1.3.7, p. 166. 
128. B. G. 3: 17-18. 
129. AI. U. B. intro., p. 8. Also, B. G. B. 2: 46 and 69. 
The fact that the brahmajnäni transcends the necessity 
for the sruti does not in any way detract from its 
indispensability as a pramäna of brahman. The point 
is that a pramana, having successfully given birth 
to knowledge, 16 no longer needed for that purpose. 
Its value is not thereby reduced, nor does it suggest 
that knowledge is otherwise attainable. 
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CHAPTER 4 
1. "Nor can the scriptures speak about an unknown thing 
without having recourse to conventional words and their meanings" (BR. U. B. 2.1.20, p. 209). 
2. The view that the words of the Vedas are the same 
as those of conventional usage is accepted even by 
the orthodox Pürva-Mimänsa system. See M. S. J. 1.3.30, 
p. 91. 
3. B. G. B. 13: 12, pp. 346-47. Also KE. U. B. 1.3, p. 49. 
4. KA. U. 2.2.15. Also B. G. 13: 17. 
5. B. S. B. intro., pp. 3-4. 
6. Ibid. , p. 3. 
7. Ibid., 1.1.1, p. 11. 
8. Ibid. , p. 12. Also 2.3.7, p. 455. In the Bhagavadgitä 
bhäshya a similar argument is made: 
For, the Self is not a thing unknown to anybody at 
any time, is not a thing to be reached or got rid 
of or acquired. If the Self be quite unknown, all 
undertakings intended for the benefit of oneself 
would have no meaning. It is not, indeed, possible 
to imagine that they are for the benefit of the 
physical body or the like which has no consciousness; 
nor is it possible to imagine that pleasure is 
for pleasure's sake and pain is for pain's sake. 
It is, moreover, the Self-knowledge which is the 
aim of all endeavour. Wherefore, just as there 
is no need for an external evidence by which to 
know one's body, so there is no need for an external 
evidence to know the Self who is even nearer than 
the body (B. G. B. 18: 50, p. 488). 
9. B. S. B. 1.1.2, pp. 12-13. 
10. Ibid., intro., pp. 1-2. 
11. Ibid., p. 6. 
12. "Therefore we have only to eliminate what is falsely 
ascribed to Brahman by avidya; we have to make no 
more effort to acquire a knowledge of Brahman as He 
is quite self-evident. Though thus quite self-evident, 
easily knowable, quite near, and forming the very 
Self, Brahman appears - to the unenlightened, to those 
whose reason is carried away by the differentiated 
phenomena of names and forms created 
by avidya - as 
unknown, difficult to know, very remote, as 
though 
He were a separate thing. But to those whose reason 
has turned away from external 
secured the grace of the Guru 
of the self (manas), there is 
so well-known, so easily know, 
as Brahman" (B. G. B. 18, -50, p. 
39. 
phenomena, who have 
and attained the serenity 
nothing else so blissful 
able and quite so near 
487). Also 2: 18, p. 
13. Shankara does not absolutely dismiss the value of karma in the pursuit of freedom. The role which he 
assigns to it will be considered later. 
14. B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 32-34. Also TA. U. B. 1.11.4, p. 286. 
15. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 32. 
16. Ibid. The idea here is that brahman is free from 
all qualities and unconnected with anything. 
17. Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
18. See BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 83. Also TA. U. B. 2.1.1, p. 
300. 
19. Other examples are used by Shankara to illustrate 
the idea of a notional loss. A prince, discarded 
by his parents soon after his bi rth, grew up in a 
fowler's home. Not aware of his princely identity, 
he took himself to be a fowler and identified with 
that role. When told by a compassionate man of his 
royal descent, he immediately gave up his mistaken 
identity and assumed his rightful royal status. 
(BR. U. B. 2.1.20, pp. 210-11). Another common example 
used by Advaita teachers is the story of a necklace 
wearer, who somehow thinks that he has lost the 
necklace which is all the time around his neck. 
20. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 96. 
21. The word dharma in this context indicates any action, 
ritualistic or otherwise, which results in the production 
of merit (punya) and leads to enjoyment in this or 
in other worlds. 
22. M. S. J. 1.1.2, p. 3. 
23. Ibid., 1.2.1, p. 22. 
24. Ibid., 1.2.7, p. 26. A sentence which subserves an 
injunction by praising the act or its result is termed 
an a rthaväda . 
25. For example, it is argued that a sentence such as, 
"Väyu is a swift deity", is purposeless by itself. 
When, however, it is seen in relation to the injunction, 
"One who wants prosperity should touch a goat relating 
to Vayull, it serves as a praise of the deity and a 
recommendation of the ritual. 
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26. See M. S. J. 1.1.4-6, pp. 6-7. The argument here is 
that dharma is not amenable to any other 2ramana because it has no external or tangible form. ---I-"t- 
also has to be brought into existence by prescribed 
acts. Vedic injunctions are the only source of its knowledge. We should remind ourselves that Shankara 
accepts the Vedas as the authoritative pramana for 
dharma. " 
27. There is a linguistic dimension to the Mimänsä argument 
that the central concern of the Vedas is the initiation 
of activity through injunctive statements. They hold 
the view that in all sentences, words derive their 
meaningfulness only from their relationship with the 
verb. The pivot of any sentence is the verb, and 
all usage is thus meant for instituting action. 
A factual statement therefore, is never an end in 
itself, but has its reference in some activity. 
See M. S. J. 1.1.25. p. 18. 
28. B. S. B. 1.3.33, p. 225. 
29. BR. U. B. 1.3.1, p. 33. 
30. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 22. 
31. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 92. 
32. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 25. 
33. Ibid., pp. 39-40. Also BR. U. B. 1.4.7, pp. 92-93 
and 1.4.10, p. 103. 
34. "For it is the very nature of the negative to convey 
the idea of the non-existence of the action with 
which it gets connected. The idea of non-existence 
causes inactivity, and that idea ceases to exist 
automatically like fire that has exhausted its fuel" 
(B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 38-39). Also BR. U. B. 1.3.1, 
pp. 34-35. 
35. TA. U. B. 1.11.4, p. 290. Also B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 22- 
23. Shankara does not deny that there are some Vedic 
texts which subserve injunctions. He maintains, 
however, that this is not the case with Vedanta-väkyas 
which have their own result. 
36. B. S. B . 1.1.4, p. 22. 
37. For good definitions of the sixfold criteria, see, 
Saddnanada' s Vedantasära, Ch. 5. There is little 
information on Sadänanda's (ca. 1450 A. D. ) life. 
It is not known whether he wrote any work other than 
the Vedäntasära. The text itself systematically 
presents the main doctrines of Advaita. 
It is held 
in high esteem and widely studied by students of 
Advaita. 
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38. The nature of the reasoning process acceptable to 
Advaita is discussed in detail later. 
39. The desirable ends attainable by adopting the means 
prescribed in the karmakända are sometimes classified 
as dharma, artha (wealth ; 'and käma (pleasure). 
These three human goals (purushärthas) are also referred 
to as pravritti-dharma (the way of Works). 
40. The jnänakända is also, of course, collectively referred 
to as Vedäntä. The word V eddnta (Veda + anta (end)) 
literally means the end of the Vedas (i. e. the Upanishads) 
The purushärtha of this section is moksha, also referred 
to as nivritti dharma (the way of Renunciation). 
41. B. S. B. 1.1.1, pp. 6-13. 
42. MU. U. 1.2.12. 
43. See B. G. B. intro., pp. 2-3. 
44. BR. U. B. 5.1.1, pp. 560-61. 
45. Ibid., 2.1.20, p. 216. 
46. Ibid., pp. 216-17. 
47. It is clear that Shankara denies the reality of actions 
and results, etc. only from the absolute standpoint 
(paramdrtha). This is the standpoint of brahmajnäna. 
Their empirical (vyavahära) reality is not denied. 
The term prätibhäsika describes the illusory, such 
as the rope mistaken for a snake. Dream experiences 
also come under this category. The universe enjoys 
a vyavahära status. 
48. BR. U. B. 2.1.20, p. 217. Also 4.5.15, pp. 549-51. 
49. See above, Ch. 3.3, pp. 107-9. 
50. KE. U. B. 1.4, pp. 51-52. 
"Knowledge alone which is imparted by those who have 
realised the truth - and no other knowledge - can 
prove effective" (B. G. B. 4: 34, p. 149). 
51. KA. U. B. 1.2.7-9, pp. 137-40. 
52. CH. U. 6.14.1-2. See also Shankara's bhashya on same. 
53. MU. U. 1.2.12. The qualification of brahmanishtham 
emphasizes the necessity ofjnäna becoming an 
ässimilated 
and integrated part of his outlook. Sh ankara's repeated 
demand for scriptural mastery does not find echo 
in modern interpretations of Advaita. This 
is directly 
related to the different perceptions of the role 
of the Vedas in the acquisition of brahma 
'n] än. 
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54. Ibid., 1.2.13. Also Shankara's bhäshya. 
55. B. S. B. 1.1.8, p. 57. A similar illustration is also 
explained by Shankara in CH. U. B. 8.12.1, p. 472. 
56. The method is also mentioned by Saddnanda in V. S. 
1: 31. 
57. B. G. 13: 12. 
58. See Shankara's commentary on ibid. 
59. The word sat is often used to describe brahman. 
It is interesting to note here the very ordinary 
sense in which he understands the term. 
60. B. G. 13: 13. 
61. Ibid., 13: 14. 
62. See IS. U. 2.4-5; KA. U. 1.2.20; KE. U. 1.4-9; 2.2. 
63. In Advaita, definitions through non-essential 
characteristics (upddhis) are referred to as 
tatasthalakshana. The non-essential attributes are 
referred to as' upalakshana. Definitions which focus 
on the essential nature öf the object are referred 
to as svarüpalakshana. These will be discussed shortly. 
64. TA. U. 3.1.1. 
65. KE. U. 1.6. 
66. "As a spider spreads out and withdraws (its thread), 
as on the earth grow the herbs (and trees), and as 
from the living man issues out hair on the head and 
body, so out of the Immutable does the universe emerge" 
(MU. U. 1.1.7). 
67. MU. U. 1.1.6. 
68. KA. U. 1.3.15; 2.1.2; 
69. KA. U. 1.2.14. 
70. BR. U. 3.8.8. 
71. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 95. 
72. Ibid., 2.3.6, p. 239. 
Also PR. U. 4.9; IS. U. 6.8. 
73. We have already discussed the various kinds of 
implication 
and the conditions which necessitated their employment. 
See above, Ch. 2.4, pp. 80-82. 
74. TA. U. 2.1.1. 
75. The following discussion is based largely on Shankara's 
It u 
commentary on this definition. See, TA. U. B. 2.1.1, 
pp. 299-319. 
76. Shankara goes on to deny the idea that this text 
suggests that the ätman can know Itself. The Self, 
he argues, is without parts and cannot simultaneously 
be both Knower and known. If the Self became a knowable, there will be no Knower. Moreover, if 
the ätman is in any way cognizable, scriptural instruction 
about It will become useless, even as instruction 
about a pot. See ibid., pp. 305-6. 
77. TA. U. B. 2.1.1, pp. 309-10. 
78. The reason is that brahman is free from all attributes 
through which words directly signify objects. 
79. TA. U. B. 2.1.1, p. 310. 
80. CH. U. B. 7.1.3, p. 370. 
81. BR. U. B. 4.3.32, pp. 475-76. Also CH. U. B. 7.23.1, 
p. 402. 
82. BR. U. B. 3.9.28.7, pp. 395-96. 
83. Also referred to as bhagalakshanä. See above, Ch. 
2.4, pp. 80-82. 
84. B. S. B. 3.2.22, pp. 625-26. See full commentary 
on this sutra. 
85. These mahdväkyas are generally considered to be 
four in number, one from each of the four Vedas: 
(i) "That Thou Art (tat tvam asi)" (CH. U. 6.8.7) 
of the Sdma-Veda. 
(ii) "Consciousness is brahman (prajnänam brahma)" 
(AI. U. 3.1.3) of the Ri -Veda 
(iii) "I am brahman (aham brahmäsmi)" (BR. U. 1.4.10) 
of the Yajur-Veda. 
(iv) "This -atman is brahman (ayam ätmä brahma)" 
(MA. U. 2) of the Atharva-Veda. 
8 6. The mahäväkya is then repeated nine times during 
the course of the instruction. Shankara, however, 
only comments elaborately on CH. U. 6.16.3, and 
6.8.7. 
87. CH. U. B. 6.8.7, p. 339. 
verse. 
Se entire bhäshya on this 
88. Ibid., 6.16.3, p. 361. 
89. Ibid., p. 362. 
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90. "We hold that the scriptures aim at establishing 
the identity of the transmigrating soul with God 
Himself by removing from the soul all vestiges 
of transmigration. From this point of view it becomes 
affirmed that God is possessed of the characteristics 
of being untouched by sins etc., and that the opposite 
characteristics of the soul are unreal" (B. S. B. 
4.1.3, p. 820. 
91. See above, Ch. 2.4, pp. 81-82. 
92. See, V. S. 4: 144-47. 
93. CH. U. B. 6.16.3, pp. 363-64. 
ývi 
CHAPTER 5 
1. For the basis of the discussion below on this distinction, 
see B. S. B. 1.1.2, pp. 16-18. 
2. BR. U. B. 5.1.1, pp. 558-59. One of the very important 
reasons for emphasizing the distinction between 'näna 
and karma is that if 'näna is classified as an activity, 
moksa will become the result of an action, and therefore, 
non=eternal. 
3. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 34. 
4. Ib id. 
5. Ib id. 
6. Ibid., p. 35. 
7. Ibid., p. 31. 
8. The root meaning of updsanä is to sit by the side 
of. 
9. BR . U. B. 1.3.9, p. 45. 
"Meditation consists in a current of uniform concepts, 
not interspersed with dissimilar ones, which proceeds 
according to the scriptures and relates to an object 
enjoined in the scriptures" (TA. U. B. 1.3.4, p. 247). 
"Upasanä consists in setting up a current of similar 
thoughts" (B. S. B. 4.1.7, p. 831). 
10. See B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 29-30. 
11. See BR. U. 3.1.9. 
12. BR. U. B. 1.5.2, pp. 144-45. 
13. For another example of adhyasa upasanä, see BR. U. B. 
1.1.1, p. 6. 
14. B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 30-31. Also BR. U. B. 1.4.10, pp. 
105-6. 
15. For example, "When that Self, which is both high 
and low, is realised, the knot of the heart gets 
untied, all doubts become solved, and all one's actions 
become dissipated" (MU. U. 2.2.8). 
16. Each meditation has its own distinctive result. 
See BR. U. B. 2.1.14, p. 186. 
17. B. S. B. 1.1.1, pp. 8-9. 
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18. See CH. U. B. intro., 1.1, p. 4, and TA. U. B. 1.11.4, 
pp. 291-92. The prerequisites of 'nana will be considered in detail later. 
19. See B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 28-29. Shankara himself cites the following texts in support of the simultaneity 
of 'nana and moksha: "Anyone who knows Brahman becomes 
Brahman" (MU. U. 3.2.19). "When that Brahman, the 
basis of all causes and effects, becomes known, all the results of his (i. e. aspirant's) actions become 
exhausted" (MU. U. 2.2.8). 
"One who knows the Bliss (that is the very nature) 
of Brahman ceases to have fear from anything" 
(TA. U. 2.9). 
"O Janaka, you have certainly attained (Brahman that 
is) fearlessness" (BR. U. 4.2.4). 
"Then what delusion and what sorrow can there be 
for that seer of unity? " (IS. U. 7). 
20. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 28. 
21. MU. U. B. 1.15, p. 88. 
Also, "This identity of the embodied soul, that is 
taught, is a self-established truth, and it has not 
to be accomplished through some extraneous effort. 
From this it follows that like the idea of the rope 
removing the ideas of snake etc. (superimposed on 
it), the acceptance of the unity of the (individual) 
Self With Brahman, as declared in the scripture, 
results in the removal of the idea of an individual 
soul bound up with the body, that is a creation of 
beginningless ignorance" (B. S. B. 2.1.14, p. 328). 
22. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 36. Also BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 93. 
23. BR. U. B. 1.4.10, p. 114. 
24. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, pp. 87-90. 
25. In B. G. B. 13: 2, pp. 329-30, a similar purvapaksha 
is formulated as follows: 
The Lord Himself is the Ksetrajna and Ksetra 
is quite distinct from Ksetrajna who perceives 
it; but I am a samsarin subject to pleasure 
and pain. To bring about the cessation of samsara, 
I should first acquire a discriminative knowledge 
of Ksetra and Ksetrajna, then attain a direct perception 
of Ksetrajna, the Lord, by means of dhyana or 
meditation of the Lord and dwell in the true nature 
of the Lord". 
Shankara says that this is the view of someone who 
lacks the traditional method of understanding the 
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26. 
27. 
28. 
sästra. Such a person, according to Shankara, is 
"the slayer of the Self. Ignorant in himself, he 
confounds others, devoid as he is of the traditional 
key (sampradaya) to the teaching of the sastras. 
Ignoring what is directly taught, he suggests what 
is not taught. Therefore, not being acquainted with 
the traditional interpretation, he is to be neglected 
as an ignorant man, though learned in all sastras". 
BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 89. 
Ibid., pp. 90-92. See also, B. S. B. 2.1.4, pp. 331- 
32. 
BR. U. B. 4.5.15, pp. 548-49. 
29. MU. U. 1.1.4-5, distinguishes between aparä vidyä 
(lower knowledge), and park vidya (higher knowledge). 
Para vidyä is described as that by which the Immutable 
is known . 
30. CH. U. 7.1.3. See Shankara' s commentary, p. 371. 
31. Other terms used for the antahkarana are buddhi, 
citta and manas. 
32. "Among thousands of men, one perchance strives for 
perfection; even among those who strive and are perfect, 
only one perchance knows me in truth" (B. G. 7: 3) . 
Also BR. U. B. 4.4.12, p. 512. 
33. See BR. U. B. 2.4.1, p. 242 and B. S. B. 3.4.26, p. 783. 
34. B. G. B. 15: 11, p. 405. Also KA. U. B. 1.2.24, pp. 155-56. 
35. MU. U. B. 3.1.8, pp. 155-56. Also KE. U. B. 4.8, 
pp. 93-94. 
36. B. S. B. 1.1.1, pp. 6-9. 
37. See above, Ch. 4.2, pp. 140-41. 
38. B. S. B. 1.1.1, p. 9. 
39. The nature of the arguments employed in these discussions 
is discussed subsequently. 
40. See, for example, KA. U. 1.3.4-9; 1.3.12-14. 
41. See ibid., 1.1.1-29. 
42. Ibid., 1.1.26-27. 
43. MU. U. B. 1.2.12, p. 110. 
44. B. G. 9: 21. Also 2: 42-44 and KA. U. 1.2.10. 
45. See KA. U. 1.2.1-2, and Shankara's commentary. 
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46. For brief definitions of all prerequisites, see V. S. 1: 15-26. 
47. B. G. B. 6: 26. Also 6: 34-35; 2: 62-64. 
48. Ibid., 2: 54. 
49. KA. U. 2.1.1-2. 
50. Ibid., 1.3.3-9. 
51. V. S. 1: 21. 
52. B. G. 2: 14-15. 
53. CH. U. B. 6.12.2, pp. 347-48. Also 4.1.1, p. 176; 4.10. 2, p. 199; B. G. B. 4; 39, pp. 151-52.9; 3, pp. 240-41. 
54. For another detailed enumeration of qualities conducive 
to brahma jnäna, see B. G. 13: 7-11. 
55. See MU. U. B. 1.2.13, pp. 111-12, and B. G. B. 18: 67, 
pp. 516-17. 
56. B. G. 3: 34. 
57. Ibid., 5: 3. 
58. Ibid., 2: 57. 
59. Ibid. , 2: 64. See also, 12: 17; 14: 22: 18: 10. 
60. B. G. B. 8: 27, pp. 219-20. 
61. "Thy concern is with action alone, never with results. 
Let not the fruit of action be thy motive, nor let 
thy att achment be for inaction" (B. G. 2: 47). 
62. B. G. B. 5: 8, p. 165. Also 5: 11-12. 
63. Ibid. , 18: 9, p. 450. 
64. Ibid., intro., pp. 5-6. See also, 2: 46-50; 2: 59; 
3: 4-5; 3: 8-9; 3: 30; 18: 3-11; BR. U. B. 3.3.1, p. 
318; 4.4.22, p. 523; B. S. B. 4.1.18, p. 845; TA. U. B. 
1.11.4, pp. 291-92. 
65. B. G. B. 3: 18-19, p. 104. 
66. Ibid., 5: intro., pp. 154-59. 
67. Ibid., 3: 20-29, pp. 104-9. 
68. See BR. U. 2.4.5, and 4.5.6. 
69. See B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 34-36. 
70. See above, CYh. 5.1. 
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71. B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 35. 
72. Ibid. , 3.2.21, p. 622. See also, 1.1.4, pp. 35- 36. 
73. Shankara proposes for refutation the view that manana and nididhyäsana are enjoined as actions after sravana. See B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 25. 
74. B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 43-44. 
75. V. S. 5: 182. 
Hearing is a mental activity leading to the conviction that the Vedantic texts inculcate only Brahman, 
the One without a second" N. P. Ch. 8, p. 213). 
76. KE. U. 1.5-7. 
77. See BR. U. B. 1.4.10, p. 107; 
"The man who knows not the Self is ruined, as 
also the man who has no faith in the teachings 
and the words of his Guru, and the man who is 
full of doubts. No doubt the ignorant and the 
faithless are ruined, but not to the same extent 
as a man of doubting mind. He is the most sinful 
of all. - How? - Even this world which is common 
to all men is not won by a sceptic, nor the 
other world, nor happiness: for even these things 
come within the sweep of his doubt" (B. G. B. 
4: 40, p. 152). 
78. V. S. 5: 191. 
"Reflection is a mental operation producing ratiocinative 
knowledge that leads to the refutation of any possible 
contradiction from other sources of knowledge regarding 
the meaning established by scriptural testimony" 
W. P. Ch. 8, p. 213). 
79. For the basis of the discussion below, see, B. S. B. 
2.1.11, pp. 320-23. 
80. Kapila is the reputed founder of the S ämkhya system 
of thought, while Kanada is supposed to'have initiated 
the Vaiseshika school. There is no reliable historical 
evidence on either thinkers. 
81. B. S. B. 2.1.11, pp. 322-23. For related arguments, 
see BR. U. B. 1.4.6, p. 75, and KA. U. B. 1.2.8, pp- 
140-41. 
82. For a discussion of these types, see M. Hiriyanna, 
Indian Philosophical Studies, pp. 45-46. 
83. B. S. B. 2.1.6, p. 314. 
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84. Ibid., 1.1.1, pp. 12-13. 
85. Ibid., 1.1.2, p. 15. The two texts cited by Shankara 
here are, "The Self is to be heard of, to be reflected 
on" (BR. U. 2.4.5), and, "A man, well-informed and 
intelligent, can reach the country of the Gandhäras 
similarly in this world, a man who has a teacher 
attains knowledge" (CH. U. 4.14.2). 
8 6. BR. U. B. 3.1.1, intro., p. 285. 
87. Ibid., 3.8.9, p. 362. 
88. See above, Ch. 3.4, pp. 111-15. 
89. MA. U. K. B. 3.1, intro., p. 268. 
90. Ibid., 4.99, p. 402. It is perhaps important to 
note that the genuineness of Shankara's commentary 
on the Kdrika of Gaudapada is under question. For 
a view on this matter, see Devaraja, An Introduction 
to ýankara' s Theory of Knowledge, pp. 222-24. 
91. TA. U. 2.5.1. 
92. B. S. B. 2.1.6, pp. 314-15. 
93. For Shankara's detailed analysis of the three states, 
see MA. U. B. 1-6, pp. 179-90. 
9 4. B. G. 2: 13. 
95. B. S. B. 1.3.19# p. 193. 
212. 
Also BR. U. B. 2.1.20, p. 
96. MU. U. 1.1.7, p. 91. 
97. B. S. B. 2.1.14, p. 327; CH. U. B. 6.1.4-6, pp. 293- 
95. 
98. B. G. 13: 32; 9: 6. 
99. B. S. B. 1.3.7, p. 166. 
100. Ibid., 3.2.18, p. 615. 
101. See ibid., 3.2.19, pp. 615-16. 
102. Ibid., 3.2.20, pp. 616-17. 
103. Ibid., 2.2.1, pp. 367-68. 
104. Ibid. 
105. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 89. 
106. See B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 23. 
407 
107. See BR. U. B. 1.5.3, pp. 147-50; B. S. B. 2.3.31, pp. 
492-93; AI. U. B. 3.1.2, pp. 67-70. 
108. B. G. B. 2: 21, p. 46. There are innumerable references 
in Shankara to the mental nature of brahmajnana 
and the functions of the mind in its production. 
See B. G. B. 18: 50, p. 487; 18: 55, p. 493; 18: 66, 
p. 500; B R. U. B. 4.4.19, p. 517; 2.1.1, p. 177; B: S. B. 
1.1.4, p. 34; KA. U. B. 1.3.12, p. 169; MU. U. B. 3.1.9, 
pp. 156-57. 
109. The mental modification which destroys avidyä is 
sometimes conceived as a final thought or vritti, 
the crystallization of brahmajnäna. As such, it 
is termed as brahmäkäravritti (a thought coinciding 
with the nature of brahmän), or akhandäkära cittavritti 
(a mental modification centred on non=duality). 
110. B. S. B. 2.1.14, pp. 330-31. 
111. Ibid., 4.1.4, pp. 820-21; B. G. B. 2: 69, pp. 78-79. 
112. In the history of Advaita thought, the prasamkhyäna 
argument is associated with the name of Mandänamisra, 
an elder contemporary of Shankara. His most famous 
work is the Brahma-siddhi. According to Mandana, 
the mahävakyas are incapable, by themselves, of 
bringing about brahmajnana. The Veddnta-väkyas 
convey an indirect knowledge which is made direct 
only by deep meditation (prasamkhyäna). The latter 
is a continuous contemplation öf the purport of 
the mahävdkyas. Sravana alone, according to Mandana, 
is incapable of eliminating the deeply ingrained 
false impressions of avidyä. Vdcaspati, following 
Mandana, emphasizes the role of deep meditation 
in. producing brahmajnäna. According to Vacaspati, 
it is the mind, perfected and refined through deep 
meditation, which is the immediate cause of brahmajnäna. 
This argument is associated with the Bhamati school 
of Advaita, named after Vdcaspati' s famous work. 
For excerpts from the Brahma-siddhi, see K. H. 
Potter 
ed. , The Encyclopedia of 
Indian Philosophies, 3,346-420. 
Also, E. Deutsch and J. A. B. van Buitenen, 
A Source Book of Advaita Vedanta, Ch. 10. 
113. N. S. 3: 124-25. 
114. Ibid. , 3: 90. 
115. Ibid., 3: 118. 
116. Ibid., 3: 91. 
117. Ibid., 3: 117. 
118. Ibid.. 2: 1-9. 
It iv 
119. Ibid., 3: 125-26. 
120. Ibid., 1: 47-51. 
121. V. S. 5: 192. 
122. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 93. In Advaita, the results of 
actions are classified in a threefold manner. 
First of all, there is the sum total of the results 
of actions done in all previous existences, yet 
to bear fruit (samcita-karman). Secondly, there 
are the results of actions presently performed and 
those likely to be done in the future ( ägämi-karman) . These would eventually form part of the samcita- 
karman. Finally, there are the results of 'actions 
which have given rise to and are currently being 
experienced in this particular birth (prärabdha- 
karman). B rahmajnäna is seen as immediately destroying 
samcita-karman. Actions done by the jivan-mukta 
after the gain of knowledge are incapable of producing 
results to be experienced by him, because they are 
unaccompanied by any sense of doership. Even while 
acting, he is identified with the actionless Self. 
The results of actions which have given rise to this 
particular body, however, are compared by Shankara 
to an arrow which is already released from the bow. 
In spite of brahmajnana, its momentum will continue 
until naturally exhausted. This is evidenced, 
according to Shankara, by the fact that there are 
knowers of brahman who still retain the body after 
knowledge. The 'näni, however, experiences the 
results of prärabdha-karman, knowing that the ätman 
is always free and unaffected. When prarabdha- 
karman exhausts itself and the body falls, the jivan- 
mukta is not reborn. See B. G. B. 4: 37, p. 150; 13: 23, 
pp. 362-65; B. S. B. 4.1.13-15, pp. 835-41. 
123. The prerequisites of sädhana-catushtaya are, in fact, 
intended to create the state of mind in which Jnäna 
can occur and abide uninterruptedly. 
124. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, pp. 93-94. 
125. Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
126. Ibid., p. 87. 
127. See also, B. S. B. 1.1.4, p. 43. It is perhaps very 
significant that Shankara himself does not pursue 
the detailed distinction between sravana, manana 
and nididhyäsana, which has characterized later 
and modern V edänta . 
128. B. S. B. 1.1.4, pp. 34-35. Although nididhydsana 
is most commonly translated as "meditation", we 
think that in order to preserve the clear distinction 
which Shankara makes between the nature of upäsana 
or dhyana and nididhyäsana, it is more appropriate 
to render nididhyasana as "contemplation". 
"Meditation" 
can be reserved for translating upäsanä or dh äna. 
129. It is significant that in the Upanishad (BR. U. 2.4.5 
and 4.5.7), the teacher Yäjnavalkya, while prescribing sravana, manana and nididhyäsana, substitutes in 
the next sentence, the word vijnäna (right knowledge 
or apprehension) for nididhyäsana. 
130. B. S. B. 4.1.2, pp. 815-17. 
131. Ibid., p. 818. 
132. Shankara's refutation is of the classical system 
of Patanjali (ca. 5th. century A. D. ), formulated 
in the Yoga-sutra. The word, "yoga" comes from 
the root yu " to unite, to join or to yoke. Its 
philosophical and epistemological foundations are 
to a large extent borrowed from the Sämkhya system. 
It proposes the duality of prakriti and purusha. 
Purusha is the individual spiritual self. It is 
pure consciousness, inactive, unattached and self- 
luminous. Prakriti is the inert material principle 
which comprises 'the external universe and the inner 
world of mental experiences. The problem of the 
purusha is its identification with the manifestations 
and qualities of prakriti. This identification 
is initially with citta, the first evolute of prakriti. 
It is constituted of the intellect (buddhi), the 
mind (manas), and the ego-sense (ahamkara). Citta 
is inert ('ada), but because of its subtlety and 
nearness to purusha, it reflects the purusha, and 
appears conscious. Purusha wrongly identifies with 
its reflection in citta, and appears to be active, 
changing, and subject to pain and pleasure. The 
aim of Yoga is to effect the freedom of purusha 
from rakriti by a cessation of the modifications 
(vrittis 'of citta (cittavritti nirodha). By a 
quelling of the modifications of citta, wrong 
identification ceases, and purusha realises its 
distinctness from prakriti. It then abides in its 
own glory and perfection. 
This freedom is brought about by an eightfold system 
of physical and mental discipline (ashta iga yoga). 
These steps are as follows: (i) yama (restraint); 
(ii) niyama (observance) ; (iii) dsana (posture) ; 
(iv) pränäydma (regulation of präna ; (v) prat ahära 
(sense withdrawal); (vi) dhärana (concentration ; 
(vii) dhyäna (meditation); viii) samädhi. 
Samädh i, the culmination of Yoga discipline, is 
said to be of two kinds. In sampraj 
dta samddhi, 
consciousness of the object meditated upon still 
persists. In asampra 'näta samädhi, objective 
consciousness is entirely absent, and the mind ceases 
to function. Purusha realises its own nature as 
isolated from prakriti. See S. N. Dasgupta, Yoga 
Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian 
Thought (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1930; reprint 
ed., 1974). 
133. It is very interesting to note the references in 
the Upanishads which Shankara cites as alluding 
to Yoga: 
"The Self is to be realized - to be heard of, reflected 
on, and profoundly meditated upon" (BR. U. 2.4.5). 
"Holding the body in balance with three limbs (chest, 
neck, and head) erect" (SV. U. 2.8). 
"The holding of the senses and organs unpertubed 
and under control is called Yoga by adepts" 
(KA. U. 2.3.11). 
"Getting fully this knowledge (of Brahman) and the 
process of Yoga" (KA. U. 2.3.18). 
See B. S. B. 2.1.3, p. 305. 
134. B. S. B. 2.1.3, p. 306. 
135. Ibid., p. 307. This should be seen in the context 
of his view that supersensuous things can be known 
only through the Vedas. See ibid. ,2 . 1.1, p. 302, 
and 2.3.1, p. 445. 
136. Ibid., 1.3.33, pp. 228-29. 
137. BR. U. B. 1.4.7, p. 91. 
138. Ibid. Also MA. U. K. B. 3: 39-40, pp. 316-17. 
139. B. S. B. 2.1.1, pp. 302-4. 
140. Ibid., p. 302. 
141. Ibid. In addition to the other evidence presented, 
this is also a refutation of personal authority 
as a basis for the validity of the sruti. 
142. B. G. B. 5: 26-29, pp. 177-78. 
143. B. S. B. 1.1.2, p. 16. For citings of this text, 
see, for example, Buch, The Philosophy of Samkara, 
pp. 261-62; Singh, The Vedanta of 
Sarnkara, p. 193; 
Iyer, Advaita Vedanta, p. 155. Hiriyanna, Indian 
Philosophical Studies, p. 49; Radhakrishnan, Indian 
Philosophy, 2,510. 
144. The inference suggested here is the Nyäya argument 
that any purposeful effect must have an intelligent 
cause. The aim of this pürvapaksha is to challenge 
the claim of sruti as the only pramäna of brahman. 
145. B. S. B. 1.1.2, p. 15. 
z9J 
146. Ibid. 
147. Ibid., p. 16. Where sruti, for instance, mentions 
a certain result as the effect of a particular ritual, 
there is no scope for reinforcing such a connection 
by resorting to any supplementary pramäna. One 
is dependent entirely on the authority 6f the sruti. 
Even reasoning has little scope in helping to establish 
that such and such a ritual will produce such and 
such a result. One is called upon merely to implement 
the mandate. 
148. B. S. B. 1.1.2, p. 16. 
149. See above, Ch. 4.1. 
150. B. S. B. 1.1.2, p. 17. 
151. Ibid., 1.1.3, pp. 19-20. 
152. See above, Ch. 1, pp. 35-36. 
153. B. G. B. 13: 11, pp. 342-43. 
"The man who has desisted from bad conduct, as also 
from the lure of the senses, whose mind has become 
concentrated, and who is also free from anxiety 
about the results of concentration, and has a teacher, 
attains the aforesaid Self through knowledge" 
(KA. U. B. 1.2.24, p. 156). 
T1T 
CHAPTER 6 
1. K. M. Panikkar, Hinduism and the West (Chandigarh: 
Panjab University Publications Bureau, 1964), 
p. 4. 
2. For a brief but good discussion of the reasons behind the failure of the bhakti movements see, C. H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social 
Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1964), pp. 28-38. 
3. Ibid., p. 37. 
4. For Spencer's influence see ibid., pp. 49-50. 
5. David Kopf's excellent study, British Orientalism 
and the Bengal Renaissance (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1969 is still authoritative. 
6. Wilson, quoted in ibid., p. 176. 
7. Ibid., p. 284. 
8. See R. C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement 
in India, 3 vols. (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 
1962-63), I, 259-60. 
9. We are not aware of any study which has examined 
the effects of this period of change upon the 
authority of these texts. 
10. For a critical 'study of the growth and development 
of the Brahmo Samaj, see David Kopf, The Brahmo 
Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
For a specific discussion of the legacy 
influence of the movement, see Ch. 2. 
1979). 
and wide 
11. In 1843, Debendranath Tagore changed the name 
of the Brahmo Sabha to Brahmo Samaj. 
12. See S. K. Das, The Shadow of the Cross: Christianity 
and Hinduism in a Colonial Context (Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal, 1974), p. 64. Das is of the opinion 
that Roy mixed up the issues of religion and nationalism, 
the inevitable result of the colonial context 
in which he operated. According to him, the use 
of the texts as a medium of instruction was primarily 
the result of nationalistic sentiment. 
13. See B. G. Ray, 
(S antiniketan: 
Religious Movements 
Visva - Bharati, 1965), p. 13. 
in Modern Benaa1 
14. Sisirkumar Mitra, Resurgent India ( Delhi: Allied Publishers, 
1963), p. 65. 
4i) 
15. Ibid., p. 66. 
16. See, D. Killingley, "Rammohun Roy' s Interpretation 
of the Veddnta" (Ph. D. thesis, London: School 
of Oriental and African Studies, 1977), pp. 342- 44. As an example of this tendency, Killingley 
cites Roy's explanation that those parts of the 
Vedas which teach the worship of figured gods 
represent an inferior view for the benefit of 
worshippers incapable of grasping the higher truths. 
Rammohun justified this interpretation as the 
only way of preserving the consistency of the 
text. 
17. This attempt to suggest a different view relies 
a great deal upon Killing ley' s study. His work 
is concerned primarily with contrasting the interpr- 
etations of Shankara and Rammohun Roy, but it 
also provides significant clues for ascertaining 
Roy's attitude to the authority of the Vedas. 
It is the only available detailed study of his 
religious thought. 
18. Rammohun Roy, quoted in Killingley, p. 341. 
19. Rammohun Roy, quoted in Killingley, p. 341. 
20. Ibid. , pp. 328-36. 
21. Ibid. , pp. 349-51. 
22. Ibid., p. 343. 
23. Sivanath Sastri, History of the Brahmo Sama ', 
2nd ed. (Calcutta: Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, 1974), 
p. 47. In spite of Sastri's own involvement in 
the history of the group, his work is written 
with commendable objectivity and insight. 
24. Keshub Chunder Sen, "The Brahmo Samaj or Theism 
in India", in K. C. Sen, Discourses and Writings 
(Calcutta: Brahmo Tract Society, 1904), p. 72. 
25. Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
26. It is perhaps strange that such a consequential 
decision has not received any detailed treatment 
in recent works discussing the movement under 
Debendranath Tagore. David Kopf, The Brahmo Samal, 
makes only brief mention of it. See p. 51. Kopf's 
concern is more with the sociological dimensions 
of the movement. 
2 7. See Mitra, Resurgent India, pp. 79-82. 
28. D. K. Biswas, "Maharshi Debendranath Tagore and 
the Tattvabodhini Sabha", in A. K. Gupta, ed. , 
Studies in the Bengal Renaissance (Calcutta: 
Lk /n 
National Council of Education, 1958). See pp. 33-46. 
29. See Sivanath Sastri, History of the Brahmo Samaj, 
p. 63. 
30. Quoted in ibid., pp. 63-64. Sastri is of the 
opinion that this article was penned by Rajnarain 
Bose, who had then recently joined the Brahmo 
Samaj. Mitra, Resurgent India, attributes this 
piece of writing to Debendranath. 
31. For a good summary of Datta's views, see Kopf, 
The Brahmo Samaj, pp. 49-54. 
32. Sastri, History of the Brahmo Samaj, p. 65. 
33. Ibid., p. 65. See also, B. G. Ray, Religious Movements 
in Modern Bengal, pp. 13-14. 
34. It is unfortunate that there are no records of 
the details of argument on both sides of the question, 
or of the nature of the studies and inquiries 
undertaken by Debendranath and his emissaries 
at Benares. These would have thrown great light 
on the nature of the debate and the propositions 
which led Debendranath to concede to Datta. 
35. See D. Killingley, "Rammohun Roy's Interpretation 
of the Vedänta", p. 349. 
36. The eleven authentic Upanishads mentioned here 
are those of the same number commented upon by 
Shankara. 
37. Debendranath Tagore, quoted in S. K. Das, The Shadow 
of the Cross, pp. 70-71. 
38. See J. N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements 
in India, Indian ed. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal 
1977), pp. 71-73. See also p. 41. 
39. Debendranath Tagore's Brahmo Dharma, trans. Hem 
Chandra Sarkar (Calcutta: H. C. Sarkar 1928), does 
not offer a detailed discussion on the source 
of knowledge of God. Debendranath speaks of an 
innate knowledge of God hidden in the hearts of 
all human beings. This innate knowledge is kindled 
by the study of the universe, in which is revealed 
the wisdom, beneficience, glory and majesty of 
God. 
"Truth is revealed in an intuitive knowledge 
and our Self trusts in the truth. So this 
natural intuition is the only (ultimate) means 
of proving the existence of God. When 
the Infinite Person is revealed in our innate 
knowledge through intuition, our understanding 
'*1i 
finds proof of His wisdom in the creation of 
the universe and makes known to us His beneficient 
purpose. Though our infinite [or finite? ] 
understanding cannot fully comprehend the 
Infinite Person, yet it greatly confirms our 
intuitive knowledge (of Him). Therefore the 
seeker of God desirous of salvation should 
never neglect the cultivation of understanding 
by the study of the mystery of the world, 
inner and outer. When understanding is cultivated 
we can clearly and thoroughly realise the 
meaning and scope of intuition" (Brahmo Dharma, 
p. 73). 
The few discussions in the Brahmo Dharma on the 
nature of intuition are not very lucid. At one 
point the innate knowledge of God is presented 
as the presupposition of our sense of dependence 
and imperfection. There is no basis for considering 
ourselves to be dependent and imperfect, says 
Tagore, unless there is a perfect and independent 
being. This intuitive knowledge of God is described 
as being natural to every soul. 
Doubt in Intuition means cutting the root 
of all reasoning and leads to utter delusion. 
It will lead to doubt in our own existence 
as well as the existence of the outer world 
and of cause and effect resulting in complete 
nescience. He who does not believe in intuition 
can never believe unhesitatingly in the Almighty... 
who is revealed in knowledge and who is the 
support of all" (Brahmo Dharma, pp. 119-20). 
These views of Debendranath closely parallel the 
Unitarian ideas of Channing and Parker discussed 
below, and are suggestive of the influence of 
the Unitarians. 
40. Debendranath, quoted in Mitra, Resurgent India, 
p. 85. 
41. David Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj, p. 175. 
42. Ibid., p. 79. 
43. Ibid., p. 81. 
44. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
45. K. C. Sen, "The Living God in England and India", 
a sermon delivered at Mill-Hill Chapel, 
Leeds, 
August 28th, 1870, in K. C. Sen, Discourses and 
Writings, p" 5" 
46. Sastri, History of the Brahmo Samaj, p. 149. 
47. We are not aware of any work which specifically 
I 
4 ýa 
studies and analyzes Keshub's thought. There 
are a few texts containing surveys of a very general 
kind only. 
48. K. C. Sen, "Great Men", a lecture delivered at 
the Town Hall, Calcutta, September 28th, 1866, 
in S. D. Collet ed., Lectures and Tracts by Keshub 
Chunder Sen, (London: Strahan and Co. , 1870), 
pp. 49-93. 
4 9. Ibid., p. 53. One is reminded of the same argument 
in Rammohun Roy. In Keshub, the arguments are 
worked out in more detail. 
50. Ibid., p. 56. 
51. K. C. Sen, "The Religious Importance of Mental 
Philosophy", two lectures delivered to the students 
of the Calcutta Brahmo School, May 5th and 12th, 
1867, in Collet ed., Lectures and Tracts, p. 184. 
52. Ibid. 
53. K. C. Sen, "Great Men", 
and Tracts, p. 57. 
in Collet ed., Lectures 
54. 
55. 
Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
The Brahmo Samaj has consistently rejected the 
orthodox theory of the avatära. 
56. Collet ed., Lectures and Tracts, pp. 71-74. 
57. Ibid., p. 86. 
58. Ibid., p. 88. 
59. K. C. Sen, "Regenerating Faith", a sermon preached 
on the occasion of the thirty-eighth anniversary 
of the Brahmo Samaj, January 24th, 1868, in Collet 
ed ., Lectures and Tracts, p. 
110. 
60. K. C. Sen, "The Brahmo Samaj or Theism in India", 
in K. C. Sen, Discourses and Writings p. 73. 
61. K. C. Sen "The Living God in England and India", 
pp. 9-11. 
62. K. C. Sen, "Primitive Faith and Modern Speculations", 
substance of an anniversary lecture at 
the Town 
Hall, Calcutta, January 23rd, 1872, in K. C. 
Sen, 
Discourses and Writings, p. 46. 
63. K. C. Sen, The Existence of God", substance of 
an unpublished lecture at Albert Hall, 
Calcutta, 
January 29th, 1879, in K. C. Sen, Discourses and 
Writings, p. 58. 
TIl 
64. See Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj, Ch. 9. See also S. Sastri, History of the Brahmo Samaj, pp. 163- 86. 
65. The idea of ädesa was noted in connection with Debendranath. 
66. K. C. Sen, "Apostles of the New Dispensation", 
a lecture delivered at the Town Hall, Calcutta, 
on January 22nd, 1881, and quoted in Sastri, 
History of the Brahmo Samaj , p. 230. 
67. K. C. Sen, The New Dispensation or Religion 
Harmony (Calcutta: Bidhan 
59. This particular work 
his writings between may 
68. See ibid., pp. 33-35. 
69. Ibid., p. 34. 
70. Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
71. Ibid. , p. 257. 
72. Ibid. , p. 250. 
73. Ibid., p. 86. 
of 
Press, 1963), pp. 258- 
is a compilation of 
and December, 1881. 
74. See S. N. Dhar, A Comprehensive Biographv of Swami 
Vivekananda, 2 vols. (Madras: Vivekananda Praka'shan 
Kendra, 1975-76), I, 66. See also Kopf, The Brahmo 
Sama j, pp. 2 04-6 . 
75. There are, of course, very important differences 
between the ideas of Keshub and Vivekananda. 
The most important perhaps is Keshub's uncompromising 
rejection of Advaita, which forms the bedrock 
of Vivekananda's philosophy. There are intriguing 
parallels, however, some of which will be made 
obivous in our discussion of Vivekananda. A full 
contrast between both men is well worth further 
study. 
76. There are many available biographies. See Christopher 
Isherwood, Ramakrishna and His Disciples, 3rd 
ed. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1974). Also Romain 
Rolland, The Life of Ramakrishna (Calcutta: Advaita 
Ashrama, 1974). 
77. Ramakrishna, quoted in Swami Saradananda, Sri 
Ramakrishna the Great Master, trans. Swami Jagadananda, 
5th revised ed., 2 vols. (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna 
Math, 1978-79), I, 162-63. 
78. See Romain Rolland, The Life of Ramakrishna, pp. 
75-80. 
4 ou 
79. For this selection, two main sources have been 
relied upon. The major source is Mahendra Gupta, 
The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Swami Nikhilananda 
(New York: Ramakrishna-Vedanta Center, 1977). 
This is a detailed record, by the disciple Gupta, 
of the conversations of Ramakrishna from March 
1882 to April 1886, only a few months before his 
death. It is the authoritative work for any study 
of Ramakrishna's ideas. The second is, Sri Ramakrishna 
Math, Sayings of Sri Ramakrishna, (Madras: Sri 
Ramakrishna Math, 1975). This is a considerably 
smaller work based on Gupta's records, which attempts 
to arrange under subject headings some of his 
teachings. 
80. Sayings of Ramakrishna, pp. 62-64 and pp. 68-69. 
81. Ibid., p. 64 and p. 67. 
82. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, p. 625. 
83. Ibid., p. 543. 
84. Ibid., pp. 645-46. 
85. Ibid., p. 475. 
86. Ibid., p. 476. 
87. Sayings of Ramakrishna, p. 263. See also p. 278 
and p. 284. The concept of sam7adhi will be treated 
when we consider Vivekananda. 
88. Isherwood, Ramakrishna and his Disciples, p. 115. 
89. Walter G. Neevel, "The Transformation of 
Sri Rämakrishna" 
in B. L. Smith ed. , Hinduism: New Essays 
in the 
History of Religions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976). 
90. Ibid., p. 55. 
91. Ibid., p. 67. 
92. Ibid., pp. 85-97. In a very recent study, Freda 
Matchett, "The Teaching of Ramakrishna in Relation 
to the Hindu Tradition and as Interpreted by Vivekananda", 
Religion 11 (1981), 171-84, argues along similar 
lines. Her work seems to draw heavily on Neevel's 
study, but she argues that no single strand of 
the Hindu tradition should be emphasized as determining 
the framework of Ramakrishna' s thought. 
93. See Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India 
(New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1951)-,, p. 569. 
94. David Kopf , The Brahmo S ama 
1, p. 4. 
95. N. C. Ganguly, Raja Ram Mohun Roy, 
(Calcutta: Y. M. C. A. 
Publishing House, 1934), p. 141. 
96. Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj, pp. 15-26. 
97. Sastri, History of the Brahmo Samaj, p. 336. 
98. For a full discussion of the basic doctrines and arguments of Unitarian Christianity, see W. E. Channing, The Complete Works (London: Williams 
and Norgate, 1880), pp. 292-306. 
99. Ibid., p. xvii. 
100. Ibid., p. 293. 
101. Theodore Parker, The Collected Works, ed. Frances Power Cobbe, 12 vols. (London: TrUbner and Co. , 1863-65), I, 216. 
102. See Channing, The Complete Works, p. xvii. 
103. Ibid., p. xii. 
104. Parker, The Collected Works., I, 140. For full 
discussion see pp. 138-50. 
105. Ibid., I, 1-28. 
106. Ibid., I, 7. 
107. See K. C. Sen, "The Existence of God", pp. 58-59. 
108. Ibid., p. 59. 
109. For a discussion of Dayananda's life and the doctrines 
of the movement see, Lajpat Rai, A History of the 
Arya Samaj (Bombay: Orient Longman' s, 1967). 
The development of the Arya Samaj is also well 
treated in K. W. Jones, Arya Dharm (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976). 
110. See Lajpat Rai, History of the Arya Samaj, 
p. 82. For a full discussion of Dayananda's view 
of the Vedas see, Swami Dayananda Saraswati, An 
Introduction to the Commentary on the Vedas, trans. 
Pt. Ghasi Ram (Delhi: Jan Gyan Prakashan, 1973). 
111. See R. C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement 
in India, I, 264. 
112. K. M. Panikkar, The Foundations of New India (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 29. 
113. This does not by any means imply that there was 
agreement on all matters of doctrine between the 
Rrahmo Samai and Ramakrishna. They were divided 
on many issues such as the doctrine of transmigration, 
the concept of the avatära, the ultimate supremacy 
of Advaita, and the use of images in worship. 
ZVG 
CHAPTER 7 
1. CW1, pp. 204-6. 
2. Shankara clearly uses the word ä ama as synonymous 
with the words of the sruti. See KE. U. B. 1.3, 
p. 49. Vivekananda translates äpta as "attained". 
3. CW1, p. 204. 
4. Ibid. 
5. CW6, p. 181. 
6. CW1, p. 205. 
7. It is very interesting to note the similarity 
of this argument with the ones advanced by Shankara 
for the necessity and justification of the Vedas 
as ap ramdna. His general contention is that 
the Vedas are necessary to provide knowledge of 
those things which cannot be obtained through 
our normal processes of knowing. It is not concerned 
to inform us of subjects knowable through perception 
and inference. See above, Ch. 3.3, pp. 99-109. Here, 
however, Vivekananda applies this criterion to the evaluation 
of the integrity of the äpta. 
8. CW1, p. 205. Again there is a similarity between 
this criterion and Shankara's argument that one 
pramäna does not contradict another, but only 
provides information unknown through any other 
means. See BR. U. B. 2.1.20, p. 209. 
9. CW8, p. 270. Also CW4, p. 340; CW1, p. 232. 
It is interesting to note that Vivekananda uses 
the concept of the äpta to argue for the acceptance 
of his translation of, The Imitation of Christ, 
among Hindu readers. He argues that the words 
of such persons have a probative force and are 
"technically" known as sabda-pramäna. This identification 
of sabda-pramäna with the words of the äpta is 
adopted by Vivekananda from the philosophy of 
Nyäya. See N. Y. S. G. 1.70 p. 5. According to 
Nyäya, sabda-pramaiia is twofold in its concern. 
It informs us of things which are the objects 
of perception and of those things which cannot 
be seen (drishta and adrishta). 
10. CW2, p. 60. 
11. CW3, p. 494. 
12. CWl, p. 7. This analogy is just one example of 
the continuous attempt of V iv ekananda to draw 
parallels between the spheres of science and religion 
TV.! 
and their respective methods and findings. It is an important feature of his thought, and we shall be examining this later. See also, 
CW8, p. 232. 
13. CW3, p. 409. The view that knowledge is within is a repeated assertion of Vivekananda, and we shall be exploring this subsequently, as far as 
possible. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
See CW1, pp. 185-86; CW6, p. 14. 
CW1, p. 326. 
CW8, p. 124. 
CW2, p. 163. 
Also CW7, p. 210. 
See CW4, p. 191; CW7, p. 89. 
19. "The book is not the proof of your conduct, but 
you are the proof of the book. How do you know 
that a book teaches truth? Because you are truth 
and feel it. That is what the Vedanta says" (CW2, 
p. 307). See also, CW1, p. 369,324. 
20. CW3, p. 253. 
21. CW7, p. 9. 
22. CW1, p. 185. 
23. See CW2, p. 473; CW5, p. 410. 
24. CW3, p. 175. The same idea is expressed in the 
view that belief is only possible when individuals 
become prophets. See CW6, p. 13,181. 
25. CW3, p. 283. With reference to Christianity, 
Vivekananda asserted that the ideal was not to 
follow the Bible, but to become the Bible, to 
see it as a mere guide-post. See CW4, p. 45. 
In connection with this, he presented Christ and 
Buddha as states to be attained. The historical 
Christ and Gautama were persons who manifested 
it. See CW7, p. 29; CW8, p. 105. 
26. See CW3, p. 284. 
27. See CW4, p. 165; CW7, p. 85,89. 
28. See CW3, p. 283; CW5, p. 311,411; CW7, p. 6; 
CW8, p. 27. 
29. The concept of religion as realization is a central 
one in Vivekananda's philosophy of religion, and 
will be explored later. 
It V It 
30. CW1, p. 232. 
31. See CW8, p. 255. 
32. See CW7, p. 41. 
33. Ibid. , p. 253. 
34. CW7, p. 70. 
"Religion, which is the highest knowledge 
and the highest wisdom, cannot be bought, nor 
can it be acquired from books" (CW3, p. 52). 
Also CW8, p. 210. 
35. See CW1, p. 412; CW4, p. 34,190. 
36. See CW3, p. 45; CW4, p. 168. 
37. See CW4, p. 238,166; CW6, p. 101. 
38. CW7, p. 34. 
39. See CW8, p. 218; CW2, p. 483. 
40. See CW2, pp. 38-39,46; CW1, p. 257. 
41. See CW1, p. 185. 
42. For Vivekananda's references to sravana, manana 
and nididhydsana, see CW1, p. 177; CW2, p. 396; 
CW3, p. 402; CW4, p. 245; CW5, p. 302,322; CW7, 
p. 37; CW8, pp. 1 54-55. 
43. CW1, p. 504. 
44. See CW3, p. 25. 
45. CW7, pp. 37-38. 
46. See CW4, p. 148; CW6, p. 64. 
47. CW8, p. 114. 
48. See CW4, p. 24. 
49. CW61 p. 184. He also admires Buddha for his discovery 
of truth by himself. See CW8, p. 104. 
50. See CW1, p. 328. This was in response to whether 
he believed that the "Sermon on the Mount" was preached 
by Christ. 
51. Ibid., p. 186. 
52. Ibid., p. 453; CW8, p. 34. 
It 0, 
"The Church tries to fit Christ into it, not the Church into Christ; so only those writings 
were preserved that suited the purpose in hand. 
Thus the books are not to be depended upon and book-worship is the worst kind of idolatry to 
bind out f eet. All has to conform to the book 
- science, religion, philosophy; it is the most horrible tyranny, this tyranny of the Protestant 
Bible" (CW7, p. 30). 
53. CW4, p. 42. Vivekananda also sees belief in books 
as being responsible for much of the fanaticism 
associated with religious persecutions. 
54. See CW6, p. 47; CW1, p. 329. 
55. CW2, p. 374. 
56. See CWS, p. 34. 
57. See ibid., p. 255; CW3, p. 521; CW2, p. 195. 
58. 
59. 
See CW5, p. 411,315. 
r 
See CW2, pp. 159-60. 
60. Ibid., p. 336; Also CW6, p. 47. One must admit, 
however, that in both of these places Vivekananda 
simplifies and caricatures the Mimänsä theory 
that creation proceeds out of the eternal words 
of the Vedas. It is not that one verifies the 
existence of anything by its mention in the Vedas. 
For our earlier discussion of this theory, see 
above, Ch. 3.1, pp. 89-96. Vivekananda also attacks the 
view of the Vedas as a treasury of the sum total 
of all knowledge, past, present and future, revealed 
to a particular group. See CW4, p. 433. It is 
important to note that in Shankara's view, it 
is not the purpose of the Vedas to inform us of 
everything. They only impart beneficial knowledge 
which is unobtainable through any other means. 
61. For Vivekananda's discussion of these processes 
see CW1, pp. 405-16; CW8, pp. 106-21. 
62. In Vivekananda's treatment of these qualities, 
he presents them more as fully accomplished rather 
than as preparatory. 
63. CW8, p. 107. 
64. CWl, p. 405. 
65. See ibid., p. 406. 
66. See CW8, pp. 112-13. 
67. See CW1, pp. 407-11. 
-too 
6 8. See ibid., p. 412. 
69. Ibid., p. 414. 
70. Ibid., p. 416. 
71. For a full discussion of Shankara's orthodox views 
on this matter see B. S. B. 1.3.34, pp. 229-34. 
72. See CW7, pp. 117-18. 
73. For Shankara's views see BR. U. B. 3.5.1, pp. 334-41; 
PR. U. B. 1.16, pp. 424-25. 
74. CW6, p. 505; Also CW7, p. 193; CW1, p. 410,184; 
CW5, p. 261. 
75. See particularly above, Ch. 3.3. B. S. B. 1.1.4, 
is especially concerned with establishing this 
view. 
76. BR. U. B. 2.3.6, p. 236. 
77. Ibid., 3.5.1, p. 336. 
78. See CW3, p. 233. 
79. See CW7, p. 40. It must be added, however, that 
Vivekananda does not provide any detailed evidence 
to substantiate his accusations. 
8 0. CW3, p. 233. Ramakrishna's life, according to 
Vivekananda, was a working out of the underlying 
harmony of all religious groups in India. 
81. See, for example, CW2, pp. 240-53. 
82. CW3, p. 234. 
83. Ibid., pp. 281-82. 
84. See CW8, pp. 24-25. Vivekananda sees the Bhagavadgitä 
as a good illustration of this principle of exegesis; 
it proposes, according to him, a gradual method 
of exegesis until the Absolute is attained. See 
CW3, pp. - 261-62. 
85. See CH. U. B. 8.12.1, p. 472. We have referred 
to this method in above, Ch. 4.3 , p. 145. 
86. See CW3, pp. 397-98. 
87. CW5, p. 263. Also CW8, pp. 139-40. 
88. CW1, p. 18. 
89. CW2, p. 500. 
ZV1 
90. Ibid., p. 347. 
91. See, for example, CW1, pp. 322-23. 
92. See above, Ch. 4.2, pp. 140-41. 
93. See CW1, pp. 450-54. 
94. See CW3, pp. 103-461. 
95. Vivekananda often said that by the term sruti 
he meant primarily the Upanishads. He felt that in the present times most of the rituals of the 
karmakända were impractical. 
96. CW3, p. 121. 
97. He often spoke out against the problem of a plurality 
of authoritative sources and the prevalence of 
Tantra practices in Bengal. His tone was usually 
impassioned on these occasions. Without specifying 
the nature of the customs, he often vehemently 
denounced the vämacära (left-handed) practices 
of T antra, describing these as "horrible debauchery". 
He felt that the texts authorizing these practices 
had replaced sruti in Bengal. See, for example, 
ibid., pp. 332-33,340-41. 
98. CW3, p. 120. 
99. Ibid. , p. 228. In India, Vivekananda often said 
that he preferred the name "Vedantist" rather 
than "Hindu". He thought the latter term to be 
quite descriptively meaningless, while "Vedantist" 
signified the common acceptance of the authority 
of the Vedas. 
100. Ibid., p. 220. 
101. Ibid., pp. 286-87. It is obvious that when Vivekananda 
spoke of religion as forming the rallying point 
of national unity, he was thinking primarily of 
Hinduism. Islam, for instance, was not mentioned 
in the context of this unity. National unity 
basically meant Hindu religious accord. Vivekananda 
did not seem to anticipate the fears and suspicions 
this could have aroused among non-Hindus, and 
the eventual division of his country over this 
very question. 
102. Ibid., p. 333. 
103. Ibid. , p. 280. 
104. Ibid., p. 120. 
105. CW6, p. 182. 
106. See CW3, pp. 248-50; CW6, p. 105. 
zvv 
107. CW3, pp. 182-83. 
108. Ibid., 249. 
109. Ibid., pp. 118-19,183-84,249-51,279-80,332. 
The foundation of V edänta on impersonal principles 
was one of its characteristics, Vivekananda claimed, 
which commended it as a universal religion. It 
is impossible, he argued to unite all people 
around any particular human figure. 
110. See, for example, CW1, pp. 6-7. For the Indian 
expression of this interpretation, see CW5, p. 206; CW6, 
p. 9,103. 
111. See CW3, pp. 118-19. 
112. Ibid., p. 230,322,456. 
113. Ibid., p. 334. Vivekananda's attempt to reconcile 
Vedic statements on the principle of an evolution 
from dualism to non-dualism also featured more 
prominently in his Indian addresses. We have 
also earlier noted his ridicule of the Mimänsä 
theory of the creation of the world from Vedic 
words. There is one occasion in India, however, 
when he showed considerable sympathy to this argument 
and offered an interpretation of it to a disciple. 
See CW6, pp. 495-99. The gist of Vivekananda's 
argument in this lengthy discussion is that with 
reference to the origin of the universe from Vedic 
words, the term sabda (lit. word) indicates subtle 
ideas. Even when the entire universe is withdrawn, 
the subtle idea or sabda-state of every created 
object exists in brahman, and the gross objects 
are created out of these subtle ideas. In Shankara's 
own discussion of this theory, we have seen that 
he does not distinguish between sabda as word 
and sabda as idea. 
114. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Swami Vivekananda and the Indian 
Renaissance, (Coimbatore: Sri Ramakrishna Mission 
Vidyalaya Teachers College, 1965), p. 52. 
115. R. S. Srivastava, Contemporary Indian Philosophy, 
(Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1965), p. 43. 
116. It is possible to argue that in the West, Vivekananda 
felt that Advaita could be made more acceptable 
if he gave little or no significance to the Vedas 
as its authoritative source. But Vivekananda's 
denunciation of the value of scriptures was not 
confined to the Vedas, and the reasons for this 
censure are too broad to be explained away 
by 
this argument. 
117. CW3, pp. 254-55. 
zvi 
CHAPTER 8 
1. See CW1, p. 53; CW2, pp. 83-84; CW3, p. 128. 
2. CW1, p. 238; Also CW2, pp. 257-58. 
3. See CW2, p. 439; CW4, p. 227. 
4. CW2, p. 281; Also CW1, p. 27,333; CW7, p. 37. 
5. CW2, p. 350; Also CW3, p. 239. 
6. In the present chapter, we have confined ourselves 
to a discussion of karma, bhakti and 'näna. Rdjayoga 
is closely linked with the central spiritual experience 
about which Vivekananda continuously speaks, and 
we shall be considering this method in Chapter 
9. 
7. CW8, p. 152. 
8. See CW4, p. 432; CW6, p. 182. 
9. CW1, p. 55. 
10. Ibid., p. 93. 
11. For elaborations of this argument see CW2, pp. 
385-88; CW6, pp. 16-17,137-38. 
12. CW1, pp. 28-29. 
13. See ibid., pp. 31-32. 
14. Ibid., pp. 42-43; Also p. 62. 
15. CW5, p. 246; Also CW1, p. 84. 
16. See CW1, pp. 59-60,102. 
17. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
18. CW2, p. 392. 
19. "Performing actions without attachment for the 
sake of Isvara, man attains moksha, through attaining 
purity of mind (sattva-suddhi " B. G. B. 3: 19, 
p. 104) . 
20. Vivekananda often argues about the contradiction 
of the concept of a perfect life. Good and evil, 
he says, define each other, and the former is 
not possible without having the latter. The sum 
total of pain in the world is always the same; 
the variation is only in expression. See CW1, 
pp. 83-84,111-13. 
It 7V 
21. See CW1, pp. 36-37. 
22. Ibid., p. 39. 
23. See ibid., pp. 72-75. Along with his attempt 
to enlarge the concept of karmayoga, one also 
finds in Vivekananda the search for new ways of 
justifying this means. The primary new rationale 
centres around the idea of k armayoga as the secret 
of activity or work. Sometimes this is emphasized 
in a manner which appears to take karmayoga out 
of the context of being a way to moksha and converts 
it into a pragmatic method of maximising the success 
of any activity. The main argument in this context 
is that failure in accomplishing the ends of activity 
is often due to an obsession with these ends, 
and insufficient attention to the means. Karmayoga 
remedies this by diverting attention from the 
result and stressing the perfection of the means. 
See CW2, pp. 1-9. Vivekananda also sees the self- 
restraint involved in being indifferent to rewards 
as leading to the cultivation of will-power. 
For a contemporary discussion of the karmayoga 
concept see, Ursula King, "Who is the Ideal Karmayogin? 
The Meaning of a Hindu Religious Symbol", Religion 
10 (1980), 41-59. 
24. CW1, p. 111. Also p. 93. Among other reasons, 
Buddha is described as an ideal karmayogi because 
of what Vivekananda considers to be his doctrinal 
indifference. 
25. Ibid. , pp. 100-101. 
"So the only way is to give up all the fruits 
of work, to be unattached to them. Know that 
this world is not we, nor are we this world; that 
we are really not the body; that we really do 
not work. We are the Self, eternally at rest 
and at peace" (ibid., p. 116). 
26. Ibid., p. 84. Also CW7, p. 179. 
27. CW1, pp. 34-35. 
28. Ibid., p. 59. 
29. Ibid. , p. 93. These are very 
of passages one encounters in 
how karmayoga leads directly 
other examples see ibid., p. 
p. 142; CW4, p. 436; CW7, p. 
30. See CW8, p. 153. 
31. See CW1, pp. 84-87. 
32. CW7, pp. 111-12. 
typical of the kinds 
trying to understand 
to knowledge. For 
107,110; CW3, 
63,69,75,110. 
33. See CW1, p. 109. 
34. Ibid., p. 106. 
35. Ibid., p. 512. See also p. 498. 
36. CW5, p. 325. 
"Good works and all that (merely) make the mind a little quiet" (CW1, p. 517). See also CW5, 
pp. 240-41; CW7, p. 54,159-60,221-22. 
37. CW7, pp. 178-79. 
38. CW3, p. 31. 
39. Ibid., p. 36. 
40. CW6, p. 90. 
41. Vivekananda defines isvara in accordance with B. S. 1.1.2, "From whom is the birth, continuation, 
and dissolution of the universe". 
42. CW3, p. 37. Also p. 42. 
43. CW3, pp. 59-62. 
"The object of Bhakti is 
without a subject and an 
love again must be at fi 
our love. Therefore the 
some sense a human God. 
love" (CW8, p. 153). 
God. Love cannot be 
object. The object of 
rst a being who can reciprocate 
God of love must be in 
He must be a God of 
44. CW3, p. 387. 
45. The disadvantage of this method, according to 
Vivekananda, is its tendency to degenerate into 
fanaticism. The reverse side of the singleness 
of attachment required in bhaktiyoga is often 
the deprecation of everything else, for we seem 
only to be able to love our own ideals by hating 
all others. This danger, however, says Vivekananda, 
is only a possibility in the lower and early stages 
of bhaktiyoga. 
46. CW3, pp. 70-71. 
47. Ibid., p. 72. Also pp. 77-79; CW6, p. 90; CW7, 
p. 198. In commending the virtues of bhaktiyoga, 
Vivekananda mentions what he sees as some disadvantages 
and difficulties of 'näna and räjayoga. Jna-na, 
he says, requires favourable circumstances and 
strenuous practice. There is also the danger 
of being caught "in the interminable net of vain 
argumentation", and of knowledge being used to 
justify any kind of conduct. In rä 'ayoga, the 
T/!. 
danger is the attraction for the acquisition of 
psychic powers. 
48. In karmayoga, for example, there is no emphasis 
on the necessity of a teacher. The main reason 
for the wealth of details he provides in his discussions 
on bhaktiyoga is the availability of a mass of 
traditional literature on the subject. In these 
discussions, he draws heavily on the commentaries 
of Rama nu ja. 
49. For a full discussion of these qualifications 
see CW4, pp. 1-12,21-33; CW3, pp. 45-56,64-69. 
The Bhagavadgitä (17: 7-10) relates the nature 
of the food preferred to the characteristics of 
the individual temperament. Preference is determined 
by the predominance of the qualities of sattva, 
rajas or tamas. See also CH. U. 7.26.2. 
50. CW3, pp. 47-48. 
51. Because of the secondary role which he ascribes 
to scriptures and therefore, exegesis, Vivekananda 
does not seem to consider the possibility that 
a knowledge of philology, etymology and syntax, 
may be of great value in arriving at the spirit 
of any scripture. 
52. CW3, p. 50; Also CW4, pp. 24-26. The question 
of Krishna's historicity was widely discussed 
at the turn of the nineteenth century in Bengal. 
See Ursula King, "True and Perfect Religion: Bankim 
Chandra Ch atterjee's Reinterpretation of Hinduism", 
Religion 7 (1977), 127-48. 
53. CW3, pp. 93-99. 
54. Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
55. See CW2, pp. 47-49; CW3, pp. 86-90,391-92; CW6, 
pp. 70-71. 
56. CW3, p. 82; Also p. 76,92. 
57. See CW4, p. 3; CW3. P. 35,38. 
58. CW7, p. 192; Also p. 121; CW1. p. 440; CW3. 
p. 32,128,282. 
59. CW3, pp. 72-73; Also pp. 42-43,78; CW1, 
p. 13. 
Vivekananda explains that grace operates both 
within and outside the concept of law. 
While 
it naturally descends on the pure, it 
is not constrained 
by any conditions. The Lord has a playful nature, 
and grace can bring about even unsolicited release. 
See CW6, pp. 481-83. 
't .7 -) 
60. CW5, p. 317. 
61. CW3, p. 100. For other examples see p. 86; CW81 p. 221,258. 
62. See above, Ch. 7.5, pp. 289-90. 
63. See CW1, p. 98; CW3, p. 11. CW71 p. 198. 
64. CW8, p. 3. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid. , p. 11; Also p. 10; CW3, p. 17. 
67. See, for example, CW1, p. 98. 
68. See CW5, p. 300. 
69. See CW6, p. 464; CW8, p. 4. 
70. See CW5, p. 272; CW8, p. 8. 
71. See CW1, p. 150, 181. 
72. Ibid., p. 232. 
73. See CW8, p. 20. 
74. CW2, p. 162. 
75. See above, Ch. 5.5, pp. 196-206. 
76. KA. U. 1.2.9. 
77. See CW2, pp. 162-63; CW7, p. 167. 
78. See KA. U. B. 1.2.7-8, pp. 137-41. 
79. See CW1, p. 150,183,197,262-63; CW2, p. 61. 
80. CW1, p. 232. 
81. CW2, p. 306; Also p. 307; CW5, p. 283; CW7, p. 60, 
91-92. 
82. See, "Reason and Religion", in CW1, pp. 366-82. 
For arguments along the same lines, see also CW2, 
pp. 329-36; CW3, pp. 423-24; CW8, p. 18 4. 
83. CW1, p. 367. Vivekananda also suggests that reason 
is the only guide able to decide among the conflicting 
claims of. religion. Conflicting claims cannot 
be decided by each asserting the superi ority of 
its authoritative text. 
84. Ibid., pp. 369-70. 
Z -i z 
85. Ibid., p. 371. 
86. Ibid., p. 372. 
87. See CW1, p. 99; CW3, p. 73. 
88. See David Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj, pp. 42-86. 
89. See, for example, CW1, pp. 14-15. 
90. Ibid. 
91. Vivekananda also sees as characteristic of the 
scientific method, the availability of a common 
experiential referent, against which the truth 
or fallacy of its conclusions can be readily evaluated. 
Because he can evaluate scientific claims by reference 
to his own experiences, the ordinary man, Vivekananda 
argues, has no difficulty in seeing their plausibility. 
It is important for him to identify this as describing 
the scientific approach, for in räjayoga he proposes 
a method for arriving at such an experience in 
the religious sphere, against which its claims 
could be evaluated. It is clear here, however, 
that he is equating two different kinds of experiences, 
and in the next chapter we shall be looking at 
the difficulties which this equation presents. 
For a discussion on some of the problems of defining 
the nature of science see A. F. Chalmers, What 
is This Thing Called Science, 2nd ed. Milton Keynes: 
The Open University Press, 1982. 
92. See CW2, p. 335,390. 
93. For a good example of this, see CW2, "The Cosmos", 
pp. 203-25. The Upanishads themselves, of course 
frequently draw this analogy. 
9 4. CW2, pp. 254-55. 
95. See CW1, p. 24; CW2, p. 363. 
96. "Religion is the acceptance of all existing creeds, 
seeing in them the same striving toward the same 
destination. Creed is something antagonistic 
and combative" (CW7, p. 286). 
97. CW2, pp. 382-83. 
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CHAPTER 9 
1. CW1, p. 13. 
2. CW3, pp. 377-78. 
3. This, of course, challenges his own attempt to 
present the method of jhdnayoga as a path to ultimate 
knowledge through independent reasoning. 
4. In Chapter 8, we have made reference to his attempts 
to draw analogies with the methods and findings 
of science. The further significance of these 
attempts will become more obvious in his arguments 
for the imperative of a direct perception of religious 
truths. 
5. Vivekananda distinguishes between internal and 
external experience. He classifies knowledge 
gathered from the former as psychology, metaphysics 
and religion, and from the latter as the physical 
sciences. See CW2, p. 432. Even when knowledge 
is gained from someone's words, says Vivekananda, 
one must presume the experience in a former existence, 
because only through experience can one learn 
anything. See CW7, p. 46. 
6. CWi, p. 125. For similar statements on the derivation 
of all knowledge from experience, see CW2, p. 226; 
CW6, p. 81,128,132-33. 
7. CW1, p. 126. Also CW2, pp. 60-61. There are occasions 
in India, however, when Vivekananda asserted that the 
idea of religion as direct perception is unique to 
Hinduism. See CW3, p. 345. 
8. See CW1, p. 127,122. 
"The Vedanta says that Yoga is the one way that 
makes men realise this divinity" (CW5, p. 282). 
9. See CW1, p. 128,131; Also CW8, p. 36. 
10. See CW1, p. 137. 
11. See ibid., pp. 147-48. 
12. Viv ekananda often enthusiastically describes 
the control 
of Ana in the body as leading to a control of 
all 
forces in the universe, to all knowledge, and eventually 
to freedom. See CW1, pp. 148-49. 
13. See CW1, pp. 171-78. 
14. Ibid., p. 186; Also p. 181,270. 
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15. Ibid., p. 188. 
16. The kundalini is described by Vivekananda as a coiled 
up, untnänifested energy lying at the base of the 
spinal canal. Its awakening through the practice 
of rajayoga leads to its upward movement through 
a subtle, non-physical hollow in the spinal column (sushumna). As it progresses, it passes through 
seven centres of consciousness (cakras), each step 
marked by distinct spiritual experiences. When 
it reaches the seventh, the thousand-petalled 
(sahasrdra cakra) located in the brain, full 
spiritual illumination is gained. See CW1, pp. 160-70. 
For more information see Agehananda Bharati, 
The Tantric Tradition (London: Rider & Company, 
1965). 
17. CW1, p. 165. 
18. See Georg Feuerstein, The Philosophy of Classical 
Yoga (Manchester University Press, 1980). The word 
T antra means a system or discipline. There is a great 
division of opinion among scholars over the origin of 
the beliefs and practices of T antra . Although the 
earliest Tantric texts are not dated before the 
fifth century A. D., attempts have been made to find 
its roots in the Rig-Veda. See G. Feuerstein and 
J. Miller, A Rea 'raisal of Yoga (London: Rider & 
Company, 1971 . See Ch. 5. Other views suggest that 
it was the prevalent form of worship among the 
non-Aryans and gradually assimilated by the Aryans. 
It has also been argued that the roots of Tantra 
are to be found in Mahäydna Buddhism. According 
to T. W. Organ, the background of T antra is largely 
Sämkhya. While Siva is the passive purusha, Sakti 
is 'the dynamic prakriti. The evolution and 
diversity of the ld are traced to the interaction 
of the three gunas. Tantricism classifies the 
Hindu scripture's into the ägamas and nigamas, 
equivalent to the traditional distinction between 
sruti and smriti. Tantric texts, however, are 
accorded the'status of ägamas (sruti) while the 
Vedas are grouped with the nigamas smriti). See 
T. W. Organ, The Hindu Quest for the Perfection of 
Man, first paperbound ed. (Ohio: Ohio University, 
1980). See Ch. 5, pp. 319-29. For a good 
discussion of Ramakrishna in the context of Tantra 
see H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India, pp. 
560-95. 
19. See CW2, p. 389,446. 
20. CW1, p. 150,180- 
21. We have already considered in detail the nature of 
reason in Vivekananda. See above, Ch. 
8.3, pp. 340-44. 
22. CWl, p. 180. Also CW4, p. 213. 
Zl 
23. CW1, p. 185. Also CW2, p. 390; CW4, p. 59. It is significant that Vivekananda often substitutes the term "inspiration" for samädhi or superconscious- 
ness. See, for example, CW2 , p. 389-90. Keshub Chandra Sen also upholds inspiration as the highest instrument of spiritual knowledge. He presents it as direct communion with God made possible through 
His mercy. We have suggested that Keshub was deeply influenced in this matter by leading Unitarian writers 
of the time. See above, Ch. 6.4, pp. 246-50; Ch. 6.6, 
pp. 261-66. 
24. CW1, p. 129. 
25. Ibid., p. 130. See also CW2, pp. 390-91; CW5, p. 299. Vivekananda often replaces the words concentration 
and observation by meditation, and speaks of the 
latter as the great scientific method of knowledge, 
the process through which all scientific and other 
types of knowledge is gained. See, for example, 
CW4, p. 230,249. 
26. CW1, p. 131. 
27. "In making money, or in worshipping God, or in doing 
anything, the stronger the power of concentration, 
the better will that thing be done. This is the 
one call, the one knock, which opens the gates of 
nature, and lets out floods of light. This, the 
power of concentration, is the only key to the treasure 
house of knowledge. The system of Raja-Yoga deals 
almost exclusively with this" (CW2, p. 391). 
28. CW1, pp. 130-31,135. 
29. Ibid., p. 129,131. 
30. See CW2, p. 163,413. Vivekananda's arguments about 
the derivation of the fundamental doctrines of religion 
from the study of the mind is almost identical with 
Keshub Chandra Sen' s views on this subject. See 
above, Ch. 6.4, p. 247. 
31. CW1, p. 28. Also CW3, p. 130; CW2, pp. 3 39-40 . 
32. CW1, p. 28. 
33. Ibid., pp. 216-17. 
34. Ibid., p. 439. Also CW7, p. 71. CH. U. 4.4.1 - 
4.9.3, describes the method by which the student, 
Satyakama, gains brahma ' nana . Af ter convincing 
his teacher of his strict adherence to truth, he 
is initiated and given four hundred lean and weak 
cows to tender. He departs from his teacher, promising 
not to return until the herd had multiplied to a 
thousand cows. The text describes Satyakama's instruction 
by a bull, fire, a flamingo and an aquatic bird. 
According to Vivekananda, the student mistakenly 
interprets the knowledge 
himself, as originating 
See CW2, pp. 309-11. 
which was coming from within from the external world. 
35. CW4, pp. 431-32; CW5, p. 366. 
36. CW1, pp. 183-84. 
37. Ibid., p. 184. Vivekananda uses Muhammad as an example of a prophet who accidentally encountered the state of samddhi. 
38. Ibid. , p. 188,212-13. 
39. CW7, p. 196. 
40. CW8, p. 40. 
41. CW7, p. 195. 
"Then when the mind is free from activity or functioning, 
it vanishes, and the Self is revealed" (CW6, p. 475). 
See also, CW1, p. 203,234. 
42. "If you can get absolutely still for just one moment, 
you have reached the goal. The mind may go on working 
after that; but it will never be the same mind again. 
You will know yourself as you are - your true Self. 
Still the mind but for one moment, and the truth 
of your real nature will flash upon you, and freedom 
is at hand; no more bondage after that" (CW6, 
pp. 96-97). See also CW1, p. 453; CW7, p. 431, 
434. 
43. See CW8, p. 36; CW7, p. 140. 
44. See CW7, p. 196. Also CW5, p. 336; CW6, p. 89. 
45. CW5, p. 392. For the second account see CW7, 
p. 139. In this description, he says that he was 
only able to return to the relative world because 
of a persistence of the ego-sense. 
46. Some of the roots of this idea of religion as direct 
perception and realization, with its rejection of 
formal learning, organization, and worship, go back 
perhaps to the tradition of bhakti, and in Bengal, 
to its poet-saints. Vivekananda himself, in a lecture 
on Ramakrishna, mentions the idea as being common 
among these poets. See CW4, pp. 164-65. This is 
an area that deserves further examination. In 
Vivekananda himself, the quest for some form of 
direct, authoritative and immediate knowledge of 
God seems to have been well developed even before 
his meeting with Ramakrishna. Keshub Chandra Sen, 
with whom we have suggested certain significant 
parallels, could have been an important influence. 
The following questions put by Vivekananda to Ramakrishna 
'2 ll 
are significant in understanding the kind of quest he was pursuing at that time. The words are Vivekananda's 
own. 
I heard of this man, and I went to hear him. 
He looked just like an ordinary man, with nothing 
remarkable about him. He used the most simple language, and I thought "Can this man be a great 
teacher"? -I crept near to him and asked him 
the question which I had been asking others 
all my life: "Do you believe in God, Sir"? 
"Yes", he replied. "Can you prove it, Sir"? 
"Yes". "How"? "Because I see Him just as I 
see you here, only in a much intenser sense". 
That impressed me at once. For the first time 
I found a man who dared to say that he saw God, 
that religion was a reality to be felt, to be 
sensed in an infinitely more intense way than 
we can sense the world" (CW4, p. 179). 
47. 
48. 
49. 
The search for an incontrovertible, self-validating 
experience, must in part also be the result of the 
scepticism induced in his thought at college through 
the works of writers such as Mill, Hume and Spencer. 
Reason seemed a meandering path with no visible 
end, and failed to satisfy him. The kind of scepticism 
which seemed to have plagued him in his early days 
was evinced much later on, after the death of Ramakrishna. 
There were doubts in his mind about the authoritativeness 
of the Vedas, and the reliability of its authors. 
He sought answers from Pramadadas Mitra of Benares, 
whose erudition he regarded highly. See letter to 
Pramadadas Mitra in, Letters of Swami Vivekananda, 
4th ed., (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1976), pp. 
7-11. It is quite possible that his search for 
a spiritual experience may also have been prompted, 
in part, by his study of English Romantic poetry, 
with its strong mystical bent and its preference 
for the faculties of intuition and feeling as opposed 
to reason. It is significant that one version of 
his life records as the motive for his first visit 
to Ramakrishna, a discussion of a verse from Wordsworth' s 
"Excursion", describing a state of mystic rapture. 
See S. N. Dhar, A Comprehensive Biography of Swami 
Vivekananda, I, 79-80. 
CW1, p. 415. Also CW4, p. 34. 
CW4, p. 167. 
CW7, p. 64. 
"If God is true, we must feel Him as a fact, and 
if there is a soul, we ought to be able to see it 
and feel, it" (CW8, p. 39). These references cited 
here are representative of his innumerable and 
almost identical statements on this issue. 
For 
similar affirmations see CW1, p. 232,234; 
CW2, 
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p. 129,372,410-11,474, CW41 p. 30,126. 
50. See CW5, p. 318. 
51. See CW8, p. 233. 
52. CW1, p. 159. 
53. Ibid., p. 164. 
54. CW4, p. 58. 
55. CW8, p. 12. 
56. See CW3, p. 100,282. Also CW6, p. 97; CW7, p. 92. 
57. CW2, p. 284. Similar views, in almost identical 
language, are repeated in nearly every one of Vivekananda's 
major addresses. 
58. See CW8, p. 45; CW7, p. 60. 
59. See CW1, p. 128; CW2, p. 165; CW4, p. 128-; CW7, 
p. 77. 
60. CW1, pp. 184-85. 
61. In Ch. 8.3, pp. 346-50, we have already considered 
some of the general difficulties raised in connection 
with his equation of Advaita and science. 
62. For a brief, lucid discussion of many of the problems 
associated with a evaluating religious experience 
see, P. Donavan, Interpreting Religious Experience 
(London: Sheldon Press, 1979). 
63. For our discussion of Shankara's position on this 
issue see above, Ch. 3.3, pp. 102-105. 
64. CW2, pp. 133-34; Also CW3, p. 422. 
65. For a series of illuminating discussions on this 
issue see S. T. Katz ed., Mysticism and Philosophical 
Analysis (London: Sheldon Press, 1978). Also Ninian 
Smart, "Interpretation and Mystical Experience", 
Religious Studies 1 (1965), 75-87. 
66. See above, Ch. 7.1, pp. 273-74. 
67. CW1, p. 140. 
6 8. See ibid., p. 251,253,361; CW2, pp. 454-62. Among 
the differences mentioned by Vivekananda are the 
Sämkhy_a concept of a plurality of individual selves, 
and the total separation of the self (purusha) 
from 
nature (prakciti). He also argues against the concept 
of a plurality of infinites. 
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69. See CW6, p. 81; CW7, p. 43. 
70. CW6, p. 125. 
71. CW5, p. 250. The suggestion of moksha as obtaining only in the state of samddhi occurs throughout Vivekananda's räjayoga presentation. For two specific discussions where this view is very obvious see CW1, pp. 197-99,212-24. 
72. See CW6, p. 456. 
73. See ibid., pp. 132-33; Also CW3, p. 1,72. 
74. See CW1, p. 160,255; CW4, p. 226. 
75. See CW1, p. 133,172,257,412. 
76. Sdmkhya, as a system of dualistic realism, proposes 
two ultimate realities, purusha and prakriti. They 
are absolutely separate and independent 6f each other in respect of their existence. Unlike Advaita, 
there is an infinity of purushas, each distinct 
from the other. Through some unexplained process, 
purushas got mixed up in prakriti, and impose the 
qualities of prakriti upon themselves. In Sämkhya, 
moksha involves total isolation (kaivalya) of *each 
purusha from prakriti, and from each other. Since 
prakriti is as real as purusha, any association 
between the two would constitute bondage and this 
seems to explain the emphasis on isolation or with- 
drawal. For a brief discussion see R. C. Zaehner, 
Hinduism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
pp. 69-70. For detailed account see C. Sharma, 
A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Ch. 9. 
Also S. N. Dasgupta, A Histo of Indian Philosophy, 
first Indian ed., 5 vols., (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
1975), I, Ch. 7. 
77. For a specific discussion of this point see above, 
Ch. 5.5, pp. 206-9. 
78. For our discussion of the status and function of 
reason in Shankara see above, Ch. 5.5, pp. 196-206. 
79. In CW3, pp. 281-82, three such texts are mentioned 
by Vivekananda. These are KE. U. 1.3, and 2.2, as 
well as TA. U. 2.9.1. We are using Vivekananda's 
own translations. 
80. KE. U. B. 1.4, pp. 50-51. 
81. See TA. U. B. 2.9.1, pp. 385-86. We have discussed 
Shankara's approach to the problem of defining brahman 
which lacks genus, quality, relation and activity 
in above Ch. 4.3, pp. 143-56. 
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82. See, for example, CW3, p. 10,55; CW1, p. 365. 
83. CW7, p. 140. 
84. Vivekananda appears to be even more inconsistent when in ibid. , p. 112, he describes the state of samädhi 
as being only of a temporary duration. 
85. See above, Ch. 5.2 , pp. 170-71. 
86. This is the last sutra, and the repetition of the 
sentence indicates the end of the text. 
87. See B. S. B. 4.4.22, pp. 911-12. 
88. See above, Ch. 5.5, pp. 214-16. 
89. See above, Ch. 4.3, pp. 143-45; Also Ch. 5.5, pp. 194-95. 
90. CH. U. 4.4.1 - 4.9.3, which Vivekananda interprets 
as affirming his theory of brahmajnäna as being 
within, is understood differently by Shankara. 
When Satyakäma returns to his teacher's home, his 
teacher, noticing his radiant appearance, realizes 
that he had received instruction about brahman. 
He inquires about this, and is told by Satyakama 
that he received instruction from "people other 
than human beings". Unlike Vivekananda, Shankara 
says that the student was instructed by deities. 
It is very interesting that in the next verse 
(4.9.3), Satyakama still requests instruction from 
his teacher. In his commentary, Shankara paraphrases 
this request. 
Further, it has been heard by me, in this connection, 
from sages like Your Reverence, that it is only 
knowledge learnt from the Teacher that becomes 
best, - acquires its highest character; hence Your 
Reverence alone should teach me" (CH. U. B. 4.9.3, 
p. 198). 
91. B. G. 4: 32, advances the traditional method of the 
Upanishads for gaining knowledge. The student is 
advised to approach the teacher with reverence, 
service and inquiry. Commenting on this verse, 
Shankara says that the teacher should be asked about 
the cause of bondage, the means of deliverance, 
and the nature of ignorance and knowledge. See 
also MU. U. 1.2.12-13, along with Shankara's commentary. 
There is no suggestion in these texts discussing 
the role of the teacher, that the knowledge he 
imparts 
is already possessed by his student. 
-) v-) 
CONCLUSION 
1. CW3, pp. 194-95. 
2. Ibid., p. 450. 
3. Ibid., p. 195,213-20. 
4. For a detailed discussion of the impact of science 
in Bengal in the nineteenth century see David Kopf, 
The Brahmo Samaj, Chapter 2: "The Deification of 
Science, Humanity and Reason: Brahmo Secularism", 
pp. 42-85. 
5. We have referred to de Smet's study in Chapter 1. 
For Murty's analysis see K. Satchidananda Murty, 
Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta (Andhra 
University and Columbia University Press, 1959; 
reprint ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974). 
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GLOSSARY 
The following list does not include all of the Sanskrit 
terms used in this study. It is a selection only of the 
more technical terms used in Advaita Veddnta. All of the 
Sanskrit terms, however, are fully explained in the text 
itself. It is very difficult to give literal translations 
of important Advaita concepts and the following explanations 
should not be regarded as substitutes for the detailed 
discussion of each term in the text. 
abhydsa: repetition; one of the sixfold 
criteria used in Advaita for 
T determining the purport of sruti 
passages; the frequent repetition 
of a text is seen as an indication 
of its importance. 
a dhikäri: a qualified student or spiritual 
3MEIIZ6 ý aspirant. 
adhyäropa: wrong attribution of the qualities 
ýfij3 of one entity upon another. 
adhyäsa: superimposition; in Advaita the 
3T£-ZTT; ý: - term is used to 
describe the 
erroneous identification of 
brahman with the qualities of the 
body and mind. 
Advaita: literally, "non-duality"; the 
3-3 cf school of 
thought systematized 
and expounded by Shankara. 
ägama: traditional text or doctrine; 
J: r sometimes used as a synonym 
for 
the sruti. 
ägämi karma: the results of actions 
done in the 
3 present 
and those likely to be 
done in the future. 
ahamkära: 
a%ý ý, 
a jahallakshanä: 
"y 
a 3nana: 
3r 
akhandärthaka vakyam: 
anädi: 
31ý1 
änanda: 
311cic- 
a nantam: 
3% '! c 
anitya: 
antahkarana: 
;- ýT 
a nubhav a: 
37-1 -LTzf- 
anumäna: 
a nupa l abdh i: 
aparä vidyd: 
3< 
ego or "I" notion. 
a non-exclusive form of implication, 
in which both the primary and 
implied meanings of a word or 
sentence are taken into consideration 
in order to arrive at its meaning. 
ignorance, error, or invalid 
cognition. 
a sentence or statement positing 
identity between subject and 
predicate. 
that which is without beginning; 
eternal. 
Bliss; the very nature of brahman 
in Advaita. 
limitless, boundless, eternal. 
impermanent, changing, transient. 
literally, "the internal organ"; 
used as a general designation for 
the mind and all of its functions. 
experience, firm opinion; the term 
is also used to designate knowledge 
gained from any valid source other 
than memory. 
inference; one of the six sources 
of valid knowledge accepted by 
Advaita. 
non-cognition; one of the six sources 
of valid knowledge accepted by 
Advaita. 
brahman; the latter alone is posited 
as leading directly to moksha. 
literally, "lower knowledge"; in 
Advaita, it includes all kinds of 
lennual P(ic7A other than that of 
aparoksha: literally, "not invisible"; used as an adjective of 'nIna, it 
signifies knowledge which is directly and immediately gained. 
apaurusheya: that which is not of human origin 
or nature; it is used as a description of the sruti to 
distinguish it from texts having 
a human origin. 
apavada: negation or refutation; in Advaita 
-4 dT it refers to the negation, through 
knowledge, of qualities wrongly 
superimposed on brahman. 
apramä: invalid or incorrect knowledge. 
3TVT4T 
äpta: a credible, trustworthy or 
authoritative person. 
äptaväkya: the statement of an authoritative 
person. 
apurva: novelty; one of the sixfold criteria 
used in Advaita for determining the _YTf 
purport of sruti-passages; the idea 
here is that if the subject is 
knowable through other pramanas, it 
cannot be the central purport of the 
the sruti; sruti aims only to inform 
us of things which we cannot know 
otherwise. 
a rthdpatti: postulation; one of the six sources 
3' 2( - of knowledge accepted in Advaita. 
arthaväda: praise or commendation; one of 
f4-T the sixfold criteria used in Advaita T 2 for determining the purport of the 
sruti; the term is also used in 
Pr a-Mimdnsä to describe Vedic 
sentences which subserve injunctions 
by praising the act or its result. 
asat: unreal, impermanent, 
false; the 
ý: E Opposite of sat. 
dtman: the individual Self; in Advaita 
the ätman is posited as being identical with brahman. 
ä tmajnana: knowledge of the ätman; synonymous 
C", V jaq with ätmavidyä. 
avidyä: ignorance, misapprehension, 
erroneous knowledge; in Advaita 
it especially denotes erroneous 
knowledge about the nature of the 
ätman. 
avidyänivritti: the removal or negation of 
ignorance by knowledge. 
bh shya: a commentary or explanatory work. 
b rahmajijnäsä: inquiry (especially into the sruti 
texts) about the nature of brahman. 
brahmajnäna: the knowledge of brahman; synonymous 
1 with brahmavidyä. 
brahman: the limitless reality; identical, 
4F-CT in Advaita, with the ätman. 
brahmanishtham: the state of being established in 
40P 1 IQ 1064-L the knowledge of brahman; a 
qualification of the spiritual teacher 
in Advaita. 
itanya/cit: Awareness or Consciousness; the Taom- 
/g-nature of the Self in Advaita. 
citta suddhi: the purity of the mind; a precondition, f-Q- 4 in Advaita, for the knowledge of 
brahman. 
drik: the Knower, Subject or Seer; the 
nature of the ätman in Advaita, 
emphasizing that It cannot be 
objectified. 
g una: quality or attribute; 
merit or 
excellence. 
indriya: 
$ 161 5k Zi 
r. 
i svara: 
ýýz 
j ad a: 
-ýTi 
j ägarita-avasthä: 
31 2)T 
j ahada j ahal lakshana: 
j ahallakshanä: 
Ul 
"N 
jii nasa: 
jgwTýPT 
-11 - jijnasu: 
jivanmukta: 
nana: 
j näni : 
organ, especially sense organ. 
the Lord; the impersonal brahman 
conceived of as Creator and Ruler 
of the universe, and possessing 
the qualities of omnipotence and 
omniscience. 
insentient or inert; the opposite 
of caitanya. 
the waking state. 
an exclusive-non-exclusive type 
of implication, in which only part 
of the original meaning of a word 
or sentence is retained, while the 
rest is rejected; this is the kind 
of implication used in Advaita for 
the exegesis of "tat tvam asi" ; it 
is also referred to as bhagalakshana. 
an exclusive type of implication, 
in which the primary meaning of a 
word or sentence is abandoned in 
favour of its implied meaning. 
inquiry, especially into the 
meaning of the srpti. 
one who inquires (or desires to) 
literally, "living free"; in 
Advaita, the term is used to 
describe one who retiains the body 
after attaining moksha; such a 
person enjoys a send of freedom 
and fullness in spite of the 
limitations of the body. 
this term literally signifies any 
kind of cognition, without regard 
to the question of truth or error; 
it is generally used, however, to 
designate valid knowledge. 
the one who possess valid 
(esp. 
spiritual) knowledge. 
jnänakända: final sections of the Vedas (viz. 
the Upanishads), seen in Advaita 
as having an independent purport in revealing the knowledge of 
brahma n. 
k ärana: cause or instrument. 
BUT 
karmaj ij nasa: inquiry or investigation into the C on first sections of the Vedas dealing 
with the performance of rituals. 
karmakända: first se 
with the 
actions; 
having a 
from the 
ctions of the Vedas dealing 
performance of ritual 
seen, in Advaita, as 
different aim and result 
jnänakända. 
kshetra: literally, "the field"; this term 
is used in the Bhagavadgita (13: 1 ) 
to refer to the body and, by 
extension, to any object other than 
the dtman. 
kshetrajna: literally, "the knower of the_ 
field"; used in the Bhagavadgita 
(13: 1) to define the ätman, pointing 
out Its nature as the Subject or 
Knower. 
lakshanä: definition; indirect or implied 
umeaning; in the latter sense it 
constitutes an important principle 
of exegesis in Advaita. 
lakshyartha: secondary or implied meaning of a 
ý2- word or sentence. 
mahävdkya: literally, "great sentence"; 
Advaita 
44 holds four such sentences, 
taken 
from the four Vedas, to be especially 
meaningful in positing the identity 
of dtman and brahman; one of the 
best known is "tat tvam asi". 
manana: thinking or reflection; 
in Advaita, 
7Iý it describes the process 
of pondering 
over the meaning of the sruti with 
the 
aid of reason. 
moksha: 
mukhyärtha: 
T 
mumuk shu tv am : 
murtukshu: 
naiyäyika: 
4-1 zi 1121 Cf> 
neti neti: 
nididhyäsana: 
nimitta kärana: 
i-( v"I 
nirguna: 
nirvikalpa: (2f -ff rn 
nishedha: 
! ter °r 
literally, "freedom", generally 
from the cycle of birth and death; 
in Advaita this freedom is 
conceived as being coincident with 
the knowledge of brahman, and 
attainable while living in the body. 
literal or direct meaning of a word 
or sentence; its opposite is 
lakshyärtha. 
the desire for the attainment of 
moksha; one of the preconditions 
for the gain of knowledge in 
Advaita. 
the spiritual aspirant who 
earnestly desires moksha. 
a follower of the Nyäya system of 
Indian philosophy. 
literally, "not this, not this"; 
this Upanishadic statement is seen 
in Advaita as a negative method of 
defining brahman by denying all 
false attributes or specifications. 
contemplation or attentive thinking. 
the intelligent or efficient cause, 
as distinguished_ from the material 
cause (upädana krana). 
devoid of all qualities; the nature 
of brahman in Advaita. 
free from change or differences; 
without modifications. 
prohibitions; applied by Pürva- 
Mimänsd to statements in the Vedas 
instituting restraint from acts 
opposed to dharma, and seen by this 
school as having an independent 
authority. 
.. l LZ 
nitya: changeless or eternal. 
r 
p aram rthika satta: absolute existence or reality, 
Cl- jc{" characteristic, in Advaita, of 
brahman alone. 
p aratah-prämänya-vada: Nyäya doctrine of the extrinsic 
-L4 W iJ ZJ validity of knowledge. 
p aratah-prakäsa-väda: P-urva-Mim-ansd doctrine of the 
- extrinsic luminosity of knowledge; 
one of the important epistemological 
differences of this school with 
Advaita. 
pars vidyä: literally, "higher or supreme 
**T knowledge"; used in Advaita to 
refer to the knowledge of brahman, 
which alone leads to moksha. 
paroksha: literally, "invisible"; used as an 
adjective of h'ana, it signifies 
mediate or indirect knowledge. 
paurusheya: that which is of human nature or 
origin; used as a definition of L4 I pq b/ 24 
% 
the smriti texts to distinguish 
their origin from the f ruti. 
phala: fruit or result; one of the sixfold 
L r criteria used in Advaita 
for 
determining the purport of sruti 
passages; the proposal in a passage 
of a distinct result is seen as 
evidence of its independent 
authoritativeness. 
prams: valid knowledge. 
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pramäna: a source of valid 
knowledge; six 
such sources are accepted in W-L41 U1 Advaita. 
prarnätri: perceiver or cognizer. 
J4 I 
p rameya " an object of 
knowledge. 
ýFý 
..! Z. -1 
p ramiti: a correct notion or cognition; 
knowledge gained by the application 
of a valid pramana. 
prärabdha karma: the results of actions which have 
VF; <ý (EF, given rise to, and are currently 
being experienced in this 
particular birth. 
p rasamkhyäna: reflection, contemplation, meditation. ýoý 
prätibhäsika sättä: illusory existence, such as that 
belonging to a mirage or any optical 
illusion. 
p ratyaksha: perception; one of the six sources 
of valid knowledge in Advaita. 
Purva-Mimansä: school of Vedic exegesis founded 
by Jaimini, and concerned with the 
analysis of the first (pürva) or 
ritualistic section (karmakända) 
of the Vedas. 
pürvapaksha: the first objection to an assertion 
in any discussion; a series of such 
objections are generally proposed by 
Shankara in his commentaries. 
rishi: inspired poet or sage; thought of 
in Hinduism as the ones to whom the 
Vedas were originally revealed. 
sabda: sound or word. 
sabda-pramäna: a means of valid knowledge consisting 
, ýý--ý-r- of words; 
identified, in Advaita, 
with the sruti and posited as one of 
the six sources of knowledge. 
sabda-pramä: knowledge derived from sabda-pramäna. 
ATMr - JTT- 
sädhana-catushtaya: the fourfold 
disciplines proposed in 
flE T Advaita as preparatory 
for the 
successful gain of knowledge from 
the sruti. 
saguna (brahman): with qualities; brahman conceived 
of as Creator of the universe, and 
possessing all good qualities. 
säkshi: Witness; the nature of brahman in ýpTfiF Advaita. 
s amddhi: literally, "putting together"; ýE' 
concentration or meditation; the 
eighth and last stage in the Yoga 
system of Patanjali. 
s amänya jnäna: knowledge of a very general kind, 
4T677 07-c-f - lacking in specificity. 
s amcita karma: the sum total of the results of 
actions done in all previous 
existences, and yet to bear fruit. 
samsära: cycle of successive births and 
k4 1"ý deaths, freedom from which 
constitutes moksha. 
sästra: any manual of teaching or sacred text; 
-T -. T the term 
is often used as a synonym 
for the sruti . 
sat: that which really is; absolute 
existence; the nature of brahman 
in Advaita. 
savikalpa: with modifications or differences; 
, yl 
determinate; the opposite is 
-44 1 Cl C4-- nirvikalpa. 
shadlinga" the sixfold exegetical criteria 
' employed in Advaita for determining 
the purport of the sruti. 
s iddhänta: the established or 
demonstrated 
conclusion of an argument. 
6ishya: student or disciple. 
CTFyir- 
smriti: literally, "memory"; name given 
to the whole body of religious 
texts other than the sruti; s mriti 
texts are subservient to the ' 
authority of the sruti because of 
their human origin. 
sraddhä: faith; faith in the authority of 
the sruti as a source of valid 
knowledge, and in the teacher who 
unfolds its meaning is an important 
prerequisite for the gain of 
knowledge in Advaita. 
s ravana: the act of listening or hearing; 
in Advaita, it signifies the 
acquisition of knowledge by 
listening to the words of the 
sruti as unfolded by the spiritual 
teacher. 
srotriya: one who is well versed in the 
qT meaning of the sruti; a qualification 
of the teacher in Advaita. 
ruti: literally, "that which is heard"; 
synonym for the Vedas, emphasizing 
that they were transmitted orally 
from teacher to student; unlike the 
smriti texts, sruti is posited as 
having a non-human origin. 
sthita-prajna: one who is firm or well-established 
0' in Self-knowledge. 
sushupti avasthd: the state of deep sleep. 
344T 
svapna avasthä: the dream state. 
44 T 3* 2TT 
svarüpa lakshana: a definition which points out 
the 
LI VU essential or intrinsic nature of 
its object. 
svatah-prdmdnya-vdda: Advaita and Pürva-Mimausä 
doctrine 
1 J41 U 24 aT of the self-validity of 
knowledge. 
svatah-prakäsa-vdda: Advaita 
doctrine of the self- 
. o(-Cfý : 9427 RI- 4 14 
luminosity of knowledge. 
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tarka: reason or logic. 
tatastha lakshana: a definition which points out the J ýV- non-essential or accidental 
characteristics of its object. 
t ätparya: purport, intention or meaning of a 
iy scriptural text; in Advaita. this 
is determined by the application of 
the sixfold exegetical criteria, 
on the basis of which they contend 
that the tätparya of the Upanishads 
is the revelation of the non-dual 
brahman. 
upädäna karana: the material cause, as distinguished 
3yß i -, KT from the efficient cause (nimitta 
kärana). 
upädhi: a substitute or anything which may 
3 47-PET- be taken for or has the appearance 
of another thing; in Advaita, the 
term is applied to all qualities and 
characteristics wrongly attributed 
to brahman, but which neither belong 
to, nor limit brahman. 
upakramopasamhärau: the beginning and the end; one of 
the sixfold criteria used in 
Advaita for determining the purport 
of sruti texts; the initial and 
concluding statements of any passage 
are considered to be especially 
important in determining its meaning. 
u palakshana: a non-essential attribute or quality. 
314 
upamäna: comparison; one of the six sources 
- of valid knowledge accepted by 
Advaita. 
upapatti: reasonableness; one of 
the sixfold 
criteria employed in Advaita for 3 determining the meaning of sruti 
passages; the interpretation more 
satisfactory to reason is given 
priority when determining the 
purport of any text. 
u pasanä: the act of sitting or being near 3 at hand; service, homage, adoration, 
worship, meditation. 
Uttara-Mimänsä: literally, "later or higher inquiry"; 
3 term applied to the study of the 
last section of the Vedas (viz. the 
Upanishads or jnänakända) as 
distinguished from inquiry into the 
first section of the Vedas (viz. 
k armakända) dealing with ritual; 
often used as a synonym for the 
system of V eddnta. 
väkya: a sentence or statement. 
Veddnta: literally, "the end of the Vedas"; 
general term applied to the last 
sections of the Vedas (viz. the 
Upanishads, and to all systems of 
thought based on their interpretation. 
V edänta-väkya: sentences of the Upanishads, seen 
-ýý in Advaita as having an independent 
purport in revealing the nature of 
brahman. 
vidhi: injunctions; applied by Pürva-Mimdnsd 
to Vedic statements inculcating the 
performance of acts for the attainment 
of dharma; the Vedas, according to 
this school, are only concerned with 
prescribing acts for the attainment 
of dharma. 
v isesha jnana: knowledge of a specific or detailed 
nature; its opposite is sämänya 
ný ana. 
v ritti: any modification or change occurring 
in the mind. 
v yav ahärika sattä: empirical reality or existence, 
such 
024 as 
that attributed, in Advaita, to 41 
the world; distinguished from the 
absolute reality of brahman and the 
entirely illusory existence of a 
mirage. 
yukti: reason or argument. 
